move the key consistency check to a library

this allows us to refer to it in boot1 if we eventually decide
it's useful to do it there.

however, as a matter of policy, boot1 checks loader signatures
against *boot1*'s public key block - so if the loader is to be
signed with a different key, boot1 needs to be updated.
This commit is contained in:
bunnie 2025-12-19 16:06:50 +08:00
parent 88cbdbe076
commit 0c18c62d0a
2 changed files with 50 additions and 52 deletions

View file

@ -16,9 +16,9 @@ use core::cell::RefCell;
use bao1x_api::pubkeys::{BOOT0_SELF_CHECK, BOOT0_TO_ALTBOOT1, BOOT0_TO_BOOT1};
use bao1x_api::{BOOT0_PUBKEY_FAIL, BOOT1_PUBKEY_FAIL, DEVELOPER_MODE, bollard};
use bao1x_api::{HardenedBool, PARANOID_MODE, PARANOID_MODE_DUPE};
use bao1x_api::{PARANOID_MODE, PARANOID_MODE_DUPE};
use bao1x_hal::acram::OneWayCounter;
use bao1x_hal::hardening::{Csprng, check_pll, die, mesh_setup};
use bao1x_hal::hardening::{check_pll, die, mesh_setup};
use bao1x_hal::sigcheck::{hardened_erase_policy, jump_to};
#[cfg(feature = "unsafe-dev")]
use critical_section::Mutex;
@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ pub unsafe extern "C" fn rust_entry() -> ! {
let slot_mgr = bao1x_hal::acram::SlotManager::new();
// check that the pubkeys in boot0 matches the reference keys
compare_refkeys(
bao1x_hal::hardening::compare_refkeys(
&owc,
&slot_mgr,
&mut csprng,
@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ pub unsafe extern "C" fn rust_entry() -> ! {
bollard!(die, 4);
// check that the pubkeys in boot1 matches the reference keys
compare_refkeys(
bao1x_hal::hardening::compare_refkeys(
&owc,
&slot_mgr,
&mut csprng,
@ -238,51 +238,3 @@ fn print_ifr() {
}
crate::println!("");
}
/// check that pub keys in the images match those burned into the indelible key area
/// glitch_safety: I'd imagine that glitching in this routine would lead to good_compare being `false`,
/// so no additional hardening is done.
fn compare_refkeys(
owc: &OneWayCounter,
slot_mgr: &bao1x_hal::acram::SlotManager,
csprng: &mut Csprng,
pubkey_ptr: *const bao1x_api::signatures::SignatureInFlash,
fail_counter: usize,
) {
let reference_keys =
[bao1x_api::BAO1_PUBKEY, bao1x_api::BAO2_PUBKEY, bao1x_api::BETA_PUBKEY, bao1x_api::DEV_PUBKEY];
// check that the pub keys match those burned into the indelible key area
// glitch_safety: I'd imagine that glitching in this routine would lead to good_compare being `false`,
// so no additional hardening is done.
let pk_src: &bao1x_api::signatures::SignatureInFlash = unsafe { pubkey_ptr.as_ref().unwrap() };
let mut good_compare = HardenedBool::TRUE;
for (boot0_key, ref_key) in pk_src.sealed_data.pubkeys.iter().zip(reference_keys.iter()) {
let ref_data = slot_mgr.read(&ref_key).unwrap();
if ref_data != &boot0_key.pk {
good_compare = HardenedBool::FALSE;
}
}
csprng.random_delay();
match good_compare.is_true() {
Some(false) => {
bollard!(die, 4);
// don't over-increment this to avoid RRAM wear-out. However, do allow it to increment to higher
// than 1 so we have a higher hamming distance on the counter than a single bit.
if owc.get(fail_counter).unwrap() < 15 {
// safety: the offset is from a pre-validated constant, which meets the safety requirement
unsafe {
owc.inc(fail_counter).unwrap();
}
}
// erase secrets (or ensure they are erased) if the boot pubkey doesn't check out.
bollard!(die, 4);
bao1x_hal::sigcheck::erase_secrets(&mut Some(csprng))
.inspect_err(|e| crate::println!("{}", e))
.ok(); // "ok" because the expected error is a check on logic/configuration bugs, not attacks
}
Some(true) => (),
None => die(),
}
bollard!(die, 4);
}

View file

@ -448,3 +448,49 @@ pub fn glitch_handler(attacks_since_boot: u32) {
}
irq13.wo(utra::irqarray13::EV_PENDING, reason);
}
/// check that pub keys in the images match those burned into the indelible key area
/// glitch_safety: I'd imagine that glitching in this routine would lead to good_compare being `false`,
/// so no additional hardening is done.
pub fn compare_refkeys(
owc: &OneWayCounter,
slot_mgr: &crate::acram::SlotManager,
csprng: &mut Csprng,
pubkey_ptr: *const bao1x_api::signatures::SignatureInFlash,
fail_counter: usize,
) {
let reference_keys =
[bao1x_api::BAO1_PUBKEY, bao1x_api::BAO2_PUBKEY, bao1x_api::BETA_PUBKEY, bao1x_api::DEV_PUBKEY];
// check that the pub keys match those burned into the indelible key area
// glitch_safety: I'd imagine that glitching in this routine would lead to good_compare being `false`,
// so no additional hardening is done.
let pk_src: &bao1x_api::signatures::SignatureInFlash = unsafe { pubkey_ptr.as_ref().unwrap() };
let mut good_compare = HardenedBool::TRUE;
for (boot0_key, ref_key) in pk_src.sealed_data.pubkeys.iter().zip(reference_keys.iter()) {
let ref_data = slot_mgr.read(&ref_key).unwrap();
if ref_data != &boot0_key.pk {
good_compare = HardenedBool::FALSE;
}
}
csprng.random_delay();
match good_compare.is_true() {
Some(false) => {
bollard!(die, 4);
// don't over-increment this to avoid RRAM wear-out. However, do allow it to increment to higher
// than 1 so we have a higher hamming distance on the counter than a single bit.
if owc.get(fail_counter).unwrap() < 15 {
// safety: the offset is from a pre-validated constant, which meets the safety requirement
unsafe {
owc.inc(fail_counter).unwrap();
}
}
// erase secrets (or ensure they are erased) if the boot pubkey doesn't check out.
bollard!(die, 4);
crate::sigcheck::erase_secrets(&mut Some(csprng)).inspect_err(|e| crate::println!("{}", e)).ok(); // "ok" because the expected error is a check on logic/configuration bugs, not attacks
}
Some(true) => (),
None => die(),
}
bollard!(die, 4);
}