convert bootloader to use prehash method

This applies to the *kernel* image.

The loader itself is still signed with the conventional signature.

Version number of the loader is also incremented.
This commit is contained in:
bunnie 2024-01-05 16:08:22 +08:00
parent d88e446a33
commit 5894e71095

View file

@ -1,14 +1,17 @@
use crate::println; use crate::println;
use sha2_loader::Sha512;
use ed25519_dalek_loader::Digest;
use crate::SIGBLOCK_SIZE; use crate::SIGBLOCK_SIZE;
const VERSION_STR: &'static str = "Xous OS Loader v0.9.5\n\r"; const VERSION_STR: &'static str = "Xous OS Loader v0.9.6\n\r";
// v0.9.0 -- initial version // v0.9.0 -- initial version
// v0.9.1 -- booting with hw acceleration, and "simplest signature" check on the entire xous.img blob // v0.9.1 -- booting with hw acceleration, and "simplest signature" check on the entire xous.img blob
// v0.9.2 -- add version and length check between header and signed area // v0.9.2 -- add version and length check between header and signed area
// v0.9.3 -- add lockout of key ROM in die() routine // v0.9.3 -- add lockout of key ROM in die() routine
// v0.9.4 -- monorepo conversion // v0.9.4 -- monorepo conversion
// v0.9.5 -- multiplatform conversion and phase 1 optimization // v0.9.5 -- multiplatform conversion and phase 1 optimization
// v0.9.6 -- convert signature check to pre-hash signature (see #472 https://github.com/betrusted-io/xous-core/issues/472)
pub const STACK_LEN: u32 = 8192 - (7 * 4); // 7 words for backup kernel args pub const STACK_LEN: u32 = 8192 - (7 * 4); // 7 words for backup kernel args
pub const STACK_TOP: u32 = 0x4100_0000 - STACK_LEN; pub const STACK_TOP: u32 = 0x4100_0000 - STACK_LEN;
@ -403,11 +406,18 @@ pub fn validate_xous_img(xous_img_offset: *const u32) -> bool {
let protected_len = let protected_len =
u32::from_le_bytes(image[signed_len as usize - 4..].try_into().unwrap()); u32::from_le_bytes(image[signed_len as usize - 4..].try_into().unwrap());
// check that the signed versions match the version reported in the header // check that the signed versions match the version reported in the header
if sig.version != 1 || (sig.version != protected_version) { if sig.version != 2 || (sig.version != protected_version) {
if sig.version == 1 {
gfx.msg(
"v1 signature found, but v2 required.\n\rIs your kernel up to date?\n\r",
&mut cursor,
);
} else {
gfx.msg( gfx.msg(
"Check fail: mismatch on signature record version numbering.\n\r", "Check fail: mismatch on signature record version numbering.\n\r",
&mut cursor, &mut cursor,
); );
}
println!("Check fail: mismatch on signature record version numbering.\n\r"); println!("Check fail: mismatch on signature record version numbering.\n\r");
println!("sig.version: {}", sig.version); println!("sig.version: {}", sig.version);
println!("protected_version: {}", protected_version); println!("protected_version: {}", protected_version);
@ -435,13 +445,16 @@ pub fn validate_xous_img(xous_img_offset: *const u32) -> bool {
} }
let ed25519_signature = ed25519_dalek_loader::Signature::from(sig.signature); let ed25519_signature = ed25519_dalek_loader::Signature::from(sig.signature);
use ed25519_dalek_loader::Verifier;
gfx.msg("Checking signature...\n\r", &mut cursor); gfx.msg("Checking signature...\n\r", &mut cursor);
if pubkey.verify(image, &ed25519_signature).is_ok() { let mut h: Sha512 = Sha512::new();
h.update(&image);
if pubkey.verify_prehashed(h, None, &ed25519_signature).is_ok() {
gfx.msg("Signature check passed\n\r", &mut cursor); gfx.msg("Signature check passed\n\r", &mut cursor);
println!("Signature check passed"); println!("Signature check passed");
break; break;
} else { } else {
gfx.msg("Downgrading security...\n\r", &mut cursor);
println!("Downgrading security...");
// signature didn't work out, setup the next key and try it // signature didn't work out, setup the next key and try it
match keyloc { match keyloc {
KeyLoc::SelfSignPub => { KeyLoc::SelfSignPub => {