diff --git a/services/root-keys/locales/i18n.json b/services/root-keys/locales/i18n.json index 1b3a7f043..f265ceeec 100644 --- a/services/root-keys/locales/i18n.json +++ b/services/root-keys/locales/i18n.json @@ -48,10 +48,10 @@ "en-tts": "Restore record is corrupted. Aborting restore!" }, "rootkeys.restore_already_init": { - "en": "Device has already been initialized. A restore will overwrite all data, and potentially fail if your device is locked to a different backup key.\n\nProceed?", + "en": "Device has already been initialized. A restore will overwrite root keys, and potentially fail if your device is locked to a different backup key.\n\nProceed?", "ja": "デバイスはすでに初期化されています。 復元するとすべてのデータが上書きされ、デバイスが別のバックアップキーにロックされていると失敗する可能性があります。\n \n続行しますか?", "zh": "设备已经初始化。 还原将覆盖所有数据,如果您的设备被锁定到不同的备份密钥,则可能会失败。\n\n是否继续?", - "en-tts": "Device has already been initialized. A restore will overwrite all data, and potentially fail if your device is locked to a different backup key.\n\nProceed?" + "en-tts": "Device has already been initialized. A restore will overwrite root keys, and potentially fail if your device is locked to a different backup key.\n\nProceed?" }, "rootkeys.backup_key_enter": { "en": "Please enter your backup key now:", diff --git a/services/root-keys/src/implementation.rs b/services/root-keys/src/implementation.rs index 5ae701e9c..799197177 100644 --- a/services/root-keys/src/implementation.rs +++ b/services/root-keys/src/implementation.rs @@ -740,6 +740,17 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys { } key } + /// Reads a 256-bit key at a given index offset + fn read_staged_key_256(&mut self, index: u8) -> [u8; 32] { + let mut key: [u8; 32] = [0; 32]; + for (addr, word) in key.chunks_mut(4).into_iter().enumerate() { + let keyword = self.sensitive_data.borrow().as_slice::()[index as usize + addr]; + for (&byte, dst) in keyword.to_be_bytes().iter().zip(word.iter_mut()) { + *dst = byte; + } + } + key + } /// Returns the `salt` needed for the `bcrypt` routine. /// This routine handles the special-case of being unitialized: in that case, we need to get @@ -1200,12 +1211,7 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys { return Err(RootkeyResult::KeyError); } - let mut enc_signing_key = [0u8; 32]; - enc_signing_key.copy_from_slice( - &self.sensitive_data.borrow().as_slice::() - [KeyRomLocs::SELFSIGN_PRIVKEY as usize * size_of::().. - KeyRomLocs::SELFSIGN_PRIVKEY as usize * size_of::() + 32] - ); + let enc_signing_key = self.read_staged_key_256(KeyRomLocs::SELFSIGN_PRIVKEY); for (key, (&enc_key, &pw)) in keypair_bytes[..ed25519_dalek::SECRET_KEY_LENGTH].iter_mut() .zip(enc_signing_key.iter().zip(pcache.hashed_update_pw.iter())) { @@ -1215,11 +1221,11 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys { #[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")] log::debug!("keypair privkey (after anti-rollback): {:x?}", &keypair_bytes[..ed25519_dalek::SECRET_KEY_LENGTH]); // read in the public key from the staged data - keypair_bytes[ed25519_dalek::SECRET_KEY_LENGTH..].copy_from_slice( - &self.sensitive_data.borrow().as_slice::() - [KeyRomLocs::SELFSIGN_PUBKEY as usize * size_of::().. - KeyRomLocs::SELFSIGN_PUBKEY as usize * size_of::() + 32] - ); + for (key, &src) in keypair_bytes[ed25519_dalek::SECRET_KEY_LENGTH..].iter_mut() + .zip(self.read_staged_key_256(KeyRomLocs::SELFSIGN_PUBKEY).iter()) { + *key = src; + } + log::info!("keypair_bytes {:x?}", keypair_bytes); // Keypair zeroizes the secret key on drop. let keypair = Keypair::from_bytes(&keypair_bytes).map_err(|_| RootkeyResult::KeyError)?; #[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")] @@ -1472,7 +1478,13 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys { // check signatures if keypair.is_some() { pb.set_percentage(96); - if !self.verify_gateware_self_signature() { + let pubkey = match update_type { + UpdateType::Restore => { + PublicKey::from_bytes(&self.read_staged_key_256(KeyRomLocs::SELFSIGN_PUBKEY)).expect("public key was not valid") + } + _ => PublicKey::from_bytes(&self.read_key_256(KeyRomLocs::SELFSIGN_PUBKEY)).expect("public key was not valid") + }; + if !self.verify_gateware_self_signature(&pubkey) { return Err(RootkeyResult::IntegrityError); } // as a sanity check, check the kernel self signature @@ -2259,10 +2271,9 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys { } /// This is a fast check on the gateware meant to be called on boot just to confirm that we're using a self-signed gateware - pub fn verify_gateware_self_signature(&mut self) -> bool { + pub fn verify_gateware_self_signature(&mut self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> bool { log::info!("verifying gateware self signature"); // read the public key directly out of the keyrom - let pubkey = PublicKey::from_bytes(&self.read_key_256(KeyRomLocs::SELFSIGN_PUBKEY)).expect("public key was not valid"); let gateware_region = self.gateware(); let mut sig_region: [u8; core::mem::size_of::()] = [0; core::mem::size_of::()]; diff --git a/services/root-keys/src/lib.rs b/services/root-keys/src/lib.rs index b442b4f6b..10093267d 100644 --- a/services/root-keys/src/lib.rs +++ b/services/root-keys/src/lib.rs @@ -143,13 +143,13 @@ impl RootKeys { } pub fn do_restore_backup_ux_flow(&self) { send_message(self.conn, - Message::new_scalar(Opcode::DoRestore.to_usize().unwrap(), + Message::new_blocking_scalar(Opcode::DoRestore.to_usize().unwrap(), 0, 0, 0, 0) ).expect("couldn't send message to root keys"); } pub fn do_erase_backup(&self) { send_message(self.conn, - Message::new_scalar(Opcode::EraseBackupBlock.to_usize().unwrap(), + Message::new_blocking_scalar(Opcode::EraseBackupBlock.to_usize().unwrap(), 0, 0, 0, 0) ).expect("couldn't send message to root keys"); } diff --git a/services/root-keys/src/main.rs b/services/root-keys/src/main.rs index 7aaac6b33..569f5e0e3 100644 --- a/services/root-keys/src/main.rs +++ b/services/root-keys/src/main.rs @@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ fn main() -> ! { use crate::implementation::RootKeys; log_server::init_wait().unwrap(); - log::set_max_level(log::LevelFilter::Debug); + log::set_max_level(log::LevelFilter::Info); log::info!("my PID is {}", xous::process::id()); let xns = xous_names::XousNames::new().unwrap(); @@ -1404,6 +1404,7 @@ fn main() -> ! { } Some(Opcode::DoRestore) => { // check to see if the device was already initialized. If so, warn the user. + deferred_response = Some(msg.sender); if keys.is_initialized() { modals.add_list_item(t!("rootkeys.confirm.yes", xous::LANG)).expect("modals error"); modals.add_list_item(t!("rootkeys.confirm.no", xous::LANG)).expect("modals error"); @@ -1412,6 +1413,9 @@ fn main() -> ! { Ok(response) => { if response == t!("rootkeys.confirm.no", xous::LANG) { modals.show_notification(t!("rootkeys.restore_abort", xous::LANG), None).ok(); + if let Some(sender) = deferred_response { + xous::return_scalar(sender, 1).ok(); + } continue; } } @@ -1419,10 +1423,14 @@ fn main() -> ! { } } // try the '0' key and skip key entry (developers will not have burned an AES key) + let mut showed_zero_key_notice = false; if let Ok((mut header, ct)) = keys.read_backup() { if header.op != BackupOp::Restore { log::warn!("Header op was not Restore. Aborting!"); modals.show_notification(t!("rootkeys.restore_corrupt", xous::LANG), None).ok(); + if let Some(sender) = deferred_response { + xous::return_scalar(sender, 1).ok(); + } continue; } let mut restore_key = backups::BackupKey::default(); // default is the 0 key @@ -1441,14 +1449,18 @@ fn main() -> ! { } else { // notify of zero key modals.show_notification(t!("rootkeys.restore_zero_key", xous::LANG), None).ok(); + showed_zero_key_notice = true; } // actual restore if let Some(pt) = backups::restore_backup(&restore_key, &ct) { // everything should match except for the op. header.op = pt.header.op; // now check that the two records are identical - if pt.deref() != header.deref() { + if pt.header.deref() != header.deref() { modals.show_notification(t!("rootkeys.restore_corrupt", xous::LANG), None).ok(); + if let Some(sender) = deferred_response { + xous::return_scalar(sender, 1).ok(); + } continue; } let mut restore_rom = backups::KeyRomExport::default(); @@ -1477,7 +1489,9 @@ fn main() -> ! { restore_rom.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&[0u32; 8]); } if restore_key.0 == [0u8; 32] { - modals.show_notification(t!("rootkeys.restore_needs_keyburn", xous::LANG), None).ok(); + if !showed_zero_key_notice { + modals.show_notification(t!("rootkeys.restore_needs_keyburn", xous::LANG), None).ok(); + } } // this will setup the pepper so we can request a password keys.setup_restore_init(restore_key, restore_rom); @@ -1539,26 +1553,43 @@ fn main() -> ! { send_message(main_cid, xous::Message::new_scalar(Opcode::UxTryReboot.to_usize().unwrap(), 0, 0, 0, 0) ).expect("couldn't initiate dialog box"); + // don't unblock the caller if we go to the reboot arc } Err(RootkeyResult::AlignmentError) => { modals.show_notification(t!("rootkeys.init.fail_alignment", xous::LANG), None).expect("modals error"); + if let Some(sender) = deferred_response { + xous::return_scalar(sender, 1).ok(); + } } Err(RootkeyResult::KeyError) => { modals.show_notification(t!("rootkeys.init.fail_key", xous::LANG), None).expect("modals error"); + if let Some(sender) = deferred_response { + xous::return_scalar(sender, 1).ok(); + } } Err(RootkeyResult::IntegrityError) => { modals.show_notification(t!("rootkeys.init.fail_verify", xous::LANG), None).expect("modals error"); + if let Some(sender) = deferred_response { + xous::return_scalar(sender, 1).ok(); + } } Err(RootkeyResult::FlashError) => { modals.show_notification(t!("rootkeys.init.fail_burn", xous::LANG), None).expect("modals error"); + if let Some(sender) = deferred_response { + xous::return_scalar(sender, 1).ok(); + } } Err(RootkeyResult::StateError) => { modals.show_notification(t!("rootkeys.wrong_state", xous::LANG), None).expect("modals error"); + if let Some(sender) = deferred_response { + xous::return_scalar(sender, 1).ok(); + } } } } Some(Opcode::EraseBackupBlock) => { keys.erase_backup(); + xous::return_scalar(msg.sender, 1).ok(); } Some(Opcode::IsZeroKey) => msg_blocking_scalar_unpack!(msg, _, _, _, _, { let query = keys.is_zero_key();