swisspost-evoting-go-poc/pkg/protocol/protocol_test.go
saymrwulf ec4be74e17 Due-diligence hardening + Rust transport-security layer
Correctness/security review of the whole PoC, with fixes and regression tests.

Cryptographic soundness:
- mixnet: enforce the multi-exponentiation c_{B_m}=commit(0;0) check that was
  stubbed out with an empty if — without it a malicious mixer can prove a
  non-permutation shuffle.
- zkp: derive all four Fiat-Shamir challenges via RecursiveHashToZq instead of
  a biased `hash mod q` (which also capped the challenge space at 256 bits for
  production-sized groups).

Verification honesty:
- protocol: VerifyTally now actually calls zkp.VerifySchnorrProof and returns
  the true aggregate result instead of an unconditional true.
- protocol: persist the padded mix input (event.MixInput) so the verifier checks
  shuffle 0 against the same padding the tally used (fixes false INVALID for N<2).

Other correctness:
- kdf: length-prefix BuildKDFInfo parts so the info encoding is injective.
- math: GqElementFromSquareRoot accepts the valid root q (off-by-one that could
  panic in HashAndSquare); RandomGqElement samples the full canonical range.
- cmd: validate demo --voters/--options instead of panicking on degenerate values.
- protocol: use crypto/rand in the demo driver (drop the last math/rand import).

Transport security (new): pkg/transportsec exposes Ed25519 signatures and X25519
ECDH — implemented in Rust (rust/transportsec: ed25519-dalek, x25519-dalek),
linked into Go via cgo. No RSA. Cross-language conformance test proves the Rust
Ed25519 signatures interoperate with Go's crypto/ed25519. Makefile builds the
Rust static lib before the Go binary.

Tests: added unit/round-trip/tamper coverage for math, hash, elgamal, zkp,
mixnet, kdf, returncodes, protocol (end-to-end), and the Rust FFI bridge.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 14:42:34 +02:00

66 lines
1.9 KiB
Go

package protocol
import (
"math/big"
"testing"
emath "github.com/user/evote/pkg/math"
)
const (
testP = "179688417486862032111147025351064878713905624387098436271724698527496946737299"
testQ = "89844208743431016055573512675532439356952812193549218135862349263748473368649"
testG = "4"
)
func testConfig(t *testing.T, numVoters, numOptions int) *Config {
t.Helper()
p, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(testP, 10)
q, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(testQ, 10)
g, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(testG, 10)
group, err := emath.NewGqGroup(p, q, g)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("test group: %v", err)
}
return &Config{
Group: group,
NumCCs: 4,
NumOptions: numOptions,
NumVoters: numVoters,
ElectionID: "unit-test",
SecurityLvl: 128,
}
}
// TestEndToEndTallyAndVerify runs the full ceremony deterministically (fixed
// group, fixed votes) and asserts both the decoded result and that the honest
// verifier returns true — this is the regression guard for the F2/F7 fixes
// (VerifyTally must now return the real outcome, and small-N padding must match).
func TestEndToEndTallyAndVerify(t *testing.T) {
for _, tc := range []struct {
voters int
options int
votes []int // one selection per voter
want map[int]int
}{
{voters: 3, options: 3, votes: []int{0, 1, 1}, want: map[int]int{0: 1, 1: 2}},
{voters: 1, options: 2, votes: []int{0}, want: map[int]int{0: 1}}, // exercises N<2 padding
{voters: 4, options: 2, votes: []int{0, 0, 1, 1}, want: map[int]int{0: 2, 1: 2}},
} {
cfg := testConfig(t, tc.voters, tc.options)
event := Setup(cfg)
for v := 0; v < tc.voters; v++ {
CastVote(event, v, []int{tc.votes[v]})
}
Tally(event)
for opt, want := range tc.want {
if event.FinalResult[opt] != want {
t.Errorf("voters=%d: option %d got %d, want %d", tc.voters, opt, event.FinalResult[opt], want)
}
}
if !VerifyTally(event) {
t.Errorf("voters=%d: honest ceremony failed verification", tc.voters)
}
}
}