Commit graph

13 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
bunnie
81f35b17be add the missing 4 bytes from the public key block
after some discussion with a cryptographer it's just safer to do
this even if it might mean some compatibility issues in the future
2026-01-16 17:25:47 +08:00
bunnie
6eda3925ae update fuse blocks 2026-01-16 00:51:18 +08:00
bunnie
bf721e3b5c
adjust permissions on serial number; make chip init more permissive
It is not clear if I can get the factory to burn the serial number
(wafer lot, ID, x/y location) into the location I want it to be.
So, I am allowing this to be updated by the firmware on boot,
thus necessitating the permissions to be writeable for the serial
number field.

Furthermore, if there is any error in initializing the chip's
identity in the factory, right now the chip goes into a mode
where it has crashed and can't run diagnostic code. Write errors
in this stage are thus turned into .ok() instead of .unwrap()
because we want to allow the chip to go through the whole flow
and then diagnose any issues later on.
2026-01-15 16:58:22 +08:00
bunnie
6635770530 add the rv-only config line for ifr 180 2025-12-11 02:28:54 +08:00
bunnie
a74a87e1ac fix iv for cm7 2025-12-11 02:05:08 +08:00
bunnie
362124127e
add redundant counters, paranoid mode, attack counters
This allocates some additional one way counters dedicated
to hardening:

- Paranoid mode is duplicated in slots 65 & 67
- An attack counter is in slot 66
- Redundant revocation counters are seated in slot 68

The primary revocation counters are in slot 116. This means
that cutting out the revocation counters would probably require
at least two edits to the memory array - simply cutting the
word addressing line for those columns might be enough to
defeat a counter.

Paranoid mode duplicate is stored somewhat close to the
primary counter, which means it could be subject to a single
line cut to fully defeat the counter, but the space is getting
pretty crowded so I'll leave it like that; I really want to
leave the bottom 64 slots available for application use.

A "flag" key is allocated, plus a dummy flag is committed
to the repo. This is a value that, if retrieved, would
ostensibly bring the retriever glory and bounty, to the
extent that any glory or bounty is to be had (ps: I'm poor
and this project is obscure). The actual flag, of course,
is not in the repo...I hope!

The flag value is different from all other values in that
this is the only shared, common secret across all devices.

All other device secrets are generated on a per-device
basis from the TRNGs. So the flag needs some special treatment
such that it's not overwritten during device keying.

The flag exists because I'm hoping that anyone who manages
to extract it will also provide a helpful explanation of
the procedure to get it out, so that the system could be
patched (if the error is patchable) or rev'd in future
silicon. That being said, a flag retrieval is not necessarily
equal to a full break of security across all devices because
as mentioned above, most device secrets are on a per-device
basis. The flag represents then, the amount of effort necessary
to apply to every device to retrieve the secrets within.
2025-12-04 14:56:07 +08:00
bunnie
6af2001810
fix write protect bits
Each write protect bit in the IFR array covers *8* key slots.
This scopes the write protect down to just the 8 slots we care about.
2025-11-13 18:20:12 +08:00
bunnie
cebc87d29a Revert "make acl correct by default for the data region"
This reverts commit 643946a82a.
2025-10-29 00:51:09 +08:00
bunnie
643946a82a
make acl correct by default for the data region 2025-10-28 21:53:33 +08:00
bunnie
1549a87772
update blobs
include artifacts that burn pubkeys and write-protects into
the data array
2025-10-28 03:32:12 +08:00
bunnie
5f7b3d6442
commit more boot blobs
these are burned in at CP and define the accessibility of various
regions in the RRAM
2025-10-27 18:20:58 +08:00
bunnie
72a7ea3a56 add settings for IFR locations 0x280 and 0xc0
Setting these JTAG-only accessible locations will set
write protection on boot0. This effectively makes the public keys
used to establish the boot chain indelible.
2025-10-26 01:31:34 +08:00
bunnie
254780b382 add some artifacts for an early sample run
These are a bit rushed but wanted to be able to have some
serialization/tracking in the earliest samples sent to
'alpha-zero' developers.
2025-10-16 23:21:07 +08:00