update todo list

This commit is contained in:
bunnie 2025-11-12 18:56:26 +08:00
parent 63e78b202b
commit 3aea86213d

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@ -34,80 +34,27 @@ use crate::vendor_commands::VendorSession;
/*
Dev status & notes --
Aug 3 2025:
Nov 12 2025:
`cargo xtask baosec-emu` will launch the emulated UI. The aspect currently
in progress is the user interaction. Some firm conclusions so far are:
`cargo xtask baosec-emu` will launch the emulated UI.
- There is only going to be a TOTP and a password flow. FIDO interactions
will be through modal pop-ups only that alert of the relying party (if FIDO2).
FIDO-1 will notify that this is a legacy transaction with no identifier.
- We will use the same PDDB record format as vault original
- At the moment all "actions" are commented out in this app, so it is just a shell
used to refine the UI flow. Once the UI flow is refined we will add in the
live functionality
- Likewise there is no HID handler loop or camera loop
- Menu interactions will happen by pressing the "home" key and will be
done with an explicitly coded menu routine. This is because we don't have
a GAM in this implementation to handle layering/compositing in this UI framework.
-[ ] implement RTC
-[ ] implement QR code scanning loop
-[x] implement HID loop - needs testing, but have to implement RTC first before can test on HW
-[x] implement "action" loop
-[ ] harmonized TOTP & password interactions? It is not yet clear if we are
going to have two separate UI flows, or if we will share elements between the
two. I am inclined to harmonize the two, which means reworking the TOTP flow
to have the search entry at the bottom.
-[x] TOTP interaction prototyped
-[ ] password interaction prototyped
-[x] implement "home" button press menu mode
-[ ] implement search by text entry - activated via both menu pop-up, and by
selecting >search prefix< on the bottom line of UI
-[ ] figure out interaction for searching for passwords
-[ ] search by QR code
-[ ] search by text - is this even a good idea? i think the UX is not great, so maybe we omit it entirely.
-[ ] implement PIN management UI - entering a pin unlocks the deniable basis automatically
-[ ] remove basis management calls when replacing with PIN calls
There are three action loops that need to be implemented. These are not
necessarily listed in order of implementation:
-[ ] implement QR code scanning loop
-[ ] implement HID loop
-[ ] implement "action" loop
-[ ] Consider the side channel resistance of the AES implementation in the keystore. We may want
to use an AES API that explicitly wraps the SCE's masked AES implementation to reduce side channels,
versus the Vex CPU core's AES implementation
-[x] implement keystore
-[ ] Consider the side channel resistance of the AES implementation in the keystore. We may want
to use an AES API that explicitly wraps the SCE's masked AES implementation to reduce side channels,
versus the Vex CPU core's AES implementation
-[x] PDDB should have a base 256-bit key to protect all entries, stored in key store
This is equivalent to the "Backup key" in precursor
-[x] Base 256-bit key is derived from hash of 64kbits raw data scattered
across the RRAM array. Locations are chosen to be diverse, with the goal of reducing
voltage contrast due to parasitic leakage masking bits
-[x] 64kbit array is split into four 16kbit chunks, which are XOR'd together to create
a 16kbit number. The four 16kbit chunks are read out 256-bits at a time, with an order
determined by a random number on boot. The random ordering frustrates side channel attacks
on read-out of the array. Thus the format is:
- Kn, where n=[0..=3]
- Each Kn is 16384 bits long, composed of 64 256-bit blocks: Bm = {B0, B1, ..Bm},
where m=[0..=255]
- The pre-hash key matter P is composed of K0 ^ K1 ^ K2 ^ K3, and the final key
is SHA512/256(P)
- P is derived specifically by visiting every one of KnBm in a random order and XOR'ing
them together, such that:
- The 16384-bit P is initialized to all 0's
- Break P into 64 separate 256-bit long blocks. Fill each block as follows:
- R is a 5-bit random number from the TRNG. It is rejection-sampled to generate a number
Rk that is [0..=23] (i.e. any number 24-31 is rejected and the TRNG is run again).
- Rk is turned into a permutation using the factoradic system:
- Derive factoradic digits [d₁, d₂, d₃, d₄] where:
- d1=k÷3!d1​=k÷3!
- d2=(kmod  3!)÷2!d2​=(kmod3!)÷2!
- d3=(kmod  2!)÷1!d3​=(kmod2!)÷1!
- d4=0d4​=0 (there should only be one element left at this point)
- Starting with the ordered list [A,B,C,D], at step i,
pick the element at position dᵢ and remove it.
- [A, B, C, D] represent visiting one of bank K0..=3
- Fetching 256 bits from the respective bank and XOR it into the block position in P
- The final backup key is computed as SHA512/256(DS | P), where DS is a domain separator consisting
of 8 bits of 0's (8 bits is chosen simply because it's convenient, not to imply we could have only
256 domains - you can always add more bits at the top of the hash).
- Other keys may be derived by changing the domain separator.
-[ ] The PIN may be optionally set to one of three values:
-[ ] deniable basis implementation
-[ ] The PIN may be optionally set to one of three values:
-[ ] nothing (implemented as all 0's in the cryptographic key)
-[ ] a passcode (4-8 digits entered via keyboard)
-[ ] Configurable self-destruct after # of incorrect PIN guesses. Set at 8 by default.
@ -118,6 +65,7 @@ necessarily listed in order of implementation:
-[ ] One deniable basis at a time is allowed. It is mounted using using only:
-[ ] a PIN (4-8 digits entered via keyboard)
-[ ] a QR code (generated using browser & managed by user)
-[ ] implement backups
-[ ] PIN confirmation required to set system into backup mode
-[ ] Backup key is displayed. This is 256-bit key, displayed as QR code or Bip-39.