swisspost-evoting-go-poc/rust/transportsec/include/transportsec.h

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Due-diligence hardening + Rust transport-security layer Correctness/security review of the whole PoC, with fixes and regression tests. Cryptographic soundness: - mixnet: enforce the multi-exponentiation c_{B_m}=commit(0;0) check that was stubbed out with an empty if — without it a malicious mixer can prove a non-permutation shuffle. - zkp: derive all four Fiat-Shamir challenges via RecursiveHashToZq instead of a biased `hash mod q` (which also capped the challenge space at 256 bits for production-sized groups). Verification honesty: - protocol: VerifyTally now actually calls zkp.VerifySchnorrProof and returns the true aggregate result instead of an unconditional true. - protocol: persist the padded mix input (event.MixInput) so the verifier checks shuffle 0 against the same padding the tally used (fixes false INVALID for N<2). Other correctness: - kdf: length-prefix BuildKDFInfo parts so the info encoding is injective. - math: GqElementFromSquareRoot accepts the valid root q (off-by-one that could panic in HashAndSquare); RandomGqElement samples the full canonical range. - cmd: validate demo --voters/--options instead of panicking on degenerate values. - protocol: use crypto/rand in the demo driver (drop the last math/rand import). Transport security (new): pkg/transportsec exposes Ed25519 signatures and X25519 ECDH — implemented in Rust (rust/transportsec: ed25519-dalek, x25519-dalek), linked into Go via cgo. No RSA. Cross-language conformance test proves the Rust Ed25519 signatures interoperate with Go's crypto/ed25519. Makefile builds the Rust static lib before the Go binary. Tests: added unit/round-trip/tamper coverage for math, hash, elgamal, zkp, mixnet, kdf, returncodes, protocol (end-to-end), and the Rust FFI bridge. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 12:42:34 +00:00
/* Transport security primitives — C ABI exposed by the Rust transportsec crate.
* Ed25519: 32-byte seed, 32-byte public key, 64-byte signature.
* X25519: 32-byte private scalar, 32-byte public point, 32-byte shared secret.
* Return codes: 0 = OK, -1 = null pointer, -2 = bad key, -3 = verification failed.
*/
#ifndef TRANSPORTSEC_H
#define TRANSPORTSEC_H
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
int32_t ts_ed25519_keygen(uint8_t *seed_out, uint8_t *pub_out);
int32_t ts_ed25519_sign(const uint8_t *seed, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
uint8_t *sig_out);
int32_t ts_ed25519_verify(const uint8_t *pubkey, const uint8_t *msg,
size_t msg_len, const uint8_t *sig);
int32_t ts_x25519_keygen(uint8_t *priv_out, uint8_t *pub_out);
int32_t ts_x25519_dh(const uint8_t *privkey, const uint8_t *peer_pub,
uint8_t *shared_out);
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
#endif /* TRANSPORTSEC_H */