Closes four round-7/8 findings. Certified by the round-12 sweep: five
repositories, both buttons and every self-test, 48/48 GREEN.
── `scalar-statements-unbound` (gpt, round 7, CRITICAL) ────────────────────
The main button bound its 31 certificates' elaborated statements and reachable
specification bodies. This button bound NONE of its thirteen, while
TRUSTED-BASE item 8 said the audit covers "every certificate" — false across
the 44-certificate surface. The finding was raised in round 7, lost from the
round-8 work list by an F-number collision between two reviewers, and re-raised
in round 8.
Proofs/ScalarAudit.lean is generated from each fork's OWN Audit.lean, so the
canonicalisation is provably the same code: pp.all rendering, whitespace
normalisation, transitive specification closure. check-scalar.sh Phase 3c pins
the block's digest, requires the committed copy to match byte-for-byte so a
mismatch can be DIFFED, and cross-checks the auditor's certificate set against
the button's CERTS array.
dalek ecf3a3f8 · anza 0d942e47 · risc0 4b550a61 · betrusted 4b550a61
risc0 and betrusted share a digest and that is correct, not a collision: their
ScalarSubSpec.lean differs only in doc prose and in `black_box` entries inside
`simp only [...]` lists AFTER `:= by`. Proof scripts. They bind the same
statements over the same specifications, which is the documented scope.
selftest-scalar-statements.sh ships the two attacks the reviewer asked for:
ok gutted statement caught (cone unchanged)
ok rewritten specification body caught (name and cone unchanged)
The second rewrites a reachable reference body to `id (…)` — DEFINITIONALLY
EQUAL, so the corpus compiles and every proof typechecks and the cone is
byte-identical. Every earlier phase is blind to it.
── `drv-surface-no-cones` + `accounting-certifies-enumeration` (claude) ────
The round-7 accounting identity proved every kernel constant was ENUMERATED.
The reviewer showed enumeration is not audit: their planted claim WAS
enumerated, as DRV|LTLAccAudit.bait.smuggled|theorem with a real cone, and
nothing examined it — rows had no cone, no allowlist covered them, the
statement digest does not reach instruments, and Phase 2b gates DECLARED
AXIOMS, a different question. "Progress of one step, not two."
DRV rows now carry their axiom cone and are pinned in driver-allowlist.txt by
inventory_gate.sh with a DRV tag — the same implementation that pins the
corpus, in both directions, because a second copy of a coverage gate is a
second thing to drift. The axiom policy is per-surface and enforced per
surface: the corpus admits exactly the sanctioned boundary, the instruments
admit none, and an instrument axiom fails EVEN WHEN ALLOWLISTED.
Verified with the reviewer's own payload, both placements:
before the walk -> UNCLASSIFIED: DRV|…|bait.smuggled|theorem|Classical.choice,Quot.sound,propext
after the walk -> ACCOUNTING FAILED names it (kernel-side)
── `drv-naming-heuristic` (claude, round 7) ────────────────────────────────
Retired as load-bearing rather than patched. The rule admits a theorem whose
name extends a constant declared alongside it, and "breaks in one line" —
declare `def bait`, then `theorem bait.smuggled` walks through. It stays as a
fast readable first check; membership in a committed allowlist is what now
carries the weight, and a new row fails closed whatever it is called.
── what round 11 caught, which was mine ───────────────────────────────────
DRV rows first shipped WITHOUT their originating driver. dalek and anza run
two drivers, each declaring its own `corpus`; keyed on name alone those two
distinct declarations produced one byte-identical row, `sort -u` collapsed
them, and the trailers summed to 37 against 36. The estate had already learned
this on the corpus walk — INV rows carry their module because two modules both
declare CurveFieldProofs.zero_spec — and I rebuilt the record without it.
Rows now carry their driver, and the gate FAILS CLOSED ON DUPLICATE RECORDS
naming the collision: two declarations sharing one entry means one is covered
by the other's, which is exactly how a real declaration hides. The trailer
now checks what the drivers EMITTED, not what survives de-duplication —
conflating "the run was truncated" with "two rows were identical" is what let
a record-format defect present itself as an arithmetic complaint.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
THE GAP. The capability matrix in the control repo — built after the author
answered a capability question by grepping for a FILENAME rather than for the
property, three times in one session — asked whether each repository's auditor
enumerates itself. The four ed25519 forks answered no. Following that up found
something larger: `Proofs/Audit.lean`, the statement-binding driver from P1-a,
is compiled, is a member of the manifest, and was enumerated by NOTHING. The
kernel counted 3058 declarations where the inventory accounted for 3022, and
26 of the 36 missing were its.
THE PROPERTY, now enforced: every constant the kernel sees under this button's
manifest must appear, BY NAME, in either the corpus inventory or the
instruments' own surface. `emitDrivers` in InventoryCore walks the audit
modules and fails closed on an axiom (which would widen the trusted base
outside every cone) or on a standalone claim (which no certificate covers and
no allowlist pins), while admitting the obligations the elaborator generates
for a definition declared alongside it.
TWO WRONG FORMULATIONS FIRST, both recorded because the second is instructive:
· `kernel = corpus + instruments + N_DRIVERS`, where the last term was
justified as a per-driver "self-observation blind spot". It fitted dalek
and anza (2 drivers, residual 2) and broke on risc0 and betrusted
(1 driver, residual 2). The residual is 2 everywhere and has nothing to do
with drivers. This was curve-fitting from a sample of one, and it was named
as the highest-risk claim in the round-7 self-assessment BEFORE the data
refuted it.
· distinct-by-name counting, which collapses `CurveFieldProofs.zero_spec` —
a name that genuinely denotes two different declarations, in Proofs.Basic
and Proofs.ConstSpecs, walked by two drivers with separate environments.
THE MEASURED CAUSE of the residual. Lean materialises equation lemmas lazily,
when something forces an unfold, and each module that forces one gets its own
copy in its object file. `CurveFieldProofs.denote.eq_1` sits in both
SubNegSpec.olean and ConstSpecs.olean; `CurveFieldProofs.limbsVal.eq_1` in both
ReduceSpec.olean and ConstSpecs.olean. The kernel gate reads object files and
counts both copies; the environment holds one constant per name. Counts cannot
relate those two views in either direction — so the check compares SETS, which
is the idiom the rest of this estate already uses, and no constant remains that
could be widened to make a red run green.
Negative-tested: with the instrument walk disabled, the check names
Proofs.Audit's declarations as unaccounted.
ANZA also lacked one allowlist row, `subtle.Choice...from.eq_1`, the same
lazy-materialisation effect seen from the other side. Verified rather than
assumed before adding it: the parent is declared in gen/CurveField/
FunsExternal.lean — the model, pinned by bytes and not inventoried by
declaration — the lemma materialised in Proofs.CompressSpec which forced the
unfold, and all three other forks carry the lemma row while none carries the
parent.
CONSEQUENCE WORTH DISCLOSING: the audited declaration surface is not purely a
function of the corpus source. It depends on which proofs forced which
unfolds. This is now a known gap in the round-7 kit.
Also corrected here: Proofs/Inventory.lean's header claimed the audit drivers
were excluded from the compile manifest. They are lines 42-44 of PROOFS.
Certified by a full sweep: both buttons, all four forks, purged trees. 8/8.
THE SEAM. This repository is checked by two scripts, and until now neither
asserted anything about the other's scope. check.sh's dead-file gate simply
SKIPPED anything named Scalar*, so a new Proofs/ScalarX.lean was gated by
nothing at all: absent from one manifest by exemption, from the other by
omission, compiled by neither, inventoried by neither. Each button now reads
the other's manifest and requires every shipped proof source to belong to
EXACTLY ONE of them — neither orphaned nor double-claimed, both directions,
plus a phantom check on entries naming files that do not exist. Negative-tested
four ways, including the exact hole this item names.
THE SCALAR BUTTON. Closing the seam exposed it as the estate's weakest link,
having been left behind by every hardening round while the main button gained
five phases. 45 lines to 227:
- source-integrity check over its sources;
- harness-pin verification, so running THIS button alone is protected and not
only running it after check.sh;
- a kernel-side axiom-declaration gate over the compiled artifacts, replacing
a source-text grep that is evadable four ways on v4.30.0-rc2;
- a declaration inventory of ~1880 constants against its own allowlist,
diffed both directions with a count trailer. These 13 modules were the only
part of the proof corpus with no inventory: check.sh Phase 2c named them as
uncovered on every run, and now names the button that covers them instead;
- per-certificate exact-cone assertions replacing `-eq 13` over matching
output lines. A count cannot say WHICH certificate is clean and passes just
as happily if one cone is reported twice.
Every fork-specific fact was read from the existing script rather than assumed:
risc0 and betrusted audit sub_loop1_one_spec where dalek and anza audit
cond_add_l_one_spec, untouched.
THREE BUGS, ONE ROOT CAUSE, all found by the gates rather than by review. Each
reasoned about how a thing is SPELLED instead of what it BELONGS TO, and the
corpus punished each: Proofs/ScalarPackSpec.lean is named like the scalar layer
and owned by the main button.
- the scalar dead-file gate globbed Scalar* and demanded ScalarPackSpec be
scalar-owned. REMOVED rather than special-cased: the seam check tests
membership in exactly one manifest, which is strictly stronger than any
prefix;
- the scalar axiom gate scanned Scalar*.olean, reporting "14 modules" for a
13-module manifest. On a tree where check.sh had not run that artifact is
absent and the button would have failed for a false reason. It now scans
the manifest by membership and fails closed on a missing artifact;
- Phase 2c's driver discovery globbed Inventory*.lean and claimed the other
button's driver, then correctly complained its own manifest lacked those
modules.
This is the family the campaign began with: a source-text axiom grep reasoning
about spelling. Recorded in TRUSTED-BASE.md because it generalises.
Also fixed: the first negative test of the scalar gate's absence check passed
for the wrong reason — the button recompiles before the gate runs, so removing
an artifact merely caused it to be rebuilt. Retested against the lifted phase,
where absence is a persistent condition.
Verified green: 24 runs across the four repositories — four main buttons, four
scalar buttons, and sixteen self-tests — zero red.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 2b asks the kernel whether any AXIOM is declared under Proofs/. Phase 3
pins the cones of the named certificates. Between them sat every other
declaration in the corpus — around three thousand of them — and a helper lemma
quietly acquiring a hash oracle in its cone moved nothing either phase looked
at.
Phase 2c closes that. Ported from ltl-accumulator-verified, where a nine-attack
self-test proved a source-regex enumerator evadable by attributed, private,
indented and `instance` declarations and by a nested-namespace basename
collision. Reading the compiled environment sees what the kernel saw; no name
shape hides. Every constant contributes module, name, kind and full axiom cone,
and the observed set must equal inventory-allowlist.txt exactly in BOTH
directions, with a count trailer so a truncated run cannot pass as an empty
diff.
FOUR THINGS THIS BUILD GOT WRONG, each caught by a check rather than by review:
- The number of inventory drivers is a per-repo FACT, not an assumption.
dalek and anza cannot import their corpus as one environment (Proofs.Basic
and Proofs.ConstSpecs both declare CurveFieldProofs.zero_spec); risc0 and
betrusted have no Proofs.Basic at all. Determined by compiling a probe.
check.sh now DISCOVERS its drivers from the filesystem instead of naming
two, and the generator refuses to split out a module the repo lacks.
- The split let one real declaration hide behind another's entry. Keyed on
name alone, the two zero_specs produced byte-identical records, so 3022
declarations were covered by 3021 allowlist entries. Caught by the count
trailer. Every record now carries its originating module.
- The gate's success line said "single sanctioned axiom", inherited from the
accumulator's policy. This corpus permits NONE. A success message
describing a different rule is how an assertion stops meaning anything.
- selftest-axgate.sh lifted Phase 2b with a range ending at "Phase 3", so
inserting Phase 2c between them made it swallow the new phase and die on
variables only check.sh defines — surfacing as the BASELINE case failing,
a self-test blaming a gate for its own extraction bug. Both self-tests now
stop at the next phase marker whatever it is called, and refuse to run if
they capture more than one phase. The guard is the fix; the range was the
symptom.
WHAT THIS IS NOT, recorded in TRUSTED-BASE.md at the same length as the claim:
- No independent cone walker. The accumulator cross-checks collectAxioms
against a hand-written walker. Ported here it was wrong in BOTH directions
on mathlib's inductive shapes: EdPoint gave [] against the kernel's three
axioms, and once extended, ProjPoint gave three against the kernel's none.
Two implementations disagreeing both ways are a second wrong answer, not a
check. These cones rest on collectAxioms alone.
- Thirteen Proofs/Scalar* modules are inventoried by nothing — the
second-button seam, still open. Phase 2c names every uncovered module on
every run so the omission is visible rather than inferred.
selftest-inventory.sh exercises the shipping gate with six cases, each
asserting a specific diagnostic, including the one that matters: a cone
widened by one oracle while name, module and kind stay put. Negative-tested by
disabling the gate's diff, which turns two cases red including one for the
wrong reason, correctly reported as such.
Verified green: 20 runs across the four repositories (four buttons, four
harness, four inventory, four axgate, four binding self-tests), zero red. The
four check-scalar.sh greens from the preceding sweep stand: that script neither
reads the pin file nor changed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phases 3/3b establish what each certificate RESTS ON. Neither says what it
SAYS, nor what it is ABOUT. A certificate gutted to a tautology of the same
axiom cone passes both; so does one whose reference definition has been
redefined to BE the extracted code, at which point the theorem reads
`loop = loop` and every cone is byte-identical.
Phase 3c closes that. Proofs/Audit.lean emits a canonical block holding the
policy constants, every certificate's fully-elaborated statement (pp.all, so
implicit arguments, instances and universe levels are visible), and the body
of every specification constant transitively reachable from those statements.
Its SHA-256 is pinned in check.sh and the block itself is committed as
AUDIT-MANIFEST.txt, so a mismatch is DIFFED, not merely reported. 31
certificates, 68 specification constants per repository.
Two tiers, not one. These forks have an arithmetic tier that must stay
oracle-free and an apex tier carrying this fork's hash and wire-format axioms,
and the apex boundary genuinely differs per fork (dalek 8 extra names, anza 4,
risc0 and betrusted 5). One shared constant would have widened the arithmetic
tier to accept hash oracles, which is the most valuable property these repos
have. Each auditor is generated from its own repository's policy.
Phase 0b pins the extracted model. This was not a precaution: risc0 and
betrusted were observed emitting BYTE-IDENTICAL audit-manifest digests
(6c821b8e…) while shipping demonstrably different extracted models, their
point-doubling routines differing in operation order. A statement names an
extracted function; it does not contain that function's body. Binding
statements is not binding the subject. Membership derives from the filesystem,
so a new model file fails closed.
selftest-statements.sh attacks both phases with ten cases, each asserting a
specific diagnostic: an edited model body, an unlisted model file, a widened
policy, a hand-edited committed block, a certificate dropped from the auditor
WITH the digest refreshed to match, and a gutted statement whose cone is
unchanged. It lifts the phases out of check.sh at run time, so it attacks the
shipping gate rather than a copy.
Two bugs found and fixed during that testing, both mine: Phase 3c read `$0`
after `cd "$AENEAS_LEAN"`, and $0 is the caller's relative path; and the
axgate self-test compared the tree against a pristine checkout rather than
against how it found it. A third expectation was wrong rather than the code —
widening the apex boundary is caught by the exact-cone requirement before the
digest ever runs, which is a stronger rejection, and the test now says so.
All sixteen runs green at these commits: four main buttons, four axgate
self-tests, four binding self-tests, four scalar buttons.
TRUSTED-BASE.md records what this binds and, at equal length, what it does
not: a digest binds identity, not meaning; an author can rotate the pins in
one commit and is caught by review, not by the script; and pinning the model
says nothing about whether Charon and Aeneas translated the Rust faithfully.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(verify_accepts_iff_decompress, button-enforced)
Port of the dalek decompress chain to the risc0 fork (v4 gen):
- source patch 8b69091: decompress step_2 negate-then-conditional-assign
(the documented sqrt_ratio_i rewrite; sqrt_ratio_i itself was already
in the compatible shape); extract.sh: decompress un-opaqued,
re-extracted - the step_1/step_2 external axioms vanish from the
template, decompress is transparent.
- Proofs/DecompressSpec.lean: dalek port, instance rename
Shared0FieldElement51 -> SharedAFieldElement51.
- Proofs/FromBytesSpec.lean: PORT DELTA - this gen's from_bytes takes
RangeFrom subslices (bytes[k..]) into a local load8 CLOSURE with
literal indices instead of dalek's named load8_at: new
range_from_index_spec (over the step_simps-reduced slice index) +
closure_call_spec (same disjoint-OR loader math); window/telescope
arithmetic identical.
- Proofs/DecompressMain.lean: decompress_of_canonical (standard three)
+ verify_accepts_iff_decompress (corollary verbatim - this fork's
point-equation signature is byte-identical to dalek's):
accept <=> decompress(R) = [k]*(-A) + [s]*B (as points).
check.sh: 4-tier Phase 3b; full-lift cone exactly [3 standard +
Signature + sha512_hash3 + to_bytes + Error + Error.new]. Full button
green fresh.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
verify_accepts_iff_point_eq, button-enforced
Port of dalek's PointEqSpec (the encoding-injectivity mathematics is
fork-independent; compiled first try): for any valid on-curve point Q
whose canonical encoding is the signature's R bytes, the verifier
accepts IFF Q equals the recomputed point as denoted affine points -
the literal point-level EdDSA verification equation, no decompress
needed. enc_point_inj carries the standard three axioms; the equation
itself carries exactly this fork's enforced apex boundary, and Phase 3b
now audits all three tiers (byte apex, half-lift, point equation).
Full button green fresh.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Full replication of dalek's phase 2 in one increment - the five files
ported with only the v4 deltas (to_bytes -> as_bytes on both serializers,
byte-identical bodies verified; compress inlines the affine conversion;
recompute has ONE sha512_hash3 oracle bind instead of five, so the
inversion is a single bind_ok_inv before the proven tail). Every proof
compiled FIRST TRY after the mechanical renames.
- Proofs/ToBytesMath + ToBytesSpec: field as_bytes canonicity.
- Proofs/ScalarPackSpec: scalar pack + canonical hash-to-scalar entry.
- Proofs/CompressSpec: ed_compress_spec - compress emits the canonical
encoding of the denoted affine point.
- Proofs/PointLiftSpec: dsm dispatch transfer, byte-comparison bridge,
recompute inversion, and THE HALF-LIFT verify_accepts_iff_point:
accept IFF the signature's R bytes are the canonical encoding of the
recomputed [k](-A) + [s]B (valid, on-curve, certified model).
check.sh: five new certificates (exact standard three) and Phase 3b now
enforces the hash3 + wire-format boundary on BOTH apex and half-lift.
Full button green fresh.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replicates dalek's apex with this fork's sha2-0.10 adaptation: the hash
oracle is the single monomorphic sha512_hash3(R, A, m) call (no foreign
types in its signature — the 0.10 Sha512 alias cannot be declared opaque),
and extraction runs --no-default-features so the error path avoids boxed
dyn-Error.
- gen/CurveSig: the extracted verify glue, definitionally welded to the
proven model (TypesExternal/FunsExternal import CurveField; every curve
and scalar call is a certified definition).
- Proofs/SigApexSpec.lean (unchanged from dalek): verify_loop_full (the
32-byte comparison = array equality; axiom cone exactly the standard
three) and verify_accepts_iff — accept IFF compress([s]B - [k]A) = R
byte-for-byte, SHA-512 opaque.
- check.sh Phase 3b: the apex axiom cone is enforced to be EXACTLY
[propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound, ed25519.Signature,
verifying.sha512_hash3, ed25519.Signature.to_bytes,
signature.error.Error, signature.error.Error.new]
- zero curve, scalar, or backend axioms.
Full check.sh green: 17 standard certificates + the apex audit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replicates dalek's gen merge: extract.sh co-extracts the Scalar52 backend
and scalar::from_bytes_mod_order[_wide] into the CurveField model (with this
fork's sub::black_box opaqued, its identity model ported to the merged
FunsExternal), pins RUSTFLAGS --cfg curve25519_dalek_backend="serial" so
the SIMD dispatch arm compiles out (get_selected_backend becomes a real
definition), and upgrades unwrap_u8 to the documented Choice-model
definition. ScalarDenote repoints by one import line; both buttons green
over the merged gen (scalar chain + field/group/dsm chain, all certificates
axiom-clean).
Prepares the verify-glue integration (CurveSig) on this fork.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The complete non_adjacent_form(5) verification (four stages):
- `Proofs/DsmNafLoadSpec.lean` (generated) — the LE byte-to-word load.
- `Proofs/DsmNafMath.lean` — the digit loop's arithmetic core: window-read
lemmas (single/cross-word), the exact ZZ invariant steps (Nat.mod_mul
telescope), the carry-kill argument from V < 2^253, and the exit theorem.
- `Proofs/DsmNafLoopSpec.lean` — the w=5 digit loop by induction on the
remaining-bits measure: per-step 64-bit window read (4-way word split),
digit write via hcast/wrapping_sub (exact value window - 32*carry',
oddness, |d| < 16), invariant carried through even/odd steps.
- `Proofs/DsmNafSpec.lean` — the public spec: both entry masserts
DISCHARGED; the digits satisfy the NAF conditions and
sum naf[k]*2^k = V EXACTLY (integers, no modular slack)
for any scalar whose LE byte value V is below 2^253.
And the campaign's brick 4, `Proofs/DsmMulSpec.lean`:
- `run_basepoint` — the transpiled ED25519_BASEPOINT_POINT is the standard
base point: valid extended coordinates (X*Y = Z*T) and the curve equation,
kernel-checked via denominator-free 121666-scaled witnesses. Includes the
generic witness lemmas fp_mul_eq_of_witness / onCurve_of_witness.
- `vartime_double_base_mul_spec` — THE PHASE-1 COMPUTATIONAL SPEC of
vartime_double_base::mul: for canonical scalars and a valid on-curve A,
the result is valid, on-curve, and denotes
dsmFold (naf a) (naf b) (edPt A) edBasePt edId 256
with both digit arrays proven exact NAF encodings. Phase 2 (group
semantics [a]A + [b]B) requires Edwards associativity — deferred and
documented; nothing assumes it.
Also: removed a vestigial pre-re-extraction axiom stub
(backend.serial.scalar_mul.vartime_double_base.mul) from FunsExternal —
a root-level leftover that shadowed the real namespaced definition during
name resolution in proof files. Never referenced by any certificate (the
#print-axioms audit guards against that); deleted for hygiene.
CERTS += naf_load_spec, naf_exit, naf_digit_loop_spec,
non_adjacent_form_spec, run_basepoint, vartime_double_base_mul_spec —
each audited to exactly [propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound].
Full check.sh green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three new proof files over the CurveField extraction, composing the proven
group-law layer (no new axioms, no associativity assumed — computational
layering over the abstract `edAdd`):
- `Proofs/DsmTableSpec.lean` — `NafLookupTable5::from(&A)`: the 8 entries
are valid `ProjectiveNielsPoint` caches of valid on-curve points denoting
the odd multiples A, 3A, ..., 15A as the `edOdd` double-and-add recursion.
7 explicit loop peels over edwards_as_projective_niels_spec /
add_projniels_law / compl_as_extended_law, seeded by edwards_double_law.
`select`: both masserts (x odd, x < 16) DISCHARGED — panic-freedom is
proven, not assumed; post enumerates all 8 digit cases.
- `Proofs/DsmStepSpec.lean` — `proj_double_law` (the projective doubling
denotes `edAdd P P`; same Z^2-scaled linear_combination discipline as the
extended-coordinate law), `compl_as_projective_law` ((X:Z),(Y:T) to
(XT:YZ:ZT) preserves the point), `naf_select_entry` (digit-indexed lookup
returns THE entry: NafEntryOf r A ((x-1)/2)), and `dsm_step_p_law` /
`dsm_step_b_law`: the three-way NAF digit step denotes `edDigit` — add
the d-th odd multiple, add its negation, or pass through.
- `Proofs/DsmLoopSpec.lean` — the 256-iteration Straus loop by GENUINE
induction on the counter (one symbolic body walk, no unrolling):
`dsm_loop_spec` — from the identity, the loop returns a valid on-curve
point denoting `dsmFold ... edId 256`, the abstract double-and-add fold
of both digit arrays over the table points. Digit and table hypotheses
are exactly what the NAF spec and naf_table_spec provide (layering).
check.sh wired: PROOFS + AUDIT_IMPORTS + 7 new CERTS (naf_table_spec,
naf_select_spec, proj_double_law, compl_as_projective_law, dsm_step_p_law,
dsm_step_b_law, dsm_loop_spec), each `#print axioms`-audited to exactly
[propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound]. Full check.sh green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The apex brick of the scalar layer: for any 64 bytes (the opaque SHA-512
digest), [from_bytes_wide bytes] = (LE 512-bit value) mod l, with
canonical 52-bit-bounded output. Composition: bytes_unpack_spec (8x8
loops) -> split_words_lo/hi_spec (exact div/mod per limb, disjoint ORs
as additions) -> wide_split_telescope (isolated omega) -> montgomery_mul
by R and RR (R cancels as a unit, RR restores it) -> the canonical add.
The two kernel-capacity walls found and crossed en route (control repo
FAILURES.md updated):
- a montgomery_mul inside any walk motive replays its 400-line body at
every kernel step (fix: named prefix functions in the pinned source);
- straight-line IndexMut closure chains make kernel defeq exponential in
depth (fix: struct-literal construction - the split halves now build
Scalar52([...]) directly). Full certificate: 77 s kernel-inclusive.
Regenerated gen (sources factor from_bytes_wide -> from_bytes_wide_parts
-> split_words_lo/hi; documented pure refactors, cargo-checked).
check-scalar.sh: 13 proof files, 13 kernel audits, all exactly
[propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound]. Button pressed fresh: green.
Toward Scalar::from_hash: bytes_unpack_spec proves the from_bytes_wide
word-unpack loops pack 64 little-endian bytes into 8 words exactly.
- Proofs/ScalarBytesSpec.lean (3308 lines): bytes_word_loop_spec_0..7,
each split head/tail at j=4 (the 8-fold monolith grows exponentially
in elaboration - METHOD 4). Disjoint-bit ORs become additions via
core's Nat.two_pow_add_eq_or_of_lt with explicit calc bridges (the
default simp set literalizes 2^8 -> 256 and breaks pow-form rewrites;
simp only everywhere).
- Proofs/ScalarUnpackSpec.lean: bytes_unpack_spec composes the eight
inner lemmas through the outer loop (iterator start needs a term-level
equality rewrite per peel).
The from_bytes_wide main walk itself is proven at elaboration level
(fail-probe verified end to end) but its single-decl kernel certificate
replays >30min; it ships next as a phase-split (plan in the control
repo's method notes). check-scalar.sh: 12 proof files, 12 kernel audits,
all exactly [propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound]. Button green.
Canonicity pass (the layer is now closed under its own preconditions):
- sub_val_spec post carries the exact value equation
(exists beta <= 1, scVal r + scVal b = scVal a + ell*beta, with the
underflow guard beta = 1 -> scVal a < scVal b)
- add/montgomery_reduce/mul/aggregate posts all carry scVal r < ell:
canonical inputs give canonical outputs everywhere. Needed because
from_bytes_wide (hash-to-scalar) feeds Montgomery outputs into add.
Hash-to-scalar foundation (toward Scalar::from_hash / EdDSA verify):
- extraction scope + from_bytes_wide (brings constants::R); regenerated gen
- source repos carry a documented Aeneas-compat patch: the bare
`hi[4] = words[7] >> 20` extracts ill-typed at pin bf13c42e; masked
(semantic no-op, words[7] >> 20 < 2^44)
- Proofs/ScalarWideSpec.lean: R constant lemmas (R = 2^260 mod ell,
witness 2^260 = R + 255*ell) and montgomery_mul_spec, the single
Montgomery round: [r]*2^260 = [a]*[b], canonical bounded output
check-scalar.sh: 10 proof files, 11 kernel audits, all exactly
[propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound]. Button pressed fresh: green.
This v4.1.x fork implements Scalar52::sub with TWO loops (loop0 = borrow
chain; loop1 adds L &&& underflow_mask — the arithmetic-mask constant-time
conditional), a genuinely different code path from upstream v5's
subtle-based conditional_add_l. Verified per R2 against this fork's own gen:
- sub_loop_spec (= loop0): borrow chain, verbatim technique from dalek
- sub_loop1_zero_spec / sub_loop1_one_spec: the masked-L add, both mask
values (0 / 2^64-1), full carry chains
- sub_val_spec: denote(sub a b) = denote a - denote b in ZMod l; the
underflow mask um = ((borrow>>>63) XOR 1) - 1 resolved per case
- add_loop_spec + add_val_spec: denote(add a b) = denote a + denote b
(v4 add_loop extracts token-identical to v5; composition through this
fork's own sub_val_spec)
check-scalar.sh: full manifest, 5/5 kernel axiom audit
[propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound], green at 300-400s/4096MB.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Transpile the Scalar52 limb backend (backend::serial::u64::scalar
add/sub/mul/square/montgomery_*) from Rust to Lean via Charon/Aeneas,
scoped at the function level to the iterator-free arithmetic core.
- verification/extract-scalar.sh: function-level Charon/Aeneas extraction.
This fork (v4.1.3) inlines a local `black_box` (a volatile read used as an
optimization barrier) inside Scalar52::sub; charon cannot translate the
`&raw const` it lowers to, so it is marked --opaque and modeled below.
- verification/gen/CurveScalar/{Types,Funs}.lean: transpiled model (27 defs)
- verification/gen/CurveScalar/FunsExternal.lean: hand-written model of
Scalar52::sub::black_box as the identity on u64 (a volatile read returns
the value written; the qualifier is only an optimization barrier).
TypesExternal.lean is decl-free — this fork pulls in no external types
(unlike v5 dalek, which routes sub through subtle::Choice).
- verification/Proofs/ScalarDenote.lean: semantic foundation — Scalar52
denotation into ℤ/ℓℤ, limb-bound invariant, and L_val (the transpiled
constants::L denotes exactly the group order ℓ, kernel-checked).
- verification/check-scalar.sh: guarded compile of the gen modules plus the
denotation foundation.
check-scalar.sh passes: gen compiles; denotation + L = ℓ proven.
add/sub/mul remain in progress.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Ported from the locally verified Hermes working copy; FeQ and Square2Spec
(dead files in the published replica) now compile and are in the check
manifest. Basic.lean (never compiled under v4 Aeneas) removed rather than
shipped dead.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
