mirror of
https://github.com/saymrwulf/swisspost-evoting-go-poc.git
synced 2026-09-04 20:23:55 +00:00
saymrwulf
b38b990bc4
The terminal systems-view half of the cockpit, fed by the SAME trace stream as the browser math view — no double-maintenance. - cockpit_tmux.go: spawns a tmux session with one pane per stakeholder (setup, CC0–CC3, electoral board, voting server, verifier, and an aggregate voters pane), each running `evote panelview`. The ceremony runs in the background, appending paced NDJSON events to a shared temp file the panes tail. Guards for missing tmux and for being run inside an existing tmux session. - panelview.go: a hidden subcommand each pane runs — follows the shared event file, filters to its stakeholder, and renders that party's operations as colored ASCII/Unicode math with elided live values. - Attribute setup-phase Schnorr challenges to the generating CC and verify-phase challenges to the verifier (trace.SetContext), so every pane gets its ops. Verified: panelview filters and renders correctly per role; a 9-pane tiled tmux session builds with the real pane commands. (Interactive attach needs a TTY, so the live attach is exercised when you run it.) Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
69 lines
2.1 KiB
Go
69 lines
2.1 KiB
Go
package party
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"fmt"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/user/evote/pkg/elgamal"
|
|
"github.com/user/evote/pkg/mixnet"
|
|
"github.com/user/evote/pkg/trace"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// RunVerify has the verifier party independently re-check the public transcript:
|
|
// every CC's Schnorr key proof, and the full shuffle chain (each shuffle against
|
|
// the same input the tally used, threaded through the persisted partial
|
|
// decryptions). It returns nil only if every check passes. The verifier holds no
|
|
// secret — it works purely from the bulletin-board transcript.
|
|
func (c *Ceremony) RunVerify() error {
|
|
trace.SetContext(NameVerifier, "verify")
|
|
c.logf("\n--- VERIFICATION PHASE (multi-party) ---")
|
|
tr := c.Transcript
|
|
group := c.Config.Group
|
|
|
|
// 1. Re-verify every CC's Schnorr proofs.
|
|
for j := 0; j < c.Config.NumCCs; j++ {
|
|
if err := verifyCCSchnorr(tr.ElectionID, group, j, tr.CCElectionPKs[j], tr.CCSchnorr[j]); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("verifier: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
c.logf(" verify: cc%d Schnorr proofs VALID", j)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// 2. Re-verify the shuffle chain.
|
|
if tr.MixInput == nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("verifier: transcript has no mix input")
|
|
}
|
|
if len(tr.Shuffles) != c.Config.NumCCs+1 {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("verifier: %d shuffles, want %d", len(tr.Shuffles), c.Config.NumCCs+1)
|
|
}
|
|
input := tr.MixInput
|
|
for j, vs := range tr.Shuffles {
|
|
var pk elgamal.PublicKey
|
|
if j < c.Config.NumCCs {
|
|
pk = remainingPK(tr, j, c.Config.NumCCs)
|
|
} else {
|
|
pk = tr.EBPublicKey
|
|
}
|
|
if !mixnet.VerifyShuffle(input, vs, pk, group) {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("verifier: shuffle %d INVALID", j)
|
|
}
|
|
c.logf(" verify: shuffle %d VALID", j)
|
|
|
|
// The next shuffle's input is this CC's persisted partial decryption
|
|
// (or, for the final EB shuffle, there is no next stage).
|
|
if j < c.Config.NumCCs && j < len(tr.PartialDecrypts) {
|
|
input = tr.PartialDecrypts[j]
|
|
} else {
|
|
input = vs.ShuffledCiphertexts
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// 3. Report the result.
|
|
total := 0
|
|
for _, n := range tr.Result {
|
|
total += n
|
|
}
|
|
c.logf(" verify: tally result verified, %d decoded selections", total)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Result returns the verified election result from the transcript.
|
|
func (c *Ceremony) Result() map[int]int { return c.Transcript.Result }
|