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https://github.com/saymrwulf/xous-core.git
synced 2026-11-15 08:30:02 +00:00
add SPIM optional target for signature checking
this allows us to check the signature on stuff in off-chip swap memory through the SPI interface.
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1 changed files with 38 additions and 9 deletions
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@ -4,8 +4,10 @@ use alloc::string::String;
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use bao1x_api::signatures::*;
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use digest::Digest;
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use sha2_bao1x::Sha512;
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use xous::arch::PAGE_SIZE;
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use crate::acram::OneWayCounter;
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use crate::udma::Spim;
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/// Current draw @ 200MHz CPU ACLK (400MHz FCLK), VDD85 = 0.80V nom (measured @0.797V): ~71mA peak @ 27C,
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/// measured on VDD33 (LDO path places strict upper bounds on IDD85). Target: < 100mA under all PVT.
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@ -17,7 +19,8 @@ use crate::acram::OneWayCounter;
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/// IDD85 > 100mA. Thus we can't boot at max speed config, as not all system configurations have the
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/// external regulator. So, we have to work at reduced VDD/frequency and make sure this constraint is met.
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///
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/// `img_offset` is a pointer to untrusted image data
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/// `img_offset` is a pointer to untrusted image data. It's assumed that the 0-offset of the pointer is
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/// a `SignatureInFlash` structure.
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///
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/// `pubkeys_offset` is a pointer to trusted public key data. Because 'pubkeys_offset` is assumed to be
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/// trusted minimal validation is done on this pointer. It's important that the caller has vetted this
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@ -38,18 +41,24 @@ pub fn validate_image(
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revocation_offset: usize,
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function_codes: &[u32],
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auto_jump: bool,
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mut spim: Option<&mut Spim>,
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) -> Result<usize, String> {
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// conjure the signature struct directly out of memory. super unsafe.
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let sig_ptr = img_offset as *const SignatureInFlash;
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let sig: &SignatureInFlash = unsafe { sig_ptr.as_ref().unwrap() };
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crate::println!("validate_image");
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// Copy the signature into a structure so we can unpack it.
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let mut sig = SignatureInFlash::default();
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if let Some(ref mut spim) = spim {
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spim.mem_read(img_offset as u32, sig.as_mut(), false);
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} else {
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// safety: `u8` can represent all values within the pointer.
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let sig_slice =
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unsafe { core::slice::from_raw_parts(img_offset as *const u8, size_of::<SignatureInFlash>()) };
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sig.as_mut().copy_from_slice(sig_slice);
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};
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let pubkey_ptr = pubkeys_offset as *const SignatureInFlash;
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let pk_src: &SignatureInFlash = unsafe { pubkey_ptr.as_ref().unwrap() };
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let signed_len = sig.sealed_data.signed_len;
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let image: &[u8] = unsafe {
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core::slice::from_raw_parts((img_offset as usize + UNSIGNED_LEN) as *const u8, signed_len as usize)
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};
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if sig.sealed_data.version != BAOCHIP_SIG_VERSION {
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crate::println!(
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@ -86,9 +95,29 @@ pub fn validate_image(
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ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey::from_bytes(key).or(Err(String::from("invalid public key")))?;
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let ed25519_signature = ed25519_dalek::Signature::from(sig.signature);
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// crate::println!("Verifying image {:x?} with {:x?}", &image[..16], &key);
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let mut h: Sha512 = Sha512::new();
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h.update(&image);
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if let Some(ref mut spim) = spim {
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// need to read the data out page by page and hash it.
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// ASSUME: the SPIM driver has allocated a read buffer that is actually PAGE_SIZE. If the SPIM
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// driver has a smaller buffer, reads get less efficient.
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let end = img_offset as usize + UNSIGNED_LEN + signed_len as usize;
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for offset in ((img_offset as usize + UNSIGNED_LEN)..end).step_by(PAGE_SIZE) {
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let mut buf = [0u8; PAGE_SIZE];
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spim.mem_read(offset as u32, &mut buf, false);
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let valid_length = if offset + PAGE_SIZE < end { PAGE_SIZE } else { end - offset };
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h.update(&buf[..valid_length]);
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}
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} else {
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// easy peasy
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let image: &[u8] = unsafe {
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core::slice::from_raw_parts(
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(img_offset as usize + UNSIGNED_LEN) as *const u8,
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signed_len as usize,
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)
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};
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// crate::println!("Verifying image {:x?} with {:x?}", &image[..16], &key);
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h.update(&image);
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}
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// debugging note: h.clone() does *not* work. You have to print the hash by modifying
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// the function inside the ed25519 crate.
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match verifying_key.verify_prehashed(h, None, &ed25519_signature) {
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