mirror of
https://github.com/saymrwulf/xous-core.git
synced 2026-11-15 08:30:02 +00:00
add multi-pass validation in paranoid mode to boot0
this patch uses the previously modified APIs and implements a multi-pass check on signatures in the case that paranoid mode is turned on. This may effectively double the boot time but it also reduces the chance of a successful glitch attack on signature validation by a multiple of the glitch success probability. this also updates other API calls and implements the XOR-on-target-address code.
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3 changed files with 76 additions and 101 deletions
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@ -14,6 +14,9 @@ vexriscv = { version = "0.5.6", package = "xous-riscv" }
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riscv = { version = "0.14.0", features = ["critical-section-single-hart"] }
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linked_list_allocator = { version = "0.10.5", optional = true }
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critical-section = "1.2.0"
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hex-literal = "0.4"
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sha2-bao1x = { path = "../sha2-bao1x", default-features = false }
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digest = "0.10.7"
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[features]
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# Baochip feature tree below
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@ -14,10 +14,12 @@ use alloc::collections::VecDeque;
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#[cfg(feature = "unsafe-dev")]
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use core::cell::RefCell;
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use bao1x_api::HardenedBool;
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use bao1x_api::{BOOT0_PUBKEY_FAIL, bollard, signatures::FunctionCode};
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use bao1x_api::pubkeys::{BOOT0_SELF_CHECK, BOOT0_TO_ALTBOOT1, BOOT0_TO_BOOT1};
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use bao1x_api::{BOOT0_PUBKEY_FAIL, bollard};
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use bao1x_api::{HardenedBool, PARANOID_MODE, PARANOID_MODE_DUPE};
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use bao1x_hal::acram::OneWayCounter;
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use bao1x_hal::hardening::{check_pll, die, mesh_setup};
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use bao1x_hal::sigcheck::{hardened_erase_policy, jump_to};
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#[cfg(feature = "unsafe-dev")]
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use critical_section::Mutex;
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use platform::*;
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@ -138,95 +140,80 @@ pub unsafe extern "C" fn rust_entry() -> ! {
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}
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// erase secrets if the boot0 pubkey doesn't check out.
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bollard!(die, 4);
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bao1x_hal::sigcheck::erase_secrets(&mut Some(&mut csprng));
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bao1x_hal::sigcheck::erase_secrets(&mut Some(&mut csprng))
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.inspect_err(|e| crate::println!("{}", e))
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.ok(); // "ok" because the expected error is a check on logic/configuration bugs, not attacks
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}
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Some(true) => (),
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None => die(),
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}
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bollard!(die, 4);
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// self-validate the image with the keys we put in, just to make sure our code wasn't tampered with
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if bao1x_hal::sigcheck::validate_image(
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bao1x_api::BOOT0_START as *const u32,
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bao1x_api::BOOT0_START as *const u32,
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bao1x_api::BOOT0_REVOCATION_OFFSET,
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&[FunctionCode::Boot0 as u32], // only boot0 is allowed for boot0
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false,
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None,
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Some(&mut csprng),
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)
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.is_ok()
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{
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seal_boot0_keys();
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bollard!(die, 4);
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let (paranoid1, paranoid2) = owc.hardened_get2(PARANOID_MODE, PARANOID_MODE_DUPE).unwrap();
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let allowed_functions =
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[FunctionCode::Boot1 as u32, FunctionCode::UpdatedBoot1 as u32, FunctionCode::Developer as u32];
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let one_way_access = bao1x_hal::acram::OneWayCounter::new();
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match one_way_access.get_decoded::<bao1x_api::AltBootCoding>() {
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Ok(bao1x_api::AltBootCoding::PrimaryPartition) => {
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// Primary boot selected. Check Boot1 first, then fall back to LOADER/BAREMETAL.
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bao1x_hal::sigcheck::validate_image(
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bao1x_api::BOOT1_START as *const u32,
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bao1x_api::BOOT0_START as *const u32,
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bao1x_api::BOOT0_REVOCATION_OFFSET,
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&allowed_functions,
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true,
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None,
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Some(&mut csprng),
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)
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.ok();
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bao1x_hal::sigcheck::validate_image(
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bao1x_api::LOADER_START as *const u32,
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bao1x_api::BOOT0_START as *const u32,
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bao1x_api::BOOT0_REVOCATION_OFFSET,
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&allowed_functions,
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true,
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None,
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Some(&mut csprng),
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)
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.ok();
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}
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Ok(bao1x_api::AltBootCoding::AlternatePartition) => {
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// Alternate boot selected. Check LOADER/BAREMETAL, then fall back to Boot1.
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bao1x_hal::sigcheck::validate_image(
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bao1x_api::LOADER_START as *const u32,
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bao1x_api::BOOT0_START as *const u32,
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bao1x_api::BOOT0_REVOCATION_OFFSET,
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&allowed_functions,
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true,
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None,
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Some(&mut csprng),
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)
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.ok();
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bao1x_hal::sigcheck::validate_image(
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bao1x_api::BOOT1_START as *const u32,
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bao1x_api::BOOT0_START as *const u32,
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bao1x_api::BOOT0_REVOCATION_OFFSET,
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&allowed_functions,
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true,
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None,
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Some(&mut csprng),
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)
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.ok();
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}
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Err(_) => {
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crate::println!("Internal error: alt boot encoding is invalid!");
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bao1x_hal::sigcheck::die_no_std();
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}
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// == self-validate the image with the keys we put in, just to make sure our code wasn't tampered with ==
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let boot0_check1 = bao1x_hal::sigcheck::validate_image(BOOT0_SELF_CHECK, None, Some(&mut csprng))
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.unwrap_or_else(|_| die());
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csprng.random_delay();
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if paranoid1 != paranoid2 || boot0_check1.0 != !boot0_check1.1 {
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die();
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}
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bollard!(die, 4);
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csprng.random_delay();
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if paranoid1 != 0 || paranoid2 != 0 {
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// do a redundant boot0 check if paranoid mode.
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let boot0_check2 = bao1x_hal::sigcheck::validate_image(BOOT0_SELF_CHECK, None, Some(&mut csprng))
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.unwrap_or_else(|_| die());
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csprng.random_delay();
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if boot0_check2.0 != !boot0_check2.1 {
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die();
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}
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}
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bao1x_hal::sigcheck::die_no_std();
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}
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bollard!(die, 4);
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// == end self validation ==
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fn seal_boot0_keys() {
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// - set an ASID that locks out any boot0 secrets (currently none, as it's PK based)
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// - this does not offer strong security, but prevents someone with an arbitrary read primitive from
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// accessing any boot0 secrets. An arbitrary-exec primitive at this point can, of course, undo the ASID
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// mapping.
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//
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// Only necessary if we have secrets to seal. The current implementation only contains a public key,
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// so there's no secrets to seal.
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bollard!(die, 4);
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let boot_order = match owc.get_decoded::<bao1x_api::AltBootCoding>() {
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// Primary boot selected. Check Boot1 first, then fall back to LOADER/BAREMETAL.
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Ok(bao1x_api::AltBootCoding::PrimaryPartition) => [BOOT0_TO_BOOT1, BOOT0_TO_ALTBOOT1],
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// Alternate boot selected. Check LOADER/BAREMETAL, then fall back to Boot1.
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Ok(bao1x_api::AltBootCoding::AlternatePartition) => [BOOT0_TO_ALTBOOT1, BOOT0_TO_BOOT1],
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Err(_) => {
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crate::println!("Internal error: alt boot encoding is invalid!");
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bao1x_hal::sigcheck::die_no_std();
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}
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};
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for configuration in boot_order {
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bollard!(die, 4);
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csprng.random_delay();
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match bao1x_hal::sigcheck::validate_image(configuration, None, Some(&mut csprng)) {
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Ok((key, key_inv, tag, target)) => {
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if key != !key_inv {
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die();
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}
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// implement the hardened erase policy. This is marked #[inline(always)].
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hardened_erase_policy(paranoid1, paranoid2, key, key_inv, tag, &mut csprng)
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.inspect_err(|e| crate::println!("{}", e))
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.ok(); // "ok" because the expected error is a check on logic/configuration bugs, not attacks
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// second check if paranoid is not 0. While this branch can be glitched over, to get here,
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// you had to glitch into this routine.
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bollard!(die, 4);
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csprng.random_delay();
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if paranoid1 != 0 || paranoid2 != 0 {
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// re-check the image: it *should* pass. If not, die.
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bao1x_hal::sigcheck::validate_image(configuration, None, Some(&mut csprng))
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.unwrap_or_else(|_| die());
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}
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csprng.random_delay();
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bollard!(die, 4);
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jump_to((target ^ u32::from_le_bytes(tag)) as usize);
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}
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_ => {}
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}
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}
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bollard!(die, 4);
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bao1x_hal::sigcheck::die_no_std();
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}
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#[cfg(feature = "print-ifr")]
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@ -133,16 +133,10 @@ impl Repl {
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}
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crate::println!("");
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}
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"check" => match bao1x_hal::sigcheck::validate_image(
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bao1x_api::BOOT0_START as *const u32,
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bao1x_api::BOOT0_START as *const u32,
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bao1x_api::BOOT0_REVOCATION_OFFSET,
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&[FunctionCode::Boot0 as u32], // only boot0 is allowed for boot0
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false,
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None,
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None,
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) {
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Ok(key_number, _key_number2, _id) => crate::println!("sigcheck passed on key {}", key_number),
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"check" => match bao1x_hal::sigcheck::validate_image(BOOT0_SELF_CHECK, None, None) {
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Ok(key_number, _key_number2, _id, _target) => {
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crate::println!("sigcheck passed on key {}", key_number)
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}
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Err(e) => crate::println!("sigcheck failed: {}", e),
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},
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"reps" => {
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@ -163,16 +157,7 @@ impl Repl {
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if new_time >= start_time + 5 {
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break;
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}
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bao1x_hal::sigcheck::validate_image(
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bao1x_api::BOOT0_START as *const u32,
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bao1x_api::BOOT0_START as *const u32,
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bao1x_api::BOOT0_REVOCATION_OFFSET,
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&[FunctionCode::Boot0 as u32], // only boot0 is allowed for boot0
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false,
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None,
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None,
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)
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.ok();
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bao1x_hal::sigcheck::validate_image(BOOT0_SELF_CHECK, None, None).ok();
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count += 1;
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}
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crate::println!("{} reps/sec", count / 5);
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