make secboot optional

This commit is contained in:
bunnie 2023-02-21 18:11:32 +08:00
parent f95b05fdb0
commit 0c6ee68a3b
2 changed files with 6 additions and 4 deletions

View file

@ -18,13 +18,13 @@ branch = "main"
lazy_static = "1.4.0"
[features]
precursor = ["utralib/precursor", "ed25519-dalek-loader/precursor", "curve25519-dalek-loader/precursor", "resume"]
renode = ["utralib/renode", "ed25519-dalek-loader/renode", "curve25519-dalek-loader/renode", "resume"]
cramium = ["utralib/cramium"]
precursor = ["utralib/precursor", "ed25519-dalek-loader/precursor", "curve25519-dalek-loader/precursor", "resume", "secboot"]
renode = ["utralib/renode", "ed25519-dalek-loader/renode", "curve25519-dalek-loader/renode", "resume", "secboot"]
platform-tests = []
debug-print = []
earlyprintk = []
renode-bypass = []
secboot = []
#default = ["debug-print"]
resume = [] # suspend/resume pathway code
default = []

View file

@ -55,8 +55,9 @@ const VVDBG: bool = false; // very verbose debug
mod debug;
mod fonts;
#[cfg(feature="secboot")]
mod secboot;
#[cfg(feature="secboot")]
use secboot::SIGBLOCK_SIZE;
// Install a panic handler when not running tests.
@ -1396,6 +1397,7 @@ pub unsafe extern "C" fn rust_entry(signed_buffer: *const usize, signature: u32)
// initially validate the whole image on disk (including kernel args)
// kernel args must be validated because tampering with them can change critical assumptions about
// how data is loaded into memory
#[cfg(feature="secboot")]
if !secboot::validate_xous_img(signed_buffer as *const u32) {
loop {}
};