swisspost-evoting-go-poc/pkg/party/transcript.go
saymrwulf 313db92321 Add party layer scaffolding: PKI bootstrap + signed handshake
pkg/party models each endpoint of the system as a separate object holding only
its own private state, wired together through the transport bus.

- ceremony.go: NewCeremony bootstraps the Ed25519 root CA, enrolls all parties
  (setup, 4 CCs, electoral board, voting server, verifier, N voters) with
  CA-signed identity certs, registers each in the directory, and wires its
  handler into the bus.
- parties.go: the six party types and a shared hello/ack handshake; Handshake()
  proves the full sign -> route -> verify -> reply -> verify path for every
  party before any election logic runs.
- state.go: per-party private state structs (nothing shared across parties).
- transcript.go: PublicTranscript, the append-only bulletin board a remote
  verifier will consume (no secrets).
- phases.go: phase handlers reject unknown message types cleanly (the transport
  boundary never panics on unexpected input) — filled in over the next commits.

Transport CA API simplified to own its serial counter (NewCA/Issue).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 15:07:31 +02:00

30 lines
1.3 KiB
Go

package party
import (
"github.com/user/evote/pkg/elgamal"
emath "github.com/user/evote/pkg/math"
"github.com/user/evote/pkg/mixnet"
"github.com/user/evote/pkg/zkp"
)
// PublicTranscript is the append-only bulletin board: everything a remote
// verifier needs to re-check the election, and nothing secret. It is populated
// by the parties as the ceremony proceeds and consumed by the verifier.
type PublicTranscript struct {
ElectionID string
// Setup artifacts.
CCElectionPKs []elgamal.PublicKey // per-CC election public keys
CCSchnorr [][]zkp.SchnorrProof // per-CC Schnorr proofs of key knowledge
EBPublicKey elgamal.PublicKey // electoral board public key
ElectionPK elgamal.PublicKey // combined election public key
Primes []string // decimal encodings of the encoding primes
// Tally artifacts.
MixInput *elgamal.CiphertextVector // padded ballot ciphertexts fed to shuffle 0
Shuffles []mixnet.VerifiableShuffle // one per CC + EB
PartialDecrypts []*elgamal.CiphertextVector // partial decryption after each CC
DecryptProofs [][]zkp.DecryptionProof // per-stage decryption proofs
FinalPlaintexts []*emath.GqVector // EB's decrypted messages
Result map[int]int // option index → count
}