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https://github.com/saymrwulf/xous-core.git
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refactor the key ordering specification
this makes it much easier to check for errors - and one was found,
the erase coupon was accidentally off by one, and equal to the
master key slot. oops! 🤦
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58d17f1423
2 changed files with 52 additions and 36 deletions
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@ -42,33 +42,6 @@ pub const CPU_VDD_LDO_BOOT_MV: u32 = 810;
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pub const DEFAULT_FCLK_FREQUENCY: u32 = 700_000_000;
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// =========== KEY SLOTS ==============
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/// The `ROOT_SEED` is the "mothership" secret that all device identity and secrets
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/// are derived from. The seed may be blended with other bits of data scattered about
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/// the RRAM array, other device identifiers and hardware measurements to create the final
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/// device secret key.
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pub const ROOT_SEED: SlotIndex = SlotIndex::Data(256, PartitionAccess::Fw0, RwPerms::ReadWrite);
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/// The `RMA_KEY` is a secret parameter that is unique per-device secret which is recorded
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/// at manufacturing time. Its purpose is to facilitate the creation of a signed RMA
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/// authorization certificate which upon receipt would blank the device and unlock various
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/// features for debugging failed hardware.
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pub const RMA_KEY: SlotIndex = SlotIndex::Data(257, PartitionAccess::Fw0, RwPerms::ReadWrite);
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/// Reserved for use as a CP to FT tracking cookie. This is used to help track inventory
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/// between CP and FT, if such a feature is desired in the supply chain. Blanked on entry
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/// to developer mode.
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pub const CP_COOKIE: SlotIndex = SlotIndex::Data(258, PartitionAccess::Fw0, RwPerms::ReadWrite);
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/// The swap encryption key. Used to protect swap images beyond the signing key, if we so desire.
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pub const SWAP_KEY: SlotIndex = SlotIndex::Data(259, PartitionAccess::Fw0, RwPerms::ReadWrite);
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/// A test value placed by FT into the memory array. If you can read the original value, you've captured a
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/// flag!
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/// There is a second flag stored somewhere else. Can you find it?
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pub const THE_FLAG_1: SlotIndex = SlotIndex::Data(260, PartitionAccess::Fw0, RwPerms::ReadWrite);
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// NOTE: COLLATERAL is from 261..265, but it is in the "common" page
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/// `NUISANCE_KEYS` are hashed together with `ROOT_SEED` to derive the core secret.
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/// Their primary purpose is to annoy microscopists trying to read the secret key by
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/// directly imaging the RRAM array. They also exist to reduce power side channels
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@ -89,15 +62,14 @@ pub const THE_FLAG_1: SlotIndex = SlotIndex::Data(260, PartitionAccess::Fw0, RwP
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/// is convenient because that's the natural page size over which the key range will be carved up before
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/// handing to other processes.
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///
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/// The first 8 keys in bank 0 of NUISANCE_KEYS is not used. This is because due to an ECO in the A1
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/// spin of silicon, the JTAG-wired access control on these is going to be tied to those on the similarly
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/// numbered data slots. Some of the data slots in the first 8 slots will be read-only at CP time, and
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/// thus they can't be initialized with random data and be used as a nuisance key. This is a minor degradation
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/// in security margin.
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/// The first 8 keys in bank 0 of NUISANCE_KEYS alias with data slots 0..7. This is because due to an ECO in
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/// the A1 spin of silicon that effectively removes the key bank, meaning only data banks exist.
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/// The IFR-managed access control on these is going to be tied to those on the similarly numbered data slots,
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/// and the control happens on a stride of 8 slots at a time.
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///
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/// Notice there is a second range of nuisance keys at the end of the slot range (1920..2048), stuck there
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/// to force spatial diversity in the nuisance keys.
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pub const NUISANCE_KEYS_0: SlotIndex = SlotIndex::DataRange(8..128, PartitionAccess::Fw0, RwPerms::ReadWrite);
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pub const NUISANCE_KEYS_1: SlotIndex =
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SlotIndex::DataRange(1920..2048, PartitionAccess::Fw0, RwPerms::ReadWrite);
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pub const NUISANCE_KEYS: [SlotIndex; 2] = [NUISANCE_KEYS_0, NUISANCE_KEYS_1];
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/// `CHAFF_KEYS` are a bank of keys that are hashed into the key array, but instead of
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/// being read out in strict order, they are read in a random permutation every time.
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@ -131,7 +103,41 @@ pub const CHAFF_KEYS: SlotIndex = SlotIndex::DataRange(128..256, PartitionAccess
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/// Placing this at the end of the key array ostensibly means that all the keys before it were
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/// erased; it might be possible to glitch all the way to the end and just have this one erased
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/// but I think that is reasonably unlikely...
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pub const ERASE_PROOF: SlotIndex = SlotIndex::Data(256, PartitionAccess::Fw0, RwPerms::ReadWrite);
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pub const ERASE_PROOF: SlotIndex = SlotIndex::Data(255, PartitionAccess::Fw0, RwPerms::ReadWrite);
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/// The `ROOT_SEED` is the "mothership" secret that all device identity and secrets
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/// are derived from. The seed may be blended with other bits of data scattered about
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/// the RRAM array, other device identifiers and hardware measurements to create the final
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/// device secret key.
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pub const ROOT_SEED: SlotIndex = SlotIndex::Data(256, PartitionAccess::Fw0, RwPerms::ReadWrite);
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/// The `RMA_KEY` is a secret parameter that is unique per-device secret which is recorded
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/// at manufacturing time. Its purpose is to facilitate the creation of a signed RMA
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/// authorization certificate which upon receipt would blank the device and unlock various
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/// features for debugging failed hardware.
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pub const RMA_KEY: SlotIndex = SlotIndex::Data(257, PartitionAccess::Fw0, RwPerms::ReadWrite);
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/// Reserved for use as a CP to FT tracking cookie. This is used to help track inventory
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/// between CP and FT, if such a feature is desired in the supply chain. Blanked on entry
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/// to developer mode.
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pub const CP_COOKIE: SlotIndex = SlotIndex::Data(258, PartitionAccess::Fw0, RwPerms::ReadWrite);
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/// The swap encryption key. Used to protect swap images beyond the signing key, if we so desire.
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pub const SWAP_KEY: SlotIndex = SlotIndex::Data(259, PartitionAccess::Fw0, RwPerms::ReadWrite);
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/// A test value placed by FT into the memory array. If you can read the original value, you've captured a
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/// flag!
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/// There is a second flag stored somewhere else. Can you find it?
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pub const THE_FLAG_1: SlotIndex = SlotIndex::Data(260, PartitionAccess::Fw0, RwPerms::ReadWrite);
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// [261..=383] reserved for Baochip data slot usage, see the "common" page for more details
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// NOTE: COLLATERAL is from 261..265, but it is in the "common" page
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// [384..=1919] are unused and available for third party use
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pub const NUISANCE_KEYS_1: SlotIndex =
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SlotIndex::DataRange(1920..2048, PartitionAccess::Fw0, RwPerms::ReadWrite);
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pub const NUISANCE_KEYS: [SlotIndex; 2] = [NUISANCE_KEYS_0, NUISANCE_KEYS_1];
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/// All the slots of concern located in a single iterator. The idea is that everything is
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/// condensed here and used to check for access integrity using the array below.
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@ -237,6 +237,8 @@ pub const BAO2_PUBKEY: SlotIndex = SlotIndex::Data(5, PartitionAccess::All, RwPe
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pub const BETA_PUBKEY: SlotIndex = SlotIndex::Data(6, PartitionAccess::All, RwPerms::ReadOnly);
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pub const DEV_PUBKEY: SlotIndex = SlotIndex::Data(7, PartitionAccess::All, RwPerms::ReadOnly);
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// [8..=260 used as nuisance and master keys]
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/// Collateral is a data range that is *always* erased every time the system transitions from boot0
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/// to a Baochip-signed boot1. The only condition under which it is not erased is if *all* the boot1 keys
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/// in slots 0, 1, *and* 2 do *not* match the Baochip set.
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@ -269,6 +271,14 @@ pub const BOOT1_PK_RECEIPT_SLOT3: SlotIndex = SlotIndex::Data(268, PartitionAcce
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pub const BOOT1_RECEIPT_SLOTS: [SlotIndex; 4] =
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[BOOT1_PK_RECEIPT_SLOT0, BOOT1_PK_RECEIPT_SLOT1, BOOT1_PK_RECEIPT_SLOT2, BOOT1_PK_RECEIPT_SLOT3];
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// [269..=271] reserved for future use
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// 32 bytes reserved to configure/set up clock scrambling
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pub const CLOCK_SCRAMBLE_PARAMS: SlotIndex = SlotIndex::Data(272, PartitionAccess::Open, RwPerms::ReadWrite);
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// [273..=383] available for future data slot usage - in particular opentitan provisioning block (2k of data)
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// can fit in this with some margin.
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// Notes on defining the boot0 IFR region.
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// RISC-V boot0 region start is defined by IFR slot 6, bits [55:48]
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// RISC-V boot1 region start (which is boot0 end) is defined by IFR slot 6, bits[47:40]
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