saymrwulf d2cfbf291f Ballot carries E2 + plaintext-equality proof, CC-verified ... The voter now also submits E2 = Enc(vote, returnCodesPK[0]) and a plaintext- equality proof that E2 and the ballot's slot 0 encrypt the SAME vote. Every CC verifies this proof during ballot verification. This is the soundness link that makes the return code cast-as-intended: a client that encrypts one vote for the tally and a different one for the return-code channel is rejected, so the code the CCs compute from E2 necessarily reflects the tallied vote. - transcript: publish the combined return-codes public key. - voter stores returnCodePK from the (confidential) card delivery. - wire: plaintext-equality proof DTO. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>		2026-07-06 15:47:53 +02:00
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elgamal	Due-diligence hardening + Rust transport-security layer	2026-07-06 14:42:34 +02:00
hash	Due-diligence hardening + Rust transport-security layer	2026-07-06 14:42:34 +02:00
kdf	Due-diligence hardening + Rust transport-security layer	2026-07-06 14:42:34 +02:00
math	Due-diligence hardening + Rust transport-security layer	2026-07-06 14:42:34 +02:00
mixnet	Due-diligence hardening + Rust transport-security layer	2026-07-06 14:42:34 +02:00
party	Ballot carries E2 + plaintext-equality proof, CC-verified	2026-07-06 15:47:53 +02:00
protocol	Due-diligence hardening + Rust transport-security layer	2026-07-06 14:42:34 +02:00
returncodes	Tally + verification: full multi-party ceremony runs end-to-end	2026-07-06 15:23:56 +02:00
serialize	Swiss Post E-Voting Go PoC	2026-02-13 19:53:09 +01:00
symmetric	Swiss Post E-Voting Go PoC	2026-02-13 19:53:09 +01:00
transport	Add party layer scaffolding: PKI bootstrap + signed handshake	2026-07-06 15:07:31 +02:00
transportsec	Due-diligence hardening + Rust transport-security layer	2026-07-06 14:42:34 +02:00
verify	Due-diligence hardening + Rust transport-security layer	2026-07-06 14:42:34 +02:00
zkp	Pin plaintext-equality proof soundness with a correct-usage test	2026-07-06 15:42:29 +02:00