2026-02-13 18:53:09 +00:00
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package zkp
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import (
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"github.com/user/evote/pkg/hash"
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emath "github.com/user/evote/pkg/math"
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2026-07-07 12:06:08 +00:00
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"github.com/user/evote/pkg/trace"
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2026-02-13 18:53:09 +00:00
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)
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// GenSchnorrProof generates a Schnorr proof of knowledge of discrete log.
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// Proves knowledge of x such that y = g^x.
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func GenSchnorrProof(x emath.ZqElement, y emath.GqElement, group *emath.GqGroup, auxInfo ...hash.Hashable) SchnorrProof {
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zqGroup := emath.ZqGroupFromGqGroup(group)
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g := group.Generator()
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// 1. Sample random b
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b := emath.RandomZqElement(zqGroup)
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// 2. Commitment: c = g^b
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c := g.Exponentiate(b)
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// 3. Build hash inputs
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e := schnorrChallenge(group, y, c, zqGroup, auxInfo)
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// 4. Response: z = b + e*x
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z := b.Add(e.Multiply(x))
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return SchnorrProof{E: e, Z: z}
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}
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// VerifySchnorrProof verifies a Schnorr proof.
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func VerifySchnorrProof(proof SchnorrProof, y emath.GqElement, group *emath.GqGroup, auxInfo ...hash.Hashable) bool {
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zqGroup := emath.ZqGroupFromGqGroup(group)
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g := group.Generator()
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// Reconstruct commitment: c' = g^z * y^(-e)
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gZ := g.Exponentiate(proof.Z)
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yNegE := y.Exponentiate(proof.E.Negate())
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cPrime := gZ.Multiply(yNegE)
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// Recompute challenge
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ePrime := schnorrChallenge(group, y, cPrime, zqGroup, auxInfo)
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return proof.E.Equals(ePrime)
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}
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// schnorrChallenge computes the Fiat-Shamir challenge for Schnorr proofs.
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// Hash order: (p, q, g), y, c, h_aux
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func schnorrChallenge(group *emath.GqGroup, y emath.GqElement, c emath.GqElement, zqGroup *emath.ZqGroup, auxInfo []hash.Hashable) emath.ZqElement {
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// f = (p, q, g)
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f := hash.HashableList{Elements: []hash.Hashable{
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hash.HashableBigInt{Value: group.P()},
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hash.HashableBigInt{Value: group.Q()},
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hash.HashableBigInt{Value: group.Generator().Value()},
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}}
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// h_aux
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hAux := buildAuxHash("SchnorrProof", auxInfo)
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Due-diligence hardening + Rust transport-security layer
Correctness/security review of the whole PoC, with fixes and regression tests.
Cryptographic soundness:
- mixnet: enforce the multi-exponentiation c_{B_m}=commit(0;0) check that was
stubbed out with an empty if — without it a malicious mixer can prove a
non-permutation shuffle.
- zkp: derive all four Fiat-Shamir challenges via RecursiveHashToZq instead of
a biased `hash mod q` (which also capped the challenge space at 256 bits for
production-sized groups).
Verification honesty:
- protocol: VerifyTally now actually calls zkp.VerifySchnorrProof and returns
the true aggregate result instead of an unconditional true.
- protocol: persist the padded mix input (event.MixInput) so the verifier checks
shuffle 0 against the same padding the tally used (fixes false INVALID for N<2).
Other correctness:
- kdf: length-prefix BuildKDFInfo parts so the info encoding is injective.
- math: GqElementFromSquareRoot accepts the valid root q (off-by-one that could
panic in HashAndSquare); RandomGqElement samples the full canonical range.
- cmd: validate demo --voters/--options instead of panicking on degenerate values.
- protocol: use crypto/rand in the demo driver (drop the last math/rand import).
Transport security (new): pkg/transportsec exposes Ed25519 signatures and X25519
ECDH — implemented in Rust (rust/transportsec: ed25519-dalek, x25519-dalek),
linked into Go via cgo. No RSA. Cross-language conformance test proves the Rust
Ed25519 signatures interoperate with Go's crypto/ed25519. Makefile builds the
Rust static lib before the Go binary.
Tests: added unit/round-trip/tamper coverage for math, hash, elgamal, zkp,
mixnet, kdf, returncodes, protocol (end-to-end), and the Rust FFI bridge.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 12:42:34 +00:00
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// Challenge: RecursiveHashToZq oversamples to q.BitLen()+2λ bits before
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// reducing mod q, giving a uniform Z_q element (per the Swiss Post spec).
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// A plain RecursiveHash reduced mod q would be biased and would cap the
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// challenge space at 256 bits for production-sized groups.
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eVal := hash.RecursiveHashToZq(
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zqGroup.Q(),
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2026-02-13 18:53:09 +00:00
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f,
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hash.HashableBigInt{Value: y.Value()},
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hash.HashableBigInt{Value: c.Value()},
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hAux,
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)
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e, _ := emath.NewZqElement(eVal, zqGroup)
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2026-07-07 12:06:08 +00:00
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trace.EmitFunc(func() trace.Event {
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return trace.Event{
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Kind: trace.KindChallenge,
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Caption: "Fiat-Shamir challenge (Schnorr proof)",
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LaTeX: `e = \mathcal{H}\big((p,q,g),\, y,\, c,\, h_{\mathrm{aux}}\big) \bmod q`,
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ASCII: "e = H((p,q,g), y, c, h_aux) mod q",
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Values: map[string]string{
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"e": e.Value().String(),
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"y": y.Value().String(),
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"c": c.Value().String(),
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},
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}
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})
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2026-02-13 18:53:09 +00:00
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return e
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}
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// buildAuxHash builds the auxiliary hash list.
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// If auxInfo is empty: ["label"]
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// Otherwise: ["label", auxInfo...]
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func buildAuxHash(label string, auxInfo []hash.Hashable) hash.Hashable {
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elements := []hash.Hashable{hash.HashableString{Value: label}}
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if len(auxInfo) > 0 {
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elements = append(elements, auxInfo...)
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}
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return hash.HashableList{Elements: elements}
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}
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