diff --git a/cmd/evote/web/crypto.html b/cmd/evote/web/crypto.html index 3010568..b54ff57 100644 --- a/cmd/evote/web/crypto.html +++ b/cmd/evote/web/crypto.html @@ -1233,6 +1233,40 @@ r = 833704513946265251405968611993787771762... ` }, +// ============================================================ +// PART IV½: BEYOND THE TALLY +// ============================================================ +{ + part: 'Part IV½: The Channels', + title: 'Cast-as-Intended: Return Codes', + html: ` +

How does a voter know their encrypted ballot really contains their choice, when malware could have swapped it? The return code -- a short code printed on their card -- must be computed from the submitted ciphertext, not merely looked up.

+

The voter sends the ballot E1, a second ciphertext E2 = Enc(vote, returnCodesPK), and a plaintext-equality proof that both encrypt the same vote:

+
+ Prove knowledge of (r₁, r₂) with
+   γ₁ = gr₁,   γ₂ = gr₂,   φ₁/φ₂ = hr₁/h'r₂
+ (the shared plaintext cancels in φ₁/φ₂ — so equality is proven without revealing it) +
+

Each CC verifies this proof. Then the CCs exponentiate E2 by their return-code keys and jointly decrypt, recovering voteΣk = the card's base primeselΣk, which maps to the short code returned to the voter.

+
Because the equality proof binds E2 to the tallied ballot E1, the code reflects the vote that is actually counted. Malware that alters the vote produces a code that won't match the card -- and it can't forge a matching one without the control components' secrets.
+ ` +}, + +{ + part: 'Part IV½: The Channels', + title: 'Transport Security: EdDSA + ECDH', + html: ` +

Everything so far is the protocol. But the parties -- setup component, four control components, electoral board, voting server, voters, verifier -- run on separate machines and must authenticate every message they exchange. That's a different cryptographic layer:

+
+
Ed25519 — every inter-party message is signed; the receiver verifies against the sender's certificate.
+
X25519 (ECDH) — confidential deliveries (voting cards) derive an AES-256-GCM session key from a Diffie-Hellman exchange.
+
Ed25519 X.509 PKI — a root CA issues each party an identity certificate; no RSA anywhere.
+
+

In this PoC these primitives are implemented in a small Rust crate (ed25519-dalek, x25519-dalek) and called from Go over a C ABI -- a clean separation between the hand-built protocol math and the audited, constant-time transport primitives.

+
Two independent trust arguments: the protocol proofs (Schnorr, Bayer-Groth) make the election publicly verifiable; the transport signatures make each message attributable to a specific party. Verifiability answers "is the tally correct?"; transport security answers "who said this?"
+ ` +}, + // ============================================================ // PART V: THE VERDICT // ============================================================