mirror of
https://github.com/saymrwulf/swisspost-evoting-go-poc.git
synced 2026-11-18 09:54:49 +00:00
Ballot carries E2 + plaintext-equality proof, CC-verified
The voter now also submits E2 = Enc(vote, returnCodesPK[0]) and a plaintext- equality proof that E2 and the ballot's slot 0 encrypt the SAME vote. Every CC verifies this proof during ballot verification. This is the soundness link that makes the return code cast-as-intended: a client that encrypts one vote for the tally and a different one for the return-code channel is rejected, so the code the CCs compute from E2 necessarily reflects the tallied vote. - transcript: publish the combined return-codes public key. - voter stores returnCodePK from the (confidential) card delivery. - wire: plaintext-equality proof DTO. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
parent
577205a2ff
commit
d2cfbf291f
6 changed files with 99 additions and 15 deletions
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@ -163,8 +163,13 @@ func (p *VoterClient) handleVotingCard(env *transport.Envelope) (*transport.Enve
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if err != nil {
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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return nil, err
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}
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}
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rcPK, err := d.ReturnCodePK.decode(group)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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p.st.card = &d.Card
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p.st.card = &d.Card
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p.st.electionPK = pk
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p.st.electionPK = pk
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p.st.returnCodePK = rcPK
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p.st.primes = make([]*big.Int, len(d.Primes))
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p.st.primes = make([]*big.Int, len(d.Primes))
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for i, ps := range d.Primes {
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for i, ps := range d.Primes {
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v, ok := new(big.Int).SetString(ps, 10)
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v, ok := new(big.Int).SetString(ps, 10)
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@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ func (c *Ceremony) RunSetup() error {
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c.Transcript.ElectionID = cfg.ElectionID
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c.Transcript.ElectionID = cfg.ElectionID
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c.Transcript.EBPublicKey = ebPK
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c.Transcript.EBPublicKey = ebPK
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c.Transcript.ElectionPK = c.Setup.st.electionPK
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c.Transcript.ElectionPK = c.Setup.st.electionPK
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c.Transcript.ReturnCodePK = c.Setup.st.returnCodePK
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c.Transcript.Primes = make([]string, len(c.Setup.st.primes))
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c.Transcript.Primes = make([]string, len(c.Setup.st.primes))
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for i, p := range c.Setup.st.primes {
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for i, p := range c.Setup.st.primes {
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c.Transcript.Primes[i] = p.String()
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c.Transcript.Primes[i] = p.String()
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@ -52,11 +52,12 @@ type serverState struct {
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// voterState is a voter client's private card and ballot secrets.
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// voterState is a voter client's private card and ballot secrets.
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type voterState struct {
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type voterState struct {
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card *votingCard
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card *votingCard
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electionPK elgamal.PublicKey
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electionPK elgamal.PublicKey
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primes []*big.Int
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returnCodePK elgamal.PublicKey
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vcSK emath.ZqElement
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primes []*big.Int
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selected []int
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vcSK emath.ZqElement
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selected []int
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}
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}
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// votingCard is a voter's credential bundle (private to the voter, produced by
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// votingCard is a voter's credential bundle (private to the voter, produced by
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@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ type PublicTranscript struct {
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CCSchnorr [][]zkp.SchnorrProof // per-CC Schnorr proofs of key knowledge
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CCSchnorr [][]zkp.SchnorrProof // per-CC Schnorr proofs of key knowledge
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EBPublicKey elgamal.PublicKey // electoral board public key
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EBPublicKey elgamal.PublicKey // electoral board public key
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ElectionPK elgamal.PublicKey // combined election public key
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ElectionPK elgamal.PublicKey // combined election public key
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ReturnCodePK elgamal.PublicKey // combined return-codes public key (CCs only, no EB)
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Primes []string // decimal encodings of the encoding primes
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Primes []string // decimal encodings of the encoding primes
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// Tally artifacts.
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// Tally artifacts.
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@ -21,16 +21,20 @@ const (
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// wireBallot is a submitted ballot. It carries the encrypted vote, the
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// wireBallot is a submitted ballot. It carries the encrypted vote, the
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// exponentiated ciphertext, the verification-card public key (persisted so a
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// exponentiated ciphertext, the verification-card public key (persisted so a
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// remote party can reconstruct the proof statement — finding F6), and the
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// remote party can reconstruct the proof statement — finding F6), the
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// exponentiation proof binding vcPK to the exponentiation.
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// exponentiation proof binding vcPK to the exponentiation, and the return-code
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// ciphertext E2 with a plaintext-equality proof binding it to the ballot (so the
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// return code is genuinely derived from the submitted vote — cast-as-intended).
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type wireBallot struct {
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type wireBallot struct {
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VoterID string `json:"voter_id"`
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VoterID string `json:"voter_id"`
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VcID string `json:"vc_id"`
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VcID string `json:"vc_id"`
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Ciphertext wireCiphertext `json:"ciphertext"`
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Ciphertext wireCiphertext `json:"ciphertext"`
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ExponentiatedG string `json:"exp_gamma"`
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ExponentiatedG string `json:"exp_gamma"`
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ExponentiatedP string `json:"exp_phi0"`
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ExponentiatedP string `json:"exp_phi0"`
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VcPK string `json:"vc_pk"`
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VcPK string `json:"vc_pk"`
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ExpProof wireSchnorr `json:"exp_proof"`
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ExpProof wireSchnorr `json:"exp_proof"`
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ReturnCodeCT wireCiphertext `json:"return_code_ct"` // E2: Enc(vote, returnCodesPK[0])
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EqProof wirePlaintextEquality `json:"eq_proof"` // proves E1[0] and E2 encrypt the same vote
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}
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}
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// RunVoting has every voter encrypt its selection and submit a ballot; the
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// RunVoting has every voter encrypt its selection and submit a ballot; the
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@ -75,7 +79,8 @@ func (p *VoterClient) castBallot(selected []int) (*transport.Envelope, error) {
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for i := 1; i < cfg.NumOptions; i++ {
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for i := 1; i < cfg.NumOptions; i++ {
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msgElems[i] = group.Identity()
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msgElems[i] = group.Identity()
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}
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}
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ct := elgamal.Encrypt(elgamal.NewMessage(emath.GqVectorOf(msgElems...)), emath.RandomZqElement(zq), p.st.electionPK)
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msgRandomness := emath.RandomZqElement(zq)
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ct := elgamal.Encrypt(elgamal.NewMessage(emath.GqVectorOf(msgElems...)), msgRandomness, p.st.electionPK)
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// 2. Verification-card key pair.
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// 2. Verification-card key pair.
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p.st.vcSK = emath.RandomZqElement(zq)
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p.st.vcSK = emath.RandomZqElement(zq)
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@ -94,6 +99,25 @@ func (p *VoterClient) castBallot(selected []int) (*transport.Envelope, error) {
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hash.HashableString{Value: p.st.card.VerificationCardID},
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hash.HashableString{Value: p.st.card.VerificationCardID},
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)
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)
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// 5. Return-code ciphertext E2 and the plaintext-equality proof binding it
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// to the ballot. E2 encrypts the same vote value (slot 0) under the
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// return-codes key; the proof lets the CCs trust that the return code
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// they compute from E2 reflects the actually-submitted vote. (Single
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// selected option — the return-code channel is defined for one choice.)
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rcPK0 := elgamal.PublicKey{Elements: emath.GqVectorOf(p.st.returnCodePK.Get(0))}
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r2 := emath.RandomZqElement(zq)
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e2 := elgamal.Encrypt(elgamal.NewMessage(emath.GqVectorOf(voteElem)), r2, rcPK0)
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// Single-component view of the ballot's slot 0 for the equality statement.
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c1 := elgamal.NewCiphertext(ct.Gamma, emath.GqVectorOf(ct.GetPhi(0)))
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eqProof := zkp.GenPlaintextEqualityProof(
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c1, e2,
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p.st.electionPK.Get(0), p.st.returnCodePK.Get(0),
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msgRandomness, r2, group,
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hash.HashableString{Value: cfg.ElectionID},
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hash.HashableString{Value: p.st.card.VerificationCardID},
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)
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ballot := wireBallot{
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ballot := wireBallot{
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VoterID: p.st.card.VoterID,
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VoterID: p.st.card.VoterID,
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VcID: p.st.card.VerificationCardID,
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VcID: p.st.card.VerificationCardID,
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@ -102,6 +126,8 @@ func (p *VoterClient) castBallot(selected []int) (*transport.Envelope, error) {
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ExponentiatedP: phi0Exp.Value().String(),
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ExponentiatedP: phi0Exp.Value().String(),
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VcPK: vcPK.Value().String(),
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VcPK: vcPK.Value().String(),
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ExpProof: encodeExponentiation(expProof),
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ExpProof: encodeExponentiation(expProof),
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ReturnCodeCT: encodeCiphertext(e2),
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EqProof: encodePlaintextEquality(eqProof),
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}
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}
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return p.cer.send(p.id, NameServer, MsgCastBallot, ballot)
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return p.cer.send(p.id, NameServer, MsgCastBallot, ballot)
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}
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}
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@ -206,5 +232,29 @@ func (p *ControlComponent) handleVerifyBallot(env *transport.Envelope) (*transpo
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if !ok {
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if !ok {
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return reject("exponentiation proof INVALID")
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return reject("exponentiation proof INVALID")
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}
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}
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// Verify the plaintext-equality proof binding E2 to the ballot's slot 0.
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// This is what makes the return code cast-as-intended: if E2 encrypted a
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// different vote than the ballot, this proof fails and the ballot is
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// rejected, so the code computed from E2 must reflect the tallied vote.
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e2, err := b.ReturnCodeCT.decode(group)
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if err != nil {
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return reject("bad return-code ciphertext")
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}
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eqProof, err := b.EqProof.decode(zq)
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if err != nil {
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return reject("bad equality proof encoding")
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}
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c1 := elgamal.NewCiphertext(ct.Gamma, emath.GqVectorOf(ct.GetPhi(0)))
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eqOK := zkp.VerifyPlaintextEqualityProof(
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c1, e2,
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p.cer.Transcript.ElectionPK.Get(0), p.cer.Transcript.ReturnCodePK.Get(0),
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eqProof, group,
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hash.HashableString{Value: cfg.ElectionID},
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hash.HashableString{Value: b.VcID},
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)
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if !eqOK {
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return reject("plaintext-equality proof INVALID")
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}
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return reply(p.id, env.From, MsgBallotVerdict, env.Nonce, ballotVerdict{Accept: true})
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return reply(p.id, env.From, MsgBallotVerdict, env.Nonce, ballotVerdict{Accept: true})
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}
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}
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@ -138,6 +138,32 @@ func (w wireSchnorr) decodeExponentiation(zq *emath.ZqGroup) (zkp.Exponentiation
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return zkp.ExponentiationProof{E: e, Z: z}, nil
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return zkp.ExponentiationProof{E: e, Z: z}, nil
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}
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}
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// --- plaintext-equality proof (E scalar + Z vector of 2) ---
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type wirePlaintextEquality struct {
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E string `json:"e"`
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Z []string `json:"z"`
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}
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func encodePlaintextEquality(p zkp.PlaintextEqualityProof) wirePlaintextEquality {
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return wirePlaintextEquality{E: zqToStr(p.E), Z: zqVecToStrs(p.Z)}
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}
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func (w wirePlaintextEquality) decode(zq *emath.ZqGroup) (zkp.PlaintextEqualityProof, error) {
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e, err := strToZq(w.E, zq)
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if err != nil {
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return zkp.PlaintextEqualityProof{}, fmt.Errorf("pe E: %w", err)
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}
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z, err := strsToZqVec(w.Z, zq)
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if err != nil {
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return zkp.PlaintextEqualityProof{}, fmt.Errorf("pe Z: %w", err)
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}
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if z.Size() != 2 {
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return zkp.PlaintextEqualityProof{}, fmt.Errorf("pe Z must have size 2, got %d", z.Size())
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}
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return zkp.PlaintextEqualityProof{E: e, Z: z}, nil
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}
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// --- ciphertext ---
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// --- ciphertext ---
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type wireCiphertext struct {
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type wireCiphertext struct {
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