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https://github.com/saymrwulf/swisspost-evoting-go-poc.git
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saymrwulf
6933835bac
wire.go: the validated serialization boundary between parties. Crypto objects (group elements, public keys, Schnorr proofs, ciphertexts) travel as decimal DTOs; every decode routes through NewGqElement/NewZqElement so a peer cannot inject a value outside G_q or Z_q — closing the small-subgroup / non-residue hole (finding M4) at the trust boundary. setup.go: RunSetup drives distributed key generation over the bus. Each CC generates its ElGamal keypair + return-code secret PRIVATELY and returns only its public key and Schnorr proofs; the setup component verifies every proof on receipt before combining keys. The electoral board derives its own key and returns only the public key. Combined election PK and setup artifacts are published to the public transcript. Test confirms the combined election key equals the product of the individually generated CC and EB keys, and that private key material stays with each party (never appears in the transcript). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
50 lines
1.6 KiB
Go
50 lines
1.6 KiB
Go
package party
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import (
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"testing"
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)
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// TestRunSetupDistributedKeygen runs the distributed key generation over the
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// transport and checks that: every CC's Schnorr proof verified (RunSetup would
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// have errored otherwise), the combined election public key equals the product
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// of the individual CC and EB keys, and the transcript captured the artifacts.
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func TestRunSetupDistributedKeygen(t *testing.T) {
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cfg := testConfig(t, 5, 3)
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c, err := NewCeremony(cfg, nil)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("NewCeremony: %v", err)
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}
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if err := c.RunSetup(); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("RunSetup: %v", err)
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}
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tr := c.Transcript
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if len(tr.CCElectionPKs) != cfg.NumCCs {
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t.Fatalf("transcript has %d CC keys, want %d", len(tr.CCElectionPKs), cfg.NumCCs)
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}
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if len(tr.Primes) != cfg.NumOptions {
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t.Fatalf("transcript has %d primes, want %d", len(tr.Primes), cfg.NumOptions)
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}
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// Recompute election PK = Π CC_j.PK * EB.PK per component and compare.
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for i := 0; i < cfg.NumOptions; i++ {
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want := cfg.Group.Identity()
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for j := 0; j < cfg.NumCCs; j++ {
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want = want.Multiply(tr.CCElectionPKs[j].Elements.Get(i))
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}
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want = want.Multiply(tr.EBPublicKey.Elements.Get(i))
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got := tr.ElectionPK.Elements.Get(i)
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if !got.Equals(want) {
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t.Fatalf("election PK component %d mismatch", i)
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}
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}
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// The setup component must actually hold private primes; a CC must hold a
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// secret key that never appeared in the transcript.
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if c.Setup.st.primes == nil {
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t.Fatal("setup component did not retain encoding primes")
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}
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if c.CCs[0].st.keyPair.SK.Elements == nil {
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t.Fatal("cc0 did not retain its private key")
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}
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}
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