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https://github.com/saymrwulf/xous-core.git
synced 2026-11-15 08:30:02 +00:00
patch over rootkeys issues with the new hash
- new api incantations - KeyInit trait demotion into individual functions - decomposition of Scalar derivations because the hasher API changes and is no longer directly passable into Scalar (this should probably get reverted if/when curve25519/ed25519 is bumped in API later...) - notes about areas that should be hardware accelerated but are not
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9a5fac408c
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1 changed files with 21 additions and 14 deletions
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@ -6,12 +6,11 @@ use core::convert::TryInto;
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use core::mem::size_of;
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use core::num::NonZeroUsize;
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use aes::cipher::{BlockDecrypt, BlockEncrypt, KeyInit};
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use aes::cipher::{BlockDecrypt, BlockEncrypt};
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use aes::Aes256;
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use cipher::generic_array::GenericArray;
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use curve25519_dalek::constants;
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use curve25519_dalek::scalar::Scalar;
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use digest::Digest;
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use ed25519_dalek::{ExpandedSecretKey, Keypair, PublicKey, SecretKey, Signature, Signer};
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use gam::modal::{ActionType, Modal, ProgressBar, Slider};
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use graphics_server::BulkRead;
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@ -21,7 +20,8 @@ use num_traits::*;
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pub use oracle::FpgaKeySource;
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use rand_core::RngCore;
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use root_keys::key2bits::*;
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use sha2::{FallbackStrategy, Sha256, Sha512, Sha512Trunc256};
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use sha2::Digest;
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use sha2::{Sha256, Sha512, Sha512_256Sw};
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use utralib::generated::*;
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use xous::KERNEL_BACKUP_OFFSET;
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use xous_semver::SemVer;
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@ -56,8 +56,8 @@ const SELFSIG_OFFSET: usize = 0x27_F000;
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/// This structure is mapped into the password cache page and can be zero-ized at any time
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/// we avoid using fancy Rust structures because everything has to "make sense" after a forced zero-ization
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/// The "password" here is generated as follows:
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/// `user plaintext (up to first 72 bytes) -> bcrypt (24 bytes) -> sha512trunc256 -> [u8; 32]`
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/// The final sha512trunc256 expansion is because we will use this to XOR against secret keys stored in
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/// `user plaintext (up to first 72 bytes) -> bcrypt (24 bytes) -> Sha512_256 -> [u8; 32]`
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/// The final Sha512_256 expansion is because we will use this to XOR against secret keys stored in
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/// the KEYROM that may be up to 256 bits in length. For shorter keys, the hashed password is simply
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/// truncated.
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#[repr(C)]
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@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
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} // prevent increment-up attacks that roll over
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log::debug!("rollback_limit: {}", rollback_limit);
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for _i in 0..MAX_ROLLBACK_LIMIT - rollback_limit as u8 {
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let mut hasher = Sha512Trunc256::new_with_strategy(FallbackStrategy::SoftwareOnly);
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let mut hasher = Sha512_256Sw::new();
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hasher.update(&key);
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let digest = hasher.finalize();
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assert!(digest.len() == 32, "Digest had an incorrect length");
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@ -400,6 +400,7 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
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/// data laying around.
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/// ASSUME: the caller has confirmed that the user password is valid and in cache
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pub fn aes_op(&mut self, key_index: u8, op_type: AesOpType, block: &mut [u8; 16]) {
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use aes::cipher::KeyInit;
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let mut key = match key_index {
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KeyRomLocs::USER_KEY => {
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let mut key_enc = self.read_key_256(KeyRomLocs::USER_KEY);
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@ -433,6 +434,7 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
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}
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pub fn aes_par_op(&mut self, key_index: u8, op_type: AesOpType, blocks: &mut [[u8; 16]; PAR_BLOCKS]) {
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use aes::cipher::KeyInit;
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let mut key = match key_index {
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KeyRomLocs::USER_KEY => {
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let mut key_enc = self.read_key_256(KeyRomLocs::USER_KEY);
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@ -859,8 +861,7 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
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// expand the 24-byte (192-bit) bcrypt result into 256 bits, so we can use it directly as XOR key
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// material against 256-bit AES and curve25519 keys
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// for such a small hash, software is the most performant choice
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let mut hasher = Sha512Trunc256::new_with_strategy(FallbackStrategy::SoftwareOnly);
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let mut hasher = Sha512_256Sw::new();
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hasher.update(hashed_password);
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let digest = hasher.finalize();
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@ -1159,7 +1160,7 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
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// the KeyROM has not yet been set (it should be zero, but there is no reason for it
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// to be at this point).
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for _i in 0..MAX_ROLLBACK_LIMIT {
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let mut hasher = Sha512Trunc256::new_with_strategy(FallbackStrategy::SoftwareOnly);
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let mut hasher = Sha512_256Sw::new();
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hasher.update(&derived_sk);
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let digest = hasher.finalize();
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derived_sk.copy_from_slice(&digest);
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@ -2680,7 +2681,8 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
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+ 8; // two u32 words are appended to the end, which repeat the "version" and "length" fields encoded in the signature block
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// this is a huge hash, so, get a hardware hasher, even if it means waiting for it
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let mut hasher = Sha512::new_with_strategy(FallbackStrategy::WaitForHardware);
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// FIXME: should be "wait for hardware" strategy but this does not exist in 0.10 API
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let mut hasher = Sha512::new();
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// extract the secret key so we can prime the hash
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let expanded_key = ExpandedSecretKey::from(&signing_key.secret);
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@ -2723,10 +2725,13 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
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pb
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});
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let r = Scalar::from_hash(hasher);
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let mut output = [0u8; 64];
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output.copy_from_slice(hasher.finalize().as_slice());
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let r = Scalar::from_bytes_mod_order_wide(&output);
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let R = (&r * &constants::ED25519_BASEPOINT_TABLE).compress();
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let mut hasher = Sha512::new_with_strategy(FallbackStrategy::WaitForHardware);
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// FIXME: should be "wait for hardware" strategy but this does not exist in 0.10 API
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let mut hasher = Sha512::new();
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hasher.update(R.as_bytes());
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hasher.update(signing_key.public.as_bytes());
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@ -2762,7 +2767,9 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
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pb.increment_work(1);
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}
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let k = Scalar::from_hash(hasher);
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let mut output = [0u8; 64];
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output.copy_from_slice(hasher.finalize().as_slice());
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let k = Scalar::from_bytes_mod_order_wide(&output);
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let s = &(&k * &key) + &r;
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let mut signature_bytes: [u8; 64] = [0u8; 64];
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@ -3319,7 +3326,7 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
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// compute a hash of the data, for fast verification of the backup header integrity to detect media
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// errors, etc.
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let mut hasher = Sha512Trunc256::new_with_strategy(FallbackStrategy::HardwareThenSoftware);
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let mut hasher = Sha512_256Sw::new();
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hasher.update(&block[..size_of::<BackupHeader>() + size_of::<backups::BackupDataCt>()]);
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let digest = hasher.finalize();
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assert!(digest.len() == HASH_LEN, "Wrong length hash selected! Check your code.");
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