sigcheck hardening

- xor-masking of jump target moved to immediately before the jump
- mscratch csr zeroed
- anti-rollback single-update distance limited to 512: let's hope we
never even get close to having 512 security revisions in a single
generation!
- sanity check untrusted signature/add length fields - constrains
hash-checks to within the right "range", preventing abuse of the
hash reads as an oracle to leak state about other things in memory.
- check valid_key != valid_key2 invariant before returning
This commit is contained in:
bunnie 2026-02-15 03:22:47 +08:00
parent c71f472743
commit 70f219ba0a
No known key found for this signature in database
2 changed files with 27 additions and 7 deletions

View file

@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ pub const CODESEL_END: usize = 0x603D_A000;
/// This is set by the wear-out limit of the underlying RRAM.
pub const ONEWAY_MAX_VALUE: u32 = 10_0000;
/// Maximum number of times the one way counter can be incremented in
/// a single boot attempt.
pub const ONEWAY_MAX_DELTA: u32 = 512;
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum OneWayErr {

View file

@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ pub fn validate_image(
// ASSUME: the SPIM driver has allocated a read buffer that is actually PAGE_SIZE. If the SPIM
// driver has a smaller buffer, reads get less efficient.
let end = img_offset as usize + UNSIGNED_LEN + signed_len as usize;
assert!(end <= bao1x_api::offsets::baosec::SPI_FLASH_LEN);
for offset in ((img_offset as usize + UNSIGNED_LEN)..end).step_by(PAGE_SIZE) {
let mut buf = [0u8; PAGE_SIZE];
spim.mem_read(offset as u32, &mut buf, false);
@ -175,7 +176,13 @@ pub fn validate_image(
h.update(&buf[..valid_length]);
}
} else {
// easy peasy
// sanity check the purported length of the image. It can't be any bigger than the available
// storage in RRAM.
assert!(
(signed_len as usize)
<= bao1x_api::RRAM_STORAGE_LEN
- ((img_offset as usize - utralib::HW_RERAM_MEM) + UNSIGNED_LEN)
);
let image: &[u8] = unsafe {
core::slice::from_raw_parts(
(img_offset as usize + UNSIGNED_LEN) as *const u8,
@ -222,6 +229,7 @@ pub fn validate_image(
// crate::println!("hashed hash: {:x?}", hashed_hash.as_slice());
let mut msg: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
assert!((sig.aad_len as usize) <= sig.aad.len());
msg.extend_from_slice(&sig.aad[..sig.aad_len as usize]);
msg.extend_from_slice(hashed_hash.as_slice());
// crate::println!("assembled msg({}): {:x?}", msg.len(), msg);
@ -276,6 +284,8 @@ pub fn validate_image(
if sig.sealed_data.anti_rollback >= crate::acram::ONEWAY_MAX_VALUE {
return Err(String::from("Proposed anti-rollback value out of range"));
}
// enforce a maximum "reasonable" increment - just as belt-and-suspenders
assert!(sig.sealed_data.anti_rollback - arb_value < crate::acram::ONEWAY_MAX_DELTA);
// increment anti-rollback counter to match the current value of the signed image
bollard!(die_no_std, 4);
while one_way_counters.get(arb).unwrap() < sig.sealed_data.anti_rollback {
@ -290,6 +300,8 @@ pub fn validate_image(
}
bollard!(die_no_std, 4);
// key is defined as !key2, so they should never have the same value. Confirm that invariant here.
assert!(valid_key != valid_key2);
Ok((
valid_key,
valid_key2,
@ -327,9 +339,9 @@ pub fn erase_collateral(csprng: &mut Option<&mut Csprng>) -> Result<(), String>
!= 0
{
// clear the ACL so we can operate on the data
slot_mgr
.set_acl(&mut rram, slot, &AccessSettings::Data(DataSlotAccess::new_with_raw_value(0)))
.expect("couldn't reset ACL");
// Don't panic on failure: the panic can be used as a primitive to prevent
// further erasure.
slot_mgr.set_acl(&mut rram, slot, &AccessSettings::Data(DataSlotAccess::new_with_raw_value(0))).ok();
}
let bytes = unsafe { slot_mgr.read_unchecked(slot) };
// only erase if the key hasn't already been erased, to avoid stressing the RRAM array
@ -491,7 +503,7 @@ pub fn hardened_erase_policy(
bollard!(die_no_std, 4);
csprng.random_delay();
// second check on the inverse-key type - this requires a double-glitch to bypass the key number check
if !key_inv == DEVELOPER_KEY_SLOT {
if (!key_inv) == DEVELOPER_KEY_SLOT {
erase_secrets(&mut Some(csprng))?;
}
bollard!(die_no_std, 4);
@ -539,16 +551,19 @@ pub fn hardened_erase_policy(
Ok(())
}
pub fn jump_to(target: usize) -> ! {
pub fn jump_to(target: usize, mask: usize) -> ! {
// loader expects a0 to have the address of the kernel image pre-loaded
let kernel_loc = bao1x_api::offsets::KERNEL_START;
unsafe {
core::arch::asm!(
"mv t0, {target}",
"mv t1, {mask}",
"mv a0, {kernel_loc}",
"mv a1, x0",
"xor t0, t1, t0",
"jr t0",
target = in(reg) target,
mask = in(reg) mask,
kernel_loc = in(reg) kernel_loc,
options(noreturn)
);
@ -559,7 +574,7 @@ pub fn die_no_std() -> ! {
unsafe {
#[rustfmt::skip]
core::arch::asm! (
// TODO: any SCE other security-sensitive registers to be zeorized?
// TODO: any SCE other security-sensitive registers to zeroize?
// - bureg zeroize - this is priority because it has the ephemeral key
"li x1, 0x40065000",
@ -655,6 +670,8 @@ pub fn die_no_std() -> ! {
"mv x30, x0",
"mv x31, x0",
"csrw mscratch, x0",
// emit a loop out of DUART to indicate successful death
"li t0, 0x40042000",
// print 'X' (0x58)