mirror of
https://github.com/saymrwulf/xous-core.git
synced 2026-11-15 08:30:02 +00:00
refactor coreuser setting and boot flow
this accommodates the notion of erasing secret keys when a developer key is detected. Some hackery in the API is required, because I'm trying to use the same signature routine for both boot0 and boot1, but coreuser settings should not be set until boot1. Boot0 has *no* coreuser settings, whereas boot1 starts to lay them in - this interferes with key erasure, and so the nice clean "boot or die" abstraction disappears because we have to now just check if a key matches a criteria and then return because we have to handle the environment dependent case of coreuser settings.
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e1c07cbf0b
commit
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4 changed files with 64 additions and 28 deletions
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@ -70,13 +70,6 @@ pub fn setup_dabao_se0_pin<T: IoSetup + IoGpio>(iox: &T) -> (IoxPort, u8) {
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/// This can change the board type coding to a safer, simpler board type if the declared board type has
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/// problems booting.
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pub fn early_init(mut board_type: bao1x_api::BoardTypeCoding) -> (bao1x_api::BoardTypeCoding, u32) {
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// This is a security-critical initialization. Failure to do this correctly breaks
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// the hardware access control scheme for key/data slots.
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let mut cu = bao1x_hal::coreuser::Coreuser::new();
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// safety: this is safe because it's followed by a `protect()` call.
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unsafe { cu.set() };
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cu.protect(); // locks out future modifications to the Coreuser setting
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let iox = Iox::new(utra::iox::HW_IOX_BASE as *mut u32);
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// setup board-specific I/Os - early boot set. These are items that have to be
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@ -247,8 +240,15 @@ pub fn early_init(mut board_type: bao1x_api::BoardTypeCoding) -> (bao1x_api::Boa
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setup_timer(fclk_freq);
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// check key slots for integrity
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// check key slots for integrity. Has to be done late in boot because we might
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// have to generate keys, and that requires a lot of stuff to be working correctly:
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// in particular, we'll need `alloc` (to store the random vectors) and `timer`
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// (to detect disconnected/failed TRNG).
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let mut cu = bao1x_hal::coreuser::Coreuser::new();
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// Coreuser needs to be set up correctly for check_slots to succeed.
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cu.set();
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crate::platform::slots::check_slots(&board_type);
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// protect() is called inside sigcheck on boot!
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// Rx setup
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let _udma_uart = setup_console(&board_type, &iox, perclk);
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@ -93,9 +93,9 @@ pub fn check_slots(board_type: &bao1x_api::BoardTypeCoding) {
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crate::println!("Secret ID init done.");
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}
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// print_ifr();
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// test code for figuring out if boot0 write-protect is working or not.
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/*
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print_ifr();
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crate::println!("test boot0 write");
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let test = [7u8; 32];
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let test_data = unsafe { core::slice::from_raw_parts(0x6001_0000 as *const u8, 32) };
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@ -115,6 +115,10 @@ pub fn check_slots(board_type: &bao1x_api::BoardTypeCoding) {
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/*
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fn print_ifr() {
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let coreuser = utralib::CSR::new(utralib::utra::coreuser::HW_COREUSER_BASE as *mut u32);
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// needs to be 0x118 for IFR to be readable when the protection bit is set.
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crate::println!("coreuser status: {:x}", coreuser.r(utralib::utra::coreuser::STATUS));
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let ifr = unsafe { core::slice::from_raw_parts(0x6040_0000 as *const u32, 0x100) };
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for (i, &d) in ifr.iter().enumerate() {
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if i % 8 == 0 {
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@ -158,7 +162,9 @@ fn check_and_fix_acls(rram: &mut Reram, slot_mgr: &mut SlotManager, slot_list: &
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*/
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sa.get_partition_access() == pa && sa.get_rw_permissions() == rw
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}
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AccessSettings::Key(sa) => sa.get_partition_access() == pa && sa.get_rw_permissions() == rw,
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AccessSettings::Key(sa) => {
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sa.get_partition_access() == pa && sa.get_rw_permissions() == rw && sa.akey_id() == 31
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}
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};
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if !is_correct || !is_consistent {
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crate::println!(
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@ -175,6 +181,7 @@ fn check_and_fix_acls(rram: &mut Reram, slot_mgr: &mut SlotManager, slot_list: &
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AccessSettings::Key(sa) => {
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sa.set_partition_access(&pa);
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sa.set_rw_permissions(rw);
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sa.set_akey_id(31); // testing ID
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}
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}
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crate::println!("Fixed ACL raw value: {:x?}", acl);
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@ -197,12 +204,22 @@ fn print_slots(slot_mgr: &SlotManager, slot_list: &[SlotIndex]) {
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SlotType::Data => unsafe {
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let bytes = slot_mgr.read_data_slot(data_index);
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let acl = slot_mgr.get_data_acl(acl_index);
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crate::println!(" Data {} ({:?}): {:x?}", data_index, acl, bytes);
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crate::println!(
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" Data {} ({:x?}): {:x?}",
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data_index / SLOT_ELEMENT_LEN_BYTES,
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acl,
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bytes
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);
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},
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SlotType::Key => unsafe {
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let bytes = slot_mgr.read_key_slot(data_index);
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let acl = slot_mgr.get_key_acl(acl_index);
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crate::println!(" Key {} ({:?}): {:x?}", data_index, acl, bytes);
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crate::println!(
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" Key {} ({:x?}): {:x?}",
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data_index / SLOT_ELEMENT_LEN_BYTES,
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acl,
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bytes
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);
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},
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}
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}
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@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ impl ManagedTrng {
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bio_ss.bio.wo(utra::bio_bdma::SFR_TXF0, trng_pin as u32); // start the sampling
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// check if the TRNG seems to be working. If not, reject the board setting and reboot
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/*
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let mut timer = utralib::CSR::new(utra::timer0::HW_TIMER0_BASE as *mut u32);
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timer.wfo(utra::timer0::EV_PENDING_ZERO, 1);
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let av_good: bool;
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@ -91,7 +92,8 @@ impl ManagedTrng {
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rcurst.wo(utra::sysctrl::SFR_RCURST0, 0x55AA);
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// this is actually unreachable
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None
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}
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}*/
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None
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} else {
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None
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};
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@ -9,19 +9,20 @@ pub const ALLOWED_FUNCTIONS: [u32; 5] = [
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];
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fn seal_boot1_keys() {
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// TODO:
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// - setup an initial coreuser table
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// - set an ASID that locks out any boot0 secrets (currently none, as it's PK based)
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// - this does not offer strong security, but prevents someone with an arbitrary read primitive from
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// accessing any boot0 secrets. An arbitrary-exec primitive at this point can, of course, undo the ASID
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// mapping.
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// This is a security-critical initialization. Failure to do this correctly totally breaks
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// the hardware access control scheme for key/data slots.
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//
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// Only necessary if we have secrets to seal. The current implementation only contains a public key,
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// so there's no secrets to seal.
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// However, this does not offer unbreakable security. Rather, it prevents someone with an arbitrary read
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// primitive from accessing secret keys. An arbitrary-exec primitive can, of course, forge the ASID
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// and work around the coreuser mechanism.
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let mut cu = bao1x_hal::coreuser::Coreuser::new();
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cu.set(); // re-sets the coreuser settings. Just in case they got modified along the way...
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// locks out future modifications to the Coreuser setting. Also inverts mm sense, which means you must
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// enter a virtual memory user state to access sealed keys.
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cu.protect();
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}
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pub fn boot_or_die() -> ! {
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seal_boot1_keys();
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// loader is at the same offset as baremetal. Accept either as valid boot.
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// This diverges if the signature check is successful
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match bao1x_hal::sigcheck::validate_image(
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@ -29,14 +30,30 @@ pub fn boot_or_die() -> ! {
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bao1x_api::BOOT1_START as *const u32,
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bao1x_api::BOOT1_REVOCATION_OFFSET,
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&ALLOWED_FUNCTIONS,
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true,
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false,
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None,
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) {
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Ok((k, tag)) => crate::println!(
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"**should be unreachable** Booted with key {}({})",
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k,
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core::str::from_utf8(&tag).unwrap_or("invalid tag")
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),
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Ok((k, tag)) => {
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crate::println!(
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"Booting with key {}({})",
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k,
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core::str::from_utf8(&tag).unwrap_or("invalid tag")
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);
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// the tag is from signed, trusted data
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// k is just a nominal slot number. If either match, assume we are dealing with a
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// developer image.
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if tag == *bao1x_api::pubkeys::KEYSLOT_INITIAL_TAGS[bao1x_api::pubkeys::DEVELOPER_KEY_SLOT]
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|| k == bao1x_api::pubkeys::DEVELOPER_KEY_SLOT
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{
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crate::println!("Developer key detected, erasing secrets (broken in alpha-0 release)");
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bao1x_hal::sigcheck::erase_secrets();
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}
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// this has to be called *after* erase_secrets, because we can't erase the secrets
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// once the mappings have been sealed off. This is why we can't use the auto-jump method
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// like we do in boot0.
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seal_boot1_keys();
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bao1x_hal::sigcheck::jump_to(bao1x_api::LOADER_START);
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}
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Err(e) => crate::println!("Image did not validate: {:?}", e),
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}
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crate::println!("No valid loader or baremetal image found. Halting!");
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