Commit graph

6 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
1e0b286bd5 Add evote cockpit: watch the cryptography execute as live typeset math
The differentiator. A single self-contained browser page (no libraries, offline)
renders each real cryptographic operation as typeset mathematics the instant it
runs, with the actual runtime values:

- E_1 = (γ, φ) = (g^r, pk^r·m),  r ← Z_q      (ElGamal ballot encryption)
- e = H((p,q,g), y, c, h_aux) mod q            (Fiat-Shamir challenge)
- C' = { ReEnc_pk(C_π(i); ρ_i) }              (Bayer-Groth verifiable shuffle)
- σ ← Ed25519.Sign_sk(SHA256(envelope))        (transport signature)
- s = a·B = b·A ∈ X25519,  k = SHA256(…)      (X25519 key agreement)

Math is rendered via a focused LaTeX→native-MathML converter written for exactly
the notation the instrumentation emits — so it works in any modern browser with
zero dependencies and nothing to ship. Unknown tokens fall back to literal text,
never crashing the view.

`evote cockpit` starts an HTTP server; on page connect it runs one full multi-
party ceremony, streaming every crypto event over SSE with configurable pacing
(--delay) so a human can follow along. A stakeholder sidebar highlights the
acting party; a phase timeline tracks setup→cards→voting→tally→verify; each op
shows its live values as expandable, copyable chips.

Verified in a real browser: all five operation kinds render correctly (96 sign,
36 challenge, 6 keyex, 2 encrypt, 5 shuffle in a 2-voter run), no console errors,
ceremony completes and verifies.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-07 14:19:13 +02:00
cad6e112e3 Docs: fix remaining stale LOC claims in index.html manual + swe title
The final stale-claim sweep caught index.html's embedded operations manual
(intro paragraph + comparison table still said ~6,500 lines / no-RSA row missing)
and the swe deck title. Update both, add the signatures/key-exchange row to the
index comparison table, and re-sync the root standalone decks. Repo-wide sweep
for stale claims is now clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 19:17:58 +02:00
259bcc2f1e index.html: reflect multi-party mode + updated deck metadata
Landing cards now mention the multi-party re-architecture, Rust transport layer,
and cast-as-intended, with corrected slide counts. Operations manual: replace
the 'no network / same machine' framing with the netdemo trust-boundary
explanation, update prerequisites (Go 1.25 + Rust, make build), and fix the
'no network access required' line (netdemo's signed transport runs in-process).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 19:12:06 +02:00
3f45439dbe crypto.html: add cast-as-intended + transport-crypto slides
New Part IV½ shows the return-code cast-as-intended mechanism (E2 + plaintext-
equality proof, CC exponentiation + joint decryption) and the transport-security
layer (Ed25519/X25519, Ed25519 X.509 PKI, implemented in Rust) — so the deck's
existing "cast-as-intended" claim is now backed by the actual construction.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 19:09:43 +02:00
583d09a410 swe.html: add Part VI½ on the multi-party re-architecture
New section covers splitting the parties, the Rust transport-security layer
(Ed25519/X25519 over cgo, no RSA), the validated wire boundary, and cast-as-
intended return codes. Also corrects the error-handling slide (the netdemo mode
does cross a real trust boundary) and notes the Rust dependency on the deps
slide. Verified: deck serves 200 and the script balances.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 19:07:59 +02:00
e8b6f30871 Swiss Post E-Voting Go PoC
Proof-of-concept reimplementation of the Swiss Post e-voting
cryptographic protocol in Go. Single binary, 52 source files,
2 dependencies. Covers ElGamal encryption, Bayer-Groth verifiable
shuffles, zero-knowledge proofs, return codes, and a full
election ceremony demo.
2026-02-13 19:53:09 +01:00