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Docs: cast-as-intended return codes are now real
ARCHITECTURE: replace the "return codes simulated" scope limit with the cast-as-intended design (E2 + plaintext-equality proof, CC exponentiation + decryption, voter check, substitution-attack test) and document the remaining honest limits (single-选option; return-code lookup lets the server infer the selection — a privacy simplification that does not affect tally secrecy). README: note that netdemo return codes are cast-as-intended. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@ -71,8 +71,12 @@ Run it with `evote netdemo --verbose` to watch every signed envelope.
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long-code-share-resp` (return-code shares from the CC's private secret). Setup
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long-code-share-resp` (return-code shares from the CC's private secret). Setup
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assembles cards and delivers them **confidentially**: `setup → voter:
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assembles cards and delivers them **confidentially**: `setup → voter:
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voting-card` and `setup → server: mapping-table` (both X25519-encrypted).
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voting-card` and `setup → server: mapping-table` (both X25519-encrypted).
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- **Voting** — `voter → server: cast-ballot`; `server → CCj: verify-ballot`;
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- **Voting** — `voter → server: cast-ballot` (ballot + E2 + equality proof);
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`CCj → server: ballot-verdict`. Stored on unanimous acceptance (vcPK persisted).
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`server → CCj: verify-ballot`; `CCj → server: ballot-verdict`. Stored on
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unanimous acceptance (vcPK persisted). Then the return-code extraction:
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`server → CCj: rc-exp-req` / `rc-dec-req`; `CCj →: rc-exp-resp` / `rc-dec-resp`.
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The server returns the recovered code to the voter, who checks it against the
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card (cast-as-intended — see below).
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- **Tally** — `→ server: start-tally` (server pads the ballot box); then
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- **Tally** — `→ server: start-tally` (server pads the ballot box); then
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`→ CCj: shuffle` / `CCj →: shuffled` chained through all CCs; `→ EB: final-mix`
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`→ CCj: shuffle` / `CCj →: shuffled` chained through all CCs; `→ EB: final-mix`
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/ `EB →: final-done`. Each party posts its shuffle + decryption proofs to the
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/ `EB →: final-done`. Each party posts its shuffle + decryption proofs to the
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@ -108,17 +112,41 @@ addressed in the party layer:
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- **F12** (panic on malformed plaintext): tally uses `DecodeVoteChecked`, so a
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- **F12** (panic on malformed plaintext): tally uses `DecodeVoteChecked`, so a
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ballot that does not decode is spoiled, not fatal; handlers reject malformed
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ballot that does not decode is spoiled, not fatal; handlers reject malformed
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messages cleanly rather than panicking.
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messages cleanly rather than panicking.
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- **F5 / F16** (return codes were decorative): the return-code path is now
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genuinely **cast-as-intended** — see below.
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### Honest scope limits
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## Cast-as-intended return codes
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- **F5** (the unsound plaintext-equality proof) is *not* reimplemented. The
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The return code the voter checks is computed by the control components **from the
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multi-party ballot uses only the **sound exponentiation proof** binding the
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submitted ciphertext**, so client-side vote substitution is detected:
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ballot to `vcPK`; the return-code path that encrypts partial choice codes under
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the return-codes key (E2 / plaintext-equality) is omitted.
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1. The voter submits the ballot `E1` plus a second ciphertext `E2 =
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- Consistent with the original system (finding F16), the **cast-as-intended**
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Enc(vote, returnCodesPK)` and a **plaintext-equality proof** that `E1` and
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return codes are derived deterministically from CC shares rather than
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`E2` encrypt the same vote. Every CC verifies this proof; a ballot whose two
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homomorphically over the submitted ciphertext. The return-code *mechanism*
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ciphertexts disagree is rejected.
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(per-CC shares combined into a mapping-table lookup) is real and consistent
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2. The card code for option *i* is the algebraic base `prime_i^{Σ_j k_j}`, where
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across card generation and would-be extraction (fixing the old derivation
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`k_j` is CC *j*'s voter-specific return-code key. Setup builds it by combining
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mismatch, F1); the property that the shown code is computed *from the actual
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per-CC shares; the same `k_j` is used at vote time (one derivation — the old
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ballot* remains simulated.
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F1 mismatch is gone by construction).
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3. At vote time each CC exponentiates `E2` by its `k_j` (product over CCs =
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`Enc(vote^{Σk})`), then contributes a partial-decryption factor. The server
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recovers `vote^{Σk}` — which equals `prime_sel^{Σk}` — and looks up the short
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code, returning it to the voter.
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4. The voter checks the returned code against the card for the chosen option. A
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mismatch means the tallied vote differs from the intended one.
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**Soundness**: because the equality proof binds `E2` to `E1` (the tallied
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ballot), the code is derived from the vote that is actually counted. Malware that
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alters the vote cannot produce a matching card code without the CC secrets. A
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unit test drives the substitution attack (`E1`=A, `E2`=B) and confirms the CCs
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reject it.
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### Remaining scope limits (honest)
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- The return-code path is defined for a **single selected option** per voter (the
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demo case); multi-selection return codes are not implemented.
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- **Privacy**: the return-code lookup lets the server learn which mapping entry
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matched, so in this PoC the return-code-computing parties can infer the
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selection. The real system separates these roles to keep the vote secret from
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any single party; that role separation is simplified here. Vote secrecy of the
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**tally** is unaffected (it rests on the mix-net, not the return-code channel).
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@ -79,7 +79,10 @@ The `demo` command runs the whole protocol in one process. `netdemo` runs the
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**multi-party** architecture: every party is a separate endpoint holding only its
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**multi-party** architecture: every party is a separate endpoint holding only its
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own private state, and every message between them is Ed25519-signed (and, for
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own private state, and every message between them is Ed25519-signed (and, for
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card/mapping-table delivery, X25519-encrypted) — all transport cryptography in
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card/mapping-table delivery, X25519-encrypted) — all transport cryptography in
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Rust. See [ARCHITECTURE.md](ARCHITECTURE.md).
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Rust. The `netdemo` return codes are **cast-as-intended**: each voter's code is
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recomputed by the control components from the submitted ciphertext (bound to the
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ballot by a plaintext-equality proof), so a substituted vote is detected. See
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[ARCHITECTURE.md](ARCHITECTURE.md).
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If you build Go directly (`go build ./...`), run `make rust` first so the static library
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If you build Go directly (`go build ./...`), run `make rust` first so the static library
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at `rust/transportsec/target/release/libtransportsec.a` exists for cgo to link.
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at `rust/transportsec/target/release/libtransportsec.a` exists for cgo to link.
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