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https://github.com/saymrwulf/xous-core.git
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sigcheck hardening
- xor-masking of jump target moved to immediately before the jump - mscratch csr zeroed - anti-rollback single-update distance limited to 512: let's hope we never even get close to having 512 security revisions in a single generation! - sanity check untrusted signature/add length fields - constrains hash-checks to within the right "range", preventing abuse of the hash reads as an oracle to leak state about other things in memory. - check valid_key != valid_key2 invariant before returning
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c71f472743
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2 changed files with 27 additions and 7 deletions
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@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ pub const CODESEL_END: usize = 0x603D_A000;
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/// This is set by the wear-out limit of the underlying RRAM.
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pub const ONEWAY_MAX_VALUE: u32 = 10_0000;
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/// Maximum number of times the one way counter can be incremented in
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/// a single boot attempt.
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pub const ONEWAY_MAX_DELTA: u32 = 512;
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#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub enum OneWayErr {
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@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ pub fn validate_image(
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// ASSUME: the SPIM driver has allocated a read buffer that is actually PAGE_SIZE. If the SPIM
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// driver has a smaller buffer, reads get less efficient.
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let end = img_offset as usize + UNSIGNED_LEN + signed_len as usize;
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assert!(end <= bao1x_api::offsets::baosec::SPI_FLASH_LEN);
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for offset in ((img_offset as usize + UNSIGNED_LEN)..end).step_by(PAGE_SIZE) {
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let mut buf = [0u8; PAGE_SIZE];
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spim.mem_read(offset as u32, &mut buf, false);
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@ -175,7 +176,13 @@ pub fn validate_image(
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h.update(&buf[..valid_length]);
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}
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} else {
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// easy peasy
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// sanity check the purported length of the image. It can't be any bigger than the available
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// storage in RRAM.
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assert!(
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(signed_len as usize)
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<= bao1x_api::RRAM_STORAGE_LEN
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- ((img_offset as usize - utralib::HW_RERAM_MEM) + UNSIGNED_LEN)
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);
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let image: &[u8] = unsafe {
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core::slice::from_raw_parts(
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(img_offset as usize + UNSIGNED_LEN) as *const u8,
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@ -222,6 +229,7 @@ pub fn validate_image(
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// crate::println!("hashed hash: {:x?}", hashed_hash.as_slice());
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let mut msg: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
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assert!((sig.aad_len as usize) <= sig.aad.len());
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msg.extend_from_slice(&sig.aad[..sig.aad_len as usize]);
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msg.extend_from_slice(hashed_hash.as_slice());
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// crate::println!("assembled msg({}): {:x?}", msg.len(), msg);
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@ -276,6 +284,8 @@ pub fn validate_image(
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if sig.sealed_data.anti_rollback >= crate::acram::ONEWAY_MAX_VALUE {
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return Err(String::from("Proposed anti-rollback value out of range"));
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}
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// enforce a maximum "reasonable" increment - just as belt-and-suspenders
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assert!(sig.sealed_data.anti_rollback - arb_value < crate::acram::ONEWAY_MAX_DELTA);
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// increment anti-rollback counter to match the current value of the signed image
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bollard!(die_no_std, 4);
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while one_way_counters.get(arb).unwrap() < sig.sealed_data.anti_rollback {
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@ -290,6 +300,8 @@ pub fn validate_image(
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}
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bollard!(die_no_std, 4);
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// key is defined as !key2, so they should never have the same value. Confirm that invariant here.
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assert!(valid_key != valid_key2);
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Ok((
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valid_key,
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valid_key2,
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@ -327,9 +339,9 @@ pub fn erase_collateral(csprng: &mut Option<&mut Csprng>) -> Result<(), String>
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!= 0
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{
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// clear the ACL so we can operate on the data
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slot_mgr
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.set_acl(&mut rram, slot, &AccessSettings::Data(DataSlotAccess::new_with_raw_value(0)))
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.expect("couldn't reset ACL");
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// Don't panic on failure: the panic can be used as a primitive to prevent
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// further erasure.
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slot_mgr.set_acl(&mut rram, slot, &AccessSettings::Data(DataSlotAccess::new_with_raw_value(0))).ok();
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}
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let bytes = unsafe { slot_mgr.read_unchecked(slot) };
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// only erase if the key hasn't already been erased, to avoid stressing the RRAM array
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@ -491,7 +503,7 @@ pub fn hardened_erase_policy(
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bollard!(die_no_std, 4);
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csprng.random_delay();
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// second check on the inverse-key type - this requires a double-glitch to bypass the key number check
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if !key_inv == DEVELOPER_KEY_SLOT {
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if (!key_inv) == DEVELOPER_KEY_SLOT {
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erase_secrets(&mut Some(csprng))?;
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}
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bollard!(die_no_std, 4);
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@ -539,16 +551,19 @@ pub fn hardened_erase_policy(
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Ok(())
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}
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pub fn jump_to(target: usize) -> ! {
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pub fn jump_to(target: usize, mask: usize) -> ! {
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// loader expects a0 to have the address of the kernel image pre-loaded
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let kernel_loc = bao1x_api::offsets::KERNEL_START;
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unsafe {
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core::arch::asm!(
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"mv t0, {target}",
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"mv t1, {mask}",
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"mv a0, {kernel_loc}",
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"mv a1, x0",
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"xor t0, t1, t0",
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"jr t0",
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target = in(reg) target,
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mask = in(reg) mask,
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kernel_loc = in(reg) kernel_loc,
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options(noreturn)
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);
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@ -559,7 +574,7 @@ pub fn die_no_std() -> ! {
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unsafe {
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#[rustfmt::skip]
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core::arch::asm! (
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// TODO: any SCE other security-sensitive registers to be zeorized?
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// TODO: any SCE other security-sensitive registers to zeroize?
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// - bureg zeroize - this is priority because it has the ephemeral key
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"li x1, 0x40065000",
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@ -655,6 +670,8 @@ pub fn die_no_std() -> ! {
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"mv x30, x0",
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"mv x31, x0",
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"csrw mscratch, x0",
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// emit a loop out of DUART to indicate successful death
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"li t0, 0x40042000",
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// print 'X' (0x58)
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