mirror of
https://github.com/saymrwulf/swisspost-evoting-go-poc.git
synced 2026-09-05 20:30:43 +00:00
Correctness/security review of the whole PoC, with fixes and regression tests.
Cryptographic soundness:
- mixnet: enforce the multi-exponentiation c_{B_m}=commit(0;0) check that was
stubbed out with an empty if — without it a malicious mixer can prove a
non-permutation shuffle.
- zkp: derive all four Fiat-Shamir challenges via RecursiveHashToZq instead of
a biased `hash mod q` (which also capped the challenge space at 256 bits for
production-sized groups).
Verification honesty:
- protocol: VerifyTally now actually calls zkp.VerifySchnorrProof and returns
the true aggregate result instead of an unconditional true.
- protocol: persist the padded mix input (event.MixInput) so the verifier checks
shuffle 0 against the same padding the tally used (fixes false INVALID for N<2).
Other correctness:
- kdf: length-prefix BuildKDFInfo parts so the info encoding is injective.
- math: GqElementFromSquareRoot accepts the valid root q (off-by-one that could
panic in HashAndSquare); RandomGqElement samples the full canonical range.
- cmd: validate demo --voters/--options instead of panicking on degenerate values.
- protocol: use crypto/rand in the demo driver (drop the last math/rand import).
Transport security (new): pkg/transportsec exposes Ed25519 signatures and X25519
ECDH — implemented in Rust (rust/transportsec: ed25519-dalek, x25519-dalek),
linked into Go via cgo. No RSA. Cross-language conformance test proves the Rust
Ed25519 signatures interoperate with Go's crypto/ed25519. Makefile builds the
Rust static lib before the Go binary.
Tests: added unit/round-trip/tamper coverage for math, hash, elgamal, zkp,
mixnet, kdf, returncodes, protocol (end-to-end), and the Rust FFI bridge.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
178 lines
5.2 KiB
Go
178 lines
5.2 KiB
Go
package zkp
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import (
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"github.com/user/evote/pkg/elgamal"
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"github.com/user/evote/pkg/hash"
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emath "github.com/user/evote/pkg/math"
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)
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// GenDecryptionProof generates a proof of correct ElGamal decryption.
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// Proves that message = Decrypt(ciphertext, sk).
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func GenDecryptionProof(
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ct elgamal.Ciphertext,
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sk elgamal.PrivateKey,
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pk elgamal.PublicKey,
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msg elgamal.Message,
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group *emath.GqGroup,
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auxInfo ...hash.Hashable,
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) DecryptionProof {
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zqGroup := emath.ZqGroupFromGqGroup(group)
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g := group.Generator()
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l := ct.Size()
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gamma := ct.Gamma
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// 1. Sample random b = (b_0, ..., b_{l-1})
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bVec := emath.RandomZqVector(l, zqGroup)
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// 2. Commitment: phi(b, gamma)
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// c = [g^b_0, ..., g^b_{l-1}, gamma^b_0, ..., gamma^b_{l-1}]
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commitments := computePhiDecryption(bVec, g, gamma, group)
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// 3. Statement: y = [pk_0, ..., pk_{l-1}, phi_0/m_0, ..., phi_{l-1}/m_{l-1}]
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statement := buildDecryptionStatement(pk, ct, msg, l)
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// 4. Compute challenge
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e := decryptionChallenge(group, gamma, statement, commitments, ct, msg, zqGroup, auxInfo)
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// 5. Response: z_i = b_i + e * sk_i
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zElems := make([]emath.ZqElement, l)
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for i := 0; i < l; i++ {
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zElems[i] = bVec.Get(i).Add(e.Multiply(sk.Get(i)))
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}
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return DecryptionProof{
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E: e,
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Z: emath.ZqVectorOf(zElems...),
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}
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}
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// VerifyDecryptionProof verifies a decryption proof.
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func VerifyDecryptionProof(
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ct elgamal.Ciphertext,
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pk elgamal.PublicKey,
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msg elgamal.Message,
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proof DecryptionProof,
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group *emath.GqGroup,
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auxInfo ...hash.Hashable,
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) bool {
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zqGroup := emath.ZqGroupFromGqGroup(group)
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g := group.Generator()
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l := ct.Size()
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gamma := ct.Gamma
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// Compute phi(z, gamma)
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x := computePhiDecryption(proof.Z, g, gamma, group)
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// Statement
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statement := buildDecryptionStatement(pk, ct, msg, l)
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// Reconstruct commitments: c'_i = x_i * (y_i^(-1))^e
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negE := proof.E.Negate()
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cPrime := make([]emath.GqElement, len(x))
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for i := range x {
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yInvE := statement[i].Exponentiate(negE)
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cPrime[i] = x[i].Multiply(yInvE)
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}
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// Recompute challenge
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ePrime := decryptionChallenge(group, gamma, statement, cPrime, ct, msg, zqGroup, auxInfo)
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return proof.E.Equals(ePrime)
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}
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// GenVerifiableDecryptions generates decryption proofs for a batch of ciphertexts.
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func GenVerifiableDecryptions(
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cts *elgamal.CiphertextVector,
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sk elgamal.PrivateKey,
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pk elgamal.PublicKey,
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group *emath.GqGroup,
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auxInfo ...hash.Hashable,
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) ([]elgamal.Ciphertext, []DecryptionProof) {
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n := cts.Size()
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decrypted := make([]elgamal.Ciphertext, n)
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proofs := make([]DecryptionProof, n)
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for i := 0; i < n; i++ {
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ct := cts.Get(i)
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// Partial decrypt
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dec := elgamal.PartialDecrypt(ct, sk)
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decrypted[i] = dec
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// Get message for proof
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msg := elgamal.Decrypt(ct, sk)
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// Generate proof
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proofs[i] = GenDecryptionProof(ct, sk, pk, msg, group, auxInfo...)
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}
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return decrypted, proofs
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}
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func computePhiDecryption(zVec *emath.ZqVector, g emath.GqElement, gamma emath.GqElement, group *emath.GqGroup) []emath.GqElement {
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l := zVec.Size()
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// [g^z_0, ..., g^z_{l-1}, gamma^z_0, ..., gamma^z_{l-1}]
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result := make([]emath.GqElement, 2*l)
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for i := 0; i < l; i++ {
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result[i] = g.Exponentiate(zVec.Get(i))
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result[l+i] = gamma.Exponentiate(zVec.Get(i))
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}
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return result
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}
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func buildDecryptionStatement(pk elgamal.PublicKey, ct elgamal.Ciphertext, msg elgamal.Message, l int) []emath.GqElement {
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// y = [pk_0, ..., pk_{l-1}, phi_0/m_0, ..., phi_{l-1}/m_{l-1}]
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statement := make([]emath.GqElement, 2*l)
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for i := 0; i < l; i++ {
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statement[i] = pk.Get(i)
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statement[l+i] = ct.GetPhi(i).Divide(msg.Get(i))
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}
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return statement
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}
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func decryptionChallenge(group *emath.GqGroup, gamma emath.GqElement, statement, commitments []emath.GqElement, ct elgamal.Ciphertext, msg elgamal.Message, zqGroup *emath.ZqGroup, auxInfo []hash.Hashable) emath.ZqElement {
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l := ct.Size()
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// f = (p, q, g, gamma)
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f := hash.HashableList{Elements: []hash.Hashable{
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hash.HashableBigInt{Value: group.P()},
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hash.HashableBigInt{Value: group.Q()},
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hash.HashableBigInt{Value: group.Generator().Value()},
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hash.HashableBigInt{Value: gamma.Value()},
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}}
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// y as HashableList
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yElems := make([]hash.Hashable, len(statement))
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for i, s := range statement {
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yElems[i] = hash.HashableBigInt{Value: s.Value()}
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}
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yHash := hash.HashableList{Elements: yElems}
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// c as HashableList
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cElems := make([]hash.Hashable, len(commitments))
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for i, c := range commitments {
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cElems[i] = hash.HashableBigInt{Value: c.Value()}
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}
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cHash := hash.HashableList{Elements: cElems}
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// h_aux: ["DecryptionProof", [phi_0,...], [m_0,...]] or with i_aux
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phiElems := make([]hash.Hashable, l)
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mElems := make([]hash.Hashable, l)
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for i := 0; i < l; i++ {
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phiElems[i] = hash.HashableBigInt{Value: ct.GetPhi(i).Value()}
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mElems[i] = hash.HashableBigInt{Value: msg.Get(i).Value()}
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}
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auxElements := []hash.Hashable{
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hash.HashableString{Value: "DecryptionProof"},
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hash.HashableList{Elements: phiElems},
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hash.HashableList{Elements: mElems},
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}
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if len(auxInfo) > 0 {
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auxElements = append(auxElements, auxInfo...)
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}
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hAux := hash.HashableList{Elements: auxElements}
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// Uniform Z_q challenge via oversample-then-reduce (Swiss Post spec).
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eVal := hash.RecursiveHashToZq(zqGroup.Q(), f, yHash, cHash, hAux)
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e, _ := emath.NewZqElement(eVal, zqGroup)
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return e
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}
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