eliminate rendundant boot PIN request; fix bug in boot key generation

- boot PIN is not requested on root password init. it's redundant,
as it is actually set when you format the PDDB
- boot key was mistakenly a copy of the encrypted private key
for ed25519 key signing. "oops". didn't catch that bug until now...
i don't think it has a big impact on existing user base, because
the key is never exposed outside the rootkey server, and the
ed25519 key itself is encrypted with the root password and then
used as the boot key. But still -- that's just not what was intended.
- root password is requested twice to check the validity of the password
This commit is contained in:
bunnie 2022-08-12 20:18:32 +08:00
parent 5e455b60eb
commit 9122186900
4 changed files with 144 additions and 60 deletions

View file

@ -95,18 +95,24 @@
"zh": "执行备份的内部错误。 进程中止。",
"en-tts": "Internal error performing backup. Process aborted."
},
"rootkeys.bootpass": {
"en": "Create a PIN code for device unlock.",
"ja": "デバイスのロックを解除するためのPINコードを作成します。",
"zh": "输入密码 解锁 安全含义:低",
"en-tts": "Enter unlock password"
},
"rootkeys.updatepass": {
"rootkeys.updatefirstpass": {
"en": "⚠ Critical Password ⚠\nCreate a strong root password for authorizing system updates.",
"ja": "重要なパスワード\nシステムアップデートを認証するための強力なパスフレーズを作成します。",
"zh": "输入密码 软件更新 安全含义:至关重要 ",
"en-tts": "Enter a root password. This should be a strong password."
},
"rootkeys.updatepass": {
"en": "⚠ Critical Password ⚠\nPlease confirm the root password.",
"ja": "ルートパスワードを確認してください。",
"zh": "请确认root密码。",
"en-tts": "Please confirm the root password."
},
"rootkeys.updatepass_fail": {
"en": "Passwords did not match. Try again?",
"ja": "パスワードが間違っています。 再試行?",
"zh": "密码不匹配。 再试一次?",
"en-tts": "Passwords did not match. Try again?"
},
"rootkeys.blind_update": {
"en": "No device keys detected. Shall we copy the staged gateware anyways, overwriting the current image?",
"ja": "ルートキーが検出されませんでした。 とにかくステージングされたゲートウェアをコピーして、現在のイメージを上書きしませんか?",
@ -126,10 +132,10 @@
"en-tts": "Device keys already initialized."
},
"rootkeys.confirm": {
"en": "🔐 Setup passwords for Precursor 🔐\n\nYou will be prompted for two passwords:\n\t1. Device unlock PIN code\n\t2. Root passphrase.\n\nAre you ready?",
"ja": "これにより、Precursorデバイスのルートキーが初期化されます。\n\n2つのパスワードの入力を求められます。\n\t1.デバイスのロック解除PINコード\n\t2.システムアップデートパスフレーズ。\n\n準備はいいですか?",
"zh": "仅当您准备好信 任此设备时才 应继续",
"en-tts": "Setup passwords for Precursor. You will create two passwords, a PIN code, and a root password."
"en": "🔐 Setup passwords for Precursor 🔐\n\nYou will be prompted for a root passphrase that must be secure and cannot be changed.\n\nAre you ready?",
"ja": "🔐 Precursor のパスワードを設定する 🔐\n\nルート パスフレーズの入力を求めるメッセージが表示されます。ルート パスフレーズは安全である必要があり、変更することはできません。\n\n準備はできていますか?",
"zh": "🔐 为 Precursor 设置密码 🔐\n\n系统将提示您输入必须安全且无法更改的根密码。\n\n您准备好了吗?",
"en-tts": "Setup passwords for Precursor\n\nYou will be prompted for a root passphrase that must be secure and cannot be changed.\n\nAre you ready?"
},
"rootkeys.confirm.yes": {
"en": "I'm ready!",

View file

@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ pub(crate) enum Opcode {
/// attempt to initialize keys on a brand new system. Does nothing if the keys are already provisioned.
UxTryInitKeys = 9,
UxInitBootPasswordReturn = 10,
UxInitUpdateFirstPasswordReturn = 10,
UxInitUpdatePasswordReturn = 11,
/// provision a gateware update with our secret data

View file

@ -722,12 +722,12 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
/// Plaintext password is passed as a &str. Any copies internally are destroyed. Caller is responsible for destroying the &str original.
/// Performs a bcrypt hash of the password, with the currently set salt; does not store the plaintext after exit.
pub fn hash_and_save_password(&mut self, pw: &str) {
pub fn hash_and_save_password(&mut self, pw: &str, verify: bool) -> bool {
let pw_type = if let Some(cur_type) = self.cur_password_type {
cur_type
} else {
log::error!("got an unexpected password from the UX");
return;
return false;
};
let mut hashed_password: [u8; 24] = [0; 24];
let mut salt = self.get_salt();
@ -751,19 +751,51 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
let digest = hasher.finalize();
let pcache_ptr: *mut PasswordCache = self.pass_cache.as_mut_ptr() as *mut PasswordCache;
unsafe {
match pw_type {
PasswordType::Boot => {
for (&src, dst) in digest.iter().zip((*pcache_ptr).hashed_boot_pw.iter_mut()) {
*dst = src;
if !verify {
unsafe {
match pw_type {
PasswordType::Boot => {
for (&src, dst) in digest.iter().zip((*pcache_ptr).hashed_boot_pw.iter_mut()) {
*dst = src;
}
(*pcache_ptr).hashed_boot_pw_valid = 1;
}
PasswordType::Update => {
for (&src, dst) in digest.iter().zip((*pcache_ptr).hashed_update_pw.iter_mut()) {
*dst = src;
}
(*pcache_ptr).hashed_update_pw_valid = 1;
}
(*pcache_ptr).hashed_boot_pw_valid = 1;
}
PasswordType::Update => {
for (&src, dst) in digest.iter().zip((*pcache_ptr).hashed_update_pw.iter_mut()) {
*dst = src;
}
true
} else {
unsafe {
match pw_type {
PasswordType::Boot => {
if (*pcache_ptr).hashed_boot_pw_valid == 1 {
for (&src, &dst) in digest.iter().zip((*pcache_ptr).hashed_boot_pw.iter()) {
if dst != src {
return false
}
}
true
} else {
false
}
}
PasswordType::Update => {
if (*pcache_ptr).hashed_update_pw_valid == 1 {
for (&src, &dst) in digest.iter().zip((*pcache_ptr).hashed_update_pw.iter()) {
if dst != src {
return false
}
}
true
} else {
false
}
}
(*pcache_ptr).hashed_update_pw_valid = 1;
}
}
}
@ -1063,7 +1095,6 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
// extract the update password key from the cache, and apply it to the private key
#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]
{
log::debug!("cached boot passwords {:x?}", pcache.hashed_boot_pw);
log::debug!("cached update password: {:x?}", pcache.hashed_update_pw);
}
// private key must XOR with password before storing
@ -1081,30 +1112,28 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
.zip(self.sensitive_data.borrow_mut().as_slice_mut::<u32>()[KeyRomLocs::SELFSIGN_PRIVKEY as usize..KeyRomLocs::SELFSIGN_PRIVKEY as usize + 256/(size_of::<u32>()*8)].iter_mut()) {
*dst = u32::from_be_bytes(src.try_into().unwrap())
}
#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]
log::debug!("private_key_enc: {:?}", private_key_enc);
pb.set_percentage(10);
// generate and store a root key (aka boot key), this is what is unlocked by the "boot password"
// ironically, it's a "lower security" key because it just acts as a gatekeeper to further
// keys that would have a stronger password applied to them, based upon the importance of the secret
// think of this more as a user PIN login confirmation, than as a significant cryptographic event
// generate the "boot key". This is just a random number that eventually gets XOR'd with a PIN
// by the PDDB to derive the final PDDB .System unlock key.
let mut boot_key_enc: [u8; 32] = [0; 32];
for (dst, key) in
boot_key_enc.chunks_mut(4).into_iter()
.zip(pcache.hashed_boot_pw.chunks(4).into_iter()) {
for dst in
boot_key_enc.chunks_mut(4).into_iter() {
let key_word = self.trng.get_u32().unwrap().to_be_bytes();
// just unroll this loop, it's fast and easy enough
(*dst)[0] = key[0] ^ key_word[0];
(*dst)[1] = key[1] ^ key_word[1];
(*dst)[2] = key[2] ^ key_word[2];
(*dst)[3] = key[3] ^ key_word[3];
// also note that interestingly, we don't have to XOR it with the hashed boot password --
// this key isn't used by this routine, just initialized, so really, it only matters to
// XOR it with the password when you use it the first time to encrypt something.
(*dst)[0] = key_word[0];
(*dst)[1] = key_word[1];
(*dst)[2] = key_word[2];
(*dst)[3] = key_word[3];
}
#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]
log::debug!("boot_key_enc: {:?}", boot_key_enc);
// store the boot key to the keyrom staging area
for (src, dst) in private_key_enc.chunks(4).into_iter()
for (src, dst) in boot_key_enc.chunks(4).into_iter()
.zip(self.sensitive_data.borrow_mut().as_slice_mut::<u32>()[KeyRomLocs::USER_KEY as usize..KeyRomLocs::USER_KEY as usize + 256/(size_of::<u32>()*8)].iter_mut()) {
*dst = u32::from_be_bytes(src.try_into().unwrap())
}

View file

@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ mod implementation {
pub fn update_policy(&mut self, policy: Option<PasswordRetentionPolicy>) {
log::info!("policy updated: {:?}", policy);
}
pub fn hash_and_save_password(&mut self, pw: &str) {
pub fn hash_and_save_password(&mut self, pw: &str, _verify: bool) {
log::info!("got password plaintext: {}", pw);
}
pub fn set_ux_password_type(&mut self, cur_type: Option<PasswordType>) {
@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ fn main() -> ! {
use crate::implementation::RootKeys;
log_server::init_wait().unwrap();
log::set_max_level(log::LevelFilter::Info);
log::set_max_level(log::LevelFilter::Debug);
log::info!("my PID is {}", xous::process::id());
let xns = xous_names::XousNames::new().unwrap();
@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ fn main() -> ! {
true,
TextEntryVisibility::LastChars,
main_cid,
Opcode::UxInitBootPasswordReturn.to_u32().unwrap(),
Opcode::UxInitUpdateFirstPasswordReturn.to_u32().unwrap(),
vec![TextEntryPayload::new()],
None,
);
@ -481,7 +481,7 @@ fn main() -> ! {
let mut rootkeys_modal = Modal::new(
gam::ROOTKEY_MODAL_NAME,
ActionType::TextEntry(password_action.clone()),
Some(t!("rootkeys.bootpass", xous::LANG)),
Some(t!("rootkeys.updatefirstpass", xous::LANG)),
None,
GlyphStyle::Regular,
8
@ -624,29 +624,29 @@ fn main() -> ! {
}
// setup_key_init() prepares the salt and other items necessary to receive a password safely
keys.setup_key_init();
// request the boot password first
keys.set_ux_password_type(Some(PasswordType::Boot));
// request the update password first
keys.set_ux_password_type(Some(PasswordType::Update));
// pop up our private password dialog box
password_action.set_action_opcode(Opcode::UxInitBootPasswordReturn.to_u32().unwrap());
password_action.set_action_opcode(Opcode::UxInitUpdateFirstPasswordReturn.to_u32().unwrap());
rootkeys_modal.modify(
Some(ActionType::TextEntry(password_action.clone())),
Some(t!("rootkeys.bootpass", xous::LANG)), false,
Some(t!("rootkeys.updatefirstpass", xous::LANG)), false,
None, true, None
);
#[cfg(feature="tts")]
tts.tts_blocking(t!("rootkeys.bootpass", xous::LANG)).unwrap();
log::info!("{}ROOTKEY.BOOTPW,{}", xous::BOOKEND_START, xous::BOOKEND_END);
tts.tts_blocking(t!("rootkeys.updatefirstpass", xous::LANG)).unwrap();
log::info!("{}ROOTKEY.UPDPW,{}", xous::BOOKEND_START, xous::BOOKEND_END);
rootkeys_modal.activate();
}
},
Some(Opcode::UxInitBootPasswordReturn) => {
Some(Opcode::UxInitUpdateFirstPasswordReturn) => {
// assume:
// - setup_key_init has also been called (exactly once, before anything happens)
// - set_ux_password_type has been called already
let mut buf = unsafe { Buffer::from_memory_message(msg.body.memory_message().unwrap()) };
let plaintext_pw = buf.to_original::<gam::modal::TextEntryPayloads, _>().unwrap();
keys.hash_and_save_password(plaintext_pw.first().as_str());
keys.hash_and_save_password(plaintext_pw.first().as_str(), false);
plaintext_pw.first().volatile_clear(); // ensure the data is destroyed after sending to the keys enclave
buf.volatile_clear();
@ -667,7 +667,56 @@ fn main() -> ! {
let mut buf = unsafe { Buffer::from_memory_message(msg.body.memory_message().unwrap()) };
let plaintext_pw = buf.to_original::<gam::modal::TextEntryPayloads, _>().unwrap();
keys.hash_and_save_password(plaintext_pw.first().as_str());
if !keys.hash_and_save_password(plaintext_pw.first().as_str(), true) {
// password did not verify
modals.add_list_item(t!("rootkeys.gwup.yes", xous::LANG)).expect("modals error");
modals.add_list_item(t!("rootkeys.gwup.no", xous::LANG)).expect("modals error");
match modals.get_radiobutton(t!("rootkeys.updatepass_fail", xous::LANG)) {
Ok(response) => {
if response == t!("rootkeys.gwup.yes", xous::LANG) {
keys.purge_password(PasswordType::Update);
// request the update password first
keys.set_ux_password_type(Some(PasswordType::Update));
// pop up our private password dialog box
password_action.set_action_opcode(Opcode::UxInitUpdateFirstPasswordReturn.to_u32().unwrap());
rootkeys_modal.modify(
Some(ActionType::TextEntry(password_action.clone())),
Some(t!("rootkeys.updatefirstpass", xous::LANG)), false,
None, true, None
);
#[cfg(feature="tts")]
tts.tts_blocking(t!("rootkeys.updatefirstpass", xous::LANG)).unwrap();
log::info!("{}ROOTKEY.UPDPW,{}", xous::BOOKEND_START, xous::BOOKEND_END);
rootkeys_modal.activate();
continue;
} else {
// abort
plaintext_pw.first().volatile_clear(); // ensure the data is destroyed after sending to the keys enclave
buf.volatile_clear();
keys.purge_password(PasswordType::Update);
keys.purge_sensitive_data();
susres.set_suspendable(true).expect("couldn't unblock suspend/resume");
if let Some(dr) = deferred_response.take() {
xous::return_scalar(dr, 0).unwrap();
}
continue;
}
}
_ => {
log::error!("get_radiobutton failed");
plaintext_pw.first().volatile_clear(); // ensure the data is destroyed after sending to the keys enclave
buf.volatile_clear();
keys.purge_password(PasswordType::Update);
keys.purge_sensitive_data();
susres.set_suspendable(true).expect("couldn't unblock suspend/resume");
if let Some(dr) = deferred_response.take() {
xous::return_scalar(dr, 0).unwrap();
}
continue;
},
}
}
plaintext_pw.first().volatile_clear(); // ensure the data is destroyed after sending to the keys enclave
buf.volatile_clear();
@ -946,7 +995,7 @@ fn main() -> ! {
let mut buf = unsafe { Buffer::from_memory_message(msg.body.memory_message().unwrap()) };
let plaintext_pw = buf.to_original::<gam::modal::TextEntryPayloads, _>().unwrap();
keys.hash_and_save_password(plaintext_pw.first().as_str());
keys.hash_and_save_password(plaintext_pw.first().as_str(), false);
plaintext_pw.first().volatile_clear(); // ensure the data is destroyed after sending to the keys enclave
buf.volatile_clear();
// indicate that there should be no change to the policy
@ -1034,7 +1083,7 @@ fn main() -> ! {
let mut buf = unsafe { Buffer::from_memory_message(msg.body.memory_message().unwrap()) };
let plaintext_pw = buf.to_original::<gam::modal::TextEntryPayloads, _>().unwrap();
keys.hash_and_save_password(plaintext_pw.first().as_str());
keys.hash_and_save_password(plaintext_pw.first().as_str(), false);
plaintext_pw.first().volatile_clear(); // ensure the data is destroyed after sending to the keys enclave
buf.volatile_clear();
@ -1130,7 +1179,7 @@ fn main() -> ! {
let mut buf = unsafe { Buffer::from_memory_message(msg.body.memory_message().unwrap()) };
let plaintext_pw = buf.to_original::<gam::modal::TextEntryPayloads, _>().unwrap();
keys.hash_and_save_password(plaintext_pw.first().as_str());
keys.hash_and_save_password(plaintext_pw.first().as_str(), false);
plaintext_pw.first().volatile_clear(); // ensure the data is destroyed after sending to the keys enclave
buf.volatile_clear();
@ -1170,7 +1219,7 @@ fn main() -> ! {
{
let mut buf = unsafe { Buffer::from_memory_message(msg.body.memory_message().unwrap()) };
let plaintext_pw = buf.to_original::<gam::modal::TextEntryPayloads, _>().unwrap();
keys.hash_and_save_password(plaintext_pw.first().as_str());
keys.hash_and_save_password(plaintext_pw.first().as_str(), false);
plaintext_pw.first().volatile_clear(); // ensure the data is destroyed after sending to the keys enclave
buf.volatile_clear();
@ -1259,7 +1308,7 @@ fn main() -> ! {
let mut buf = unsafe { Buffer::from_memory_message(msg.body.memory_message().unwrap()) };
let plaintext_pw = buf.to_original::<gam::modal::TextEntryPayloads, _>().unwrap();
keys.hash_and_save_password(plaintext_pw.first().as_str());
keys.hash_and_save_password(plaintext_pw.first().as_str(), false);
plaintext_pw.first().volatile_clear(); // ensure the data is destroyed after sending to the keys enclave
buf.volatile_clear();
send_message(main_cid,
@ -1373,7 +1422,7 @@ fn main() -> ! {
let mut buf = unsafe { Buffer::from_memory_message(msg.body.memory_message().unwrap()) };
let plaintext_pw = buf.to_original::<gam::modal::TextEntryPayloads, _>().unwrap();
keys.hash_and_save_password(plaintext_pw.first().as_str());
keys.hash_and_save_password(plaintext_pw.first().as_str(), false);
plaintext_pw.first().volatile_clear(); // ensure the data is destroyed after sending to the keys enclave
buf.volatile_clear();
keys.set_ux_password_type(None);
@ -1554,7 +1603,7 @@ fn main() -> ! {
let mut buf = unsafe { Buffer::from_memory_message(msg.body.memory_message().unwrap()) };
let plaintext_pw = buf.to_original::<gam::modal::TextEntryPayloads, _>().unwrap();
keys.hash_and_save_password(plaintext_pw.first().as_str());
keys.hash_and_save_password(plaintext_pw.first().as_str(), false);
plaintext_pw.first().volatile_clear(); // ensure the data is destroyed after sending to the keys enclave
buf.volatile_clear();
keys.set_ux_password_type(None);