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first cut at xous-names API split-out
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23
api/xous-names/Cargo.toml
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23
api/xous-names/Cargo.toml
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[package]
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authors = ["bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com>"]
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description = "Xous microkernel OS inter-process name resolution server"
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edition = "2018"
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name = "xous-api-names"
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version = "0.9.7"
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license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
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repository = "https://github.com/betrusted-io/xous-core/"
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homepage = "https://betrusted.io/"
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# Dependency versions enforced by Cargo.lock.
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[dependencies]
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num-derive = {version = "0.3.3", default-features = false}
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num-traits = {version = "0.2.14", default-features = false}
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log = "0.4.14"
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log-server = {version = "0.1.3", package = "xous-api-log"}
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xous = "0.9.9"
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xous-ipc = "0.9.9"
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rkyv = {version = "0.4.3", default-features = false, features = ["const_generics"]}
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[features]
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debugprint = []
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default = [] # "debugprint"
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143
api/xous-names/README.md
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143
api/xous-names/README.md
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# Xous API: xous-names
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`xous-names` resolves plaintext server names to 128-bit randomly
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assigned server IDs. It is also the front-line gatekeeper for
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restricting access to services by preventing connections or
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discoverability (or more accurately, discoverability is inherently
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hard because it requires brute-forcing the server ID in a 128-bit
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space of randomly assigned numbers).
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See the [Xous Book](https://betrusted.io/xous-book/ch07-01-xous-names.html) for
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more details. The Xous Book should be considered normative; the specification
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below is historical.
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## Specification
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Server IDs (SIDs) are used by processes to send messages to
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servers. It is thus an attack surface. Furthermore, if a process can
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forge an SID before a server can claim it, it can “become” the
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server. Thus, it’s helpful to keep the SID a secret.
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In Xous, an SID is a 128-bit number that, with two exceptions, is only
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known to the server itself, and an oracle known as `xous-name-server`.
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SIDs are never revealed to a process. Processes establish connections
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to servers using a descriptive, human-readable string name. Since the
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SIDs are random numbers, there is no way to turn the descriptive
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string into the SID except by resolving it with `xous-name-server`.
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On boot, a trusted set of processes are started which form the
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operating system. These must all claim names in the name space before
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any further processes are started, to prevent later processes from
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claiming their names. Servers can also optionally limit the total
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number of connections allowed, which effectively makes them unreachable
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by less trusted code that is run after the core trusted set of processes
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have started up. The `trusted_init_done()` libary call on the name
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server will return true if all the servers that have a connection
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limit have fully populated all of their connections.
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The exception to random SIDs are the `xous-name-server`,
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`xous-log-server ` (note the trailing space), and `ticktimer-server`.
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These are three well known names that have a defined,
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fixed SID so that all processes can talk to them; `xous-name-server` is
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necessarily well-known as it is the mechanism to resolve further
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names, `xous-log-server ` is necessary for debugging, so that bugs upstream
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of name resolution can be logged. `xous-name-server` was picked because
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`name-server` already has a meaning in the context of DNS. `ticktimer-server`
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is necessary for implementing deterministic timing delays in
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`xous-name-server` upon failure, and also for other processes to
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wait a fixed period of time on initialization while the initial set
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of name registrations occur.
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A new process that intends to receive messages uses the `register_name` convenience
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function in the `xous-names/src/lib.rs` file, with the following procedure.
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1. It calls `register_name` with a preferred ASCII name string,
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limited to 64 characters. It also specifies how many connections the server
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will allow. `None` on the specifier means no limit.
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1. `xous-name-server` returns the borrowed memory to the server, where the
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buffer has been replaced with a response field. In the case that the registration
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is affirmed, the SID field in `Registration` contains the assigned SID
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of calling process. In the case that the name is determined to be invalid
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(perhaps because it is already reserved or registered), it will return
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an error code.
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3. If the registration is denied, the server can attempt to
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re-register its SID with a different ASCII name string by repeating
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steps 2-3.
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A process that would like to send a server a message must first request the
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name server to broker a connection to the target process. It does this by
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typically calling the `request_conneciton_blocking` convenience function
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with the registered name of the server.
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1. `request_connection_blocking` is called with the maximum 64-character
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ASCII name string.
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2. The convencience function creates a `Lookup` message which is lent to
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the name server.
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4. `xous-name-server` can respond with one of three results:
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A. affirm the connection by returning a connection ID
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B. a flat denial of the connection; or
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C. a slot containing a request to authenticate.
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Here are the cases worked out:
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A. affirming the connection: `xous-name-server` would use
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`MessageSender.pid()` to extract the sender’s PID, and call
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`ConnectForProcess(PID,SID)` on behalf of the sender. The sender can
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then use the CID as the first argument to `send_message()`. This is
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the common case, and many servers follow this path, such as those
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asking for access to the `ticktimer` or other public services.
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B. flat denial: `xous-name-server` simply returns a message saying the
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request was denied. This is also the case when the request is malformed or incorrect.
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No information shall be leaked about the
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nature of the denial. Denials are also delayed to the nearest 0.1 second interval since boot
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to eliminate side channels and to rate limit fuzzing requests. Some
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services (such as the key server) are restricted to only a set of
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trusted process loaded at boot, and therefore it should not be
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discoverable.
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C. request to authenticate: `xous-name-server` responds with `success` set
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to `false`, but `authenticate_request` to `true`. The `pubkey_id` field
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is populated with the ID of an acceptable Ed25519 public key for authentication, and
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a 256-bit challenge nonce is provided in the `challenge` field. Authentication
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consists of the requesting server proving that it has knowledge of a shared
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secret, namely, an Ed25519 private key.
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Upon generating the request to authenticate, `xous-name-server` computes
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the correct response to the challenge and stores it in a table with
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a timestamp.
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The sending process must then sign the `challenge` and return an
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`Authenticate` message, constructed similarly to the `Lookup`
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message but with the `response_to_challenge` field filled out. It must
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do this before `AUTHENTICATE_TIMEOUT` milliseconds have passed.
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The server, upon receipt of an `Authenticate` message, merely checks
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if the `response_to_challenge` matches any response stored in its
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table, and if it does, it accepts the process as authenticated. It is
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cryptographically unlikely for there to be a collision in the table;
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however, this implementation is weak to an attacker potentially
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stealing the response and using it. That being said, if an attacker
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already has that level of control in the calling process, there
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are bigger problems.
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The `AUTHENTICATE_TIMEOUT` field is used to give `xous-name-server`
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a chance to depopulate the response table over time, so that it
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does not "leak" memory.
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## Current Implementation
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The current implementation is a hash map that matches randomly generated
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names with a list of names each server selects for itself. Currently, any
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request to lookup and connect to a server will succeed up to the limit
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of connections (if any) specified by a server, but the hooks
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are there to enforce permissions and deny connections, and/or request
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authentication for connection.
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Server names are crate-local, and are bound through library functions
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called during the creation of server access objects. In other words,
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there is no global name space for servers.
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239
api/xous-names/src/api.rs
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239
api/xous-names/src/api.rs
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#[allow(dead_code)]
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pub const AUTHENTICATE_TIMEOUT: u32 = 10_000; // time in ms that a process has to respond to an authentication request
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#[derive(num_derive::FromPrimitive, num_derive::ToPrimitive)]
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#[non_exhaustive]
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#[repr(C)]
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pub(crate) enum Opcode {
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/// Create a new server with the given name and return its SID.
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Register = 0,
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/// Create a connection to the target server.
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Lookup = 1,
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/// Create an authenticated connection to the target server.
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AuthenticatedLookup = 2,
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/// unregister a server, given its cryptographically unique SID.
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Unregister = 3,
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/// disconnect, given a server name and a cryptographically unique, one-time use token
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Disconnect = 4,
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/// indicates if all inherentely trusted slots have been occupied. Should not run untrusted code until this is the case.
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TrustedInitDone = 5,
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/// Connect to a Server, blocking if the Server does not exist. When the Server is started,
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/// return with either the CID or an AuthenticationRequest
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///
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/// # Message Types
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///
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/// * MutableLend
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///
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/// # Arguments
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///
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/// The memory being pointed to should be a &str, and the length of the string should
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/// be specified in the `valid` field.
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///
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/// # Return Values
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///
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/// Memory is overwritten to contain a return value. This return value can be defined
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/// as the following enum:
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///
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/// ```rust
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/// #[repr(C)]
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/// #[non_exhaustive]
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/// enum ConnectResult {
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/// Success(xous::CID /* connection ID */, [u32; 4] /* Disconnection token */),
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/// Error(u32 /* error code */),
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/// Unhandled, /* Catchall for future Results */
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/// }
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/// ```
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BlockingConnect = 6,
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}
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#[derive(Debug, rkyv::Archive, rkyv::Serialize, rkyv::Deserialize)]
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#[non_exhaustive]
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#[repr(C)]
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pub(crate) enum Return {
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/// The caller must perform an AuthenticatedLookup using this challenge
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AuthenticateRequest(AuthenticateRequest),
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/// The connection failed for some reason
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Failure,
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/// A server was successfully created with the given SID
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SID([u32; 4]),
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/// A connection was successfully made with the given CID; an optional "disconnect token" is provided
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CID((xous::CID, Option<[u32; 4]>)),
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/// Operation requested was otherwise successful (currently only used by disconnect to ack the disconnect)
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Success,
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}
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#[derive(Debug, rkyv::Archive, rkyv::Serialize, rkyv::Deserialize)]
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pub(crate) struct Registration {
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pub name: xous_ipc::String<64>,
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pub conn_limit: Option<u32>,
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}
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#[derive(Debug, rkyv::Archive, rkyv::Serialize, rkyv::Deserialize)]
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pub(crate) struct Disconnect {
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pub name: xous_ipc::String<64>,
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pub token: [u32; 4],
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}
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#[derive(Debug, rkyv::Archive, rkyv::Serialize, rkyv::Deserialize)]
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pub(crate) struct AuthenticatedLookup {
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pub name: xous_ipc::String<64>,
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pub pubkey_id: [u8; 20], // 160-bit pubkey ID encoded in network order (big endian)
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pub response: [u32; 8],
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}
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#[derive(Debug, rkyv::Archive, rkyv::Serialize, rkyv::Deserialize)]
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#[repr(C)]
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pub(crate) struct AuthenticateRequest {
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pub name: xous_ipc::String<64>, // a copy of the originally requested lookup
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pub pubkey_id: [u8; 20], // 160-bit pubkey ID encoded in network order (big endian)
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pub challenge: [u32; 4],
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}
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//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
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// We keep XousServerName around because want to be able to index off the server name, without
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// burdening the Kernel String type with the Hash32 methods
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//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
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// --------------------- Taken from rkyv docs https://docs.rs/rkyv/0.3.0/rkyv/trait.Archive.html //
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#[derive(Debug, Copy, Clone)]
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pub struct XousServerName {
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value: [u8; 64],
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length: usize,
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}
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impl Default for XousServerName {
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fn default() -> Self {
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XousServerName {
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value: [0u8; 64],
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length: 0,
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}
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}
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}
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#[allow(dead_code)]
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impl XousServerName {
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pub fn to_str(&self) -> &str {
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core::str::from_utf8(unsafe {
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core::slice::from_raw_parts(self.value.as_ptr(), self.length as usize)
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})
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.unwrap()
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}
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pub fn new() -> XousServerName {
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XousServerName {
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value: [0; 64],
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length: 0,
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}
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}
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pub fn from_str(src: &str) -> XousServerName {
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let mut s = Self::new();
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// Copy the string into our backing store.
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for (&src_byte, dest_byte) in src.as_bytes().iter().zip(&mut s.value) {
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*dest_byte = src_byte;
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}
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// Set the string length to the length of the passed-in String,
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// or the maximum possible length. Which ever is smaller.
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s.length = s.value.len().min(src.as_bytes().len());
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// If the string is not valid, set its length to 0.
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if s.as_str().is_err() {
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s.length = 0;
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}
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assert!(s.length < s.value.len(), "incorrect length derivation!");
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s
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}
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pub fn as_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 64] {
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self.value
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}
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pub fn as_str(&self) -> core::result::Result<&str, core::str::Utf8Error> {
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core::str::from_utf8(&self.value[0..self.length as usize])
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}
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pub fn len(&self) -> usize {
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self.length as usize
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}
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pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
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self.length == 0
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}
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/// Clear the contents and set the length to 0
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pub fn clear(&mut self) {
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self.length = 0;
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self.value = [0; 64];
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}
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}
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// Allow using the `write!()` macro to write into a `&XousServerName`
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impl core::fmt::Write for XousServerName {
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fn write_str(&mut self, s: &str) -> core::result::Result<(), core::fmt::Error> {
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self.length = 0;
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let b = s.bytes();
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// Ensure the length is acceptable
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if b.len() > self.value.len() {
|
||||
Err(core::fmt::Error)?;
|
||||
}
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self.length = b.len();
|
||||
assert!(
|
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self.length < self.value.len(),
|
||||
"incorrect length derivation!"
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// Copy the string into this variable
|
||||
for (dest, src) in self.value.iter_mut().zip(s.bytes()) {
|
||||
*dest = src;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Attempt to convert the string to UTF-8 to validate it's correct UTF-8
|
||||
core::str::from_utf8(unsafe {
|
||||
core::slice::from_raw_parts(self.value.as_ptr(), self.length as usize)
|
||||
})
|
||||
.map_err(|_| core::fmt::Error)?;
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl std::hash::Hash for XousServerName {
|
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fn hash<H>(&self, state: &mut H)
|
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where
|
||||
H: std::hash::Hasher,
|
||||
{
|
||||
assert!(self.length < self.value.len(), "incorret length on hash!");
|
||||
std::hash::Hash::hash(&self.value[..self.length as usize], state);
|
||||
std::hash::Hash::hash(&self.length, state)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl PartialEq for XousServerName {
|
||||
fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
|
||||
assert!(self.length < self.value.len(), "incorret length on Eq!");
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
other.length < other.value.len(),
|
||||
"incorrect length on Eq (other)!"
|
||||
);
|
||||
self.value[..self.length as usize] == other.value[..other.length as usize]
|
||||
&& self.length == other.length
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl Eq for XousServerName {}
|
||||
|
||||
impl core::fmt::Display for XousServerName {
|
||||
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> core::fmt::Result {
|
||||
write!(f, "{}", self.to_str())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
184
api/xous-names/src/lib.rs
Normal file
184
api/xous-names/src/lib.rs
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
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#![cfg_attr(target_os = "none", no_std)]
|
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|
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//! Detailed docs are parked under Structs/XousNames down below
|
||||
|
||||
pub mod api;
|
||||
|
||||
use api::Disconnect;
|
||||
use core::fmt::Write;
|
||||
use num_traits::ToPrimitive;
|
||||
use xous_ipc::{Buffer, String};
|
||||
|
||||
#[doc = include_str!("../README.md")]
|
||||
#[derive(Debug)]
|
||||
pub struct XousNames {
|
||||
conn: xous::CID,
|
||||
}
|
||||
impl XousNames {
|
||||
pub fn new() -> Result<Self, xous::Error> {
|
||||
REFCOUNT.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
|
||||
let conn = xous::connect(xous::SID::from_bytes(b"xous-name-server").unwrap())
|
||||
.expect("Couldn't connect to XousNames");
|
||||
Ok(XousNames { conn })
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn unregister_server(&self, sid: xous::SID) -> Result<(), xous::Error> {
|
||||
// searches the name table and removes a given SID from the table.
|
||||
// It's considered "secure" because you'd have to guess a random 128-bit SID
|
||||
// to destroy someone else's SID.
|
||||
|
||||
// note that with the current implementation, the destroy call will have to be an O(N) search through
|
||||
// the server table, but this is OK as we expect <100 servers on a device
|
||||
let s = sid.to_array();
|
||||
let response = xous::send_message(
|
||||
self.conn,
|
||||
xous::Message::new_blocking_scalar(
|
||||
api::Opcode::Unregister.to_usize().unwrap(),
|
||||
s[0] as usize,
|
||||
s[1] as usize,
|
||||
s[2] as usize,
|
||||
s[3] as usize,
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
.expect("unregistration failed");
|
||||
if let xous::Result::Scalar1(result) = response {
|
||||
if result != 0 {
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Err(xous::Error::ServerNotFound)
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Err(xous::Error::InternalError)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn register_name(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
name: &str,
|
||||
max_conns: Option<u32>,
|
||||
) -> Result<xous::SID, xous::Error> {
|
||||
let mut registration = api::Registration {
|
||||
name: String::<64>::new(),
|
||||
conn_limit: max_conns,
|
||||
};
|
||||
// could also do String::from_str() but in this case we want things to fail if the string is too long.
|
||||
write!(registration.name, "{}", name).expect("name probably too long");
|
||||
|
||||
let mut buf = Buffer::into_buf(registration).or(Err(xous::Error::InternalError))?;
|
||||
|
||||
buf.lend_mut(self.conn, api::Opcode::Register.to_u32().unwrap())
|
||||
.or(Err(xous::Error::InternalError))?;
|
||||
|
||||
match buf.to_original().unwrap() {
|
||||
api::Return::SID(sid_raw) => {
|
||||
let sid = sid_raw.into();
|
||||
xous::create_server_with_sid(sid).expect("can't auto-register server");
|
||||
Ok(sid)
|
||||
}
|
||||
api::Return::Failure => Err(xous::Error::InternalError),
|
||||
_ => unimplemented!("unimplemented return codes"),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn request_connection_with_token(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
name: &str,
|
||||
) -> Result<(xous::CID, Option<[u32; 4]>), xous::Error> {
|
||||
let mut lookup_name = xous_ipc::String::<64>::new();
|
||||
write!(lookup_name, "{}", name).expect("name problably too long");
|
||||
let mut buf = Buffer::into_buf(lookup_name).or(Err(xous::Error::InternalError))?;
|
||||
|
||||
buf.lend_mut(self.conn, api::Opcode::Lookup.to_u32().unwrap())
|
||||
.or(Err(xous::Error::InternalError))?;
|
||||
|
||||
match buf.to_original().unwrap() {
|
||||
api::Return::CID((cid, token)) => Ok((cid, token)),
|
||||
// api::Return::AuthenticateRequest(_) => Err(xous::Error::AccessDenied),
|
||||
_ => Err(xous::Error::ServerNotFound),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
pub fn disconnect_with_token(&self, name: &str, token: [u32; 4]) -> Result<(), xous::Error> {
|
||||
let disconnect = Disconnect {
|
||||
name: String::<64>::from_str(name),
|
||||
token,
|
||||
};
|
||||
let mut buf = Buffer::into_buf(disconnect).or(Err(xous::Error::InternalError))?;
|
||||
buf.lend_mut(self.conn, api::Opcode::Disconnect.to_u32().unwrap())
|
||||
.or(Err(xous::Error::InternalError))?;
|
||||
|
||||
match buf.to_original().unwrap() {
|
||||
api::Return::Success => Ok(()),
|
||||
_ => Err(xous::Error::ServerNotFound),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn request_connection(&self, name: &str) -> Result<xous::CID, xous::Error> {
|
||||
let mut lookup_name = xous_ipc::String::<64>::new();
|
||||
write!(lookup_name, "{}", name).expect("name problably too long");
|
||||
|
||||
let mut buf = Buffer::into_buf(lookup_name).or(Err(xous::Error::InternalError))?;
|
||||
|
||||
buf.lend_mut(self.conn, api::Opcode::Lookup.to_u32().unwrap())
|
||||
.or(Err(xous::Error::InternalError))?;
|
||||
|
||||
match buf.to_original().unwrap() {
|
||||
api::Return::CID((cid, _)) => Ok(cid),
|
||||
// api::Return::AuthenticateRequest(_) => Err(xous::Error::AccessDenied),
|
||||
_ => Err(xous::Error::ServerNotFound),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// note: you probably want to use this one, to avoid synchronization issues on startup as servers register asynhcronously
|
||||
pub fn request_connection_blocking(&self, name: &str) -> Result<xous::CID, xous::Error> {
|
||||
loop {
|
||||
match self.request_connection(name) {
|
||||
Ok(val) => return Ok(val),
|
||||
Err(xous::Error::AccessDenied) => return Err(xous::Error::AccessDenied),
|
||||
_ => (),
|
||||
}
|
||||
log::info!("connection to {} could not be established, retrying", name);
|
||||
xous::yield_slice();
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn trusted_init_done(&self) -> Result<bool, xous::Error> {
|
||||
let response = xous::send_message(
|
||||
self.conn,
|
||||
xous::Message::new_blocking_scalar(
|
||||
api::Opcode::TrustedInitDone.to_usize().unwrap(),
|
||||
0,
|
||||
0,
|
||||
0,
|
||||
0,
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
.expect("couldn't query trusted_init_done");
|
||||
if let xous::Result::Scalar1(result) = response {
|
||||
if result == 1 {
|
||||
Ok(true)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Ok(false)
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Err(xous::Error::InternalError)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// todo:
|
||||
// pub fn authenticated_connection(&self, name: &str, key: Authkey)
|
||||
// this function will create an authenticated connection, if such are allowed
|
||||
// it's intended for use by dynamically-loaded third-party apps. As of Xous 0.8 this isn't supported, so it's just a "todo"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicU32, Ordering};
|
||||
static REFCOUNT: AtomicU32 = AtomicU32::new(0);
|
||||
impl Drop for XousNames {
|
||||
fn drop(&mut self) {
|
||||
// de-allocate myself. It's unsafe because we are responsible to make sure nobody else is using the connection.
|
||||
if REFCOUNT.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::Relaxed) == 1 {
|
||||
unsafe {
|
||||
xous::disconnect(self.conn).unwrap();
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue