From 61409bb94c7c46484b10a89f6dc1afd96ab47804 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: bunnie Date: Tue, 5 Jan 2021 02:28:27 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] update README on xous-names, and refine the API a bit --- services/shell/src/main.rs | 17 ++-- services/xous-names/README.md | 96 ++++++++++++------- services/xous-names/src/api.rs | 157 ++++++++++++++++---------------- services/xous-names/src/lib.rs | 17 +++- services/xous-names/src/main.rs | 6 +- 5 files changed, 167 insertions(+), 126 deletions(-) diff --git a/services/shell/src/main.rs b/services/shell/src/main.rs index 6a4b2fe4c..371dc2b51 100644 --- a/services/shell/src/main.rs +++ b/services/shell/src/main.rs @@ -5,10 +5,11 @@ use blitstr::{Cursor, GlyphStyle}; use com::*; use core::fmt::Write; use graphics_server::{Circle, DrawStyle, Line, PixelColor, Point, Rectangle}; +use xous_names::api::Registration; + use log::{error, info}; use xous::String; use xous::ipc::*; -use xous_names::api::Registration; use core::convert::TryFrom; @@ -138,7 +139,7 @@ fn shell_main() -> ! { let ticktimer_server_id = xous::SID::from_bytes(b"ticktimer-server").unwrap(); let log_server_id = xous::SID::from_bytes(b"xous-log-server ").unwrap(); let com_id = xous::SID::from_bytes(b"com ").unwrap(); - let ns_id = xous::SID::from_bytes(b"xousnames-server").unwrap(); + let ns_id = xous::SID::from_bytes(b"xous-name-server").unwrap(); let log_conn = xous::connect(log_server_id).unwrap(); let graphics_conn = xous::connect(graphics_server_id).unwrap(); @@ -219,12 +220,7 @@ fn shell_main() -> ! { .expect("unable to clear region"); let mut firsttime = true; - let mut registration = Registration { - sid: xous::SID::from_u32(0, 0, 0, 0,), - name: *b"test name ", - name_len: b"test name".len(), - success: false - }; + let mut registration = Registration::new(); let mut sendable_registration = Sendable::new(registration) .expect("can't create sendable registration structure"); loop { @@ -361,8 +357,11 @@ fn shell_main() -> ! { get_batt_stats_nb(com_conn).expect("Can't get battery stats from COM"); info!("Test NS lookup"); sendable_registration.success = false; + let test_name = b"A test Name!"; + sendable_registration.name[..test_name.len()].clone_from_slice(test_name); + sendable_registration.name_len = test_name.len(); info!("NS lookup input: {:?}", sendable_registration.success); - sendable_registration.lend_mut(ns_conn, xous_names::api::ID_REGISTER_NAME); + sendable_registration.lend_mut(ns_conn, sendable_registration.mid()); info!("NS lookup result: {:?}", sendable_registration.success); } } else { diff --git a/services/xous-names/README.md b/services/xous-names/README.md index a474fea59..a3ddb5075 100644 --- a/services/xous-names/README.md +++ b/services/xous-names/README.md @@ -6,80 +6,106 @@ forge an SID before a server can claim it, it can “become” the server. Thus, it’s helpful to keep the SID a secret. In Xous, an SID is a 128-bit number that, with two exceptions, is only -known to the server itself, and an oracle known as `xous-names`. +known to the server itself, and an oracle known as `xous-name-server`. SIDs are never revealed to a process. Processes establish connections to servers using a descriptive, human-readable string name. Since the SIDs are random numbers, there is no way to turn the descriptive -string into the SID except by resolving it with `xous-names`. +string into the SID except by resolving it with `xous-name-server`. On boot, a trusted set of processes are started which form the operating system. These must all claim names in the name space before any further processes are started, to prevent later processes from claiming their names. -The exception to random SIDs are the `xous-names` and -`log-server`. These are two well known names that have a defined, -fixed SID so that all processes can talk to them; `xous-names` is +The exception to random SIDs are the `xous-name-server` and +`xous-log-server ` (note the trailing space). These are two well known names that have a defined, +fixed SID so that all processes can talk to them; `xous-name-server` is necessarily well-known as it is the mechanism to resolve further -names, `log-server` is necessary for debugging, so that bugs upstream -of name resolution can be logged. `xous-names` was picked because +names, `xous-log-server ` is necessary for debugging, so that bugs upstream +of name resolution can be logged. `xous-name-server` was picked because `name-server` already has a meaning in the context of DNS. A new process that intends to receive messages initializes using the following procedure: -1. It creates a SID by calling `xous::create_server()` (*note*: this -needs to be refactored to take no argument). The SID is a 128-bit -GUID. +1. It creates a `Registration` IPC structure by wrapping it in `xous::ipc::Sendable`, +using the `new()` initializer. -2. It registers the SID by sending `xous-names` a “Mutable Borrow” -`MemoryMessage` consisting of a `struct` containing a preferred UTF-8 -name string (limited to how long?) plus its 128-bit SID, as well as an -empty slot for the response. The sending process will block until -`xous-names` returns. +2. It copies a preferred ASCII name string, limited to 64 characters, +into the `Registration` record. It then uses the `.lend_mut()` method +on the Sendable Registration to lend the structure to `xous-name-server`. +The sending process will block until `xous-name-server` returns. -3. `xous-names` returns the borrowed memory to the server, with the +3. `xous-name-server` returns the borrowed memory to the server, with the response field with a code that either affirms the name was registered, or the registration is denied (because the proposed name -is already taken or otherwise invalid). +is already taken or otherwise invalid). In the case that the registration +is affirmed, the SID field in `Registration` contains the assigned SID +of calling process. 4. If the registration is denied, the server can attempt to -re-register its SID with a different UTF-8 name string by repeating +re-register its SID with a different ASCII name string by repeating steps 2-3. A process that would like to send a server a message does so using the following procedure: -1. It sends `xous-names` a “Mutable Borrow” `MemoryMessage` consisting -of a `struct` containing the preferred UTF-8 name of the server it -wants to talk to, along with slots for the response codes. +1. It creates a `Lookup` IPC structure by wrapping it in a `xous::ipc::Sendable`, +using the `new()` initializer. -2. `xous-names` can respond with one of three results: A. affirm the -connection, where one of the slots contains the connection ID; B. a -flat denial of the connection; or C. a slot containing a request to -authenticate. +2. It populates the Lookup structure with the name of the server it is looking up. + +3. It uses `.lend_mut()` method to send `xous-name-server` a “Mutable Borrow” +`MemoryMessage`. + +4. `xous-name-server` can respond with one of three results: + A. affirm the connection, where one of the slots contains the connection ID; + B. a flat denial of the connection; or + C. a slot containing a request to authenticate. Here are the cases worked out: -A. affirming the connection: `xous-names` would use +A. affirming the connection: `xous-name-server` would use `MessageSender.pid()` to extract the sender’s PID, and call `ConnectForProcess(PID,SID)` on behalf of the sender. The sender can then use the CID as the first argument to `send_message()`. This is the common case, and many servers follow this path, such as those asking for access to the `ticktimer` or other public services. -B. flat denial: `xous-names` simply returns a message saying the -request was denied. This is also the case when the request is -malformed or incorrect. No information shall be leaked about the -nature of the denial. Denials are also delayed by exactly 0.5 seconds +B. flat denial: `xous-name-server` simply returns a message saying the +request was denied by setting `success` to `false`. This is also the case +when the request is malformed or incorrect. No information shall be leaked about the +nature of the denial. Denials are also delayed to the nearest 0.5 second interval since boot to eliminate side channels and to rate limit fuzzing requests. Some services (such as the key server) are restricted to only a set of trusted process loaded at boot, and therefore it should not be discoverable. -C. request to authenticate: `xous-names` responds with a 32-bit nonce -that the sending process must hash then sign with a private key to -prove that it is authorized to communicate with the requested -server. This is used to handle the intermediate case of a user-crafted -process requiring elevated access. +C. request to authenticate: `xous-name-server` responds with `success` set +to `false`, but `authenticate_request` to `true`. The `pubkey_id` field +is populated with the ID of an acceptable Ed25519 public key for authentication, and +a 256-bit challenge nonce is provided in the `challenge` field. Authentication +consists of the requesting server proving that it has knowledge of a shared +secret, namely, an Ed25519 private key. + +Upon generating the request to authenticate, `xous-name-server` computes +the correct response to the challenge and stores it in a table with +a timestamp. + +The sending process must then sign the `challenge` and return an +`Authenticate` message, constructed similarly to the `Lookup` +message but with the `response_to_challenge` field filled out. It must +do this before `AUTHENTICATE_TIMEOUT` milliseconds have passed. +The server, upon receipt of an `Authenticate` message, merely checks +if the `response_to_challenge` matches any response stored in its +table, and if it does, it accepts the process as authenticated. It is +cryptographically unlikely for there to be a collision in the table; +however, this implementation is weak to an attacker potentially +stealing the response and using it. That being said, if an attacker +already has that level of control in the calling process, there +are bigger problems. + +The `AUTHENTICATE_TIMEOUT` field is used to give `xous-name-server` +a chance to depopulate the response table over time, so that it +does not "leak" memory. diff --git a/services/xous-names/src/api.rs b/services/xous-names/src/api.rs index 23b68017c..43fda0c00 100644 --- a/services/xous-names/src/api.rs +++ b/services/xous-names/src/api.rs @@ -1,92 +1,91 @@ use xous::{Message, ScalarMessage, SID}; -pub struct Registration { - pub sid: SID, - pub name: [u8; 64], - pub name_len: usize, - pub success: bool, - // _padding: [u8; 4096-(core::mem::size_of::() + 64 + core::mem::size_of::() + core::mem::size_of::], -} - -pub struct Lookup { - sid: SID, - name: [u8; 64], - name_len: usize, - success: bool, - autheticate: bool, - challenge: [u32; 8], - response: [u32; 8], - // _padding: [u8; 4096-(core::mem::size_of::() + 64 + core::mem::size_of::() + core::mem::size_of::], -} - pub const ID_REGISTER_NAME: usize = 0; pub const ID_LOOKUP_NAME: usize = 1; pub const ID_AUTHENTICATE: usize = 2; -/* +pub const AUTHENTICATE_TIMEOUT: usize = 10_000; // time in ms that a process has to respond to an authentication request + #[derive(Debug)] -pub enum Opcode { - /// Register a 128-bit SID with a preferred, unique lookup name - RegisterName(Registration), - - /// Retrieve the 128-bit SID for a server, given its unique lookup name - LookupName(Lookup), - - /// Authenticate to the name server, based on nonce embedded in LookupName response - /// this is always as a response to a lookupname that reqeusts the authentication challenge-response - Authenticate(Lookup), +pub struct Registration { + mid: usize, + pub sid: SID, + // we use fixed-length, u8-only records to pass server names. This is different from + // your typical Rust String object; but, a key restriction on IPC calls is that the size + // of structures must be (1) statically known and (2) contain no references. Therefore + // the name is a pre-allocated, 64-length u8 array, and the length of the name is explicitly encoded. + pub name: [u8; 64], + pub name_len: usize, + pub success: bool, } -impl<'a> core::convert::TryFrom<&'a Message> for Opcode { - type Error = &'static str; - fn try_from(message: &'a Message) -> Result { - match message { - Message::MutableBorrow(m) => { - if m.id as u16 == ID_REGISTER_NAME { - let registration: Registration = unsafe { - &mut *(m.buf.as_mut_ptr() as *mut Registration) - }; - Ok(Opcode::RegisterName(registration)) - } - } - _ => Err("unhandled message type"), - } - } -}*/ +impl Registration { + pub fn mid(&self) -> usize { self.mid } -/* No "Into<>" methods -- we use the ipc::lend() to create messages -impl Into for Opcode { - fn into(self) -> Message { - match self { - Opcode::Reset => Message::Scalar(ScalarMessage { - id: 1, - arg1: 0, - arg2: 0, - arg3: 0, - arg4: 0, - }), - Opcode::RecalculateSleep => Message::Scalar(ScalarMessage { - id: 131072, - arg1: 0, - arg2: 0, - arg3: 0, - arg4: 0, - }), - Opcode::ElapsedMs => Message::BlockingScalar(ScalarMessage { - id: 4919, - arg1: 0, - arg2: 0, - arg3: 0, - arg4: 0, - }), - Opcode::SleepMs(ms) => Message::BlockingScalar(ScalarMessage { - id: 3, - arg1: ms, - arg2: 0, - arg3: 0, - arg4: 0, - }), + pub fn new() -> Self { + Registration { + mid: ID_REGISTER_NAME, + sid: xous::SID::from_u32(0,0,0,0), + name: [0; 64], + name_len: 0, + success: false, } } } -*/ \ No newline at end of file + +#[derive(Debug)] +pub struct Lookup { + mid: usize, + pub cid: xous::CID, + pub name: [u8; 64], + pub name_len: usize, + pub success: bool, + pub authenticate_request: bool, + pub pubkey_id: [u8; 20], // 160-bit pubkey ID encoded in network order (big endian) + pub challenge: [u32; 8], +} + +impl Default for Lookup { + fn default() -> Self { + Lookup { + mid: ID_LOOKUP_NAME, + cid: 0, + name: [0; 64], + name_len: 0, + success: false, + authenticate_request: false, + pubkey_id: [0; 20], + challenge: [0; 8], + } + } +} +impl Lookup { + pub fn mid(&self) -> usize { self.mid } +} + +#[derive(Debug)] +pub struct Authenticate { + mid: usize, + pub cid: xous::CID, + pub name: [u8; 64], + pub name_len: usize, + pub success: bool, + pub response_to_challenge: [u32; 8], +} + +impl Default for Authenticate { + fn default() -> Self { + Authenticate { + mid: ID_AUTHENTICATE, + cid: 0, + name: [0; 64], + name_len: 0, + success: false, + response_to_challenge: [0; 8], + } + } +} + +impl Authenticate { + pub fn mid(&self) -> usize { self.mid } +} diff --git a/services/xous-names/src/lib.rs b/services/xous-names/src/lib.rs index 315ae600b..1be5573f9 100644 --- a/services/xous-names/src/lib.rs +++ b/services/xous-names/src/lib.rs @@ -2,4 +2,19 @@ pub mod api; -use xous::{send_message, Error, CID}; +/* +Calls are made using the xous::ipc::Sendable IPC wrapper, for example: + + use xous::ipc::*; + + let mut registration = Registration::new(); + let mut sendable_registration = Sendable::new(registration) + .expect("can't create sendable registration structure"); + + let test_name = b"A test Name!"; + sendable_registration.name[..test_name.len()].clone_from_slice(test_name); + sendable_registration.name_len = test_name.len(); + + sendable_registration.lend_mut(ns_conn, sendable_registration.mid()); + +*/ diff --git a/services/xous-names/src/main.rs b/services/xous-names/src/main.rs index 611a9971e..a7601cdaa 100644 --- a/services/xous-names/src/main.rs +++ b/services/xous-names/src/main.rs @@ -15,7 +15,9 @@ fn xmain() -> ! { log_server::init_wait().unwrap(); let name_server = - xous::create_server_with_address(b"xousnames-server").expect("Couldn't create xousnames-server"); + xous::create_server_with_address(b"xous-name-server").expect("Couldn't create xousnames-server"); + + xous::create_server(); info!("NS: started"); loop { @@ -30,7 +32,7 @@ fn xmain() -> ! { let name: String = String::from_utf8(namevec).unwrap(); info!("NS: registration request for {}", name); registration.success = true; - xous::return_memory(envelope.sender, m.buf).unwrap(); + // memory is automatically returend upon exit, no need for explicit return of memory } else { error!("NS: unknown message ID received"); }