swisspost-evoting-go-poc/pkg/zkp/zkp_test.go
saymrwulf ec4be74e17 Due-diligence hardening + Rust transport-security layer
Correctness/security review of the whole PoC, with fixes and regression tests.

Cryptographic soundness:
- mixnet: enforce the multi-exponentiation c_{B_m}=commit(0;0) check that was
  stubbed out with an empty if — without it a malicious mixer can prove a
  non-permutation shuffle.
- zkp: derive all four Fiat-Shamir challenges via RecursiveHashToZq instead of
  a biased `hash mod q` (which also capped the challenge space at 256 bits for
  production-sized groups).

Verification honesty:
- protocol: VerifyTally now actually calls zkp.VerifySchnorrProof and returns
  the true aggregate result instead of an unconditional true.
- protocol: persist the padded mix input (event.MixInput) so the verifier checks
  shuffle 0 against the same padding the tally used (fixes false INVALID for N<2).

Other correctness:
- kdf: length-prefix BuildKDFInfo parts so the info encoding is injective.
- math: GqElementFromSquareRoot accepts the valid root q (off-by-one that could
  panic in HashAndSquare); RandomGqElement samples the full canonical range.
- cmd: validate demo --voters/--options instead of panicking on degenerate values.
- protocol: use crypto/rand in the demo driver (drop the last math/rand import).

Transport security (new): pkg/transportsec exposes Ed25519 signatures and X25519
ECDH — implemented in Rust (rust/transportsec: ed25519-dalek, x25519-dalek),
linked into Go via cgo. No RSA. Cross-language conformance test proves the Rust
Ed25519 signatures interoperate with Go's crypto/ed25519. Makefile builds the
Rust static lib before the Go binary.

Tests: added unit/round-trip/tamper coverage for math, hash, elgamal, zkp,
mixnet, kdf, returncodes, protocol (end-to-end), and the Rust FFI bridge.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 14:42:34 +02:00

115 lines
3.7 KiB
Go

package zkp
import (
"math/big"
"testing"
"github.com/user/evote/pkg/elgamal"
"github.com/user/evote/pkg/hash"
emath "github.com/user/evote/pkg/math"
)
const (
testP = "179688417486862032111147025351064878713905624387098436271724698527496946737299"
testQ = "89844208743431016055573512675532439356952812193549218135862349263748473368649"
testG = "4"
)
func testGroup(t *testing.T) *emath.GqGroup {
t.Helper()
p, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(testP, 10)
q, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(testQ, 10)
g, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(testG, 10)
group, err := emath.NewGqGroup(p, q, g)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("test group: %v", err)
}
return group
}
func TestSchnorrRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
group := testGroup(t)
zq := emath.ZqGroupFromGqGroup(group)
g := group.Generator()
x := emath.RandomZqElement(zq)
y := g.Exponentiate(x)
proof := GenSchnorrProof(x, y, group)
if !VerifySchnorrProof(proof, y, group) {
t.Fatal("honest Schnorr proof rejected")
}
// Wrong statement must be rejected.
yBad := y.Multiply(g)
if VerifySchnorrProof(proof, yBad, group) {
t.Fatal("Schnorr proof accepted against wrong statement")
}
// Aux-info mismatch must be rejected (domain separation).
proofAux := GenSchnorrProof(x, y, group, hash.HashableString{Value: "ctx-A"})
if VerifySchnorrProof(proofAux, y, group, hash.HashableString{Value: "ctx-B"}) {
t.Fatal("Schnorr proof accepted with mismatched aux info")
}
if !VerifySchnorrProof(proofAux, y, group, hash.HashableString{Value: "ctx-A"}) {
t.Fatal("Schnorr proof with matching aux info rejected")
}
}
// TestSchnorrChallengeInRange locks in the M1 fix: the Fiat-Shamir challenge is
// a uniform Z_q element via RecursiveHashToZq, so it must be < q.
func TestSchnorrChallengeInRange(t *testing.T) {
group := testGroup(t)
zq := emath.ZqGroupFromGqGroup(group)
g := group.Generator()
for i := 0; i < 50; i++ {
x := emath.RandomZqElement(zq)
proof := GenSchnorrProof(x, g.Exponentiate(x), group)
if proof.E.Value().Cmp(group.Q()) >= 0 {
t.Fatalf("challenge not reduced mod q: %v", proof.E.Value())
}
}
}
func TestExponentiationRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
group := testGroup(t)
zq := emath.ZqGroupFromGqGroup(group)
basesElems := []emath.GqElement{group.Generator(), emath.RandomGqElement(group), emath.RandomGqElement(group)}
bases := emath.GqVectorOf(basesElems...)
x := emath.RandomZqElement(zq)
expElems := make([]emath.GqElement, len(basesElems))
for i, b := range basesElems {
expElems[i] = b.Exponentiate(x)
}
exps := emath.GqVectorOf(expElems...)
proof := GenExponentiationProof(bases, x, exps, group)
if !VerifyExponentiationProof(bases, exps, proof, group) {
t.Fatal("honest exponentiation proof rejected")
}
// Tamper one exponentiation.
expElems[0] = expElems[0].Multiply(group.Generator())
if VerifyExponentiationProof(bases, emath.GqVectorOf(expElems...), proof, group) {
t.Fatal("exponentiation proof accepted against tampered statement")
}
}
func TestDecryptionProofRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
group := testGroup(t)
zq := emath.ZqGroupFromGqGroup(group)
kp := elgamal.GenKeyPair(group, 2)
msg := elgamal.NewMessage(emath.GqVectorOf(emath.RandomGqElement(group), emath.RandomGqElement(group)))
r := emath.RandomZqElement(zq)
ct := elgamal.Encrypt(msg, r, kp.PK)
decrypted := elgamal.Decrypt(ct, kp.SK)
proof := GenDecryptionProof(ct, kp.SK, kp.PK, decrypted, group)
if !VerifyDecryptionProof(ct, kp.PK, decrypted, proof, group) {
t.Fatal("honest decryption proof rejected")
}
// Claim a wrong plaintext.
wrong := elgamal.NewMessage(emath.GqVectorOf(decrypted.Get(0).Multiply(group.Generator()), decrypted.Get(1)))
if VerifyDecryptionProof(ct, kp.PK, wrong, proof, group) {
t.Fatal("decryption proof accepted for wrong plaintext")
}
}