during key erasure, add the proof that secret keys were erased

This commit is contained in:
bunnie 2025-12-06 18:35:43 +08:00
parent b1480fa518
commit 09e68291cf
No known key found for this signature in database

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@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ use xous::arch::PAGE_SIZE;
use crate::acram::OneWayCounter;
#[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
use crate::acram::{AccessSettings, SlotManager};
#[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
use crate::buram::{BackupManager, ERASURE_PROOF_RANGE_BYTES};
use crate::hardening::Csprng;
use crate::udma::Spim;
@ -191,7 +193,7 @@ pub fn validate_image(
// the function inside the ed25519 crate.
bollard!(die_no_std, 4);
csprng.as_deref_mut().map(|rng| rng.random_delay());
// this match statement is an achille's heel. I don't want to fork the cryptographic
// this match statement is an Achilles's heel. I don't want to fork the cryptographic
// crates, so we have an unhardened comparison of the result. The work-around is
// in paranoid mode, we command the system to verify things *twice*
match verifying_key.verify_prehashed(h, None, &ed25519_signature) {
@ -227,7 +229,7 @@ pub fn validate_image(
bollard!(die_no_std, 4);
csprng.as_deref_mut().map(|rng| rng.random_delay());
// this match statement is an achille's heel. I don't want to fork the cryptographic
// this match statement is an Achilles's heel. I don't want to fork the cryptographic
// crates, so we have an unhardened comparison of the result. The work-around is
// in paranoid mode, we command the system to verify things *twice*
match verifying_key.verify_strict(&msg, &ed25519_signature) {
@ -283,6 +285,12 @@ pub fn erase_secrets(csprng: &mut Option<&mut Csprng>) -> Result<(), String> {
let slot_mgr = SlotManager::new();
let mut rram = crate::rram::Reram::new();
let mut buram = BackupManager::new();
// erase the backup RAM region to 0 that is the erasure proof.
bollard!(die_no_std, 4);
csprng.as_deref_mut().map(|rng| rng.random_delay());
buram.store_slice(&[0u8; 32], crate::buram::ERASURE_PROOF_RANGE_BYTES.start);
let mut zero_key_count = 0;
// This is set to a higher level because we need to work around an earlier issue
// with overly-broad ACL settings on alpha0 boards
@ -345,10 +353,17 @@ pub fn erase_secrets(csprng: &mut Option<&mut Csprng>) -> Result<(), String> {
bollard!(die_no_std, 4);
}
bollard!(die_no_std, 4);
// store the proof that the key array was erased - could lead to disclosure of one key,
// but we also can't simply trust that the oneway counter below is accurate
csprng.as_deref_mut().map(|rng| rng.random_delay());
buram.store_slice(slot_mgr.read(&crate::board::ERASE_PROOF).unwrap(), ERASURE_PROOF_RANGE_BYTES.start);
let owc = OneWayCounter::new();
// once all secrets are erased, advance the DEVELOPER_MODE state
// safety: the offset is correct because we're pulling it from our pre-defined constants and
// those are manually checked.
bollard!(die_no_std, 4);
if owc.get(DEVELOPER_MODE).unwrap() < 15 {
// limit incrementing to avoid memory wear-out, as erase_secrets() can be called every time on boot.
unsafe { owc.inc(DEVELOPER_MODE).unwrap() };