implement a basis for anti-rollback upgrades

the actual transition to a new version isn't here. But,
at the very least, the root keys are now derived by hashing
them MAX_ROLLBACK_LIMIT times, which allows us to create a
key chain based on a global version number that can be incremented
while allowing derviation of older keys without compromising newer
keys.
This commit is contained in:
bunnie 2022-02-04 01:33:04 +08:00
parent 6d6b62ae60
commit 11c88b170e
6 changed files with 231 additions and 143 deletions

View file

@ -1,128 +1,128 @@
KEYROM 0 A SLICE_X36Y50 b'df14e1bb410df3a1' KEYROM 0 A SLICE_X36Y50 b'2253afe6ef9575fb'
KEYROM 0 B SLICE_X36Y50 b'd04dff21f89ee8bf' KEYROM 0 B SLICE_X36Y50 b'd7a7360d5f354148'
KEYROM 0 C SLICE_X36Y50 b'416c1a28fd83c77b' KEYROM 0 C SLICE_X36Y50 b'cd35270191ed0296'
KEYROM 0 D SLICE_X36Y50 b'ba0269ba89e641d7' KEYROM 0 D SLICE_X36Y50 b'677bccac8c854b80'
KEYROM 1 A SLICE_X37Y50 b'9c44df255fd2a5da' KEYROM 1 A SLICE_X37Y50 b'be530e5c8f3c4974'
KEYROM 1 B SLICE_X37Y50 b'aea94847e5f2cd0c' KEYROM 1 B SLICE_X37Y50 b'5f6e609627b7e0c8'
KEYROM 1 C SLICE_X37Y50 b'8b92e766041d2215' KEYROM 1 C SLICE_X37Y50 b'6e9b2b527ee1580f'
KEYROM 1 D SLICE_X37Y50 b'a0d520564ff78a60' KEYROM 1 D SLICE_X37Y50 b'2108b5666987a290'
KEYROM 2 A SLICE_X36Y51 b'f3cb7a1101eeaf6c' KEYROM 2 A SLICE_X36Y51 b'd2ce61c675aff795'
KEYROM 2 B SLICE_X36Y51 b'ab6ac834e19baefc' KEYROM 2 B SLICE_X36Y51 b'eb1ef14b699919c0'
KEYROM 2 C SLICE_X36Y51 b'00b12075b2185b18' KEYROM 2 C SLICE_X36Y51 b'46f2c8c59d5f1ba1'
KEYROM 2 D SLICE_X36Y51 b'7d4eae2b7c7b0778' KEYROM 2 D SLICE_X36Y51 b'cd80cfaa878e0180'
KEYROM 3 A SLICE_X37Y51 b'cc668b73dc5b20ed' KEYROM 3 A SLICE_X37Y51 b'0c51f2e27045d192'
KEYROM 3 B SLICE_X37Y51 b'a5b8b7120edeb93c' KEYROM 3 B SLICE_X37Y51 b'77b5a6da36ef4e1f'
KEYROM 3 C SLICE_X37Y51 b'597f101f0a33972c' KEYROM 3 C SLICE_X37Y51 b'f8a08063a4f3ed92'
KEYROM 3 D SLICE_X37Y51 b'6469cc5379d26720' KEYROM 3 D SLICE_X37Y51 b'99f7211d54ddb6c7'
KEYROM 4 A SLICE_X36Y52 b'aeb1bc7732636490' KEYROM 4 A SLICE_X36Y52 b'718a31cc9ee39a05'
KEYROM 4 B SLICE_X36Y52 b'eb882878da9c7943' KEYROM 4 B SLICE_X36Y52 b'5fd9d20624321ef8'
KEYROM 4 C SLICE_X36Y52 b'71f37802768585ae' KEYROM 4 C SLICE_X36Y52 b'471c91be68c93189'
KEYROM 4 D SLICE_X36Y52 b'3e0a50c473a23418' KEYROM 4 D SLICE_X36Y52 b'0629ab62709ed8c3'
KEYROM 5 A SLICE_X37Y52 b'bf85b47bebbd4ed0' KEYROM 5 A SLICE_X37Y52 b'39437ee930c1cb51'
KEYROM 5 B SLICE_X37Y52 b'6c3c2429eda490ae' KEYROM 5 B SLICE_X37Y52 b'39e23cac2cac61a4'
KEYROM 5 C SLICE_X37Y52 b'1b37ffc31fdfdfcc' KEYROM 5 C SLICE_X37Y52 b'4c59e99b64641d54'
KEYROM 5 D SLICE_X37Y52 b'04a6c3992e50fc67' KEYROM 5 D SLICE_X37Y52 b'b2ac7dcf09f95bc9'
KEYROM 6 A SLICE_X36Y53 b'e4d8253303f260ad' KEYROM 6 A SLICE_X36Y53 b'04863a46de78bb00'
KEYROM 6 B SLICE_X36Y53 b'94213ab1b2d87176' KEYROM 6 B SLICE_X36Y53 b'93c8c73315aa91b7'
KEYROM 6 C SLICE_X36Y53 b'd928e7243d13ee32' KEYROM 6 C SLICE_X36Y53 b'350559ee3b7c5a20'
KEYROM 6 D SLICE_X36Y53 b'1baf76b1bae5dd35' KEYROM 6 D SLICE_X36Y53 b'b5133117630b39e7'
KEYROM 7 A SLICE_X37Y53 b'f94f5b910a3adfd5' KEYROM 7 A SLICE_X37Y53 b'4294e882a04e56ba'
KEYROM 7 B SLICE_X37Y53 b'37a5ab15c01e20e4' KEYROM 7 B SLICE_X37Y53 b'c7ff1f45d08b9ca0'
KEYROM 7 C SLICE_X37Y53 b'6baa138e51b37fea' KEYROM 7 C SLICE_X37Y53 b'66d9ae43b2039467'
KEYROM 7 D SLICE_X37Y53 b'28270dc201771b62' KEYROM 7 D SLICE_X37Y53 b'524bdf2a1966c7c3'
KEYROM 8 A SLICE_X36Y54 b'ff84d4a63041c516' KEYROM 8 A SLICE_X36Y54 b'd1476a22da9f278e'
KEYROM 8 B SLICE_X36Y54 b'52918b89290e53ef' KEYROM 8 B SLICE_X36Y54 b'f05270c26650743d'
KEYROM 8 C SLICE_X36Y54 b'c6f32dcdec7b8cc9' KEYROM 8 C SLICE_X36Y54 b'28902e6d244dae0c'
KEYROM 8 D SLICE_X36Y54 b'4bf983b124ea3e62' KEYROM 8 D SLICE_X36Y54 b'566f5bb0134e0148'
KEYROM 9 A SLICE_X37Y54 b'c18b0d2924202e43' KEYROM 9 A SLICE_X37Y54 b'a5302e52dbe88445'
KEYROM 9 B SLICE_X37Y54 b'75a403a06a95f69b' KEYROM 9 B SLICE_X37Y54 b'4b8f67a43520b2d0'
KEYROM 9 C SLICE_X37Y54 b'0e6c4c529690213d' KEYROM 9 C SLICE_X37Y54 b'44fd3624d3331f52'
KEYROM 9 D SLICE_X37Y54 b'105b5014c6ff9172' KEYROM 9 D SLICE_X37Y54 b'856da7c86a5b3074'
KEYROM 10 A SLICE_X36Y55 b'2818d6b10fcc1315' KEYROM 10 A SLICE_X36Y55 b'08586053fb439e8a'
KEYROM 10 B SLICE_X36Y55 b'332f6d00f603bb50' KEYROM 10 B SLICE_X36Y55 b'13497280447028fc'
KEYROM 10 C SLICE_X36Y55 b'32332a423e3e7c1a' KEYROM 10 C SLICE_X36Y55 b'c48584b5b5b87eac'
KEYROM 10 D SLICE_X36Y55 b'b1643077491b5e06' KEYROM 10 D SLICE_X36Y55 b'86b02ea381d479e7'
KEYROM 11 A SLICE_X37Y55 b'361bab4ce8b57fee' KEYROM 11 A SLICE_X37Y55 b'f360ab86140d2b49'
KEYROM 11 B SLICE_X37Y55 b'92edf70b9cfe0098' KEYROM 11 B SLICE_X37Y55 b'66f18a9de97cc12b'
KEYROM 11 C SLICE_X37Y55 b'63039a3ecc72f58d' KEYROM 11 C SLICE_X37Y55 b'612f4c5e7721fa81'
KEYROM 11 D SLICE_X37Y55 b'733ba57f04b75284' KEYROM 11 D SLICE_X37Y55 b'7e44dc2e8baa33f4'
KEYROM 12 A SLICE_X36Y56 b'765767c682d26569' KEYROM 12 A SLICE_X36Y56 b'64db34a1ca57dff1'
KEYROM 12 B SLICE_X36Y56 b'497992efc3776d79' KEYROM 12 B SLICE_X36Y56 b'28685c8c97479bf9'
KEYROM 12 C SLICE_X36Y56 b'7d95ac30fbb5d34b' KEYROM 12 C SLICE_X36Y56 b'5f6947f723bf5916'
KEYROM 12 D SLICE_X36Y56 b'89f54d6c6492b724' KEYROM 12 D SLICE_X36Y56 b'886b36cfdd4a02dd'
KEYROM 13 A SLICE_X37Y56 b'f5eb153c883b6b6a' KEYROM 13 A SLICE_X37Y56 b'8b0a0a4ee719e0da'
KEYROM 13 B SLICE_X37Y56 b'b97af3b9d2c75292' KEYROM 13 B SLICE_X37Y56 b'1c17af721fc23adc'
KEYROM 13 C SLICE_X37Y56 b'be705ea0031d0e71' KEYROM 13 C SLICE_X37Y56 b'08a6d62f007312f0'
KEYROM 13 D SLICE_X37Y56 b'0dd907c101fddb1e' KEYROM 13 D SLICE_X37Y56 b'98375538659f662f'
KEYROM 14 A SLICE_X36Y57 b'3a773992ffd19035' KEYROM 14 A SLICE_X36Y57 b'3b95c9d486da6015'
KEYROM 14 B SLICE_X36Y57 b'39540ab5ad9029a4' KEYROM 14 B SLICE_X36Y57 b'd6214d19e434f1ee'
KEYROM 14 C SLICE_X36Y57 b'fe6a6748030621db' KEYROM 14 C SLICE_X36Y57 b'e3b5fcf0629c3760'
KEYROM 14 D SLICE_X36Y57 b'037296f110144ae4' KEYROM 14 D SLICE_X36Y57 b'da5bf495cd79a9a4'
KEYROM 15 A SLICE_X37Y57 b'62e89c33394dcb13' KEYROM 15 A SLICE_X37Y57 b'f0ffd0f51557ed10'
KEYROM 15 B SLICE_X37Y57 b'a0d90f274ca934b0' KEYROM 15 B SLICE_X37Y57 b'799568e1f278c442'
KEYROM 15 C SLICE_X37Y57 b'd3321d7e3d0817f4' KEYROM 15 C SLICE_X37Y57 b'88ae4b1b805ce08d'
KEYROM 15 D SLICE_X37Y57 b'0f89feb7554feb88' KEYROM 15 D SLICE_X37Y57 b'e79b9412723d8069'
KEYROM 16 A SLICE_X36Y58 b'6144cb3338715f56' KEYROM 16 A SLICE_X36Y58 b'9cc476c6386d531f'
KEYROM 16 B SLICE_X36Y58 b'e8b7136a67dd63dc' KEYROM 16 B SLICE_X36Y58 b'58f3aae6bb9e16e8'
KEYROM 16 C SLICE_X36Y58 b'1915eb8794f26e06' KEYROM 16 C SLICE_X36Y58 b'725cf041a326db93'
KEYROM 16 D SLICE_X36Y58 b'7e06c5e6258396b7' KEYROM 16 D SLICE_X36Y58 b'b387bcb61b5c423c'
KEYROM 17 A SLICE_X37Y58 b'1cd1cb5102979c09' KEYROM 17 A SLICE_X37Y58 b'c115a65674534d4b'
KEYROM 17 B SLICE_X37Y58 b'7e390dd426f32f6b' KEYROM 17 B SLICE_X37Y58 b'1130f37503837f8f'
KEYROM 17 C SLICE_X37Y58 b'cd796e3604b1f665' KEYROM 17 C SLICE_X37Y58 b'1468172d24b1ead7'
KEYROM 17 D SLICE_X37Y58 b'd6d3a0d503744352' KEYROM 17 D SLICE_X37Y58 b'792442338c128d22'
KEYROM 18 A SLICE_X36Y59 b'7838fefdfeff0caf' KEYROM 18 A SLICE_X36Y59 b'9c617ee9ba38a501'
KEYROM 18 B SLICE_X36Y59 b'39937d76a02e55b2' KEYROM 18 B SLICE_X36Y59 b'6d984069c95e4ef9'
KEYROM 18 C SLICE_X36Y59 b'a74ce365e488fb5c' KEYROM 18 C SLICE_X36Y59 b'f10beff31109d25b'
KEYROM 18 D SLICE_X36Y59 b'5ff47e2ad8f8c727' KEYROM 18 D SLICE_X36Y59 b'f9b4d041e7ca503c'
KEYROM 19 A SLICE_X37Y59 b'24877ab3b82cfb60' KEYROM 19 A SLICE_X37Y59 b'd4ba8f06f06b4fb7'
KEYROM 19 B SLICE_X37Y59 b'0997e1bd2730dc92' KEYROM 19 B SLICE_X37Y59 b'3ce9a9b357086462'
KEYROM 19 C SLICE_X37Y59 b'22cb622b3807b997' KEYROM 19 C SLICE_X37Y59 b'a2a225576026700a'
KEYROM 19 D SLICE_X37Y59 b'305a1a9722c36348' KEYROM 19 D SLICE_X37Y59 b'aff7b790a55eb8de'
KEYROM 20 A SLICE_X36Y60 b'ed417bdc093cc6e5' KEYROM 20 A SLICE_X36Y60 b'704409bc903ef405'
KEYROM 20 B SLICE_X36Y60 b'368c101fbe4593f9' KEYROM 20 B SLICE_X36Y60 b'c18b95e0171e54ff'
KEYROM 20 C SLICE_X36Y60 b'f524fe658b30c5ff' KEYROM 20 C SLICE_X36Y60 b'359e818020171bff'
KEYROM 20 D SLICE_X36Y60 b'427894ffe12ea152' KEYROM 20 D SLICE_X36Y60 b'db1956d85b3ac72b'
KEYROM 21 A SLICE_X37Y60 b'8d6628875ae19e43' KEYROM 21 A SLICE_X37Y60 b'f4a5bd2a85da7ad6'
KEYROM 21 B SLICE_X37Y60 b'1e3d36077f35ebed' KEYROM 21 B SLICE_X37Y60 b'7b34842435ad6643'
KEYROM 21 C SLICE_X37Y60 b'55cbcc5900fbe0fa' KEYROM 21 C SLICE_X37Y60 b'680555e38333b824'
KEYROM 21 D SLICE_X37Y60 b'b3576c48e96b040f' KEYROM 21 D SLICE_X37Y60 b'f52238f3a23f6823'
KEYROM 22 A SLICE_X36Y61 b'0c1baa89112852b0' KEYROM 22 A SLICE_X36Y61 b'e66acde30283926c'
KEYROM 22 B SLICE_X36Y61 b'39483bee52dceb4c' KEYROM 22 B SLICE_X36Y61 b'fa1d856c53476c3e'
KEYROM 22 C SLICE_X36Y61 b'd9b21bb5703e5abc' KEYROM 22 C SLICE_X36Y61 b'85c7e56acc617a6c'
KEYROM 22 D SLICE_X36Y61 b'707e78d4d0a3fd99' KEYROM 22 D SLICE_X36Y61 b'80eb2e91c11cc50a'
KEYROM 23 A SLICE_X37Y61 b'06b27a972f8fac72' KEYROM 23 A SLICE_X37Y61 b'dd72ae20a782b480'
KEYROM 23 B SLICE_X37Y61 b'5d6a42a77b856df6' KEYROM 23 B SLICE_X37Y61 b'abff67507d431c8a'
KEYROM 23 C SLICE_X37Y61 b'f48aeab4a59dcd34' KEYROM 23 C SLICE_X37Y61 b'f7777938b277aea2'
KEYROM 23 D SLICE_X37Y61 b'c210bd1111f5513f' KEYROM 23 D SLICE_X37Y61 b'634726cedd3b5537'
KEYROM 24 A SLICE_X36Y62 b'5a8d01dc3c48c365' KEYROM 24 A SLICE_X36Y62 b'e6506582408d39ce'
KEYROM 24 B SLICE_X36Y62 b'550604e502c4b51e' KEYROM 24 B SLICE_X36Y62 b'2a7511e97c36dd0a'
KEYROM 24 C SLICE_X36Y62 b'196e9d00a1dddb36' KEYROM 24 C SLICE_X36Y62 b'3612f35d7ec66f41'
KEYROM 24 D SLICE_X36Y62 b'56fcd1ec8b205a60' KEYROM 24 D SLICE_X36Y62 b'b2df7104b89c57c0'
KEYROM 25 A SLICE_X37Y62 b'b278f2eeab6f1eb6' KEYROM 25 A SLICE_X37Y62 b'ba82d0bafa114fc8'
KEYROM 25 B SLICE_X37Y62 b'daf87a1c092d4d95' KEYROM 25 B SLICE_X37Y62 b'd53e0d2f4ef1be85'
KEYROM 25 C SLICE_X37Y62 b'7e2e704497c71ad4' KEYROM 25 C SLICE_X37Y62 b'0505b902ee81679d'
KEYROM 25 D SLICE_X37Y62 b'81fe60c9b947f5cc' KEYROM 25 D SLICE_X37Y62 b'e5642bedf9d64049'
KEYROM 26 A SLICE_X36Y63 b'aaf0eab1eb9a4390' KEYROM 26 A SLICE_X36Y63 b'3273253b029bbd31'
KEYROM 26 B SLICE_X36Y63 b'44b81cf224548463' KEYROM 26 B SLICE_X36Y63 b'd835604661c9c2d6'
KEYROM 26 C SLICE_X36Y63 b'50445f9b117caeaf' KEYROM 26 C SLICE_X36Y63 b'd745ce6225442b0b'
KEYROM 26 D SLICE_X36Y63 b'80ea15490c51a616' KEYROM 26 D SLICE_X36Y63 b'721ccebdbb3ac8f6'
KEYROM 27 A SLICE_X37Y63 b'0c3cd10b73427f91' KEYROM 27 A SLICE_X37Y63 b'cf49dd20a62e6b8d'
KEYROM 27 B SLICE_X37Y63 b'a2d60f9a2e16eff3' KEYROM 27 B SLICE_X37Y63 b'7b972b0d3c859700'
KEYROM 27 C SLICE_X37Y63 b'07a7dd73948f0bf6' KEYROM 27 C SLICE_X37Y63 b'cce695c18121cc17'
KEYROM 27 D SLICE_X37Y63 b'4e84fc06d10dd094' KEYROM 27 D SLICE_X37Y63 b'38e80e3cda01e93e'
KEYROM 28 A SLICE_X36Y64 b'3f371180b689d79c' KEYROM 28 A SLICE_X36Y64 b'13c52ea98ae5b7c8'
KEYROM 28 B SLICE_X36Y64 b'8aab4a1aafd06b10' KEYROM 28 B SLICE_X36Y64 b'f3df5eaf7d98a7d4'
KEYROM 28 C SLICE_X36Y64 b'2e2bc7d70388afab' KEYROM 28 C SLICE_X36Y64 b'3f630ad83ca51d6b'
KEYROM 28 D SLICE_X36Y64 b'f84c176996b25a8a' KEYROM 28 D SLICE_X36Y64 b'a9cf6962c7bc9511'
KEYROM 29 A SLICE_X37Y64 b'adedccab0cf1047d' KEYROM 29 A SLICE_X37Y64 b'8afc60b2d3835958'
KEYROM 29 B SLICE_X37Y64 b'dc944b65364129e4' KEYROM 29 B SLICE_X37Y64 b'594fddca4fef1ceb'
KEYROM 29 C SLICE_X37Y64 b'4c71b98fc479b286' KEYROM 29 C SLICE_X37Y64 b'e0e2c4baf29e66dc'
KEYROM 29 D SLICE_X37Y64 b'9be04f29153ca694' KEYROM 29 D SLICE_X37Y64 b'5fdcfd6d8b5511cf'
KEYROM 30 A SLICE_X36Y65 b'aa98cf138633738d' KEYROM 30 A SLICE_X36Y65 b'ca31c936cf2c0ccb'
KEYROM 30 B SLICE_X36Y65 b'fdf766fd0e5a46d0' KEYROM 30 B SLICE_X36Y65 b'71bd727cb1666975'
KEYROM 30 C SLICE_X36Y65 b'5230ebd643274b37' KEYROM 30 C SLICE_X36Y65 b'8104235008036fbb'
KEYROM 30 D SLICE_X36Y65 b'e96126419731faa4' KEYROM 30 D SLICE_X36Y65 b'e26362ee08a04dc1'
KEYROM 31 A SLICE_X37Y65 b'29277868d4660ffa' KEYROM 31 A SLICE_X37Y65 b'c2d7ed7a1dd05b59'
KEYROM 31 B SLICE_X37Y65 b'e8a0b6dbe77de21c' KEYROM 31 B SLICE_X37Y65 b'd99dbec6e439a61f'
KEYROM 31 C SLICE_X37Y65 b'feaacc3708396854' KEYROM 31 C SLICE_X37Y65 b'172a205e659acfa6'
KEYROM 31 D SLICE_X37Y65 b'a43e6b13f2017b0f' KEYROM 31 D SLICE_X37Y65 b'6306a15e5c9c3467'

View file

@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
<device schemaVersion="1.1" xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xs:noNamespaceSchemaLocation="CMSIS-SVD.xsd" > <device schemaVersion="1.1" xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xs:noNamespaceSchemaLocation="CMSIS-SVD.xsd" >
<vendor>litex</vendor> <vendor>litex</vendor>
<name>SOC</name> <name>SOC</name>
<description><![CDATA[Litex SoC 2022-01-28 03:05:30]]></description> <description><![CDATA[Litex SoC 2022-02-04 00:56:54]]></description>
<addressUnitBits>8</addressUnitBits> <addressUnitBits>8</addressUnitBits>
<width>32</width> <width>32</width>
@ -1238,10 +1238,10 @@ register to disable individual events.]]></description>
<register> <register>
<name>GIT_GITREV</name> <name>GIT_GITREV</name>
<description><![CDATA[First 32-bits of the git revision. This documentation was built from git rev <description><![CDATA[First 32-bits of the git revision. This documentation was built from git rev
``5ac27d00``, so this value is 1522695424, which should be enough to check out ``1f5d7406``, so this value is 526218246, which should be enough to check out
the exact git version used to build this firmware.]]></description> the exact git version used to build this firmware.]]></description>
<addressOffset>0x0014</addressOffset> <addressOffset>0x0014</addressOffset>
<resetValue>0x5ac27d00</resetValue> <resetValue>0x1f5d7406</resetValue>
<size>32</size> <size>32</size>
<fields> <fields>
<field> <field>
@ -1258,7 +1258,7 @@ the exact git version used to build this firmware.]]></description>
is ``1``, then the repository this was built from has one additional commit is ``1``, then the repository this was built from has one additional commit
beyond the tag indicated in `MAJOR`, `MINOR`, and `REVISION`.]]></description> beyond the tag indicated in `MAJOR`, `MINOR`, and `REVISION`.]]></description>
<addressOffset>0x0018</addressOffset> <addressOffset>0x0018</addressOffset>
<resetValue>0x08</resetValue> <resetValue>0x0a</resetValue>
<size>32</size> <size>32</size>
<fields> <fields>
<field> <field>
@ -3593,7 +3593,7 @@ inject too fast.]]></description>
<name>SEED1</name> <name>SEED1</name>
<description><![CDATA[Bits 32-63 of `SEED_SEED`. Seed used for the build]]></description> <description><![CDATA[Bits 32-63 of `SEED_SEED`. Seed used for the build]]></description>
<addressOffset>0x0000</addressOffset> <addressOffset>0x0000</addressOffset>
<resetValue>0x6ef8973c</resetValue> <resetValue>0x1eaac4e</resetValue>
<size>32</size> <size>32</size>
<fields> <fields>
<field> <field>
@ -3608,7 +3608,7 @@ inject too fast.]]></description>
<name>SEED0</name> <name>SEED0</name>
<description><![CDATA[Bits 0-31 of `SEED_SEED`.]]></description> <description><![CDATA[Bits 0-31 of `SEED_SEED`.]]></description>
<addressOffset>0x0004</addressOffset> <addressOffset>0x0004</addressOffset>
<resetValue>0x5df014e4</resetValue> <resetValue>0x12142066</resetValue>
<size>32</size> <size>32</size>
<fields> <fields>
<field> <field>

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@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ use crate::bcrypt::*;
use crate::api::PasswordType; use crate::api::PasswordType;
use core::convert::TryInto; use core::convert::TryInto;
use ed25519_dalek::{Keypair, Signature, PublicKey, Signer, ExpandedSecretKey}; use ed25519_dalek::{Keypair, Signature, PublicKey, Signer, ExpandedSecretKey, SecretKey};
use curve25519_dalek::scalar::Scalar; use curve25519_dalek::scalar::Scalar;
use curve25519_dalek::constants; use curve25519_dalek::constants;
use sha2::{FallbackStrategy, Sha256, Sha512, Sha512Trunc256}; use sha2::{FallbackStrategy, Sha256, Sha512, Sha512Trunc256};
@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ use digest::Digest;
use graphics_server::BulkRead; use graphics_server::BulkRead;
use core::mem::size_of; use core::mem::size_of;
use core::cell::RefCell; use core::cell::RefCell;
use rand_core::RngCore;
use aes::{Aes256, NewBlockCipher, BlockDecrypt, BlockEncrypt}; use aes::{Aes256, NewBlockCipher, BlockDecrypt, BlockEncrypt};
use cipher::generic_array::GenericArray; use cipher::generic_array::GenericArray;
@ -35,6 +36,13 @@ use root_keys::key2bits::*;
// TODO: add hardware acceleration for BCRYPT so we can hit the OWASP target without excessive UX delay // TODO: add hardware acceleration for BCRYPT so we can hit the OWASP target without excessive UX delay
const BCRYPT_COST: u32 = 7; // 10 is the minimum recommended by OWASP; takes 5696 ms to verify @ 10 rounds; 804 ms to verify 7 rounds const BCRYPT_COST: u32 = 7; // 10 is the minimum recommended by OWASP; takes 5696 ms to verify @ 10 rounds; 804 ms to verify 7 rounds
/// Maximum number of times the global rollback limiter can be updated. Every time this is updated,
/// the firmware has to be re-signed, the gateware ROM re-injected, and the PDDB system key updated.
///
/// N.B.: As of Xous 0.9.6 we don't have a call to update the anti-rollback count, we have only provisioned for
/// that call to exist sometime in the future.
const MAX_ROLLBACK_LIMIT: u8 = 255;
/// Size of the total area allocated for signatures. It is equal to the size of one FLASH sector, which is the smallest /// Size of the total area allocated for signatures. It is equal to the size of one FLASH sector, which is the smallest
/// increment that can be erased. /// increment that can be erased.
const SIGBLOCK_SIZE: u32 = 0x1000; const SIGBLOCK_SIZE: u32 = 0x1000;
@ -86,6 +94,7 @@ impl KeyRomLocs {
const PEPPER: u8 = 0xf8; const PEPPER: u8 = 0xf8;
const FPGA_MIN_REV: u8 = 0xfc; const FPGA_MIN_REV: u8 = 0xfc;
const LOADER_MIN_REV: u8 = 0xfd; const LOADER_MIN_REV: u8 = 0xfd;
const GLOBAL_ROLLBACK: u8 = 0xfe;
const CONFIG: u8 = 0xff; const CONFIG: u8 = 0xff;
} }
@ -277,13 +286,33 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
} }
pub fn kernel_base(&self) -> u32 { self.kernel_base } pub fn kernel_base(&self) -> u32 { self.kernel_base }
/// takes a root key and computes the current rollback state of the key by hashing it
/// MAX_ROLLBACK_LIMIT - GLOBAL_ROLLBACK times.
fn compute_key_rollback(&mut self, key: &mut [u8]) {
assert!(key.len() == 32, "Key length is incorrect");
self.keyrom.wfo(utra::keyrom::ADDRESS_ADDRESS, KeyRomLocs::GLOBAL_ROLLBACK as u32);
let mut rollback_limit = self.keyrom.rf(utra::keyrom::DATA_DATA);
if rollback_limit > 255 { rollback_limit = 255; } // prevent increment-up attacks that roll over
log::debug!("rollback_limit: {}", rollback_limit);
for _i in 0..MAX_ROLLBACK_LIMIT - rollback_limit as u8 {
let mut hasher = Sha512Trunc256::new_with_strategy(FallbackStrategy::SoftwareOnly);
hasher.update(&key);
let digest = hasher.finalize();
assert!(digest.len() == 32, "Digest had an incorrect length");
key.copy_from_slice(&digest);
#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]
if _i >= (MAX_ROLLBACK_LIMIT - 3) {
log::info!("iter {} key {:x?}", _i, key);
}
}
}
/// This implementation creates and destroys the AES key schedule on every function call /// This implementation creates and destroys the AES key schedule on every function call
/// However, Rootkey operations are not meant to be used for streaming operations; they are typically /// However, Rootkey operations are not meant to be used for streaming operations; they are typically
/// used to secure subkeys, so a bit of overhead on each call is OK in order to not keep excess secret /// used to secure subkeys, so a bit of overhead on each call is OK in order to not keep excess secret
/// data laying around. /// data laying around.
/// ASSUME: the caller has confirmed that the user password is valid and in cache /// ASSUME: the caller has confirmed that the user password is valid and in cache
pub fn aes_op(&mut self, key_index: u8, op_type: AesOpType, block: &mut [u8; 16]) { pub fn aes_op(&mut self, key_index: u8, op_type: AesOpType, block: &mut [u8; 16]) {
let key = match key_index { let mut key = match key_index {
KeyRomLocs::USER_KEY => { KeyRomLocs::USER_KEY => {
let mut key_enc = self.read_key_256(KeyRomLocs::USER_KEY); let mut key_enc = self.read_key_256(KeyRomLocs::USER_KEY);
let pcache: &PasswordCache = unsafe{& *(self.pass_cache.as_ptr() as *const PasswordCache)}; let pcache: &PasswordCache = unsafe{& *(self.pass_cache.as_ptr() as *const PasswordCache)};
@ -308,6 +337,7 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
self.fake_key self.fake_key
} }
}; };
self.compute_key_rollback(&mut key);
let cipher = Aes256::new(GenericArray::from_slice(&key)); let cipher = Aes256::new(GenericArray::from_slice(&key));
match op_type { match op_type {
AesOpType::Decrypt => cipher.decrypt_block(block.try_into().unwrap()), AesOpType::Decrypt => cipher.decrypt_block(block.try_into().unwrap()),
@ -315,7 +345,7 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
} }
} }
pub fn aes_par_op(&mut self, key_index: u8, op_type: AesOpType, blocks: &mut[[u8; 16]; PAR_BLOCKS]) { pub fn aes_par_op(&mut self, key_index: u8, op_type: AesOpType, blocks: &mut[[u8; 16]; PAR_BLOCKS]) {
let key = match key_index { let mut key = match key_index {
KeyRomLocs::USER_KEY => { KeyRomLocs::USER_KEY => {
let mut key_enc = self.read_key_256(KeyRomLocs::USER_KEY); let mut key_enc = self.read_key_256(KeyRomLocs::USER_KEY);
let pcache: &PasswordCache = unsafe{& *(self.pass_cache.as_ptr() as *const PasswordCache)}; let pcache: &PasswordCache = unsafe{& *(self.pass_cache.as_ptr() as *const PasswordCache)};
@ -337,6 +367,7 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
self.fake_key self.fake_key
} }
}; };
self.compute_key_rollback(&mut key);
let cipher = Aes256::new(GenericArray::from_slice(&key)); let cipher = Aes256::new(GenericArray::from_slice(&key));
match op_type { match op_type {
AesOpType::Decrypt => { AesOpType::Decrypt => {
@ -352,7 +383,7 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
} }
} }
pub fn kwp_op(&mut self, kwp: &mut KeyWrapper) { pub fn kwp_op(&mut self, kwp: &mut KeyWrapper) {
let key = match kwp.key_index { let mut key = match kwp.key_index {
KeyRomLocs::USER_KEY => { KeyRomLocs::USER_KEY => {
let mut key_enc = self.read_key_256(KeyRomLocs::USER_KEY); let mut key_enc = self.read_key_256(KeyRomLocs::USER_KEY);
let pcache: &PasswordCache = unsafe{& *(self.pass_cache.as_ptr() as *const PasswordCache)}; let pcache: &PasswordCache = unsafe{& *(self.pass_cache.as_ptr() as *const PasswordCache)};
@ -374,6 +405,11 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
self.fake_key self.fake_key
} }
}; };
#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]
log::debug!("root user key: {:x?}", key);
self.compute_key_rollback(&mut key);
#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]
log::debug!("root user key (anti-rollback): {:x?}", key);
let keywrapper = Aes256KeyWrap::new(&key); let keywrapper = Aes256KeyWrap::new(&key);
match kwp.op { match kwp.op {
KeyWrapOp::Wrap => { KeyWrapOp::Wrap => {
@ -810,9 +846,37 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
// get access to the pcache and generate a keypair // get access to the pcache and generate a keypair
let pcache: &mut PasswordCache = unsafe{&mut *(self.pass_cache.as_mut_ptr() as *mut PasswordCache)}; let pcache: &mut PasswordCache = unsafe{&mut *(self.pass_cache.as_mut_ptr() as *mut PasswordCache)};
// initialize the global rollback constant to 0
self.sensitive_data.borrow_mut().as_slice_mut::<u32>()[KeyRomLocs::GLOBAL_ROLLBACK as usize] = 0;
let mut root_sk = [0u8; ed25519_dalek::SECRET_KEY_LENGTH];
self.trng.fill_bytes(&mut root_sk);
#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]
log::debug!("root privkey: {:x?}", root_sk);
let keypair = if true { // true for production, false for debug (uses dev keys, so we can compare results) let keypair = if true { // true for production, false for debug (uses dev keys, so we can compare results)
// we use software hashing because for short keys its faster
let mut derived_sk = [0u8; ed25519_dalek::SECRET_KEY_LENGTH];
derived_sk.copy_from_slice(&root_sk);
// hash a derived secret key based on the maximum rollback limit we anticipate less the current global rollback limit (which is 0)
// this allows us to work with a "final" key that generates a private signing key, which can't be predicted to future versions
// given the current key (due to the irreversability of Sha512/256), but once derived to a more recent version can be willfullly
// computed to an older version to recover e.g. old data encrypted with a prior key
//
// We don't use the `compute_key_rollback` function because the value of the GLOBAL_ROLLBACK in the KeyROM
// has not yet been set (it should be zero, but there is no reason for it to be at this point).
for _i in 0..MAX_ROLLBACK_LIMIT {
let mut hasher = Sha512Trunc256::new_with_strategy(FallbackStrategy::SoftwareOnly);
hasher.update(&derived_sk);
let digest = hasher.finalize();
derived_sk.copy_from_slice(&digest);
#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]
if _i >= (MAX_ROLLBACK_LIMIT - 3) {
log::info!("iter {} key {:x?}", _i, derived_sk);
}
}
let sk: SecretKey = SecretKey::from_bytes(&derived_sk).expect("couldn't construct secret key");
let pk: PublicKey = (&sk).into();
// keypair zeroizes on drop // keypair zeroizes on drop
Keypair::generate(&mut self.trng) Keypair{public: pk, secret: sk}
} else { } else {
Keypair::from_bytes( Keypair::from_bytes(
&[168, 167, 118, 92, 141, 162, 215, 147, 134, 43, 8, 176, 0, 222, 188, 167, 178, 14, 137, 237, 82, 199, 133, 162, 179, 235, 161, 219, 156, 182, 42, 39, &[168, 167, 118, 92, 141, 162, 215, 147, 134, 43, 8, 176, 0, 222, 188, 167, 178, 14, 137, 237, 82, 199, 133, 162, 179, 235, 161, 219, 156, 182, 42, 39,
@ -825,7 +889,7 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")] #[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]
log::debug!("keypair privkey: {:?}", keypair.secret.to_bytes()); log::debug!("keypair privkey: {:?}", keypair.secret.to_bytes());
#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")] #[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]
log::debug!("keypair privkey: {:x?}", keypair.secret.to_bytes()); log::debug!("keypair privkey (after anti-rollback): {:x?}", keypair.secret.to_bytes());
// encrypt the FPGA key using the update password. in an un-init system, it is provided to us in plaintext format // encrypt the FPGA key using the update password. in an un-init system, it is provided to us in plaintext format
// e.g. in the case that we're doing a BBRAM boot (eFuse flow would give us a 0's key and we'd later on set it) // e.g. in the case that we're doing a BBRAM boot (eFuse flow would give us a 0's key and we'd later on set it)
@ -876,7 +940,7 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
// I don't think this loop should make any extra copies of the secret key, but might be good to check in godbolt! // I don't think this loop should make any extra copies of the secret key, but might be good to check in godbolt!
for (dst, (plain, key)) in for (dst, (plain, key)) in
private_key_enc.iter_mut() private_key_enc.iter_mut()
.zip(keypair.secret.to_bytes().iter() .zip(root_sk.iter() // we encrypt the root sk, not the derived sk
.zip(pcache.hashed_update_pw.iter())) { .zip(pcache.hashed_update_pw.iter())) {
*dst = plain ^ key; *dst = plain ^ key;
} }
@ -1071,16 +1135,27 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
// derive signing key // derive signing key
let mut keypair_bytes: [u8; ed25519_dalek::KEYPAIR_LENGTH] = [0; ed25519_dalek::KEYPAIR_LENGTH]; let mut keypair_bytes: [u8; ed25519_dalek::KEYPAIR_LENGTH] = [0; ed25519_dalek::KEYPAIR_LENGTH];
let enc_signing_key = self.read_key_256(KeyRomLocs::SELFSIGN_PRIVKEY); let enc_signing_key = self.read_key_256(KeyRomLocs::SELFSIGN_PRIVKEY);
#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]
log::debug!("encrypted root privkey: {:x?}", enc_signing_key);
for (key, (&enc_key, &pw)) in for (key, (&enc_key, &pw)) in
keypair_bytes[..ed25519_dalek::SECRET_KEY_LENGTH].iter_mut() keypair_bytes[..ed25519_dalek::SECRET_KEY_LENGTH].iter_mut()
.zip(enc_signing_key.iter().zip(pcache.hashed_update_pw.iter())) { .zip(enc_signing_key.iter().zip(pcache.hashed_update_pw.iter())) {
*key = enc_key ^ pw; *key = enc_key ^ pw;
} }
#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]
log::debug!("decrypted root privkey: {:x?}", &keypair_bytes[..ed25519_dalek::SECRET_KEY_LENGTH]);
// derived_sk now holds the "Root" secret key. It needs to be hashed (MAX_ROLLBACK_LIMIT - GLOBAL_ROLLBACK) times to get the current signing key.
self.compute_key_rollback(&mut keypair_bytes[..ed25519_dalek::SECRET_KEY_LENGTH]);
// now populate the public key portion. that's just in the plain.
// note that this would have been updated in the case of an update to GLOBAL_ROLLBACK -- the purpose of
// this routine is to sign software in the current rollback count, not to increment the rollback count
for (key, &src) in keypair_bytes[ed25519_dalek::SECRET_KEY_LENGTH..].iter_mut() for (key, &src) in keypair_bytes[ed25519_dalek::SECRET_KEY_LENGTH..].iter_mut()
.zip(self.read_key_256(KeyRomLocs::SELFSIGN_PUBKEY).iter()) { .zip(self.read_key_256(KeyRomLocs::SELFSIGN_PUBKEY).iter()) {
*key = src; *key = src;
} }
#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")] #[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]
log::debug!("anti-rollback privkey: {:x?}", &keypair_bytes[..ed25519_dalek::SECRET_KEY_LENGTH]);
#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]
log::debug!("trying to make a keypair from {:x?}", keypair_bytes); log::debug!("trying to make a keypair from {:x?}", keypair_bytes);
// Keypair zeroizes on drop // Keypair zeroizes on drop
let keypair: Option<Keypair> = if provision_bbram && !self.is_initialized() { let keypair: Option<Keypair> = if provision_bbram && !self.is_initialized() {
@ -1090,6 +1165,8 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
Some(Keypair::from_bytes(&keypair_bytes).map_err(|_| RootkeyResult::KeyError)?) Some(Keypair::from_bytes(&keypair_bytes).map_err(|_| RootkeyResult::KeyError)?)
}; };
log::debug!("keypair success"); log::debug!("keypair success");
#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]
log::debug!("keypair privkey (after anti-rollback): {:x?}", keypair.as_ref().unwrap().secret.to_bytes());
// stage the keyrom data for patching // stage the keyrom data for patching
self.populate_sensitive_data(); self.populate_sensitive_data();
@ -1286,12 +1363,17 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
.zip(enc_signing_key.iter().zip(pcache.hashed_update_pw.iter())) { .zip(enc_signing_key.iter().zip(pcache.hashed_update_pw.iter())) {
*key = enc_key ^ pw; *key = enc_key ^ pw;
} }
self.compute_key_rollback(&mut keypair_bytes[..ed25519_dalek::SECRET_KEY_LENGTH]);
#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]
log::debug!("keypair privkey (after anti-rollback): {:x?}", &keypair_bytes[..ed25519_dalek::SECRET_KEY_LENGTH]);
for (key, &src) in keypair_bytes[ed25519_dalek::SECRET_KEY_LENGTH..].iter_mut() for (key, &src) in keypair_bytes[ed25519_dalek::SECRET_KEY_LENGTH..].iter_mut()
.zip(self.read_key_256(KeyRomLocs::SELFSIGN_PUBKEY).iter()) { .zip(self.read_key_256(KeyRomLocs::SELFSIGN_PUBKEY).iter()) {
*key = src; *key = src;
} }
// Keypair zeroizes the secret key on drop. // Keypair zeroizes the secret key on drop.
let keypair = Keypair::from_bytes(&keypair_bytes).map_err(|_| RootkeyResult::KeyError)?; let keypair = Keypair::from_bytes(&keypair_bytes).map_err(|_| RootkeyResult::KeyError)?;
#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]
log::debug!("keypair privkey (after anti-rollback + conversion): {:x?}", keypair.secret.to_bytes());
// check if the keypair is valid by signing and verifying a short message // check if the keypair is valid by signing and verifying a short message
let test_data = "whiskey made me do it"; let test_data = "whiskey made me do it";
@ -1755,6 +1837,7 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
self.debug_print_key(KeyRomLocs::USER_KEY as usize, 256, "Boot key: "); self.debug_print_key(KeyRomLocs::USER_KEY as usize, 256, "Boot key: ");
self.debug_print_key(KeyRomLocs::PEPPER as usize, 128, "Pepper: "); self.debug_print_key(KeyRomLocs::PEPPER as usize, 128, "Pepper: ");
self.debug_print_key(KeyRomLocs::CONFIG as usize, 32, "Config (as BE): "); self.debug_print_key(KeyRomLocs::CONFIG as usize, 32, "Config (as BE): ");
self.debug_print_key(KeyRomLocs::GLOBAL_ROLLBACK as usize, 32, "Global rollback state: ");
} }
#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")] #[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]

View file

@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ fn xmain() -> ! {
use crate::implementation::RootKeys; use crate::implementation::RootKeys;
log_server::init_wait().unwrap(); log_server::init_wait().unwrap();
log::set_max_level(log::LevelFilter::Info); log::set_max_level(log::LevelFilter::Debug);
log::info!("my PID is {}", xous::process::id()); log::info!("my PID is {}", xous::process::id());
let xns = xous_names::XousNames::new().unwrap(); let xns = xous_names::XousNames::new().unwrap();

View file

@ -583,14 +583,19 @@ def main():
with open(args.soc, "rb") as f: with open(args.soc, "rb") as f:
image = f.read() image = f.read()
pc_usb.flash_program(locs['LOC_SOC'][0], image, verify=verify) pc_usb.flash_program(locs['LOC_SOC'][0], image, verify=verify)
print("Erasing PDDB root structures")
pc_usb.erase_region(locs['LOC_PDDB'][0], 1024 * 1024)
else: else:
print("This will overwrite any secret keys in your device. Continue? (y/n)") print("This will overwrite any secret keys in your device and erase PDDB keys. Continue? (y/n)")
confirm = input() confirm = input()
if len(confirm) > 0 and confirm.lower()[:1] == 'y': if len(confirm) > 0 and confirm.lower()[:1] == 'y':
print("Programming SoC gateware {}".format(args.soc)) print("Programming SoC gateware {}".format(args.soc))
with open(args.soc, "rb") as f: with open(args.soc, "rb") as f:
image = f.read() image = f.read()
pc_usb.flash_program(locs['LOC_SOC'][0], image, verify=verify) pc_usb.flash_program(locs['LOC_SOC'][0], image, verify=verify)
print("Erasing PDDB root structures")
pc_usb.erase_region(locs['LOC_PDDB'][0], 1024 * 1024)
if args.audiotest != None: if args.audiotest != None:
print("Loading audio test clip {}".format(args.audiotest)) print("Loading audio test clip {}".format(args.audiotest))