\chapter{The Second Summit: A Hash-Based Pyramid}
\label{ch:secondsummit}

\section{The theorem that survives, and the reason that doesn't}

One leaf in the log does not belong to the pyramid you just climbed. Its
subject kind says \code{slh\_dsa} where eighteen others say
\code{ed25519} or \code{merkle\_accumulator}; it carries eleven
certificates where its neighbors carry sixteen, forty-four, or sixty-one;
and the scheme it attests contains no curve, no field, no scalar --- not
one line of the algebra this book spent twelve chapters verifying. Leaf~18
attests the log's first \emph{post-quantum signature scheme}, and this
chapter is the climb that earns it.

First, the honest reason such a thing exists. Every certificate in the
Ed25519 pyramid will still be \emph{true} the day a large quantum computer
boots --- whether that day is a decade out or never; what dies that day is
the reason anyone cared. Read that carefully,
because it separates two ideas this book has been keeping distinct all
along. The certificates say the code \emph{computes the right function} ---
that the extracted verifier accepts exactly the signatures the mathematics
accepts. Whether accepting those signatures keeps anyone \emph{safe} rests
on an assumption no proof in this book touches: that computing discrete
logarithms on the curve is infeasible. Shor's algorithm, on a big enough
quantum computer, computes them efficiently. Correctness certificate:
intact. Scheme: forgeable. A correct implementation of a broken lock is
still a broken lock.

Hash functions are the part of the cryptographic toolbox that takes this
future best. The strongest known quantum attack on preimage search is
Grover's algorithm, a \emph{quadratic} speedup --- the kind of erosion you
answer with modestly larger parameters, not the kind that dissolves the
problem. So in August 2024, NIST standardized FIPS~205: \textbf{SLH-DSA},
the \emph{stateless hash-based digital signature algorithm} (descended
from SPHINCS\textsuperscript{+}) --- a signature scheme built from hash
functions and \emph{nothing else}. No group. No field. Nothing for Shor
to eat.

\begin{bigidea}
The second summit asks the question the first one could not: does the
\emph{method} --- extract the real code, build a bridge, prove the
certificates, audit the cones, attest the result --- transfer to terrain
with entirely different mathematics? Signature chains and Merkle trees
instead of limbs and group laws. If the method only worked on the terrain
it was invented for, it was a trick. If it transfers, it is a discipline.
This chapter is the experiment, run for real, on the parameter set
\textbf{SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s}.
\end{bigidea}

The whole parameter set fits on an index card, and you should copy it out
now, because every number in this chapter comes from it: hash output
$n = 16$ bytes; total tree height $h = 63$, split into $d = 7$ layers of
height $h' = 9$ (check the joint: $63 = 7 \cdot 9$); FORS forest of
$k = 14$ trees of height $a = 12$; Winternitz parameter $w = 16$ (digits
are hex nibbles, $\log_2 w = 4$), giving $\mathit{len} = 35$ chains
($32$ message nibbles $+$ $3$ checksum digits; check: $35 = 2n + 3$ ---
two nibbles per byte of the $n = 16$-byte value, plus three);
message digest $m = 30$ bytes. In the verified repository these are not
documentation --- they are the const-generic arguments baked into the one
extracted entry point, \code{slh\_verify\_128s}, in
\code{gen/SlhVerify/Funs.lean} (except $w$ and $\log_2 w$, which ride
along as the crate constants \code{W} and \code{LGW} in the same file).

\section{Signatures with nothing but a hash}

Strip the idea to one bit. Pick a hash function $F$. Choose two secret
random values $s_0, s_1$; publish $F(s_0)$ and $F(s_1)$ as your public
key. To sign the bit $0$, reveal $s_0$; to sign $1$, reveal $s_1$. A
verifier hashes what you revealed and compares against your public key.
A forger must produce a preimage of a published hash --- the exact thing
hash functions exist to prevent. That is Lamport's 1979 scheme, and it
already contains the whole species: \emph{a signature is a controlled
leak of preimages; verification is re-hashing the leak}.

Two problems, and their fixes build the entire pyramid. First, one bit
per key pair is absurd; the fix is \emph{chains}. Second, every key is
one-time --- reveal twice and a forger can mix and match; the fix is
\emph{trees}. Chains first.

\textbf{Winternitz chains (WOTS\textsuperscript{+}).} Instead of two
secrets per bit, keep one secret per hex \emph{nibble} and define a chain:
$c_0 = \text{secret}$, $c_{i+1} = F(c_i)$, sixteen positions
$c_0 \dots c_{15}$. Publish the chain \emph{end} $c_{15}$ (all
thirty-five chain ends will later be compressed to one value; the
compressor is the $T$ of the pricing box to come). To sign the nibble
value $v \in \{0,\dots,15\}$, reveal $c_v$
--- the chain value $v$ steps up. The verifier takes what you revealed
and \emph{walks the remaining steps}: $15 - v$ more applications of $F$
must land exactly on the published end.

\begin{worked}{one chain, resumed --- and the checksum see-saw}
Real parameters ($w = 16$), no napkin scaling needed. Say message nibble
$v = 11$ ($\mathtt{0xB}$). The signature reveals $c_{11}$. The verifier
computes $15 - 11 = 4$ applications of $F$ --- in the verified code the
hash \emph{address} is set to $11, 12, 13, 14$ in turn, one per step ---
and compares the result against the chain end. Four hashes; no secrets;
done.

Now attack it. $F$ is public, so anyone holding $c_{11}$ can compute
$c_{12} = F(c_{11})$ --- a valid signature for the nibble $12$! Walking
\emph{forward} is free; only walking \emph{backward} needs a preimage.
Forging ``11 $\to$ 12'' costs nothing... for that one chain. The fix is
bookkeeping, and you can run all of it by hand. Alongside the $32$
message nibbles, WOTS signs a \textbf{checksum}:
\[
\mathit{csum} \;=\; \sum_{i=0}^{31} \,(15 - \mathit{msg}_i),
\]
the total of all \emph{remaining} steps. Take the extreme case, all
nibbles zero: $\mathit{csum} = 32 \cdot 15 = 480 = \mathtt{0x1E0}$. The
code shifts left by $4$, flush against the top of two bytes, because the
digit extractor reads nibbles most-significant-first:
$\mathtt{0x1E00}$, bytes $[\mathtt{1E}, \mathtt{00}]$, whose
first three nibbles are the checksum digits $(1, 14, 0)$ --- signed with
three more chains, walked $15{-}1$, $15{-}14$, $15{-}0$ steps by the
verifier.

Now run the see-saw, on these numbers. A forger bumps one message nibble
$0 \to 1$ (walking that chain forward one step, free). The checksum
follows: $\mathit{csum} = 479 = \mathtt{0x1DF}$, shifted
$\mathtt{0x1DF0}$, digits $(1, 13, 15)$. Compare against $(1, 14, 0)$:
the \emph{third} digit rose $0 \to 15$ --- forward walk, free --- but
the \emph{second} fell $14 \to 13$, and the signature only revealed that
chain's value at position $14$. The forger needs position $13$: one step
\emph{earlier}. Walking backward. Inverting $F$. (In general: a strictly
smaller checksum must have a strictly smaller digit at the most
significant position where the two differ --- some chain always falls.)
The thirty-five chains hold each other hostage, and the
hostage-taking is pure arithmetic --- the kind a certificate can pin.
\end{worked}

In the verified repository that arithmetic \emph{is} pinned:
\lean{fips205.wots\_csum\_loop\_eq} certifies that the extracted checksum
loop computes exactly the fold
$\mathit{csum} \leftarrow \mathit{csum} + (W{-}1 - \mathit{msg}_i)$ ---
and its axiom cone is the bare kernel three, because summing nibbles
needs no hash at all. Keep that observation; it becomes a pattern.

\section{One virtual tree of $2^{63}$ keys}

Chains sign one message per key pair. The tree fix: make $2^{63}$
one-time WOTS key pairs, hash each down to a leaf, and build a Merkle
tree; the public key is the single root. A signature then contains the
one-time signature \emph{plus the authentication path} --- the $\log_2$
chain of sibling hashes from that leaf to the root. The verifier
recomputes the leaf from the WOTS signature, hashes its way up the path
--- at each level the current bit of the leaf index says whether the
running node is a left or right child, i.e.\ whether to compute
$H(\text{node} \,\Vert\, \text{sibling})$ or
$H(\text{sibling} \,\Vert\, \text{node})$ --- and compares the result to
the published root. You met this exact structure in
Chapter~\ref{ch:why}'s pyramid diagrams and will meet it once more in the
final chapter, holding this book's own proofs; here it holds signature
keys.

Except nobody can build that tree. Count it: $2^{63}$ leaves, each
requiring a full WOTS key generation ($35$ chains $\times$ $15$ steps
$+$ compression), plus the internal hashes --- on the order of $10^{21}$
hash evaluations --- roughly $5 \times 10^{21}$, about $2^{72}$ --- to
materialize once. The resolution is two-fold:

\begin{itemize}[leftmargin=1.4em]
\item \textbf{Hypertree}: don't build one tree of height $63$; build
  $7$ layers of trees of height $9$, where each tree's root is signed by
  a WOTS key of the tree \emph{above} it --- so nobody, signer included,
  ever materializes more than a height-$9$ tree at a time. A signature
  carries $7$ small WOTS signatures, one per layer.
\item \textbf{Virtuality}: secrets are generated pseudorandomly from a
  seed, so any leaf can be \emph{recomputed on demand}. The full
  structure exists only potentially. The signer touches one path of it
  per signature; the verifier re-hashes exactly that path.
\end{itemize}

\begin{aha}
The hypertree is never built. A structure of $2^{63}$ keys --- more
one-time keys than there are seconds in two hundred billion years ---
exists only as the \emph{promise} that any requested piece can be
recomputed from a $16$-byte seed, and the root pins every piece of it at
once. This is the find/check asymmetry of Chapter~\ref{ch:prime} scaled
to its logical extreme: the object is astronomically too large to ever
exist, and verifying one path through it costs a few thousand hashes on
your laptop.
\end{aha}

One piece is missing: the hypertree's leaves are \emph{one-time} keys,
and the signer is stateless --- it cannot remember which leaves it has
used. The scheme picks the leaf pseudorandomly per message, and to
survive the rare event that two messages draw the same leaf, it does not
put the message directly under a WOTS key. Instead the message digest is
signed by \textbf{FORS} (Forest Of Random Subsets): $k = 14$ little
Merkle trees of height $a = 12$. Each tree hides $2^{12}$ secrets in its
leaves; the message digest names one leaf per tree; signing reveals
those $14$ secrets with their authentication paths, and the $14$
recomputed roots are compressed into one value which the hypertree then
certifies.

\begin{worked}{FORS on a napkin --- two trees, height two}
Shrink to $k = 2$, $a = 2$: two trees of four secrets each, eight
secrets total, digest length $k \cdot a = 4$ bits. Say the digest is
$\mathtt{1001}$. Split into $2$-bit indices: tree $0$ opens leaf
$\mathtt{10} = 2$, tree $1$ opens leaf $\mathtt{01} = 1$. The signature
reveals secret $2$ of tree $0$ with its two path siblings, and secret
$1$ of tree $1$ with its two; the verifier hashes each secret to a leaf,
climbs both paths, and compresses the two roots. Now reuse the key on a
second digest, $\mathtt{0111}$: it opens leaves $1$ and $3$ --- two
\emph{more} secrets leaked, four of eight now public. A forger wanting
to sign digest $\mathtt{1011}$ needs leaves $2$ and $3$: both already
leaked --- forgery! At napkin scale reuse is fatal in one collision. At
real scale the same arithmetic is the defense: two signatures leak at
most $28$ of $57{,}344$ secrets, and a target digest needs its
\emph{fourteen} indices --- each $12$ bits --- to land entirely inside
the leaked sliver: probability about $(28/57{,}344)^{14}$ per key, and
the pseudorandom leaf choice means the attacker cannot steer which
key pair collides. Graceful degradation is not a slogan; it is this
exponent.
\end{worked}

That degradation arithmetic --- a \emph{few} secrets out of
$14 \cdot 2^{12} = 57{,}344$, and fourteen simultaneous hits needed ---
is the reason the scheme can afford statelessness.

\begin{worked}{the digest split, to the bit --- and the price of everything}
The verifier's first act is one call to the message-digest oracle
$H_{\mathit{msg}}$, producing $m = 30$ bytes. Those $30$ bytes are then
split three ways by live arithmetic you can audit on paper:
\[
\Big\lceil \tfrac{k \cdot a}{8} \Big\rceil
= \Big\lceil \tfrac{14 \cdot 12}{8} \Big\rceil = 21 \text{ bytes}
\qquad
\Big\lceil \tfrac{h - h/d}{8} \Big\rceil
= \Big\lceil \tfrac{63 - 9}{8} \Big\rceil = 7 \text{ bytes}
\qquad
\Big\lceil \tfrac{h}{8d} \Big\rceil
= \Big\lceil \tfrac{63}{56} \Big\rceil = 2 \text{ bytes}
\]
--- and $21 + 7 + 2 = 30$ exactly, no slack byte anywhere. The first
$21$ bytes are the $14 \times 12 = 168$ bits of FORS leaf indices; the
next $7$ bytes, masked to $54$ bits, choose \emph{which} bottom-layer
tree of the $2^{54}$ signs this message; the last $2$ bytes, masked to
$9$ bits, choose the leaf within it. (The masks in the extracted code
are $\mathtt{U64.MAX} \ggg (64{-}54)$ and $\mathtt{U64.MAX} \ggg
(64{-}9)$, the shift amounts computed from $h$ and $d$ --- keep $54$,
keep $9$. And the hypertree spends the $54$ tree-index bits like a
meter: the bottom layer takes the $9$-bit leaf index directly, then each
of the six upper layers peels
$\mathit{idx\_leaf} = \mathit{idx\_tree} \bmod 2^9$ off the bottom and
shifts right by $9$; after the sixth peel, $54 - 6 \cdot 9 = 0$ bits
remain --- the budget is spent exactly at the top layer.)

Now price the whole verification, from the parameter card. Five oracles
do all the work --- $F$ steps chains and hashes leaves, $H$ hashes tree
nodes, two compressors $T$ squeeze the $35$ WOTS chain ends and the $14$
FORS roots down to single values, and $H_{\mathit{msg}}$ digests the
message --- and every one of them is countable. Input-independent first:
FORS paths $k \cdot a = 168$ calls to $H$, XMSS paths
$d \cdot h' = 63$ more --- $231$ exactly; compressions, one $T$ per WOTS
public key per layer ($7$) plus one for the FORS roots; the single
$H_{\mathit{msg}}$; and the $14$ $F$-calls hashing the revealed FORS
secrets to leaves: a fixed overhead of $254$ oracle calls. The chains
add the input-dependent part, and here the see-saw earns its keep a
second time: each chain walks at most $15$ steps, suggesting a cap of
$35 \cdot 15 = 525$ per layer --- but that cap is \emph{unreachable},
because message walks total exactly $\mathit{csum}$ while long message
walks force short checksum digits and vice versa. Run the numbers over
every possible checksum and the true per-layer maximum is $510$,
achieved precisely at the all-zero message you worked above. So: at
worst $7 \cdot 510 = 3{,}570$ chain steps, a grand total of $3{,}824$
oracle calls --- just under four thousand, typically nearer $2{,}000$.
Set the two numbers side by side: $\sim 2^{72}$ hash calls to
materialize the structure, $\sim 2^{12}$ to check one path through it.
The verifier touches a $2^{-60}$ sliver and trusts the rest to
arithmetic.

And the signature that steers those two thousand hashes? Its size is an
exercise in reading types: $n \cdot \big(1 + k(1+a) + d(\mathit{len} +
h')\big) = 16 \cdot (1 + 182 + 308) = \mathbf{7{,}856}$ bytes, against a
$32$-byte public key. (An Ed25519 signature is $64$ bytes. Post-quantum
insurance is not free; it is merely \emph{possible}.)
\end{worked}

\section{The same method, on alien terrain}

Now the experiment this chapter exists to report. The repository
\code{fips205-slhdsa-verified} runs the exact pipeline you learned in
Chapters~\ref{ch:rust}--\ref{ch:field}: pin a Rust source (a pure-Rust,
no-unsafe FIPS~205 implementation, pinned by commit), extract through
Charon and Aeneas into Lean --- starting from the one entry point
\code{slh\_verify\_128s}, with the five hash primitives marked
\emph{opaque} at the extraction boundary --- and prove certificates
about the extracted model under a memory-guarded button. Same tools,
same discipline, same \code{check.sh} skeleton with the same fail-closed
phases. What comes out the other side is \textbf{eleven certificates}:
ten loop theorems and one apex.

The ten are old friends wearing new clothes. Every one has the shape of
Chapter~\ref{ch:denotation}'s bridge: on the left, the loop the
extraction produced (chain walking, checksum accumulation, Merkle
ascent, hypertree layering); on the right, a hand-written structural
fold; between them, an equality theorem proved by unfolding one loop
turn and inducting on the trip count. You have met every one of these
folds already, as arithmetic. \lean{wots\_csum\_loop\_eq} pins the
see-saw sum. \lean{chain\_free\_loop\_eq} pins the resume-the-chain
walk, address sequence $v, v{+}1, \dots$ included.
\lean{xmss\_loop\_eq} pins the even-bit/odd-bit sibling order of the
Merkle ascent. And \lean{ht\_loop\_eq} pins the layer walk --- the
peel-nine-bits-and-shift meter you just ran on the digest split, as a
theorem.

But this terrain withholds something the first pyramid gave freely, and
the repository says so in bold type. In the field proofs, the right-hand
side of the bridge was \emph{independent mathematics} --- $\Zmod{p}$,
which Mathlib understands without ever seeing dalek's code --- so each
commuting square landed in a second semantics and meant something on its
own. The natural move here would be the same: restate SLH-DSA
verification as free-standing mathematics and prove the code equal to
\emph{that}. But what would the restatement be made of? Hash chains and
Merkle nodes --- the same oracles, the same folds; there is no
Mathlib theory of SLH-DSA waiting on the other side of the bridge the
way $\Zmod{p}$ was waiting for dalek. So the reference folds are built
from \emph{the same extracted hash oracles} the loops call, and each
certificate buys visibility rather than independent meaning: the
extracted chain loop is some forty lines of monadic, generated Lean; the
fold standing beside it in \lean{chain\_free\_loop\_eq} is fourteen you
can hold against the standard's algorithm over a coffee. That last
reading --- fold against FIPS~205 --- is a human step, named as such in
the trusted base. The repository's own phrase is the one to memorize:
read each loop certificate as \emph{``visible,'' not ``correct.''}

\begin{pitfall}
Chapter~\ref{ch:honesty} trained you to ask what a certificate does
\emph{not} say; this repository answers before you ask, and its ledger
is worth reading twice. The five hash oracles are \emph{axioms} ---
nothing relates them to FIPS~180-4's SHA-256, the same standing boundary
as SHA-512 in the Ed25519 apex. One inner loop (\code{base\_2b}, the
digit extractor that feeds both FORS indices and WOTS nibbles) is
threaded opaquely with \emph{no certificate} --- a defect there would
change the recomputed root while all eleven theorems held. The proved
subject is a monomorphic facade; its bridge to the deployed generic
verifier is a $137$-case differential test, \emph{evidence, not proof}.
Signing and key generation were never extracted at all. And everything
\emph{above} the extraction root is trusted base too --- the assembly of
the domain-separated message $M'$, including the single separator byte
that is all that distinguishes pure from prehash verification; get that
byte wrong and you have a cross-variant forgery primitive that no
certificate in the repository would notice. A trusted
base is not a weakness; an \emph{unstated} one is.
\end{pitfall}

The apex closes the pyramid the same way the Ed25519 apex did --- as an
acceptance characterization, lightly paraphrased:

\begin{lstlisting}[language=Lean]
theorem slh_verify_128s_accepts_iff (mprime sig pk) :
    slh_verify_128s mprime sig pk
      = do let root ← slhVerifyRoot mprime sig pk
           ok (decide (root.val = pk.pk_root.val))
\end{lstlisting}

(The paraphrase elides only typography: the const-generic parameter
decorations and the \lean{Result}-monad plumbing. The verbatim statement
is theorem \lean{fips205.slh\_verify\_128s\_accepts\_iff} in
\code{verification/Proofs/ApexSpec.lean} --- diff this prose against
that source; the book taught you to distrust paraphrases, including its
own.) For \emph{every} message digest, \emph{every} signature,
\emph{every} public key at these parameters: the extracted verifier
accepts exactly when the recomputed hypertree root byte-equals the
public key's root. There is no other acceptance path --- no debug
backdoor, no unchecked branch, no early \lean{true}. Both summits end in
the same clean air: a quantified equation whose right-hand side a
stranger can read.

One more object from this repository deserves a place in your permanent
toolkit: the audit table of axiom cones, which turns
Chapter~\ref{ch:honesty}'s discipline into a picture of the pyramid
itself.

\begin{center}
\small
\begin{tabular}{@{}ll@{}}
\toprule
\textbf{Certificate layer} & \textbf{Cone beyond the kernel three} \\
\midrule
digit/byte plumbing (4 certs) & --- \emph{(pure arithmetic, no hash)} \\
chain, WOTS recompute & $F$ \\
XMSS ascent, FORS inner & $H$ \\
FORS outer & $F, H$ \\
hypertree walk & $F, H$, the WOTS compressor (axiom \code{t\_l}) \\
apex & all five oracles \\
\bottomrule
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

The cone \emph{grows as you climb}: bit-shuffling needs no oracles at
all; each layer adds exactly the hash primitives it touches; the apex
carries all five. The audit enforces every row with exact equality ---
one axiom extra or one missing fails the build --- so this table is not
documentation, it is a \emph{theorem about the theorems}.

And the table carries a war story, told here so you inherit the scar
without the wound. During the audit, comparing what each compressor
axiom was \emph{used as} against what it was \emph{named} turned up a
mismatch: the axiom spelled \code{t\_l} is the one doing the standard's
$T_{\mathit{len}}$ job (compressing WOTS chain ends), while the axiom
spelled \code{t\_len} does the $T_k$ job (compressing FORS roots) ---
the source's names are \emph{inverted} against FIPS~205. Worse, both
axioms model what is a \emph{single} primitive in the Rust source. The
repository's response was not to quietly ``fix'' the names --- renaming
proves nothing --- but to document the inversion at the axiom
declarations and keep the two axioms separate anyway, assuming
\emph{less} (two possibly-different functions) rather than more. Had the
auditor trusted spelling, the cone table above would read cleanly and
lie. When you audit a stranger's certificate, judge every axiom by what
it is used as, never by what it is named. Names are spelling; cones are
property.

The experiment the chapter opened with can now be called. The pipeline
re-ran end to end on terrain its designers never saw: extraction, the
loop-to-fold bridge shape, the exact-cone audit, the fail-closed button,
the acceptance-characterization apex --- all of it transferred without a
structural change. Discipline, not trick. With one honest asterisk the
ledger already made you read: this terrain offered no second semantics,
so the bridges here are thinner than the field layer's --- visibility,
not independent meaning. A method that transfers \emph{and tells you
exactly how much thinner its guarantees just got} is rarer than either
half alone.

\section{The leaf, live}

The climb ends where the chapter began, but now you can read every field.
Leaf~18 of the log --- \code{entries/000018.json} in the mirror,
nineteenth and newest --- binds the repository at its pinned commit to
the eleven certificate names you now know, each with \code{status}
proven, each with its \emph{observed} axiom cone equal to its expected
cone: kernel-3 for the four plumbing certificates, the oracle sets of
the table above for the rest, all five for the apex. Its scope block
recites the trusted base you just read --- oracles assumed, signing out
of scope, \code{base\_2b} uncertified, differential bridge not a proof
--- because an attestation that hides its boundary is advertising, and
this log does not accept advertising.

``Leaf~18 landed, so the log went post-quantum'' --- plausible, and
wrong twice. First: leaf~18 is the first leaf \emph{about} a
post-quantum signature scheme, but its own issuance signature --- the
block inside \code{entries/000018.json}, like every leaf's --- is
Ed25519 only. Second: the log's \emph{tree heads} did start carrying an
additional SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s co-signature in the same publication batch
--- but the first dual-signed head is the size-\emph{14} head (leaf~18
arrives at size $19$, five appends later). Two separate facts, one lazy
conflation avoided; append-only history keeps them distinguishable
forever.

And here the estate quietly eats its own cooking --- with the books kept
scrupulously. The head's required Ed25519 signature is produced by the
dalek library attested at leaf~13 --- forty-four certificates,
self-inclusion verified inside the signature block itself: machinery
attested \emph{in the log}, signing \emph{for the log}. The additional
co-signature closes a different, looser loop: it uses parameter set
SHA2-128s --- \emph{exactly} the parameter set whose verification path
leaf~18 proves --- but the OpenSSL backend that actually produces and
checks that co-signature carries no certificate anywhere; what is
attested is the scheme's verification path in an independent, extracted
implementation, not the tool on duty. And for the \emph{signing}
operations, no loop closes at all --- no signing operation is proven for
either scheme, and the log says so. Read the three clauses again in
order: attested machinery, attested scheme, honest gap. Even the
self-reference keeps its books honest.

\begin{tryit}
Touch the second summit yourself; it costs one command. Clone
\code{github.com/saymrwulf/lean-transparency-log} and run:
\begin{center}
\code{python3 verify.py \ddash receipt receipts/fips205-slhdsa-verified.receipt.json}
\end{center}
The receipt binds
leaf~18 by inclusion proof to the size-$19$ signed head. Then open
\code{entries/000018.json} and find, with your own eyes: the eleven
certificate names, the five oracle axioms in the apex's observed cone,
and the exclusions block naming \code{base\_2b}. You have just audited a
post-quantum verification claim --- boundary and all --- in the time it
takes to pour a coffee.
\end{tryit}

\section*{Exercises}

\exercise{(Paper) All thirty-two message nibbles equal $7$. Compute the
checksum, the shift, the two bytes, and the three checksum digits, as
the worked example did for the all-zero message. How many steps of $F$
does the verifier walk on each of the three checksum chains?}

\exercise{(Paper) Re-derive the digest split from the parameter card:
show $\lceil 168/8 \rceil = 21$, $\lceil 54/8 \rceil = 7$,
$\lceil 63/56 \rceil = 2$, and verify they exhaust $m = 30$. Then
explain in one sentence why the second slice is masked to exactly $54$
bits and what would go wrong with a $55$-bit mask.}

\exercise{(Paper) Derive the signature size from the types: $n$ bytes of
randomness, $k$ revealed FORS secrets plus $k$ auth paths of $a$ nodes,
and $d$ XMSS signatures of $\mathit{len} + h'$ hashes each. Show the
total is $16 \cdot 491 = 7{,}856$ and locate the single largest
contributor.}

\exercise{(Audit drill) State the see-saw precisely and prove it: if a
forger changes the message so that some nibble strictly increases and
none decreases, then the checksum strictly decreases, and at least one
checksum digit's chain must be evaluated at a position \emph{earlier}
than the one revealed. Why does ``earlier position'' mean ``invert
$F$''?}

\exercise{(Audit drill) The audit holds five oracle axioms but the Rust
source has four hash primitives: \code{t\_l} and \code{t\_len} both
delegate to one function. Explain why modeling one primitive as two
independent axioms is the \emph{conservative} choice --- what could a
proof using ``they are equal'' conclude that the current model cannot,
and why is refusing that conclusion safer?}

\exercise{(Discussion) The day a cryptographically relevant quantum
computer exists, which statements in this book's estate become false?
Work through: the four Ed25519 apex certificates; the Ed25519 signatures
on the log's tree heads; leaf~18's certificates; the SLH-DSA
co-signatures on the heads. Sort each into ``still true,'' ``true but no
longer load-bearing,'' and ``broken'' --- and defend the sorting.}

\section*{Solutions and pathways}
\solutionsintro

\solhead{13.1}
\pathway Same three moves as the worked box: sum the remaining steps,
align, extract nibbles.
\answer $\mathit{csum} = 32 \cdot (15 - 7) = 256 = \mathtt{0x100}$.
Shifted left $4$: $\mathtt{0x1000}$, bytes $[\mathtt{10}, \mathtt{00}]$,
first three nibbles $(1, 0, 0)$. The verifier walks $15 - 1 = 14$,
$15 - 0 = 15$, $15 - 0 = 15$ steps. (Sanity: middle-of-the-road message
digits still force near-full walks on checksum chains --- the checksum
digits are usually \emph{small}, so their remaining walks are long.)

\solhead{13.2}
\pathway The three ceilings are $\lceil ka/8\rceil$,
$\lceil (h - h/d)/8 \rceil$, $\lceil h/(8d) \rceil$ with the card's
values substituted.
\answer $\lceil 14 \cdot 12 / 8 \rceil = \lceil 21 \rceil = 21$;
$\lceil (63-9)/8 \rceil = \lceil 6.75 \rceil = 7$;
$\lceil 63/56 \rceil = 2$; and $21 + 7 + 2 = 30 = m$. The tree index
addresses one of $2^{h - h/d} = 2^{54}$ bottom-layer trees, so the mask
keeps exactly $54$ bits; a $55$-bit mask could name a tree that does not
exist --- the verifier would recompute a root of an out-of-range tree
and reject a valid signature (or, worse in a sloppier implementation,
wrap around silently). Ranges are part of correctness; that is why the
extracted masks are certificate-adjacent code, not comments.

\solhead{13.3}
\pathway Transcribe the type structure into a sum, then factor out $n$.
\answer $n\big(1 + k(1{+}a) + d(\mathit{len}{+}h')\big)
= 16\,(1 + 14 \cdot 13 + 7 \cdot 44) = 16\,(1 + 182 + 308)
= 16 \cdot 491 = 7856$. The hypertree's $308$ hash-values (seven WOTS
signatures of $35$ plus seven auth paths of $9$) dominate: $4{,}928$ of
the $7{,}856$ bytes --- the price of splitting one impossible tree into
seven possible ones.

\solhead{13.4}
\pathway Write the checksum as a function of the digit vector and
difference it.
\answer $\mathit{csum} = \sum_i (15 - \mathit{msg}_i)$, so if some
nibbles increase by a total of $\delta > 0$ and none decrease,
$\mathit{csum}$ drops by exactly $\delta$. The checksum digits are the
base-$16$ representation of the (aligned) checksum; a strictly smaller
value must have at least one strictly smaller digit at some position
(compare digits from the most significant end; the first difference is
a decrease). The signature revealed the chain value at the \emph{old}
digit's position; a forgery needs the value at a strictly earlier
position of that chain --- but the chain runs forward by $F$, so an
earlier value is a preimage of the revealed one under iterated $F$.
Producing it is inverting the hash --- the assumption the whole scheme
stands on.

\solhead{13.5}
\pathway Ask what each axiom is \emph{used for} in the proofs, then ask
what merging them would license.
\answer The model with two independent axioms proves everything the
certificates claim while assuming only ``there exist two functions with
these signatures.'' Adding \lean{t\_l = t\_len} would let a proof
conclude that a WOTS compression can be replayed as a FORS compression
(and vice versa) --- an interchangeability the standard does not grant
(the two uses differ in domain separation via the address argument) and
no certificate needs. Assuming less can only make the theorems
\emph{harder} to prove, never falsely stronger; if the theorems still go
through, the weaker assumption is strictly safer. The general habit:
when in doubt, split the axiom --- and let the cones show exactly which
theorem leaned on which half.

\solhead{13.6}
\pathway Separate ``the theorem is true'' from ``the assumption behind
the scheme's security is true'' for each artifact.
\answer The four Ed25519 apex certificates: \emph{still true} ---
kernel-checked equations about extracted code do not cite discrete-log
hardness anywhere. The Ed25519 head signatures: \emph{true but no longer
load-bearing} --- the signatures still verify, but a quantum forger
could now mint alternative heads, so their evidentiary weight collapses
(the certificates about the \emph{verifier} remain true; the
unforgeability of \emph{signing} was never proven and is now also not
believed). Leaf~18's certificates: \emph{still true}, and still
load-bearing --- nothing in their cones or their scheme depends on
Shor-vulnerable structure. The SLH-DSA head co-signatures: the reason
the slot exists --- \emph{load-bearing by design} on that day, resting
on hash preimage resistance, eroded only quadratically by Grover.
Moral, worth saying aloud: proofs of correctness are
quantum-proof; \emph{schemes} are not; and a log that dual-signs its
heads is planning for the difference.

\begin{checkpoint}
You should now be able to: explain why a correctness certificate
survives a quantum computer while the scheme it certifies may not;
run a WOTS chain-resume and the checksum see-saw by hand at $w = 16$;
price an SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s verification ($254$ fixed oracle calls plus
the chains, against $2^{72}$ to build what it checks); read the eleven
certificates and the cone-growth table as one object; and recite what
the second summit does \emph{not} claim --- oracles assumed,
\code{base\_2b} uncertified, the $M'$ assembly above the extraction
root, signing never in scope. Both pyramids now
stand, and both end the same way: a script prints \texttt{ALL GREEN}
and a leaf lands in a public log. Which leaves exactly one question in
this book, and it is the deepest one: that script, and that log --- who
checks \emph{them}? The final chapter has been waiting for you.
\end{checkpoint}
