swisspost-evoting-go-poc/pkg/verify/setup.go
saymrwulf ec4be74e17 Due-diligence hardening + Rust transport-security layer
Correctness/security review of the whole PoC, with fixes and regression tests.

Cryptographic soundness:
- mixnet: enforce the multi-exponentiation c_{B_m}=commit(0;0) check that was
  stubbed out with an empty if — without it a malicious mixer can prove a
  non-permutation shuffle.
- zkp: derive all four Fiat-Shamir challenges via RecursiveHashToZq instead of
  a biased `hash mod q` (which also capped the challenge space at 256 bits for
  production-sized groups).

Verification honesty:
- protocol: VerifyTally now actually calls zkp.VerifySchnorrProof and returns
  the true aggregate result instead of an unconditional true.
- protocol: persist the padded mix input (event.MixInput) so the verifier checks
  shuffle 0 against the same padding the tally used (fixes false INVALID for N<2).

Other correctness:
- kdf: length-prefix BuildKDFInfo parts so the info encoding is injective.
- math: GqElementFromSquareRoot accepts the valid root q (off-by-one that could
  panic in HashAndSquare); RandomGqElement samples the full canonical range.
- cmd: validate demo --voters/--options instead of panicking on degenerate values.
- protocol: use crypto/rand in the demo driver (drop the last math/rand import).

Transport security (new): pkg/transportsec exposes Ed25519 signatures and X25519
ECDH — implemented in Rust (rust/transportsec: ed25519-dalek, x25519-dalek),
linked into Go via cgo. No RSA. Cross-language conformance test proves the Rust
Ed25519 signatures interoperate with Go's crypto/ed25519. Makefile builds the
Rust static lib before the Go binary.

Tests: added unit/round-trip/tamper coverage for math, hash, elgamal, zkp,
mixnet, kdf, returncodes, protocol (end-to-end), and the Rust FFI bridge.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 14:42:34 +02:00

108 lines
2.8 KiB
Go

package verify
import (
"fmt"
"github.com/user/evote/pkg/hash"
emath "github.com/user/evote/pkg/math"
"github.com/user/evote/pkg/protocol"
"github.com/user/evote/pkg/zkp"
"math/big"
)
// VerifySetup performs all setup phase verification checks.
func VerifySetup(event *protocol.ElectionEvent) bool {
allPassed := true
fmt.Println(" [Setup Verification]")
// 1. Verify encryption parameters
if !verifyEncryptionParams(event.Config.Group) {
fmt.Println(" FAIL: Encryption parameters invalid")
allPassed = false
} else {
fmt.Println(" PASS: Encryption parameters (p=2q+1, both prime, g generates G_q)")
}
// 2. Verify small primes are group members
for i, p := range event.Primes {
if !event.Config.Group.IsGroupMember(p) {
fmt.Printf(" FAIL: Prime %d (%v) is not a group member\n", i, p)
allPassed = false
}
}
fmt.Printf(" PASS: All %d small primes are group members\n", len(event.Primes))
// 3. Verify Schnorr proofs for each CC's keys
for j, cc := range event.CCs {
for i := 0; i < event.Config.NumOptions; i++ {
auxInfo := []hash.Hashable{
hash.HashableBigInt{Value: big.NewInt(int64(i))},
hash.HashableString{Value: event.Config.ElectionID},
hash.HashableBigInt{Value: big.NewInt(int64(j))},
}
valid := zkp.VerifySchnorrProof(cc.SchnorrProofs[i], cc.ElectionKeyPair.PK.Get(i), event.Config.Group, auxInfo...)
if !valid {
fmt.Printf(" FAIL: CC%d key %d Schnorr proof invalid\n", j, i)
allPassed = false
}
}
fmt.Printf(" PASS: CC%d Schnorr proofs (%d proofs)\n", j, event.Config.NumOptions)
}
// 4. Verify key consistency (combined PK = product of all CC PKs * EB PK)
if verifyKeyConsistency(event) {
fmt.Println(" PASS: Election public key consistency")
} else {
fmt.Println(" FAIL: Election public key inconsistent")
allPassed = false
}
return allPassed
}
func verifyEncryptionParams(group *emath.GqGroup) bool {
p := group.P()
q := group.Q()
g := group.Generator()
// p is prime
if !p.ProbablyPrime(64) {
return false
}
// q is prime
if !q.ProbablyPrime(64) {
return false
}
// p = 2q + 1
expected := new(big.Int).Mul(big.NewInt(2), q)
expected.Add(expected, big.NewInt(1))
if p.Cmp(expected) != 0 {
return false
}
// g is in G_q (Jacobi symbol = 1)
if big.Jacobi(g.Value(), p) != 1 {
return false
}
return true
}
func verifyKeyConsistency(event *protocol.ElectionEvent) bool {
// Recompute the election PK from CC keys and EB key
for i := 0; i < event.Config.NumOptions; i++ {
elem := event.Config.Group.Identity()
for _, cc := range event.CCs {
elem = elem.Multiply(cc.ElectionKeyPair.PK.Get(i))
}
elem = elem.Multiply(event.EB.PK.Get(i))
expected := event.ElectionPK.Get(i)
if !elem.Equals(expected) {
return false
}
}
return true
}