a number of warnings cropped up in the latest Rust, which
have been cleaned up.
In addition, a definition for a PlatformSpecific syscall has been
added. This is a catch-all for meta-calls that can be experimented
with on a specific platform without having to update the xous API.
Xous API updates necessitate about a hundred files to get their versions
bumped to absorb the new API, and so this is considered to be
a fairly major task.
since the swap update is going to require republishing the
Xous-rs crate, I'm adding a bunch of more descriptive error codes
that I wish Xous could have, and documented the cases in which
they would be used.
This makes it a bit easier to propagate errors up the stack on
more of the calls, at the expense of a more complicated error
type.
A particular edge case was finally reproduced & fixed. The edge
case occurs when a swap is triggered while handling an interrupt,
and an OOM happens during the context switch to/from the interrupt.
The background on this is that the hardware drivers for the swapper,
as well as much of the logical heavy lifting on e.g. what pages to
swap out, live in a userspace process known as xous-swapper.
The userspace process has to run free of interrupts - when you're
OOM'd or trying to swap, interrupts should not happen. The way to
do this in Xous is to run that code inside an interurpt context,
as interrupts are not interruptable.
Thus, the xous swapper userspace consists of two halves: a regular
userspace stub that provides some amount of control/debug over
the swapper, and a handler that gets run in a "pseudo-interrupt"
context.
Like all other interrupts, the handler "borrows" the stack of the currently
running thread - interrupt contexts don't have an explicit stack, they
just grow on top of the current stack of the current thread in the
current process at the time of the interrupt.
This is broken because when you have a swap event inside an interrupt
context, there are conditions where you might not have a stack. What
was in fact happening is that the stack pointer was being orphaned
as being the "exception stack" - which is a temporary location,
only accessible by the kernel, used for storing all the registers
going into and out of exceptions. Since no stack pointer is set up,
the moment the userspace starts to run and spill its registers to
stack, the system trips a "nested swap" event, which leads to a panic
because this is not allowed.
The fix to this is to devote two hard-wired pages, mapped in the
loader, to be the swapper's private stack area. Instead of behaving
like an interrupt and borrowing the caller's stack, the swapper instead
goes back to its hard-wired stack to do all the processing.
This should also improve the performance of swap handling in some
cases because we can now guarantee the stack is always in-memory
and doesn't need to be swapped in during swap processing.
One complication is that the "reserved memory" that the swapper
puts aside in case it *does* need to allocate extra pages during
handling can't be freed at the top of the OOM routine. Thus if
the swapper ends up using new pages, we should expect yet another
crash.
However, in practice, this doesn't seem to happen, because the
cases in which we hit needing a new page are typically related
to cases early on in boot where superpages/new page table entries
are being allocated, or if we're growing the heap that passes
data back and forth between swap and userspace. Because this call
triggers in such a specific condition, I hypothesize that actually
in practice it should generally be able to run without allocations.
One case where maybe it could hit an allocation is if the swapper
hit, for the first time, in an interrupt handler that was swapped
out, and never hit before, and the interrupt handler needed a
superpage to be allocated, thus triggering an allocation request
for a new PTE or two. I think this is probably pretty unlikely, but
if we do hit it, the fix would be to, for the purposes of targets
with "swap" enabled, to mark unmap_memory and map_memory to be
legal syscalls in interrupt contexts. These are normally illegal
because interrupts should always return - and these calls could
potentially fail or block. However, I think in this case it's
a trade-off between "we should be failing if we run out of memory"
and that failure being a potentially incorrect behavior that is guarded
against by a runtime check to discourage such calls.
have to absorb a version change due to xous-semver change
might as well also update the utra/svd generator dependencies
since that's been held off for a long time now.
This enables a couple of things that have been long wanting, including:
- the ability to know what PAGE_SIZE is from a single central define
- the ability to determine where certain virtual memory ranges are
located (useful for the userspace swapper).
Previously these were "hidden" from crates because they were embedded
directly in the kernel implementation module, which is not accessible
as a dependency, thus causing us to e.g. create redundant copies of
the PAGE_SIZE variable. This hopefully makes migrating to a larger
page size in some future version of the OS a bit simpler.
not doing a reformat of the entire project to match
nightly formatting changes, but capturing the published
crates so we can maybe save a version bump later on to get
the project clean.
Cargo changed how it decided to format some comments in one of
our key dependency crates, which is breaking all of our CI checks.
This fixes that. *sigh*.
This SysCall is introduced because not all hardware targets can
afford the luxury of a private TRNG port for the kernel.
In this case, an API is needed to exfiltrate random numbers from
the kernel so we can inspect them and check them for health.
If a TRNG is operating correctly, cherry-picking some values
out of it to QC the operation of the TRNG should be harmless.
Of course, nothing is truly stateless, and there is always a chance
that someone could construct a gadget using this to reduce the
potential state-space of the final random number generator. Therefore,
this API is (a) gated behind a feature flag and (b) any implementation
that plans to expose this should be coded with some countermeasures
to reduce data leakage after sampling.
- make the swapper API fully generic, so we don't have to change
the application ABI as the swapper requirements evolve
- assign the invalid opcode to a fixed number, so it doesn't move
between dissimilar versions.
The kernel must go back to using this target, as the primary target no
longer supports building with `panic = "abort"`.
Signed-off-by: Sean Cross <sean@xobs.io>