diff --git a/cmd/evote/web/crypto.html b/cmd/evote/web/crypto.html index 3010568..b54ff57 100644 --- a/cmd/evote/web/crypto.html +++ b/cmd/evote/web/crypto.html @@ -1233,6 +1233,40 @@ r = 833704513946265251405968611993787771762... ` }, +// ============================================================ +// PART IV½: BEYOND THE TALLY +// ============================================================ +{ + part: 'Part IV½: The Channels', + title: 'Cast-as-Intended: Return Codes', + html: ` +
How does a voter know their encrypted ballot really contains their choice, when malware could have swapped it? The return code -- a short code printed on their card -- must be computed from the submitted ciphertext, not merely looked up.
+The voter sends the ballot E1, a second ciphertext E2 = Enc(vote, returnCodesPK), and a plaintext-equality proof that both encrypt the same vote:
Each CC verifies this proof. Then the CCs exponentiate E2 by their return-code keys and jointly decrypt, recovering voteΣk = the card's base primeselΣk, which maps to the short code returned to the voter.
E2 to the tallied ballot E1, the code reflects the vote that is actually counted. Malware that alters the vote produces a code that won't match the card -- and it can't forge a matching one without the control components' secrets.Everything so far is the protocol. But the parties -- setup component, four control components, electoral board, voting server, voters, verifier -- run on separate machines and must authenticate every message they exchange. That's a different cryptographic layer:
+In this PoC these primitives are implemented in a small Rust crate (ed25519-dalek, x25519-dalek) and called from Go over a C ABI -- a clean separation between the hand-built protocol math and the audited, constant-time transport primitives.