Merge branch 'main' into rustls-exp2

This commit is contained in:
bunnie 2022-08-13 02:01:21 +08:00
commit a8f2c99b6c
11 changed files with 281 additions and 92 deletions

View file

@ -240,6 +240,9 @@ perform the Xous firmware upgrade. This requires running manual update commands,
- iterator form for PNG decoding (thanks to nworbnhoj for a ton of work to get that together)
- memory usage is well-constrained now, and suitable for everyday use
- primary limit to PNG decode speed is read speed over e.g. TCP
- Feature #211 (change unlock PIN) implemented
- The menu item is in the PDDB Submenu->Change unlock PIN
- The redundant boot PIN setting during first power on setup is also removed. Only the one you set when you init the PDDB matters.
## Roadmap to 1.0

View file

@ -108,28 +108,28 @@
"en-tts": "No"
},
"pddb.badpass": {
"en": "Incorrect password.\n\nTry again?\n",
"en": "Incorrect PIN.\n\nTry again?\n",
"ja": "パスワードを認証失敗でした。\n\nもう一度実行しませんか。\n",
"zh": "密码错误。 再试一次?",
"en-tts": "Incorrect password. Try again?"
"en-tts": "Incorrect PIN. Try again?"
},
"pddb.checkpass": {
"en": "Press any key, then re-enter your password to confirm.",
"en": "Press any key, then re-enter your PIN to confirm.",
"ja": "任意キーを押して、パスワードを再入力してセットアップを確認してください。",
"zh": "第一次使用,再次输入密码",
"en-tts": "First-time setup: Enter password again."
"en-tts": "First-time setup: Enter PIN again."
},
"pddb.checkpass_fail": {
"en": "Password mismatch!\n\nPlease try again.",
"en": "PIN mismatch!\n\nPlease try again.",
"ja": "パスワード一致していません!\n\nもう一度実行しください。",
"zh": "密码不匹配,请重试.",
"en-tts": "Password mismatch! Please try again."
"en-tts": "PIN mismatch! Please try again."
},
"pddb.badpass_infallible": {
"en": "Incorrect password.\n\nPlease try again.",
"en": "Incorrect PIN.\n\nPlease try again.",
"ja": "パスワードを認証失敗でした。\n\nもう一度実行しください。",
"zh": "密码错误。",
"en-tts": "Incorrect password. Please try again."
"en-tts": "Incorrect PIN. Please try again."
},
"pddb.requestformat": {
"en": "The PDDB needs to be cryptographically formatted. This takes about 15 minutes and can't be interrupted.\n\nProceed?",
@ -203,6 +203,36 @@
"zh": "基础姓名: ",
"en-tts": "For basis: "
},
"pddb.changepin.mountfirst": {
"en": "Unlock the device before changing the PIN",
"ja": "PIN を変更する前にデバイスのロックを解除してください",
"zh": "在更改 PIN 之前解锁设备",
"en-tts": "Unlock the device before changing the PIN"
},
"pddb.changepin.enter_new_pin": {
"en": "Enter your new PIN in the next dialog box.",
"ja": "次のダイアログ ボックスに新しい PIN を入力します。",
"zh": "在下一个对话框中输入您的新 PIN。",
"en-tts": "Enter your new PIN in the next dialog box."
},
"pddb.changepin.success": {
"en": "PIN updated!",
"ja": "PIN が更新されました。",
"zh": "PIN 已更新!",
"en-tts": "PIN updated!"
},
"pddb.changepin.nochange": {
"en": "PIN unchanged.",
"ja": "PIN は変更されていません",
"zh": "PIN 未更改",
"en-tts": "PIN unchanged."
},
"pddb.menu.change_unlock_pin": {
"en": "Change unlock PIN",
"ja": "ロック解除暗証番号の変更",
"zh": "更改解锁密码",
"en-tts": "Change unlock PIN"
},
"pddb.menu.listbasis": {
"en": "List unlocked bases",
"ja": "ロック解除されたベースをー覧表します",

View file

@ -210,6 +210,9 @@ pub(crate) enum Opcode {
/// Optimized key listing
ListKeyV2 = 45,
/// change unlock PIN
MenuChangePin = 46,
/// This key type could not be decoded
InvalidOpcode = u32::MAX as _,
}

View file

@ -82,6 +82,14 @@ impl Deref for StaticCryptoData {
}
}
}
impl DerefMut for StaticCryptoData {
fn deref_mut(&mut self) -> &mut [u8] {
unsafe {
core::slice::from_raw_parts_mut(self as *mut StaticCryptoData as *mut u8, size_of::<StaticCryptoData>())
as &mut [u8]
}
}
}
#[derive(Eq, PartialEq)]
enum DnaMode {
Normal,
@ -1562,6 +1570,63 @@ impl PddbOs {
}
}
fn pw_check(&self, modals: &modals::Modals) -> Result<()> {
let mut success = false;
while !success {
// the "same password check" is accomplished by just encrypting the all-zeros block twice
// with the cipher after clearing the password and re-entering it, and then comparing that
// the results are identical. The test blocks are never committed or stored anywhere.
// The actual creation of the "real" key material is done in step 3.
let mut checkblock_a = [0u8; BLOCK_SIZE];
self.rootkeys.decrypt_block(GenericArray::from_mut_slice(&mut checkblock_a));
log::info!("{}PDDB.CHECKPASS,{}", xous::BOOKEND_START, xous::BOOKEND_END);
#[cfg(any(target_os = "none", target_os = "xous"))] // skip this dialog in hosted mode
modals.show_notification(t!("pddb.checkpass", xous::LANG), None).expect("notification failed");
self.clear_password();
let mut checkblock_b = [0u8; BLOCK_SIZE];
self.rootkeys.decrypt_block(GenericArray::from_mut_slice(&mut checkblock_b));
if checkblock_a == checkblock_b {
success = true;
} else {
log::info!("{}PDDB.PWFAIL,{}", xous::BOOKEND_START, xous::BOOKEND_END);
modals.show_notification(t!("pddb.checkpass_fail", xous::LANG), None).expect("notification failed");
self.clear_password();
}
}
if success {
Ok(())
} else {
Err(Error::new(ErrorKind::PermissionDenied, "Password entry failed"))
}
}
/// this function attempts to change the PIN. returns Ok() if changed, error if not.
pub(crate) fn pddb_change_pin(&mut self, modals: &modals::Modals) -> Result<()> {
if let Some(system_keys) = &self.system_basis_key {
// get the new password
self.clear_password();
modals.show_notification(t!("pddb.changepin.enter_new_pin", xous::LANG), None)
.map_err(|_| Error::new(ErrorKind::Other, "Internal error"))?;
self.pw_check(modals)?;
// wrap keys in the new password, and store them to disk
let wrapped_key = self.rootkeys.wrap_key(&system_keys.data).expect("Internal error wrapping our encryption key");
let wrapped_key_pt = self.rootkeys.wrap_key(&system_keys.pt).expect("Internal error wrapping our encryption key");
let mut crypto_keys = StaticCryptoData::default();
crypto_keys.deref_mut().copy_from_slice(&self.static_crypto_data_get().deref());
assert!(wrapped_key_pt.len() == 40);
assert!(wrapped_key.len() == 40);
crypto_keys.system_key_pt.copy_from_slice(&wrapped_key_pt);
crypto_keys.system_key.copy_from_slice(&wrapped_key);
self.patch_keys(crypto_keys.deref(), 0);
Ok(())
} else {
Err(Error::new(ErrorKind::PermissionDenied, "System basis keys not unlocked"))
}
}
/// this function is dangerous in that calling it will completely erase all of the previous data
/// in the PDDB an replace it with a brand-spanking new, blank PDDB.
/// The number of servers that can connect to the Spinor crate is strictly tracked, so we borrow a reference
@ -1572,31 +1637,7 @@ impl PddbOs {
}
// step 0. If we have a modal, confirm that the password entered was correct with a double-entry.
if let Some(modals) = progress {
let mut success = false;
while !success {
// the "same password check" is accomplished by just encrypting the all-zeros block twice
// with the cipher after clearing the password and re-entering it, and then comparing that
// the results are identical. The test blocks are never committed or stored anywhere.
// The actual creation of the "real" key material is done in step 3.
let mut checkblock_a = [0u8; BLOCK_SIZE];
self.rootkeys.decrypt_block(GenericArray::from_mut_slice(&mut checkblock_a));
log::info!("{}PDDB.CHECKPASS,{}", xous::BOOKEND_START, xous::BOOKEND_END);
#[cfg(any(target_os = "none", target_os = "xous"))] // skip this dialog in hosted mode
modals.show_notification(t!("pddb.checkpass", xous::LANG), None).expect("notification failed");
self.clear_password();
let mut checkblock_b = [0u8; BLOCK_SIZE];
self.rootkeys.decrypt_block(GenericArray::from_mut_slice(&mut checkblock_b));
if checkblock_a == checkblock_b {
success = true;
} else {
log::info!("{}PDDB.PWFAIL,{}", xous::BOOKEND_START, xous::BOOKEND_END);
modals.show_notification(t!("pddb.checkpass_fail", xous::LANG), None).expect("notification failed");
self.clear_password();
}
}
self.pw_check(modals)?;
}
// step 1. Erase the entire PDDB region - leaves the state in all 1's

View file

@ -1419,6 +1419,22 @@ fn wrapped_main() -> ! {
}
modals.show_notification(&note, None).expect("couldn't show basis list");
},
Opcode::MenuChangePin => {
if basis_cache.basis_count() == 0 {
modals.show_notification(t!("pddb.changepin.mountfirst", xous::LANG), None)
.expect("couldn't show notification");
continue;
}
match pddb_os.pddb_change_pin(&modals) {
Ok(_) => modals.show_notification(t!("pddb.changepin.success", xous::LANG), None)
.expect("couldn't show notification"),
Err(e) => {
log::error!("Error changing PIN: {:?}", e);
modals.show_notification(t!("pddb.changepin.nochange", xous::LANG), None)
.expect("couldn't show notification");
}
}
},
Opcode::RekeyPddb => {
let mut buffer = unsafe { Buffer::from_memory_message_mut(msg.body.memory_message_mut().unwrap()) };
let rekey_op = buffer.to_original::<PddbRekeyOp, _>().unwrap();

View file

@ -16,6 +16,15 @@ pub(crate) fn pddb_menu(conn: xous::CID) {
close_on_select: true,
}
);
menu_items.push(
MenuItem {
name: String::from_str(t!("pddb.menu.change_unlock_pin", xous::LANG)),
action_conn: Some(conn),
action_opcode: Opcode::MenuChangePin.to_u32().unwrap(),
action_payload: MenuPayload::Scalar([0, 0, 0, 0]),
close_on_select: true,
}
);
menu_items.push(MenuItem {
name: String::from_str(t!("mainmenu.closemenu", xous::LANG)),
action_conn: None,

View file

@ -95,18 +95,24 @@
"zh": "执行备份的内部错误。 进程中止。",
"en-tts": "Internal error performing backup. Process aborted."
},
"rootkeys.bootpass": {
"en": "Create a PIN code for device unlock.",
"ja": "デバイスのロックを解除するためのPINコードを作成します。",
"zh": "输入密码 解锁 安全含义:低",
"en-tts": "Enter unlock password"
},
"rootkeys.updatepass": {
"rootkeys.updatefirstpass": {
"en": "⚠ Critical Password ⚠\nCreate a strong root password for authorizing system updates.",
"ja": "重要なパスワード\nシステムアップデートを認証するための強力なパスフレーズを作成します。",
"zh": "输入密码 软件更新 安全含义:至关重要 ",
"en-tts": "Enter a root password. This should be a strong password."
},
"rootkeys.updatepass": {
"en": "⚠ Critical Password ⚠\nPlease confirm the root password.",
"ja": "ルートパスワードを確認してください。",
"zh": "请确认root密码。",
"en-tts": "Please confirm the root password."
},
"rootkeys.updatepass_fail": {
"en": "Passwords did not match. Try again?",
"ja": "パスワードが間違っています。 再試行?",
"zh": "密码不匹配。 再试一次?",
"en-tts": "Passwords did not match. Try again?"
},
"rootkeys.blind_update": {
"en": "No device keys detected. Shall we copy the staged gateware anyways, overwriting the current image?",
"ja": "ルートキーが検出されませんでした。 とにかくステージングされたゲートウェアをコピーして、現在のイメージを上書きしませんか?",
@ -126,10 +132,10 @@
"en-tts": "Device keys already initialized."
},
"rootkeys.confirm": {
"en": "🔐 Setup passwords for Precursor 🔐\n\nYou will be prompted for two passwords:\n\t1. Device unlock PIN code\n\t2. Root passphrase.\n\nAre you ready?",
"ja": "これにより、Precursorデバイスのルートキーが初期化されます。\n\n2つのパスワードの入力を求められます。\n\t1.デバイスのロック解除PINコード\n\t2.システムアップデートパスフレーズ。\n\n準備はいいですか?",
"zh": "仅当您准备好信 任此设备时才 应继续",
"en-tts": "Setup passwords for Precursor. You will create two passwords, a PIN code, and a root password."
"en": "🔐 Setup passwords for Precursor 🔐\n\nYou will be prompted for a root passphrase that must be secure and cannot be changed.\n\nAre you ready?",
"ja": "🔐 Precursor のパスワードを設定する 🔐\n\nルート パスフレーズの入力を求めるメッセージが表示されます。ルート パスフレーズは安全である必要があり、変更することはできません。\n\n準備はできていますか?",
"zh": "🔐 为 Precursor 设置密码 🔐\n\n系统将提示您输入必须安全且无法更改的根密码。\n\n您准备好了吗?",
"en-tts": "Setup passwords for Precursor\n\nYou will be prompted for a root passphrase that must be secure and cannot be changed.\n\nAre you ready?"
},
"rootkeys.confirm.yes": {
"en": "I'm ready!",

View file

@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ pub(crate) enum Opcode {
/// attempt to initialize keys on a brand new system. Does nothing if the keys are already provisioned.
UxTryInitKeys = 9,
UxInitBootPasswordReturn = 10,
UxInitUpdateFirstPasswordReturn = 10,
UxInitUpdatePasswordReturn = 11,
/// provision a gateware update with our secret data

View file

@ -722,12 +722,12 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
/// Plaintext password is passed as a &str. Any copies internally are destroyed. Caller is responsible for destroying the &str original.
/// Performs a bcrypt hash of the password, with the currently set salt; does not store the plaintext after exit.
pub fn hash_and_save_password(&mut self, pw: &str) {
pub fn hash_and_save_password(&mut self, pw: &str, verify: bool) -> bool {
let pw_type = if let Some(cur_type) = self.cur_password_type {
cur_type
} else {
log::error!("got an unexpected password from the UX");
return;
return false;
};
let mut hashed_password: [u8; 24] = [0; 24];
let mut salt = self.get_salt();
@ -751,19 +751,51 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
let digest = hasher.finalize();
let pcache_ptr: *mut PasswordCache = self.pass_cache.as_mut_ptr() as *mut PasswordCache;
unsafe {
match pw_type {
PasswordType::Boot => {
for (&src, dst) in digest.iter().zip((*pcache_ptr).hashed_boot_pw.iter_mut()) {
*dst = src;
if !verify {
unsafe {
match pw_type {
PasswordType::Boot => {
for (&src, dst) in digest.iter().zip((*pcache_ptr).hashed_boot_pw.iter_mut()) {
*dst = src;
}
(*pcache_ptr).hashed_boot_pw_valid = 1;
}
PasswordType::Update => {
for (&src, dst) in digest.iter().zip((*pcache_ptr).hashed_update_pw.iter_mut()) {
*dst = src;
}
(*pcache_ptr).hashed_update_pw_valid = 1;
}
(*pcache_ptr).hashed_boot_pw_valid = 1;
}
PasswordType::Update => {
for (&src, dst) in digest.iter().zip((*pcache_ptr).hashed_update_pw.iter_mut()) {
*dst = src;
}
true
} else {
unsafe {
match pw_type {
PasswordType::Boot => {
if (*pcache_ptr).hashed_boot_pw_valid == 1 {
for (&src, &dst) in digest.iter().zip((*pcache_ptr).hashed_boot_pw.iter()) {
if dst != src {
return false
}
}
true
} else {
false
}
}
PasswordType::Update => {
if (*pcache_ptr).hashed_update_pw_valid == 1 {
for (&src, &dst) in digest.iter().zip((*pcache_ptr).hashed_update_pw.iter()) {
if dst != src {
return false
}
}
true
} else {
false
}
}
(*pcache_ptr).hashed_update_pw_valid = 1;
}
}
}
@ -1063,7 +1095,6 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
// extract the update password key from the cache, and apply it to the private key
#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]
{
log::debug!("cached boot passwords {:x?}", pcache.hashed_boot_pw);
log::debug!("cached update password: {:x?}", pcache.hashed_update_pw);
}
// private key must XOR with password before storing
@ -1081,30 +1112,28 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
.zip(self.sensitive_data.borrow_mut().as_slice_mut::<u32>()[KeyRomLocs::SELFSIGN_PRIVKEY as usize..KeyRomLocs::SELFSIGN_PRIVKEY as usize + 256/(size_of::<u32>()*8)].iter_mut()) {
*dst = u32::from_be_bytes(src.try_into().unwrap())
}
#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]
log::debug!("private_key_enc: {:?}", private_key_enc);
pb.set_percentage(10);
// generate and store a root key (aka boot key), this is what is unlocked by the "boot password"
// ironically, it's a "lower security" key because it just acts as a gatekeeper to further
// keys that would have a stronger password applied to them, based upon the importance of the secret
// think of this more as a user PIN login confirmation, than as a significant cryptographic event
// generate the "boot key". This is just a random number that eventually gets XOR'd with a PIN
// by the PDDB to derive the final PDDB .System unlock key.
let mut boot_key_enc: [u8; 32] = [0; 32];
for (dst, key) in
boot_key_enc.chunks_mut(4).into_iter()
.zip(pcache.hashed_boot_pw.chunks(4).into_iter()) {
for dst in
boot_key_enc.chunks_mut(4).into_iter() {
let key_word = self.trng.get_u32().unwrap().to_be_bytes();
// just unroll this loop, it's fast and easy enough
(*dst)[0] = key[0] ^ key_word[0];
(*dst)[1] = key[1] ^ key_word[1];
(*dst)[2] = key[2] ^ key_word[2];
(*dst)[3] = key[3] ^ key_word[3];
// also note that interestingly, we don't have to XOR it with the hashed boot password --
// this key isn't used by this routine, just initialized, so really, it only matters to
// XOR it with the password when you use it the first time to encrypt something.
(*dst)[0] = key_word[0];
(*dst)[1] = key_word[1];
(*dst)[2] = key_word[2];
(*dst)[3] = key_word[3];
}
#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]
log::debug!("boot_key_enc: {:?}", boot_key_enc);
// store the boot key to the keyrom staging area
for (src, dst) in private_key_enc.chunks(4).into_iter()
for (src, dst) in boot_key_enc.chunks(4).into_iter()
.zip(self.sensitive_data.borrow_mut().as_slice_mut::<u32>()[KeyRomLocs::USER_KEY as usize..KeyRomLocs::USER_KEY as usize + 256/(size_of::<u32>()*8)].iter_mut()) {
*dst = u32::from_be_bytes(src.try_into().unwrap())
}

View file

@ -147,8 +147,9 @@ mod implementation {
pub fn update_policy(&mut self, policy: Option<PasswordRetentionPolicy>) {
log::info!("policy updated: {:?}", policy);
}
pub fn hash_and_save_password(&mut self, pw: &str) {
pub fn hash_and_save_password(&mut self, pw: &str, _verify: bool) -> bool {
log::info!("got password plaintext: {}", pw);
true
}
pub fn set_ux_password_type(&mut self, cur_type: Option<PasswordType>) {
self.password_type = cur_type;
@ -197,6 +198,7 @@ mod implementation {
}
pub fn purge_password(&mut self, _ptype: PasswordType) {}
pub fn purge_user_password(&mut self, _ptype: AesRootkeyType) {}
pub fn purge_sensitive_data(&mut self) {}
pub fn get_ux_password_type(&self) -> Option<PasswordType> {self.password_type}
pub fn finish_key_init(&mut self) {}
@ -470,7 +472,7 @@ fn main() -> ! {
true,
TextEntryVisibility::LastChars,
main_cid,
Opcode::UxInitBootPasswordReturn.to_u32().unwrap(),
Opcode::UxInitUpdateFirstPasswordReturn.to_u32().unwrap(),
vec![TextEntryPayload::new()],
None,
);
@ -481,7 +483,7 @@ fn main() -> ! {
let mut rootkeys_modal = Modal::new(
gam::ROOTKEY_MODAL_NAME,
ActionType::TextEntry(password_action.clone()),
Some(t!("rootkeys.bootpass", xous::LANG)),
Some(t!("rootkeys.updatefirstpass", xous::LANG)),
None,
GlyphStyle::Regular,
8
@ -624,29 +626,29 @@ fn main() -> ! {
}
// setup_key_init() prepares the salt and other items necessary to receive a password safely
keys.setup_key_init();
// request the boot password first
keys.set_ux_password_type(Some(PasswordType::Boot));
// request the update password first
keys.set_ux_password_type(Some(PasswordType::Update));
// pop up our private password dialog box
password_action.set_action_opcode(Opcode::UxInitBootPasswordReturn.to_u32().unwrap());
password_action.set_action_opcode(Opcode::UxInitUpdateFirstPasswordReturn.to_u32().unwrap());
rootkeys_modal.modify(
Some(ActionType::TextEntry(password_action.clone())),
Some(t!("rootkeys.bootpass", xous::LANG)), false,
Some(t!("rootkeys.updatefirstpass", xous::LANG)), false,
None, true, None
);
#[cfg(feature="tts")]
tts.tts_blocking(t!("rootkeys.bootpass", xous::LANG)).unwrap();
log::info!("{}ROOTKEY.BOOTPW,{}", xous::BOOKEND_START, xous::BOOKEND_END);
tts.tts_blocking(t!("rootkeys.updatefirstpass", xous::LANG)).unwrap();
log::info!("{}ROOTKEY.UPDPW,{}", xous::BOOKEND_START, xous::BOOKEND_END);
rootkeys_modal.activate();
}
},
Some(Opcode::UxInitBootPasswordReturn) => {
Some(Opcode::UxInitUpdateFirstPasswordReturn) => {
// assume:
// - setup_key_init has also been called (exactly once, before anything happens)
// - set_ux_password_type has been called already
let mut buf = unsafe { Buffer::from_memory_message(msg.body.memory_message().unwrap()) };
let plaintext_pw = buf.to_original::<gam::modal::TextEntryPayloads, _>().unwrap();
keys.hash_and_save_password(plaintext_pw.first().as_str());
keys.hash_and_save_password(plaintext_pw.first().as_str(), false);
plaintext_pw.first().volatile_clear(); // ensure the data is destroyed after sending to the keys enclave
buf.volatile_clear();
@ -667,7 +669,56 @@ fn main() -> ! {
let mut buf = unsafe { Buffer::from_memory_message(msg.body.memory_message().unwrap()) };
let plaintext_pw = buf.to_original::<gam::modal::TextEntryPayloads, _>().unwrap();
keys.hash_and_save_password(plaintext_pw.first().as_str());
if !keys.hash_and_save_password(plaintext_pw.first().as_str(), true) {
// password did not verify
modals.add_list_item(t!("rootkeys.gwup.yes", xous::LANG)).expect("modals error");
modals.add_list_item(t!("rootkeys.gwup.no", xous::LANG)).expect("modals error");
match modals.get_radiobutton(t!("rootkeys.updatepass_fail", xous::LANG)) {
Ok(response) => {
if response == t!("rootkeys.gwup.yes", xous::LANG) {
keys.purge_password(PasswordType::Update);
// request the update password first
keys.set_ux_password_type(Some(PasswordType::Update));
// pop up our private password dialog box
password_action.set_action_opcode(Opcode::UxInitUpdateFirstPasswordReturn.to_u32().unwrap());
rootkeys_modal.modify(
Some(ActionType::TextEntry(password_action.clone())),
Some(t!("rootkeys.updatefirstpass", xous::LANG)), false,
None, true, None
);
#[cfg(feature="tts")]
tts.tts_blocking(t!("rootkeys.updatefirstpass", xous::LANG)).unwrap();
log::info!("{}ROOTKEY.UPDPW,{}", xous::BOOKEND_START, xous::BOOKEND_END);
rootkeys_modal.activate();
continue;
} else {
// abort
plaintext_pw.first().volatile_clear(); // ensure the data is destroyed after sending to the keys enclave
buf.volatile_clear();
keys.purge_password(PasswordType::Update);
keys.purge_sensitive_data();
susres.set_suspendable(true).expect("couldn't unblock suspend/resume");
if let Some(dr) = deferred_response.take() {
xous::return_scalar(dr, 0).unwrap();
}
continue;
}
}
_ => {
log::error!("get_radiobutton failed");
plaintext_pw.first().volatile_clear(); // ensure the data is destroyed after sending to the keys enclave
buf.volatile_clear();
keys.purge_password(PasswordType::Update);
keys.purge_sensitive_data();
susres.set_suspendable(true).expect("couldn't unblock suspend/resume");
if let Some(dr) = deferred_response.take() {
xous::return_scalar(dr, 0).unwrap();
}
continue;
},
}
}
plaintext_pw.first().volatile_clear(); // ensure the data is destroyed after sending to the keys enclave
buf.volatile_clear();
@ -946,7 +997,7 @@ fn main() -> ! {
let mut buf = unsafe { Buffer::from_memory_message(msg.body.memory_message().unwrap()) };
let plaintext_pw = buf.to_original::<gam::modal::TextEntryPayloads, _>().unwrap();
keys.hash_and_save_password(plaintext_pw.first().as_str());
keys.hash_and_save_password(plaintext_pw.first().as_str(), false);
plaintext_pw.first().volatile_clear(); // ensure the data is destroyed after sending to the keys enclave
buf.volatile_clear();
// indicate that there should be no change to the policy
@ -1034,7 +1085,7 @@ fn main() -> ! {
let mut buf = unsafe { Buffer::from_memory_message(msg.body.memory_message().unwrap()) };
let plaintext_pw = buf.to_original::<gam::modal::TextEntryPayloads, _>().unwrap();
keys.hash_and_save_password(plaintext_pw.first().as_str());
keys.hash_and_save_password(plaintext_pw.first().as_str(), false);
plaintext_pw.first().volatile_clear(); // ensure the data is destroyed after sending to the keys enclave
buf.volatile_clear();
@ -1130,7 +1181,7 @@ fn main() -> ! {
let mut buf = unsafe { Buffer::from_memory_message(msg.body.memory_message().unwrap()) };
let plaintext_pw = buf.to_original::<gam::modal::TextEntryPayloads, _>().unwrap();
keys.hash_and_save_password(plaintext_pw.first().as_str());
keys.hash_and_save_password(plaintext_pw.first().as_str(), false);
plaintext_pw.first().volatile_clear(); // ensure the data is destroyed after sending to the keys enclave
buf.volatile_clear();
@ -1170,7 +1221,7 @@ fn main() -> ! {
{
let mut buf = unsafe { Buffer::from_memory_message(msg.body.memory_message().unwrap()) };
let plaintext_pw = buf.to_original::<gam::modal::TextEntryPayloads, _>().unwrap();
keys.hash_and_save_password(plaintext_pw.first().as_str());
keys.hash_and_save_password(plaintext_pw.first().as_str(), false);
plaintext_pw.first().volatile_clear(); // ensure the data is destroyed after sending to the keys enclave
buf.volatile_clear();
@ -1259,7 +1310,7 @@ fn main() -> ! {
let mut buf = unsafe { Buffer::from_memory_message(msg.body.memory_message().unwrap()) };
let plaintext_pw = buf.to_original::<gam::modal::TextEntryPayloads, _>().unwrap();
keys.hash_and_save_password(plaintext_pw.first().as_str());
keys.hash_and_save_password(plaintext_pw.first().as_str(), false);
plaintext_pw.first().volatile_clear(); // ensure the data is destroyed after sending to the keys enclave
buf.volatile_clear();
send_message(main_cid,
@ -1373,7 +1424,7 @@ fn main() -> ! {
let mut buf = unsafe { Buffer::from_memory_message(msg.body.memory_message().unwrap()) };
let plaintext_pw = buf.to_original::<gam::modal::TextEntryPayloads, _>().unwrap();
keys.hash_and_save_password(plaintext_pw.first().as_str());
keys.hash_and_save_password(plaintext_pw.first().as_str(), false);
plaintext_pw.first().volatile_clear(); // ensure the data is destroyed after sending to the keys enclave
buf.volatile_clear();
keys.set_ux_password_type(None);
@ -1554,7 +1605,7 @@ fn main() -> ! {
let mut buf = unsafe { Buffer::from_memory_message(msg.body.memory_message().unwrap()) };
let plaintext_pw = buf.to_original::<gam::modal::TextEntryPayloads, _>().unwrap();
keys.hash_and_save_password(plaintext_pw.first().as_str());
keys.hash_and_save_password(plaintext_pw.first().as_str(), false);
plaintext_pw.first().volatile_clear(); // ensure the data is destroyed after sending to the keys enclave
buf.volatile_clear();
keys.set_ux_password_type(None);

View file

@ -192,6 +192,7 @@ def main():
bcrypter = bcrypt.BCrypt()
# logging.debug("{}".format(boot_pw_array[:pw_len]))
logging.debug("user_key_enc: {}".format(list(user_key_enc)))
logging.debug("private_key_enc: {}".format(list(get_key(8, keyrom, 32))))
logging.debug("salt: {}".format(list(pepper)))
hashed_pw = bcrypter.crypt_raw(boot_pw_array[:pw_len], pepper, 7)
logging.debug("hashed_pw: {}".format(list(hashed_pw)))