ARCHITECTURE: replace the "return codes simulated" scope limit with the
cast-as-intended design (E2 + plaintext-equality proof, CC exponentiation +
decryption, voter check, substitution-attack test) and document the remaining
honest limits (single-选option; return-code lookup lets the server infer the
selection — a privacy simplification that does not affect tally secrecy).
README: note that netdemo return codes are cast-as-intended.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
README: add pkg/transport + pkg/party to the component table and project tree,
document `evote netdemo` alongside `demo`, point to ARCHITECTURE.md.
ARCHITECTURE: document the implemented message flow per phase; the design
decision (ciphertexts cross the signed transport, proofs go to the bulletin-board
transcript); which due-diligence findings were folded in (M4/F6/F7/F8/F12); and
honest scope limits (F5 not reimplemented; return codes derived, not homomorphic
over the ciphertext, per F16 — but with the F1 derivation mismatch fixed).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Foundation for the multi-party re-architecture: an authenticated, confidential
message transport between the separate parties of the system.
- identity.go: per-party Ed25519 + X25519 identities and an Ed25519 root CA.
Certificates are real X.509, but signed through a crypto.Signer shim whose
Sign() calls the Rust Ed25519 — so x509.CreateCertificate's signature bytes
are produced in Rust. Verification extracts TBS bytes and calls the Rust
verifier, never Go's x509 internals. No RSA anywhere.
- envelope.go: signed inter-party messages over an injective length-prefixed
encoding of all fields; sign/verify via Rust.
- channel.go: X25519 ECDH (Rust) → session key → AES-256-GCM confidential
payloads.
- bus.go: CA-anchored directory + message router that verifies every request
and reply signature before delivery (authenticity enforced at the boundary).
Tests cover cert-chain verification (incl. foreign-CA rejection), envelope
tamper rejection, forged-sender rejection at the bus, and secure-channel
round-trip with associated-data binding.
ARCHITECTURE.md documents the parties, the transport, and the message inventory.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
