update the updater readme

The FPGA gateware region is blocked from trivial readout via USB:
this makes it a tiny bit harder to obtain the gateware image, which
contains the secret keys. This slightly aids users who haven't
burned any efuse keys and are using the default "null" key from
a trivial readout attack, and it also hampers a WBSTAR exploit.

This makes the most convenient path of attack to be loading
a custom xous.img (or otherwise exploiting the kernel) with
a gadget that is capable of reading the gateware region
through priveleged code, and then relaying it over USB through
some run-around of the firewall. This primitive isn't impossible
to create but it doesn't exist and has no use in a normal
operational flow, so, it's going to at least force an attacker
to write some code, as opposed to using off the shelf utilities
we provide.
This commit is contained in:
bunnie 2022-06-29 13:20:52 +08:00
parent 5d874ac0f3
commit f14cce55ff

View file

@ -87,13 +87,13 @@ optional arguments:
-f, --force Ignore gitrev version on SoC and try to burn an image anyways
--bounce cycle the device through a reset
```
You can try reading the first word out of the ROM to see if `usb_update.py` is working correctly.
It's located at 0x20000008, and it's always `0x665599aa` (this is the Xilinx FPGA bitstream sync word),
You can try reading the `csr.csv` descriptor out of the ROM to see if `usb_update.py` is working correctly.
Part of it is located at 0x20277008, and it's always `0x2d2d2d2d` (this is part of a `----` ASCII text header),
as follows:
```
% python3 ./usb_update.py --peek 0x20000008
0x665599aa
% python3 ./usb_update.py --peek 0x20277008
0x2d2d2d2d
```
NB: Trivial readout via USB of the gateware is blocked by the USB core now, for security reasons.