diff --git a/bao1x-boot/boot1/Cargo.toml b/bao1x-boot/boot1/Cargo.toml index e62da7105..d040b47cb 100644 --- a/bao1x-boot/boot1/Cargo.toml +++ b/bao1x-boot/boot1/Cargo.toml @@ -43,5 +43,7 @@ unsafe-debug = [] verbose-debug = ["bao1x-hal/debug-print-uart", "bao1x-hal/verbose-debug"] print-ifr = [] +test-boot0-keys = [] + verilator-only = [] -default = [] +default = ["test-boot0-keys"] diff --git a/bao1x-boot/boot1/src/repl.rs b/bao1x-boot/boot1/src/repl.rs index 010417e82..10eab4dc2 100644 --- a/bao1x-boot/boot1/src/repl.rs +++ b/bao1x-boot/boot1/src/repl.rs @@ -213,14 +213,8 @@ impl Repl { } "audit" => { let owc = OneWayCounter::new(); - crate::println!( - "Board type reads as: {:?}", - owc.get_decoded::() - ); - crate::println!( - "Boot partition is: {:?}", - owc.get_decoded::() - ); + crate::println!("Board type reads as: {:?}", owc.get_decoded::()); + crate::println!("Boot partition is: {:?}", owc.get_decoded::()); crate::println!("Semver is: {}", crate::version::SEMVER); crate::println!("Description is: {}", crate::RELEASE_DESCRIPTION); let slot_mgr = bao1x_hal::acram::SlotManager::new(); @@ -300,10 +294,59 @@ impl Repl { ), Err(e) => crate::println!("Next stage did not validate: {:?}", e), } - // TODO: - // - devboot seen - // - oem keys erased - // - uuid + + // detailed state checks + let mut secure = true; + // check that boot1 pubkeys match the indelible entries + let pubkey_ptr = bao1x_api::BOOT1_START as *const bao1x_api::signatures::SignatureInFlash; + let pk_src: &bao1x_api::signatures::SignatureInFlash = + unsafe { pubkey_ptr.as_ref().unwrap() }; + let reference_keys = [ + bao1x_api::BAO1_PUBKEY, + bao1x_api::BAO2_PUBKEY, + bao1x_api::BETA_PUBKEY, + bao1x_api::DEV_PUBKEY, + ]; + let slot_mgr = bao1x_hal::acram::SlotManager::new(); + let mut good_compare = true; + for (boot0_key, ref_key) in pk_src.sealed_data.pubkeys.iter().zip(reference_keys.iter()) { + let ref_data = slot_mgr.read(&ref_key).unwrap(); + if ref_data != &boot0_key.pk { + good_compare = false; + } + } + if !good_compare { + crate::println!("== BOOT1 FAILED PUBKEY CHECK =="); + // this may "not" be a security failure if boot1 was intentionally replaced + // but in that case, the developer customizing the image should have also edited this + // check out. + secure = false; + } + // check developer mode + if owc.get(DEVELOPER_MODE).unwrap() != 0 { + crate::println!("== IN DEVELOPER MODE =="); + secure = false; + } + if owc.get(BOOT0_PUBKEY_FAIL).unwrap() != 0 { + crate::println!("== BOOT0 REPORTED PUBKEY CHECK FAILURE =="); + secure = false; + } + if owc.get(CP_BOOT_SETUP_DONE).unwrap() == 0 { + crate::println!("== CP SETUP FAILED =="); + secure = false; + } + if owc.get(IN_SYSTEM_BOOT_SETUP_DONE).unwrap() == 0 { + crate::println!("In-system keys have NOT been generated"); + if owc.get_decoded::().unwrap() == BoardTypeCoding::Baosec { + // this is only a security failure on baosec systems + secure = false; + } + } else { + crate::println!("In-system keys have been generated"); + } + if !secure { + crate::println!("** System did not meet minimum requirements for security **"); + } } "lockdown" => { match bao1x_hal::sigcheck::validate_image( @@ -336,6 +379,61 @@ impl Repl { } } } + #[cfg(feature = "test-boot0-keys")] + "publock" => { + let rram = CSR::new(utra::rrc::HW_RRC_BASE as *mut u32); + crate::println!("RRAM security settings: {:x}", rram.rf(utra::rrc::SFR_RRCCR_SFR_RRCCR)); + + use bao1x_hal::acram::AccessSettings; + let keys = [ + bao1x_api::BAO1_PUBKEY, + bao1x_api::BAO2_PUBKEY, + bao1x_api::BETA_PUBKEY, + bao1x_api::DEV_PUBKEY, + ]; + let ifr_slot = unsafe { core::slice::from_raw_parts(0x6040_0340 as *const u8, 32) }; + crate::println!("IFR permissions at 0x340: {:x?}", ifr_slot); + let slot_mgr = bao1x_hal::acram::SlotManager::new(); + let mut rram = bao1x_hal::rram::Reram::new(); + // some value that's not 0, so we can differentiate it from access denied state + const ERASE_VALUE: u8 = 7; + let mut pass = true; + // remember: we call these keys, but they live in data slots, because they are public keys. + for key in keys { + // first print the key + let access = key.get_access_spec(); + crate::println!("Permissions (spec): {:?}", access); + let acl = slot_mgr.get_acl(&key).unwrap(); + crate::println!("Permissions (actual): {:x?}", acl); + // attempt to clear the permissions, making the keys malleable + slot_mgr + .set_acl(&mut rram, &key, &AccessSettings::Key(KeySlotAccess::new_with_raw_value(0))) + .ok(); // if we can't clear, that's by design + + let acl = slot_mgr.get_acl(&key).unwrap(); + crate::println!("Permissions (attacked): {:x?}", acl); + crate::println!("Data: {:x?}", slot_mgr.read(&key).ok()); + let eraser = [ERASE_VALUE; SLOT_ELEMENT_LEN_BYTES]; + match slot_mgr.write(&mut rram, &key, &eraser) { + Ok(_) => {} + Err(e) => { + crate::println!("Couldn't erase pubkey in data slot {}: {:?}", key.get_base(), e) + } + } + let check = slot_mgr.read(&key).unwrap(); + if check.iter().all(|&b| b == ERASE_VALUE) { + crate::println!("Data at {} was mutable, failure!", key.get_base()); + pass = false; + } + } + use bao1x_hal::board::{BOOKEND_END, BOOKEND_START}; + crate::println!( + "{}PUB_MUT,{},{}", + BOOKEND_START, + if pass { "PASS" } else { "FAIL" }, + BOOKEND_END + ); + } #[cfg(feature = "unsafe-debug")] "peek" => { const COLUMNS: usize = 4; @@ -377,6 +475,8 @@ impl Repl { crate::print!( "Commands include: reset, echo, boot, bootwait, localecho, uf2, boardtype, audit, lockdown" ); + #[cfg(feature = "test-boot0-keys")] + crate::print!(", publock"); crate::println!(""); } }