create the backup side of the flow

This commit is contained in:
bunnie 2022-07-12 04:50:03 +08:00
parent 09e1b99315
commit bfb93269f3
5 changed files with 213 additions and 10 deletions

View file

@ -1,4 +1,52 @@
{
"rootkeys.backup_key": {
"en": "This is your backup key:\nWRITE IT DOWN, KEEP IT SECRET.",
"ja": "これがバックアップキーです:\n書き留めて、秘密にしてください。",
"zh": "这是您的备份密钥:\n写下来,保密。",
"en-tts": "This is your backup key:\nWRITE IT DOWN, KEEP IT SECRET."
},
"rootkeys.backup_verify": {
"en": "Would you like to verify that you wrote the backup key down correctly by re-entering it now?",
"ja": "今すぐ再入力して、バックアップキーを正しく書き留めたことを確認しますか?",
"zh": "您想通过现在重新输入来验证您是否正确记下了备份密钥吗?",
"en-tts": "Would you like to verify that you wrote the backup key down correctly by re-entering it now?"
},
"rootkeys.backup_badpass": {
"en": "Password incorrect. Aborting backup!",
"ja": "正しくないパスワード。 バックアップを中止します!",
"zh": "密码错误。 中止备份!",
"en-tts": "Password incorrect. Aborting backup!"
},
"rootkeys.backup_key_enter": {
"en": "Please enter your backup key now:",
"ja": "今すぐバックアップキーを入力してください:",
"zh": "请立即输入您的备份密钥:",
"en-tts": "Please enter your backup key now:"
},
"rootkeys.backup_key_match": {
"en": "Backup key entered correctly!",
"ja": "バックアップキーが正しく入力されました!",
"zh": "备份密钥输入正确!",
"en-tts": "Backup key entered correctly!"
},
"rootkeys.backup_key_mismatch": {
"en": "Backup key did not match.\n\nThis is your backup key, again:",
"ja": "バックアップキーが一致しませんでした。\n\nこれもバックアップキーです:",
"zh": "备份密钥不匹配。\n\n这是您的备份密钥,再次:",
"en-tts": "Backup key did not match. This is your backup key, again:"
},
"rootkeys.backup_staged": {
"en": "Backup data is prepared. You may now connect to a host computer and download the backup data bundle.",
"ja": "バックアップデータを用意します。 これで、ホストコンピューターに接続して、バックアップデータバンドルをダウンロードできます。",
"zh": "备份数据已准备好。 您现在可以连接到主机并下载备份数据包。",
"en-tts": "Backup data is prepared. You may now connect to a host computer and download the backup data bundle."
},
"rootkeys.backup_staging_error": {
"en": "Internal error performing backup. Process aborted.",
"ja": "バックアップの実行中に内部エラーが発生しました。 プロセスが中止されました。",
"zh": "执行备份的内部错误。 进程中止。",
"en-tts": "Internal error performing backup. Process aborted."
},
"rootkeys.bootpass": {
"en": "Create a PIN code for device unlock.",
"ja": "デバイスのロックを解除するためのPINコードを作成します。",

View file

@ -11,13 +11,19 @@ const BACKUP_AAD: &'static str = "PDDB backup v0.1.0";
#[derive(Zeroize, Default)]
#[zeroize(drop)]
pub(crate) struct BackupKey([u8;32]);
pub(crate) struct BackupKey(pub [u8;32]);
#[derive(Zeroize)]
#[zeroize(drop)]
pub(crate) struct KeyRomExport([u32; 256]);
pub(crate) struct KeyRomExport(pub [u32; 256]);
impl Default for KeyRomExport {
fn default() -> Self {
KeyRomExport([0u32; 256])
}
}
#[repr(u32)]
#[derive(Copy, Clone)]
pub enum BackupOp {
/// backup and restore can be manipulated by the OS without updating the ciphertext
Backup,
@ -27,6 +33,7 @@ pub enum BackupOp {
}
#[repr(C, align(8))]
#[derive(Copy, Clone)]
pub struct BackupHeader {
pub version: u32,
// the `ver`s are all serialized SemVers. To be done by the caller.

View file

@ -2344,4 +2344,96 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
None
}
}
pub fn get_backup_key(&mut self) -> Option<(backups::BackupKey, backups::KeyRomExport)> {
// make sure the system is sane
self.xous_init_interlock();
// derive signing key
let pcache: &mut PasswordCache = unsafe{&mut *(self.pass_cache.as_mut_ptr() as *mut PasswordCache)};
if pcache.hashed_update_pw_valid == 0 {
self.purge_password(PasswordType::Update);
log::error!("no password was set going into the update routine");
#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]
log::debug!("key: {:x?}", pcache.hashed_update_pw);
log::debug!("valid: {}", pcache.hashed_update_pw_valid);
return None;
}
let mut keypair_bytes: [u8; ed25519_dalek::KEYPAIR_LENGTH] = [0; ed25519_dalek::KEYPAIR_LENGTH];
let enc_signing_key = self.read_key_256(KeyRomLocs::SELFSIGN_PRIVKEY);
for (key, (&enc_key, &pw)) in
keypair_bytes[..ed25519_dalek::SECRET_KEY_LENGTH].iter_mut()
.zip(enc_signing_key.iter().zip(pcache.hashed_update_pw.iter())) {
*key = enc_key ^ pw;
}
self.compute_key_rollback(&mut keypair_bytes[..ed25519_dalek::SECRET_KEY_LENGTH]);
#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]
log::debug!("keypair privkey (after anti-rollback): {:x?}", &keypair_bytes[..ed25519_dalek::SECRET_KEY_LENGTH]);
for (key, &src) in keypair_bytes[ed25519_dalek::SECRET_KEY_LENGTH..].iter_mut()
.zip(self.read_key_256(KeyRomLocs::SELFSIGN_PUBKEY).iter()) {
*key = src;
}
// Keypair zeroizes the secret key on drop.
let keypair = Keypair::from_bytes(&keypair_bytes).ok()?;
#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]
log::debug!("keypair privkey (after anti-rollback + conversion): {:x?}", keypair.secret.to_bytes());
// check if the keypair is valid by signing and verifying a short message
let test_data = "whiskey made me do it";
let test_sig = keypair.sign(test_data.as_bytes());
match keypair.verify(&test_data.as_bytes(), &test_sig) {
Ok(_) => {
for (&src, dst) in self.read_key_256(KeyRomLocs::FPGA_KEY).iter().zip(pcache.fpga_key.iter_mut()) {
*dst = src;
}
log::debug!("fpga key (encrypted): {:x?}", &pcache.fpga_key);
for (fkey, &pw) in pcache.fpga_key.iter_mut().zip(pcache.hashed_update_pw.iter()) {
*fkey = *fkey ^ pw;
}
pcache.fpga_key_valid = 1;
// copy the plaintext FPGA key into the backup key structure, which implements the zeroize trait.
let mut bkey = backups::BackupKey::default();
bkey.0.copy_from_slice(&pcache.fpga_key);
// copy the key rom into the backup keyrom structure, which implements the zeroize trait.
let mut backup_rom = backups::KeyRomExport::default();
for i in 0..256 {
self.keyrom.wfo(utra::keyrom::ADDRESS_ADDRESS, i);
backup_rom.0[i as usize] = self.keyrom.rf(utra::keyrom::DATA_DATA);
}
// we're done with the password now, clear all the temps
self.purge_password(PasswordType::Update);
for b in keypair_bytes.iter_mut() {
*b = 0;
}
self.purge_sensitive_data();
Some((bkey, backup_rom))
},
Err(e) => {
log::warn!("update password was not connect ({:?})", e);
self.purge_password(PasswordType::Update);
for b in keypair_bytes.iter_mut() {
*b = 0;
}
None
}
}
}
pub fn write_backup(&mut self, mut header: backups::BackupHeader, backup_ct: backups::BackupDataCt) -> Result<(), xous::Error> {
header.op = backups::BackupOp::Backup; // set the "we're backing up" flag
self.spinor.patch(
self.kernel(),
self.kernel_base(),
header.as_ref(),
xous::BACKUP_OFFSET
).map_err(|_| xous::Error::InternalError)?;
self.spinor.patch(
self.kernel(),
self.kernel_base(),
backup_ct.as_ref(),
xous::BACKUP_OFFSET + size_of::<backups::BackupHeader>() as u32
).map_err(|_| xous::Error::InternalError)?;
Ok(())
}
}

View file

@ -102,11 +102,13 @@ impl RootKeys {
).expect("couldn't send message to root keys");
}
pub fn do_create_backup_ux_flow(&self) {
send_message(self.conn,
Message::new_scalar(Opcode::CreateBackup.to_usize().unwrap(),
0, 0, 0, 0)
).expect("couldn't send message to root keys");
pub fn do_create_backup_ux_flow(&self, metadata: backups::BackupHeader) {
let mut alloc = BackupHeaderIpc::default();
let mut data = [0u8; core::mem::size_of::<backups::BackupHeader>()];
data.copy_from_slice(metadata.as_ref());
alloc.data = Some(data);
let mut buf = Buffer::into_buf(alloc).unwrap();
buf.send(self.conn, Opcode::CreateBackup.to_u32().unwrap()).unwrap();
}
pub fn do_restore_backup_ux_flow(&self) {
send_message(self.conn,

View file

@ -434,6 +434,7 @@ fn main() -> ! {
let mut reboot_initiated = false;
let mut aes_sender: Option<xous::MessageSender> = None;
let mut backup_header: Option<backups::BackupHeader> = None;
loop {
let mut msg = xous::receive_message(keys_sid).unwrap();
log::debug!("message: {:?}", msg);
@ -1201,7 +1202,7 @@ fn main() -> ! {
keys.set_prompt_for_update(if state == 1 {true} else {false});
}),
Some(Opcode::ShouldRestore) => {
let mut buf = unsafe { Buffer::from_memory_message(msg.body.memory_message().unwrap()) };
let mut buf = unsafe { Buffer::from_memory_message_mut(msg.body.memory_message_mut().unwrap()) };
let maybe_header = keys.read_backup_header();
let mut ret = BackupHeaderIpc::default();
if let Some(header) = maybe_header {
@ -1212,6 +1213,16 @@ fn main() -> ! {
buf.replace(ret).unwrap();
}
Some(Opcode::CreateBackup) => {
let buf = unsafe { Buffer::from_memory_message(msg.body.memory_message().unwrap()) };
let ipc = buf.to_original::<BackupHeaderIpc, _>().unwrap();
if let Some(d) = ipc.data {
let mut header = backups::BackupHeader::default();
header.as_mut().copy_from_slice(&d);
backup_header = Some(header);
} else {
log::error!("Create backup was called, but no header data was provided");
continue;
}
keys.set_ux_password_type(Some(PasswordType::Update));
password_action.set_action_opcode(Opcode::UxCreateBackupPwReturn.to_u32().unwrap());
rootkeys_modal.modify(
@ -1224,7 +1235,7 @@ fn main() -> ! {
log::info!("{}ROOTKEY.UPDPW,{}", xous::BOOKEND_START, xous::BOOKEND_END);
rootkeys_modal.activate();
}
Some(Opcode::UxUpdateGwPasswordReturn) => {
Some(Opcode::UxCreateBackupPwReturn) => {
let mut buf = unsafe { Buffer::from_memory_message(msg.body.memory_message().unwrap()) };
let plaintext_pw = buf.to_original::<gam::modal::TextEntryPayloads, _>().unwrap();
@ -1234,7 +1245,50 @@ fn main() -> ! {
keys.set_ux_password_type(None);
// check if the entered password is valid.
if let Some((fpga_key, keyrom)) = keys.get_backup_key() {
// this gets shown in an "insecure" modal but -- we're expatriating this data anyways, so meh?
modals.show_bip39(Some(t!("rootkeys.backup_key", xous::LANG)), &fpga_key.0.to_vec()).ok();
// let the user confirm the key, or skip it. YOLO!
loop {
modals.add_list_item(t!("rootkeys.confirm.yes", xous::LANG)).expect("modals error");
modals.add_list_item(t!("rootkeys.confirm.no", xous::LANG)).expect("modals error");
log::info!("{}ROOTKEY.CONFIRM,{}", xous::BOOKEND_START, xous::BOOKEND_END);
match modals.get_radiobutton(t!("rootkeys.backup_verify", xous::LANG)) {
Ok(response) => {
if response == t!("rootkeys.confirm.yes", xous::LANG) {
match modals.input_bip39(Some(t!("rootkeys.backup_key_enter", xous::LANG))) {
Ok(verify) => {
if &verify == &fpga_key.0 {
modals.show_notification(t!("rootkeys.backup_key_match", xous::LANG), None).ok();
} else {
modals.show_bip39(Some(t!("rootkeys.backup_key_mismatch", xous::LANG)), &fpga_key.0.to_vec()).ok();
}
}
_ => {
modals.show_bip39(Some(t!("rootkeys.backup_key_mismatch", xous::LANG)), &fpga_key.0.to_vec()).ok();
}
}
} else {
break;
}
}
_ => break,
}
}
// now write out the backup
let backup_ct = backups::create_backup(fpga_key, backup_header.unwrap(), keyrom);
// this final statement has a take/unwrap to set backup_header back to None
match keys.write_backup(backup_header.take().unwrap(), backup_ct) {
Ok(_) => {
modals.show_notification(t!("rootkeys.backup_staged", xous::LANG), None).ok();
}
Err(_) => {
modals.show_notification(t!("rootkeys.backup_staging_error", xous::LANG), None).ok();
}
}
} else {
modals.show_notification(t!("rootkeys.backup_badpass", xous::LANG), None).ok();
}
}
Some(Opcode::TestUx) => msg_blocking_scalar_unpack!(msg, _arg, _, _, _, {
// dummy test for now