change boot1 default behavior

The motivation for this is to make the tester configuration
exactly identical to that used in production. Right now a
"cheater" step is used to set the board type to dabao and
enable boot waiting because in the test environment there
isn't a physical switch anyone can press to invoke that
behavior.

So, in order to get the test environment to work just like
production, the behavior goes from insta-die if no valid
image is found on the next stage, to "wait for new image".
This is slightly less secure of a default, but only slightly
so. Basically the previous scheme required someone to be
physically present to press the "give me a new image" button,
this one causes the system to automatically accept a new image.
I suppose the main downside is this does allow the possibility
of say, a fully remote, automated exploit to be delivered
if an adversary can damage the loader image such that it
doesn't pass signature check and then it will automatically
go into a mode looking for a new image, at which point
an arbitrary image could be potentially loaded (although
because the image would need to be signed, and there is
a trap that destroys secrets if a developer image is
presented, it wouldn't instantly lead to secret disclosure,
but it would be a denial of service).

The flip side is that with the paranoid default, developers
are "confused" by the silent failure of a brand new chip that
has no code loaded in it (because it goes catatonic until
the developer knows to press the load button).

The loader image is protected from writes after boot, so
in theory there isn't a direct path to "spoil" the loader
image and trigger this path, so it's not like we're just
hanging in the wind. It just means that there isn't a
full human-presence requirement as a defense in depth against
a potential denial of service if an adversary could find
a way to spoil the loader image.

If the DoS path is a concern, one option is to configure
the system such that the developer key is revoked. This
would disallow that from being recognized as a valid
image, and would also prevent the DoS from happening,
as it would require the adversary to present a valid,
signed image which presumably they can't as long as
the signing keys are kept safe.
This commit is contained in:
bunnie 2025-10-27 18:22:00 +08:00
parent 5f7b3d6442
commit e6bef77b5f
No known key found for this signature in database
4 changed files with 26 additions and 12 deletions

View file

@ -25,9 +25,9 @@ use platform::*;
use utralib::*;
use ux_api::minigfx::{DrawStyle, FrameBuffer, Point, Rectangle};
use crate::delay;
use crate::platform::usb::glue;
use crate::secboot::boot_or_die;
use crate::{delay, platform::irq::disable_all_irqs};
use crate::secboot::try_boot;
// Notes:
// - "Towards" - not a release yet, but working towards the stated milestone
@ -104,9 +104,9 @@ pub unsafe extern "C" fn rust_entry() -> ! {
let boot_wait = one_way.get_decoded::<BootWaitCoding>().expect("internal error");
if boot_wait == BootWaitCoding::Disable && current_key.is_none() {
disable_all_irqs();
// this should diverge, rest of code is not run
boot_or_die();
// diverges if there is code to run
try_boot(false);
// or_die == false means the rest of this gets run if there is no valid image
}
if boot_wait == BootWaitCoding::Enable {
@ -291,9 +291,9 @@ pub unsafe extern "C" fn rust_entry() -> ! {
}
});
disable_all_irqs();
// when we get to this point, there's only two options...
crate::secboot::boot_or_die();
try_boot(true);
unreachable!("`or_die = true` means this should be unreachable");
}
pub fn marquee(sh1107: &mut Oled128x128, msg: &str) {

View file

@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ impl Repl {
rcurst.wo(utra::sysctrl::SFR_RCURST0, 0x55AA);
}
"boot" => {
crate::secboot::boot_or_die();
crate::secboot::try_boot(true);
}
"uf2" => {
use base64::{Engine as _, engine::general_purpose};

View file

@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ fn seal_boot1_keys() {
cu.protect();
}
pub fn boot_or_die() -> ! {
pub fn try_boot(or_die: bool) {
// loader is at the same offset as baremetal. Accept either as valid boot.
// This diverges if the signature check is successful
match bao1x_hal::sigcheck::validate_image(
@ -39,6 +39,10 @@ pub fn boot_or_die() -> ! {
k,
core::str::from_utf8(&tag).unwrap_or("invalid tag")
);
// disable IRQs in preparation for next phase
crate::platform::irq::disable_all_irqs();
// the tag is from signed, trusted data
// k is just a nominal slot number. If either match, assume we are dealing with a
// developer image.
@ -56,6 +60,8 @@ pub fn boot_or_die() -> ! {
}
Err(e) => crate::println!("Image did not validate: {:?}", e),
}
crate::println!("No valid loader or baremetal image found. Halting!");
bao1x_hal::sigcheck::die_no_std();
if or_die {
crate::println!("No valid loader or baremetal image found. Halting!");
bao1x_hal::sigcheck::die_no_std();
}
}

View file

@ -76,8 +76,8 @@ encode_oneway! {
encode_oneway! {
#[offset = 81]
pub enum BoardTypeCoding {
Baosec,
Dabao,
Baosec,
Oem,
}
}
@ -151,6 +151,14 @@ pub const IFR_HASH: SlotIndex = SlotIndex::Data(2, PartitionAccess::All, RwPerms
/// during CP.
pub const CP_ID: SlotIndex = SlotIndex::Data(3, PartitionAccess::All, RwPerms::ReadOnly);
/// Indelible versions of the public keys. The problem with the pubkeys in boot0 region is that
/// boot0 itself has the ability to modify its own memory. A copy here can have a bit set in
/// the IFR that blocks any attempt to modify these keys.
pub const BAO1_PUBKEY: SlotIndex = SlotIndex::Data(4, PartitionAccess::All, RwPerms::ReadOnly);
pub const BAO2_PUBKEY: SlotIndex = SlotIndex::Data(5, PartitionAccess::All, RwPerms::ReadOnly);
pub const BETA_PUBKEY: SlotIndex = SlotIndex::Data(6, PartitionAccess::All, RwPerms::ReadOnly);
pub const DEV_PUBKEY: SlotIndex = SlotIndex::Data(7, PartitionAccess::All, RwPerms::ReadOnly);
// Notes on defining the boot0 IFR region.
// RISC-V boot0 region start is defined by IFR slot 6, bits [55:48]
// RISC-V boot1 region start (which is boot0 end) is defined by IFR slot 6, bits[47:40]