diff --git a/libs/bao1x-hal/src/hardening.rs b/libs/bao1x-hal/src/hardening.rs
index 0741cdb8a..889a8c6bf 100644
--- a/libs/bao1x-hal/src/hardening.rs
+++ b/libs/bao1x-hal/src/hardening.rs
@@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ pub fn compare_refkeys(
     csprng: &mut Csprng,
     pubkey_ptr: *const bao1x_api::signatures::SignatureInFlash,
     fail_counter: usize,
-) {
+) -> HardenedBool {
     let reference_keys =
         [bao1x_api::BAO1_PUBKEY, bao1x_api::BAO2_PUBKEY, bao1x_api::BETA_PUBKEY, bao1x_api::DEV_PUBKEY];
     // check that the pub keys match those burned into the indelible key area
@@ -472,7 +472,22 @@ pub fn compare_refkeys(
             good_compare = HardenedBool::FALSE;
         }
     }
-
+    csprng.random_delay();
+    // The IFR (indelible) copy is weird, because the highest byte doesn't match (it's actually a flag that
+    // indicates the region has to be write protected). Thus, the IFR keys are a set of four, disjointed
+    // 31-byte memory areas, plus a collection of 4 bytes that correspond to the missing MSB.
+    let ifr_keys = [
+        unsafe { core::slice::from_raw_parts(0x6040_01A0 as *const u8, 31) },
+        unsafe { core::slice::from_raw_parts(0x6040_01C0 as *const u8, 31) },
+        unsafe { core::slice::from_raw_parts(0x6040_01E0 as *const u8, 31) },
+        unsafe { core::slice::from_raw_parts(0x6040_0200 as *const u8, 31) },
+    ];
+    let ifr_msb = unsafe { core::slice::from_raw_parts(0x6040_0240 as *const u8, 4) };
+    for (i, (boot0_key, ref_key)) in pk_src.sealed_data.pubkeys.iter().zip(ifr_keys).enumerate() {
+        if ref_key != &boot0_key.pk[..31] || ifr_msb[i] != boot0_key.pk[31] {
+            good_compare = HardenedBool::FALSE;
+        }
+    }
     csprng.random_delay();
     match good_compare.is_true() {
         Some(false) => {
@@ -493,4 +508,5 @@ pub fn compare_refkeys(
         None => die(),
     }
     bollard!(die, 4);
+    good_compare
 }
diff --git a/libs/bao1x-hal/src/sigcheck.rs b/libs/bao1x-hal/src/sigcheck.rs
index bf71525fc..410236c13 100644
--- a/libs/bao1x-hal/src/sigcheck.rs
+++ b/libs/bao1x-hal/src/sigcheck.rs
@@ -276,6 +276,41 @@ pub fn erase_secrets(_csprng: &mut Option<&mut Csprng>) -> Result<(), String> {
     );
 }
 
+#[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
+pub fn erase_collateral(csprng: &mut Option<&mut Csprng>) -> Result<(), String> {
+    let slot_mgr = SlotManager::new();
+    let mut rram = crate::rram::Reram::new();
+
+    let slot = &bao1x_api::offsets::COLLATERAL;
+    for data_index in slot.try_into_data_iter().unwrap() {
+        bollard!(die_no_std, 4);
+        csprng.as_deref_mut().map(|rng| rng.random_delay());
+        // only clear ACL if it isn't already cleared
+        if slot_mgr.get_acl(slot).unwrap().raw_u32() != 0 {
+            // clear the ACL so we can operate on the data
+            slot_mgr
+                .set_acl(&mut rram, slot, &AccessSettings::Data(DataSlotAccess::new_with_raw_value(0)))
+                .expect("couldn't reset ACL");
+        }
+        let bytes = unsafe { slot_mgr.read_data_slot(data_index) };
+        // only erase if the key hasn't already been erased, to avoid stressing the RRAM array
+        // erase_secrets() may be called on every boot in some modes.
+        bollard!(die_no_std, 4);
+        if !bytes.iter().all(|&b| b == ERASE_VALUE) {
+            let mut eraser = alloc::vec::Vec::with_capacity(slot.len() * SLOT_ELEMENT_LEN_BYTES);
+            eraser.resize(slot.len() * SLOT_ELEMENT_LEN_BYTES, ERASE_VALUE);
+
+            slot_mgr.write(&mut rram, slot, &eraser).ok();
+        }
+        let check = unsafe { slot_mgr.read_data_slot(data_index) };
+        if !check.iter().all(|&b| b == ERASE_VALUE) {
+            crate::println!("Failed to erase key at {}: {:x?}", data_index, check);
+        }
+        bollard!(die_no_std, 4);
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
 pub fn erase_secrets(csprng: &mut Option<&mut Csprng>) -> Result<(), String> {
     // ensure coreuser settings, as we could enter from a variety of loader stages