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Add CHANGELOG (five story arcs) + blog-post draft for the cockpit
CHANGELOG.md tells the project's evolution in five arcs — original PoC, due-diligence hardening, multi-party Rust-signed transport, cast-as-intended return codes, live crypto cockpit — with commit references, so the repo (and its mirrors) surface the story, not just the current state. docs/blog-draft-live-crypto-cockpit.md is a ready-to-publish draft for the offsite blog (Hugo front matter, teaser, house-style tone), covering the three developments since the February post with the cockpit as the headline. It lives in docs/ purely for versioning; the blog itself is external. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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# Changelog
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The project's story in five arcs, newest first. Hashes reference this repo's history.
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## Arc 5 — The Live Crypto Cockpit (2026-07-07)
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*The cryptography narrates itself.* A surface-agnostic event stream (`pkg/trace`)
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lets every meaningful cryptographic operation emit its notation as LaTeX plus the
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**real runtime values**, the instant it executes — at zero cost when tracing is off.
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- `evote cockpit` — browser view: each operation rendered as typeset mathematics
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(native MathML, no libraries, offline) with live values, a stakeholder sidebar,
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and a phase timeline. Auto-opens the browser; Replay button when done.
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(`1e0b286`, `a1e4ec6`)
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- `evote cockpit --tmux` — terminal view: one tmux pane per stakeholder, each
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streaming its own party's operations as colored ASCII math. Same event stream,
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two surfaces. (`b38b990`)
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- **Deep instrumentation to the Swiss Post class granularity** (`c246508`):
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Pedersen matrix commitments (`CommitmentService` analog), all five Bayer-Groth
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sub-arguments (`ShuffleArgument`, `ProductArgument`, `HadamardArgument`,
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`ZeroArgument`, `SingleValueProductArgument`, `MultiExponentiationArgument`),
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and partial decryption with proofs (`DecryptionProofService` analog). The
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shuffle proof is watched being *constructed*, not just referenced.
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- Verified in a real browser: a 6-voter run (2×3 shuffle matrix, so the full
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argument tree fires) renders ~345 live operations across 8 kinds, no errors.
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## Arc 4 — Cast-as-Intended Return Codes (2026-07-06 → 07)
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*The return code is computed from the ballot that is actually counted.*
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- The ballot now carries `E2 = Enc(vote, returnCodesPK)` plus a **plaintext-
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equality proof** binding E2 to the tallied ciphertext; every control component
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verifies it. (`d2cfbf2`)
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- Return-code extraction: CCs exponentiate E2 by their per-voter keys and
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jointly decrypt, recovering `vote^Σk = prime_sel^Σk` → mapping-table lookup →
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code returned to the voter, who checks it against the card. (`127ae61`)
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- Soundness test: a malicious client encrypting option A for the tally but
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option B for the return-code channel is **rejected** — vote substitution is
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caught. Closes findings F5/F16; the F1 derivation mismatch is gone by
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construction (single key-derivation function).
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## Arc 3 — Multi-Party Architecture over Rust-Signed Transport (2026-07-06)
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*From one process simulating everyone to separate endpoints that trust nothing
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unsigned.*
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- `rust/transportsec`: Ed25519 signatures + X25519 ECDH (ed25519-dalek,
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x25519-dalek), compiled to a C-ABI static library, called from Go via cgo.
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**No RSA anywhere** — including the X.509 CA, whose certificates are signed
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through a Rust-backed `crypto.Signer`. Cross-language test proves RFC 8032
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interop with Go's stdlib. (`ec4be74`, `f7cbe4f`)
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- `pkg/transport`: CA-anchored identity directory, signed envelopes over an
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injective encoding, X25519 secure channels, a bus that verifies every message
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before delivery. (`f7cbe4f`)
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- `pkg/party`: setup component, four control components, electoral board, voting
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server, voters, and verifier as separate endpoints holding only their own
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state; distributed key generation, confidential card delivery, CC-verified
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ballots, the CC→CC→EB mix-net cascade, and independent verification from the
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public transcript alone. (`313db92` → `23723fd`)
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- `evote netdemo` runs it end-to-end; `--verbose` logs every signed envelope.
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(`b1f5606`)
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## Arc 2 — Due-Diligence Hardening (2026-07-06)
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*A full correctness/security review of the original PoC, with fixes and
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regression tests.* (`ec4be74`)
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- **Critical**: the multi-exponentiation verifier's `c_{B_m} = commit(0;0)` check
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was stubbed out — a malicious mixer could prove a non-permutation "shuffle".
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Now enforced.
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- Fiat-Shamir challenges switched from biased `hash mod q` to the spec-correct
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oversample-then-reduce (`RecursiveHashToZq`).
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- `VerifyTally` actually verifies (it used to return `true` unconditionally);
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mix padding persisted so small-N verification checks the real input.
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- KDF domain separation made injective; `[1, q]` square-root off-by-one fixed;
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CLI flag validation; `crypto/rand` everywhere.
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- Test suite added across math, hash, elgamal, zkp, mixnet, kdf, returncodes,
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protocol, and the Rust FFI bridge.
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## Arc 1 — The Original PoC (2026-02-13)
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*The cryptographic core of Switzerland's internet voting system, distilled into
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a single Go binary.* (`e8b6f30`, `37072a5`)
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- ElGamal over G_q (safe prime p = 2q+1), Schnorr / exponentiation / decryption /
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plaintext-equality proofs, the Bayer-Groth verifiable shuffle with its full
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sub-argument tree, return-code mapping tables, Argon2id + HKDF + AES-GCM.
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- `evote demo` (full ceremony), `evote present` (terminal walkthrough),
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`evote serve` (embedded, iPad-optimized lecture decks).
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---
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title: "The cryptography narrates itself: a live-math cockpit for the Swiss Post e-voting PoC"
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date: 2026-07-07
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tags: ["e-voting", "zero-knowledge", "bayer-groth", "go", "rust", "mathml", "pedagogy"]
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draft: false
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---
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<!--
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DRAFT for blog.zkdefi.org — written to follow the February post
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"A 52-file Go re-implementation of Swiss Post's e-voting protocol".
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Copy into the blog's content/posts/ directory (Hugo) and adjust front matter
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to taste. Teaser suggestion for the listing:
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The Go re-implementation of Swiss Post's e-voting protocol grew up: it now
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runs as mutually distrusting parties over Rust-signed transport, its return
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codes are genuinely cast-as-intended, and — the headline — every cryptographic
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operation renders itself as typeset mathematics with live values, the instant
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it executes.
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-->
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Back in February I wrote about distilling Swiss Post's internet voting protocol
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— 14 Java repositories, 500K+ lines — into a small Go binary. That post ended
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where most reimplementations end: the ceremony runs, the proofs verify, the
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tally is right. Since then the project has grown in three directions, and the
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third one is the reason for this post.
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## First: it became honest about trust
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The original PoC was faithful to the *protocol* but not to the *trust model* —
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every party (the setup component, four control components, the electoral board,
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the voting server, the voters, the verifier) lived as fields on one shared Go
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struct. Anyone could read anyone's secret key; nothing stopped them but
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politeness.
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Now each party is a separate endpoint holding only its own private state, and
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everything that crosses between them travels as an **Ed25519-signed envelope**
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over a message bus that verifies every signature before delivery. Voting cards
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are delivered confidentially under **X25519-derived session keys**. Identities
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are real X.509 certificates from a root CA — and there is **no RSA anywhere**,
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including the CA: certificate signatures are produced through a Go
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`crypto.Signer` shim that forwards to Rust.
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That's the second point worth pausing on: all transport cryptography lives in a
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small **Rust** crate (`ed25519-dalek`, `x25519-dalek`) behind a five-function C
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ABI, linked into Go via cgo. The election mathematics — ElGamal over a
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safe-prime group, the zero-knowledge proofs, the Bayer-Groth shuffle — remains
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hand-built Go, because understanding every line of the *protocol* is the point.
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But hand-rolling Ed25519 would be reckless; audited constant-time
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implementations are exactly what one should depend on. A cross-language test
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keeps both sides honest: Go's `crypto/ed25519` must verify Rust's signatures
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and vice versa, from the same seed.
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## Second: the return codes stopped being decorative
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Swiss voters check short **return codes** against a printed card to detect
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malware that swaps their vote after encryption. In the original PoC (and, to be
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fair, in an early reading of the real system's structure) the displayed code
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came *from the card* — cast-as-intended theater rather than cast-as-intended.
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Now the ballot carries a second ciphertext `E2 = Enc(vote, returnCodesPK)` and
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a **plaintext-equality proof** that `E2` and the tallied ballot encrypt the
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same vote. Every control component verifies that proof before accepting the
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ballot. Then the CCs exponentiate `E2` by their per-voter secret keys and
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jointly decrypt, recovering `vote^Σk` — which equals the card's precomputed
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base `prime_selected^Σk` — and the resulting short code goes back to the voter.
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A unit test drives the actual attack (encrypt option A for the tally, option B
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for the return-code channel) and watches the equality proof reject it. The code
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you check is now derived from the vote that is actually counted.
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## Third, the headline: watch the mathematics execute
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Here is the thing I have not seen elsewhere. Run
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```
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./evote cockpit
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```
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and your browser opens on a page where **every cryptographic operation renders
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itself as typeset mathematics with its real runtime values, the instant the
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code executes**. Not an animation of the protocol. A readout of it.
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When a voter's client encrypts, you see
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> *E₁ = (γ, φ) = (g^r, pk^r·m), r ←$ ℤ_q*
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with the actual 77-digit `r` and the actual encoded vote (a squared prime — you
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watch `m₀ = 25` scroll past and know someone picked option 3). When a control
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component builds its shuffle proof, the **Bayer-Groth argument tree assembles
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itself in construction order**: the Pedersen commitment to the permutation
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matrix, then the Product, Hadamard, Zero, Single-Value-Product and
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Multi-Exponentiation arguments, each with its defining relation —
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> *∑ᵢ aᵢ ∗_y bᵢ = 0*, *b = a₁ ∘ a₂ ∘ ⋯ ∘ aₘ*, *C = (∏∏ Cᵢⱼ^{Aᵢⱼ})·ReEnc_pk(1;ρ)*
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— and its live dimensions and values. Then the partial decryptions with their
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proofs, every Fiat-Shamir challenge, every Ed25519 transport signature. A
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sidebar highlights which stakeholder is acting; a timeline tracks
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setup → cards → voting → tally → verify. Prefer a terminal?
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`./evote cockpit --tmux` opens one pane per stakeholder, each narrating its own
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operations in ASCII math from the same event stream.
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Two implementation notes for the curious. The math is **native browser MathML**
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— no KaTeX, no fonts, no network; a two-hundred-line LaTeX→MathML converter
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handles exactly the notation the instrumentation emits, and unknown tokens fall
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back to literal text so the view can never crash. And the instrumentation
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itself costs nothing when off: emitters sit behind an atomic check and build
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their event (including formatting those 77-digit values) only if a sink is
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subscribed, so `demo` and `netdemo` runs are untouched.
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The pedagogical claim, made precisely: the sub-argument tree that the February
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post could only *diagram* is now something you *watch happen*, with the same
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granularity as the production system's class structure — `CommitmentService`,
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the five `*ArgumentService` classes, `DecryptionProofService` — because the Go
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packages mirror those classes one-to-one. The tree is not a picture of the
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code. It is the code, narrating itself.
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## Honest limits
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It remains a PoC: a 256-bit demo group (production uses 3072), one OS process
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(the parties are isolation-by-architecture, not by kernel), single-choice
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ballots on the return-code path, and the return-code lookup lets the server
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learn which entry matched — a privacy simplification the real system avoids by
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separating roles. The mix-net's tally secrecy is untouched by that caveat.
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Code, tests, lecture decks and an operations manual:
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[github.com/saymrwulf/swisspost-evoting-go-poc](https://github.com/saymrwulf/swisspost-evoting-go-poc)
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(mirrored on this site). Build with `make build`; the cockpit is one command.
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