risc0-ed25519-verified/verification/selftest-statements.sh

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verification: bind the statements, the specifications, and the model (P1-a) Phases 3/3b establish what each certificate RESTS ON. Neither says what it SAYS, nor what it is ABOUT. A certificate gutted to a tautology of the same axiom cone passes both; so does one whose reference definition has been redefined to BE the extracted code, at which point the theorem reads `loop = loop` and every cone is byte-identical. Phase 3c closes that. Proofs/Audit.lean emits a canonical block holding the policy constants, every certificate's fully-elaborated statement (pp.all, so implicit arguments, instances and universe levels are visible), and the body of every specification constant transitively reachable from those statements. Its SHA-256 is pinned in check.sh and the block itself is committed as AUDIT-MANIFEST.txt, so a mismatch is DIFFED, not merely reported. 31 certificates, 68 specification constants per repository. Two tiers, not one. These forks have an arithmetic tier that must stay oracle-free and an apex tier carrying this fork's hash and wire-format axioms, and the apex boundary genuinely differs per fork (dalek 8 extra names, anza 4, risc0 and betrusted 5). One shared constant would have widened the arithmetic tier to accept hash oracles, which is the most valuable property these repos have. Each auditor is generated from its own repository's policy. Phase 0b pins the extracted model. This was not a precaution: risc0 and betrusted were observed emitting BYTE-IDENTICAL audit-manifest digests (6c821b8e…) while shipping demonstrably different extracted models, their point-doubling routines differing in operation order. A statement names an extracted function; it does not contain that function's body. Binding statements is not binding the subject. Membership derives from the filesystem, so a new model file fails closed. selftest-statements.sh attacks both phases with ten cases, each asserting a specific diagnostic: an edited model body, an unlisted model file, a widened policy, a hand-edited committed block, a certificate dropped from the auditor WITH the digest refreshed to match, and a gutted statement whose cone is unchanged. It lifts the phases out of check.sh at run time, so it attacks the shipping gate rather than a copy. Two bugs found and fixed during that testing, both mine: Phase 3c read `$0` after `cd "$AENEAS_LEAN"`, and $0 is the caller's relative path; and the axgate self-test compared the tree against a pristine checkout rather than against how it found it. A third expectation was wrong rather than the code — widening the apex boundary is caught by the exact-cone requirement before the digest ever runs, which is a stronger rejection, and the test now says so. All sixteen runs green at these commits: four main buttons, four axgate self-tests, four binding self-tests, four scalar buttons. TRUSTED-BASE.md records what this binds and, at equal length, what it does not: a digest binds identity, not meaning; an author can rotate the pins in one commit and is caught by review, not by the script; and pinning the model says nothing about whether Charon and Aeneas translated the Rust faithfully. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 22:38:20 +00:00
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# selftest-statements.sh — adversarial self-test for the BINDING phases,
# check.sh 0b (the extracted model) and 3c (statements and specifications).
#
# These phases exist because Phases 2b/3/3b establish what a certificate RESTS
# ON and never what it SAYS, nor what it is ABOUT. This script performs the
# attacks that move no axiom cone at all, and asserts each is rejected FOR THE
# STATED REASON.
#
# It lifts Phase 3c out of check.sh at run time, so it attacks the shipping
# gate rather than a copy that can drift away from it.
#
# Requires a prior green build (Proofs/*.olean present). The cheap cases each
# recompile only Proofs/Audit.lean (~10 s). The gutted-statement case also
# recompiles one certificate module and is therefore slower; skip it with
# SKIP_SLOW=1 if you only want the fast gates exercised.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
set -uo pipefail
source ~/aeneas-toolchain/env.sh
HERE="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
AENEAS_LEAN="$AENEAS_HOME/backends/lean"
TIMEOUT="${LEAN_TIMEOUT:-900}"
export LEAN_MEM_MB="${LEAN_MEM_MB:-8192}"
CORES="${LEAN_MAX_CORES:-0-3}"
SKIP_SLOW="${SKIP_SLOW:-0}"
STASH="$(mktemp -d)"
FAILURES=0
# Recorded before anything is touched, so the restore check compares against
# reality rather than assuming a pristine checkout.
TREE_AT_START="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && git status --porcelain)"
cleanup() {
[ -f "$STASH/Audit.lean" ] && cp "$STASH/Audit.lean" "$HERE/Proofs/Audit.lean"
[ -f "$STASH/AUDIT-MANIFEST.txt" ] && cp "$STASH/AUDIT-MANIFEST.txt" "$HERE/AUDIT-MANIFEST.txt"
[ -f "$STASH/check.sh" ] && cp "$STASH/check.sh" "$HERE/check.sh"
[ -n "${GUT_MOD:-}" ] && [ -f "$STASH/gut.lean" ] && cp "$STASH/gut.lean" "$HERE/Proofs/$GUT_MOD.lean"
[ -n "${GENF:-}" ] && [ -f "$STASH/genfile.bak" ] && cp "$STASH/genfile.bak" "$HERE/gen/$GENF"
[ -n "${GENF:-}" ] && rm -f "$HERE/gen/$(dirname "$GENF")/ZZExtra.lean"
rm -rf "$STASH"
}
trap cleanup EXIT INT TERM
cp "$HERE/Proofs/Audit.lean" "$STASH/Audit.lean"
cp "$HERE/AUDIT-MANIFEST.txt" "$STASH/AUDIT-MANIFEST.txt"
cp "$HERE/check.sh" "$STASH/check.sh"
DRIVER0B="$STASH/phase0b.sh"
{
echo 'set -uo pipefail'
echo "HERE=\"$HERE\""
sed -n '/^# ── Phase 0b/,/^# ── Phase 1/p' "$HERE/check.sh" | sed '$d'
} > "$DRIVER0B"
if [ "$(wc -l < "$DRIVER0B")" -lt 20 ]; then
echo "FATAL: could not lift Phase 0b out of check.sh."; exit 1
fi
DRIVER="$STASH/phase3c.sh"
build_driver() {
{
echo 'set -uo pipefail'
echo 'source ~/aeneas-toolchain/env.sh'
echo "HERE=\"$HERE\""
echo 'AENEAS_LEAN="$AENEAS_HOME/backends/lean"'
echo "TIMEOUT=$TIMEOUT; CORES=\"$CORES\""
# CERTS is referenced by the cross-check inside Phase 3c.
sed -n '/^CERTS=(/,/^)/p' "$HERE/check.sh"
# `$0` inside Phase 3c must resolve to the shipping check.sh, not to this
# driver, or the apex-name recovery would read the wrong file.
verification: pin the whole declaration surface (P1-b) Phase 2b asks the kernel whether any AXIOM is declared under Proofs/. Phase 3 pins the cones of the named certificates. Between them sat every other declaration in the corpus — around three thousand of them — and a helper lemma quietly acquiring a hash oracle in its cone moved nothing either phase looked at. Phase 2c closes that. Ported from ltl-accumulator-verified, where a nine-attack self-test proved a source-regex enumerator evadable by attributed, private, indented and `instance` declarations and by a nested-namespace basename collision. Reading the compiled environment sees what the kernel saw; no name shape hides. Every constant contributes module, name, kind and full axiom cone, and the observed set must equal inventory-allowlist.txt exactly in BOTH directions, with a count trailer so a truncated run cannot pass as an empty diff. FOUR THINGS THIS BUILD GOT WRONG, each caught by a check rather than by review: - The number of inventory drivers is a per-repo FACT, not an assumption. dalek and anza cannot import their corpus as one environment (Proofs.Basic and Proofs.ConstSpecs both declare CurveFieldProofs.zero_spec); risc0 and betrusted have no Proofs.Basic at all. Determined by compiling a probe. check.sh now DISCOVERS its drivers from the filesystem instead of naming two, and the generator refuses to split out a module the repo lacks. - The split let one real declaration hide behind another's entry. Keyed on name alone, the two zero_specs produced byte-identical records, so 3022 declarations were covered by 3021 allowlist entries. Caught by the count trailer. Every record now carries its originating module. - The gate's success line said "single sanctioned axiom", inherited from the accumulator's policy. This corpus permits NONE. A success message describing a different rule is how an assertion stops meaning anything. - selftest-axgate.sh lifted Phase 2b with a range ending at "Phase 3", so inserting Phase 2c between them made it swallow the new phase and die on variables only check.sh defines — surfacing as the BASELINE case failing, a self-test blaming a gate for its own extraction bug. Both self-tests now stop at the next phase marker whatever it is called, and refuse to run if they capture more than one phase. The guard is the fix; the range was the symptom. WHAT THIS IS NOT, recorded in TRUSTED-BASE.md at the same length as the claim: - No independent cone walker. The accumulator cross-checks collectAxioms against a hand-written walker. Ported here it was wrong in BOTH directions on mathlib's inductive shapes: EdPoint gave [] against the kernel's three axioms, and once extended, ProjPoint gave three against the kernel's none. Two implementations disagreeing both ways are a second wrong answer, not a check. These cones rest on collectAxioms alone. - Thirteen Proofs/Scalar* modules are inventoried by nothing — the second-button seam, still open. Phase 2c names every uncovered module on every run so the omission is visible rather than inferred. selftest-inventory.sh exercises the shipping gate with six cases, each asserting a specific diagnostic, including the one that matters: a cone widened by one oracle while name, module and kind stay put. Negative-tested by disabling the gate's diff, which turns two cases red including one for the wrong reason, correctly reported as such. Verified green: 20 runs across the four repositories (four buttons, four harness, four inventory, four axgate, four binding self-tests), zero red. The four check-scalar.sh greens from the preceding sweep stand: that script neither reads the pin file nor changed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-29 23:20:19 +00:00
# Stop at the next phase marker, not at a blank echo: a terminator that is
# not itself a phase boundary breaks the moment the phase's body changes.
awk '/^# ── Phase 3c/{f=1} f&&/^# ── Phase /&&!/Phase 3c/{exit} f{print}' "$HERE/check.sh" \
verification: bind the statements, the specifications, and the model (P1-a) Phases 3/3b establish what each certificate RESTS ON. Neither says what it SAYS, nor what it is ABOUT. A certificate gutted to a tautology of the same axiom cone passes both; so does one whose reference definition has been redefined to BE the extracted code, at which point the theorem reads `loop = loop` and every cone is byte-identical. Phase 3c closes that. Proofs/Audit.lean emits a canonical block holding the policy constants, every certificate's fully-elaborated statement (pp.all, so implicit arguments, instances and universe levels are visible), and the body of every specification constant transitively reachable from those statements. Its SHA-256 is pinned in check.sh and the block itself is committed as AUDIT-MANIFEST.txt, so a mismatch is DIFFED, not merely reported. 31 certificates, 68 specification constants per repository. Two tiers, not one. These forks have an arithmetic tier that must stay oracle-free and an apex tier carrying this fork's hash and wire-format axioms, and the apex boundary genuinely differs per fork (dalek 8 extra names, anza 4, risc0 and betrusted 5). One shared constant would have widened the arithmetic tier to accept hash oracles, which is the most valuable property these repos have. Each auditor is generated from its own repository's policy. Phase 0b pins the extracted model. This was not a precaution: risc0 and betrusted were observed emitting BYTE-IDENTICAL audit-manifest digests (6c821b8e…) while shipping demonstrably different extracted models, their point-doubling routines differing in operation order. A statement names an extracted function; it does not contain that function's body. Binding statements is not binding the subject. Membership derives from the filesystem, so a new model file fails closed. selftest-statements.sh attacks both phases with ten cases, each asserting a specific diagnostic: an edited model body, an unlisted model file, a widened policy, a hand-edited committed block, a certificate dropped from the auditor WITH the digest refreshed to match, and a gutted statement whose cone is unchanged. It lifts the phases out of check.sh at run time, so it attacks the shipping gate rather than a copy. Two bugs found and fixed during that testing, both mine: Phase 3c read `$0` after `cd "$AENEAS_LEAN"`, and $0 is the caller's relative path; and the axgate self-test compared the tree against a pristine checkout rather than against how it found it. A third expectation was wrong rather than the code — widening the apex boundary is caught by the exact-cone requirement before the digest ever runs, which is a stronger rejection, and the test now says so. All sixteen runs green at these commits: four main buttons, four axgate self-tests, four binding self-tests, four scalar buttons. TRUSTED-BASE.md records what this binds and, at equal length, what it does not: a digest binds identity, not meaning; an author can rotate the pins in one commit and is caught by review, not by the script; and pinning the model says nothing about whether Charon and Aeneas translated the Rust faithfully. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 22:38:20 +00:00
| sed "s|\"\$0\"|\"$HERE/check.sh\"|g"
} > "$DRIVER"
if [ "$(wc -l < "$DRIVER")" -lt 60 ]; then
echo "FATAL: could not lift Phase 3c out of check.sh — the phase markers moved."
echo "This self-test must attack the shipping gate; refusing to run against nothing."
exit 1
fi
}
build_driver
recompile_audit() {
( cd "$AENEAS_LEAN" && lake env bash -c "
set -uo pipefail
cd '$HERE/gen' && export LEAN_PATH=\"\$LEAN_PATH:\$PWD:$HERE\"
cd '$HERE'
LEAN_TIMEOUT=$TIMEOUT '$HERE/lean-guard' Proofs/Audit.lean
" ) >/dev/null 2>&1
}
expect() { # expect <name> <expected-rc> <required-substring>
local name="$1" want_rc="$2" want_txt="$3" out rc
out=$(bash "$DRIVER" 2>&1); rc=$?
if [ "$rc" -ne "$want_rc" ]; then
echo " FAIL $name: exit $rc, expected $want_rc"; FAILURES=$((FAILURES+1)); return
fi
if ! grep -qF "$want_txt" <<<"$out"; then
echo " FAIL $name: exit code right, diagnostic wrong (rejected for the wrong reason)"
echo " wanted: $want_txt"
echo " got: $(tr '\n' '|' <<<"$out" | cut -c1-260)"
FAILURES=$((FAILURES+1)); return
fi
echo " ok $name"
}
echo "=== selftest-statements: attacking check.sh Phases 0b and 3c ==="
# ── 0. THE SUBJECT. The certificates are stated ABOUT the extracted model in
# gen/. A statement names an extracted function; editing that function's
# BODY changes what the theorem is about while leaving every statement,
# every cone and the Phase 3c digest byte-identical. Demonstrated on
# 2026-07-28: risc0 and betrusted ship different extracted models and
# produce the SAME audit-manifest digest. Only the byte pin separates them.
expect0b() {
local name="$1" want_rc="$2" want_txt="$3" out rc
out=$(bash "$DRIVER0B" 2>&1); rc=$?
if [ "$rc" -ne "$want_rc" ]; then
echo " FAIL $name: exit $rc, expected $want_rc"; FAILURES=$((FAILURES+1)); return
fi
if ! grep -qF "$want_txt" <<<"$out"; then
echo " FAIL $name: exit code right, diagnostic wrong (rejected for the wrong reason)"
echo " wanted: $want_txt"; FAILURES=$((FAILURES+1)); return
fi
echo " ok $name"
}
expect0b "model pin: baseline green" 0 "match their pins"
GENF=$(awk 'NR==1{print $2}' "$HERE/GEN-MODEL.sha256")
cp "$HERE/gen/$GENF" "$STASH/genfile.bak"
printf '\n-- edited\n' >> "$HERE/gen/$GENF"
expect0b "model pin: edited model body caught" 1 "does not match its pin"
cp "$STASH/genfile.bak" "$HERE/gen/$GENF"
cp "$HERE/gen/$GENF" "$HERE/gen/$(dirname "$GENF")/ZZExtra.lean"
expect0b "model pin: an unlisted model file caught" 1 "does not match GEN-MODEL.sha256"
rm -f "$HERE/gen/$(dirname "$GENF")/ZZExtra.lean"
# ── 1. Baseline: untouched repository passes and reports what it bound.
expect "baseline green, manifest digest matches" 0 "audit-manifest sha256"
# ── 2. WIDEN THE POLICY. Add one name to the apex boundary.
# The policy IS inside the digest, but this attack never reaches the
# digest: because the apex tier requires EXACT cone equality, a widened
# boundary immediately shows up as `missing=` on all four apex
# certificates. That is a strictly stronger rejection than a digest
# mismatch — it names which certificates stopped matching instead of
# merely reporting that some byte moved. Asserted here as such, because a
# test that demanded the weaker diagnostic would go red the day the
# stronger guard started working.
python3 - "$HERE/Proofs/Audit.lean" <<'PY'
import sys, re
f = sys.argv[1]; s = open(f).read()
m = re.search(r'^def apexExtra : List Name :=\n \[(.*)\]$', s, re.M)
assert m, "apexExtra not found"
s = s.replace(m.group(0), m.group(0)[:-1] + ", `Classical.byContradiction]", 1)
open(f, "w").write(s)
PY
recompile_audit
expect "widened policy caught by the exact-cone requirement" 1 "missing=[Classical.byContradiction]"
cp "$STASH/Audit.lean" "$HERE/Proofs/Audit.lean"; recompile_audit
# ── 3. HAND-EDIT THE COMMITTED BLOCK. The digest still matches the emitted
# block, so only the byte-comparison against the committed input can see
# this. Without it the diff printed on a future failure would silently
# compare against a doctored reference.
sed -i '2s/$/ TAMPERED/' "$HERE/AUDIT-MANIFEST.txt"
expect "hand-edited committed block caught" 1 "does not match the emitted block"
cp "$STASH/AUDIT-MANIFEST.txt" "$HERE/AUDIT-MANIFEST.txt"
# ── 4. DROP A CERTIFICATE FROM THE AUDITOR — AND REFRESH THE DIGEST TO MATCH,
# exactly as an author covering their tracks would. The digest and the
# committed block are now perfectly consistent with each other. The only
# thing that can still object is the cross-check against the certificate
# list this script derives from its OWN two sources.
python3 - "$HERE/Proofs/Audit.lean" <<'PY'
import sys, re
f = sys.argv[1]; s = open(f).read()
lines = s.splitlines(True)
i = next(k for k, l in enumerate(lines) if l.strip().startswith(', (`') and 'kernel3)' in l)
del lines[i]
open(f, "w").write("".join(lines))
PY
recompile_audit
# Regenerate the committed block and re-pin the digest from the tampered run.
TAMPERED_OUT=$(cd "$AENEAS_LEAN" && lake env bash -c "
set -uo pipefail
cd '$HERE/gen' && export LEAN_PATH=\"\$LEAN_PATH:\$PWD:$HERE\"
cd '$HERE'
LEAN_TIMEOUT=$TIMEOUT '$HERE/lean-guard' Proofs/Audit.lean 2>&1")
awk '/AUDIT-MANIFEST-BEGIN/{f=1;next} /AUDIT-MANIFEST-END/{f=0} f' <<<"$TAMPERED_OUT" > "$HERE/AUDIT-MANIFEST.txt"
NEWSHA=$(sha256sum "$HERE/AUDIT-MANIFEST.txt" | cut -d' ' -f1)
sed -i "s/^EXPECTED_AUDIT_SHA256=.*/EXPECTED_AUDIT_SHA256=\"$NEWSHA\"/" "$HERE/check.sh"
build_driver
expect "dropped certificate caught by the cross-check, digest refreshed or not" 1 "have drifted"
cp "$STASH/Audit.lean" "$HERE/Proofs/Audit.lean"
cp "$STASH/AUDIT-MANIFEST.txt" "$HERE/AUDIT-MANIFEST.txt"
cp "$STASH/check.sh" "$HERE/check.sh"
build_driver
recompile_audit
# ── 5. THE REAL ONE: gut a certificate's STATEMENT while preserving its axiom
# cone. Every earlier phase passes this; only the statement binding sees it.
if [ "$SKIP_SLOW" = "1" ]; then
echo " skip gutted-statement case (SKIP_SLOW=1) — the fast gates above do not cover it"
else
# A TERMINAL certificate: nothing else in the corpus consumes it. Gutting a
# load-bearing one simply breaks its consumers and the module stops
# compiling, which demonstrates the compiler working, not this gate.
GUT_MOD=FieldMain
GUT_CERT=CurveFieldProofs.fieldImplementation
cp "$HERE/Proofs/$GUT_MOD.lean" "$STASH/gut.lean"
python3 - "$HERE/Proofs/$GUT_MOD.lean" "$GUT_CERT" <<'PY'
import sys, re
f, cert = sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2]
short = cert.split('.')[-1]
s = open(f).read()
m = re.search(r'^theorem %s\b' % re.escape(short), s, re.M)
assert m, f"certificate {short} not found in {f}"
i = m.start()
# find the next top-level declaration after it
nxt = re.search(r'^(theorem|lemma|def|noncomputable def|end|/--|@\[)', s[i+10:], re.M)
assert nxt, "no following declaration"
j = i + 10 + nxt.start()
# Same cone (Classical.em pulls in Classical.choice/propext), utterly different claim.
gut = "theorem %s : (∀ p : Prop, p ¬p) := Classical.em\n\n" % short
open(f, "w").write(s[:i] + gut + s[j:])
PY
( cd "$AENEAS_LEAN" && lake env bash -c "
set -uo pipefail
cd '$HERE/gen' && export LEAN_PATH=\"\$LEAN_PATH:\$PWD:$HERE\"
cd '$HERE'
LEAN_TIMEOUT=$TIMEOUT '$HERE/lean-guard' Proofs/$GUT_MOD.lean
" ) >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo " FAIL setup: the gutted module did not compile"; FAILURES=$((FAILURES+1)); }
recompile_audit
expect "gutted statement caught (cone unchanged)" 1 "audit-manifest digest mismatch"
cp "$STASH/gut.lean" "$HERE/Proofs/$GUT_MOD.lean"
( cd "$AENEAS_LEAN" && lake env bash -c "
set -uo pipefail
cd '$HERE/gen' && export LEAN_PATH=\"\$LEAN_PATH:\$PWD:$HERE\"
cd '$HERE'
LEAN_TIMEOUT=$TIMEOUT '$HERE/lean-guard' Proofs/$GUT_MOD.lean
" ) >/dev/null 2>&1
recompile_audit
fi
# ── 6. Restored: green again, and the working tree is as we found it.
expect "restored to green" 0 "audit-manifest sha256"
verification: pin the harness, the audit drivers and the policy files (P1-c) Every gate this repository has was executed by scripts that nothing pinned. Round-5 review of the companion SLH-DSA repository stubbed the compiler wrapper alone and its button printed ALL GREEN in 3.6 seconds over deliberately destroyed proofs; flipping two guards in the audit driver disabled every check with the digest byte-identical. Depth of checking is worth nothing if the thing doing the checking is unbound — and every gate added this week made that gap more valuable to an attacker, not less. Phase 0c requires every harness file to match HARNESS.sha256. Two design points carry the weight: - WHICH files must be pinned is POLICY and lives in check.sh, never in the map being consulted. If the required set were read from the pin file, deleting an entry would silently un-pin that file. It is instead derived from the filesystem, so a deleted entry is a set mismatch and a build failure. That is the exact defect SLH-DSA round-6 found, closed here by construction. - Membership self-derives from the executable bit: anything this script can shell out to must be pinned, so a NEW script fails closed until someone pins it deliberately. Load-bearing files that are not executable — the audit driver, the committed manifests, the policy tables — cannot be discovered that way and are listed explicitly. lean-guard is inside the set, which finally makes the standing "lean-guard stays hash-pinned" rule a property of the repository rather than a convention. selftest-harness.sh replays five cases, each asserting a specific diagnostic: an edited lean-guard, a new unpinned executable, a deleted pin entry, a missing pin file, and a positive control. It was itself negative-tested — with the hash comparison removed it goes red on exactly that case while cheerfully reporting "10 harness files match their pins". TRUSTED-BASE.md states the limit at equal length to the claim: pinning a harness from inside that harness is circular, and an author who edits a script and refreshes its pin in the same commit passes every phase. What the pin changes is that the edit can no longer be SILENT — it must appear in the diff at the commit being reviewed. A green button says "this is the apparatus that was reviewed", never "this apparatus is trustworthy". Also fixed, found by this sweep: both self-tests compared the working tree against its starting state with `diff <(echo "$VAR") <(command)`, which is asymmetric — for a clean tree the variable is empty and `echo` emits a blank line the command does not. It reported a difference precisely when nothing was wrong, and only surfaced once P1-a was committed and Proofs/ became clean. Both now compare as strings. Verified green: 20 runs across the four ed25519 repositories (four buttons, four harness self-tests, four axiom-gate self-tests, four binding self-tests, four scalar buttons), zero red. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-29 18:13:00 +00:00
# String comparison, not diff of process substitutions: for a clean tree the
# variable is empty and `echo` emits a blank line the raw command does not,
# which reports a difference precisely when there is none.
TREE_NOW="$(cd "$HERE/.." && git status --porcelain)"
if [ "$TREE_AT_START" != "$TREE_NOW" ]; then
verification: bind the statements, the specifications, and the model (P1-a) Phases 3/3b establish what each certificate RESTS ON. Neither says what it SAYS, nor what it is ABOUT. A certificate gutted to a tautology of the same axiom cone passes both; so does one whose reference definition has been redefined to BE the extracted code, at which point the theorem reads `loop = loop` and every cone is byte-identical. Phase 3c closes that. Proofs/Audit.lean emits a canonical block holding the policy constants, every certificate's fully-elaborated statement (pp.all, so implicit arguments, instances and universe levels are visible), and the body of every specification constant transitively reachable from those statements. Its SHA-256 is pinned in check.sh and the block itself is committed as AUDIT-MANIFEST.txt, so a mismatch is DIFFED, not merely reported. 31 certificates, 68 specification constants per repository. Two tiers, not one. These forks have an arithmetic tier that must stay oracle-free and an apex tier carrying this fork's hash and wire-format axioms, and the apex boundary genuinely differs per fork (dalek 8 extra names, anza 4, risc0 and betrusted 5). One shared constant would have widened the arithmetic tier to accept hash oracles, which is the most valuable property these repos have. Each auditor is generated from its own repository's policy. Phase 0b pins the extracted model. This was not a precaution: risc0 and betrusted were observed emitting BYTE-IDENTICAL audit-manifest digests (6c821b8e…) while shipping demonstrably different extracted models, their point-doubling routines differing in operation order. A statement names an extracted function; it does not contain that function's body. Binding statements is not binding the subject. Membership derives from the filesystem, so a new model file fails closed. selftest-statements.sh attacks both phases with ten cases, each asserting a specific diagnostic: an edited model body, an unlisted model file, a widened policy, a hand-edited committed block, a certificate dropped from the auditor WITH the digest refreshed to match, and a gutted statement whose cone is unchanged. It lifts the phases out of check.sh at run time, so it attacks the shipping gate rather than a copy. Two bugs found and fixed during that testing, both mine: Phase 3c read `$0` after `cd "$AENEAS_LEAN"`, and $0 is the caller's relative path; and the axgate self-test compared the tree against a pristine checkout rather than against how it found it. A third expectation was wrong rather than the code — widening the apex boundary is caught by the exact-cone requirement before the digest ever runs, which is a stronger rejection, and the test now says so. All sixteen runs green at these commits: four main buttons, four axgate self-tests, four binding self-tests, four scalar buttons. TRUSTED-BASE.md records what this binds and, at equal length, what it does not: a digest binds identity, not meaning; an author can rotate the pins in one commit and is caught by review, not by the script; and pinning the model says nothing about whether Charon and Aeneas translated the Rust faithfully. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 22:38:20 +00:00
echo " FAIL restore: the working tree differs from how this test found it:"
verification: pin the harness, the audit drivers and the policy files (P1-c) Every gate this repository has was executed by scripts that nothing pinned. Round-5 review of the companion SLH-DSA repository stubbed the compiler wrapper alone and its button printed ALL GREEN in 3.6 seconds over deliberately destroyed proofs; flipping two guards in the audit driver disabled every check with the digest byte-identical. Depth of checking is worth nothing if the thing doing the checking is unbound — and every gate added this week made that gap more valuable to an attacker, not less. Phase 0c requires every harness file to match HARNESS.sha256. Two design points carry the weight: - WHICH files must be pinned is POLICY and lives in check.sh, never in the map being consulted. If the required set were read from the pin file, deleting an entry would silently un-pin that file. It is instead derived from the filesystem, so a deleted entry is a set mismatch and a build failure. That is the exact defect SLH-DSA round-6 found, closed here by construction. - Membership self-derives from the executable bit: anything this script can shell out to must be pinned, so a NEW script fails closed until someone pins it deliberately. Load-bearing files that are not executable — the audit driver, the committed manifests, the policy tables — cannot be discovered that way and are listed explicitly. lean-guard is inside the set, which finally makes the standing "lean-guard stays hash-pinned" rule a property of the repository rather than a convention. selftest-harness.sh replays five cases, each asserting a specific diagnostic: an edited lean-guard, a new unpinned executable, a deleted pin entry, a missing pin file, and a positive control. It was itself negative-tested — with the hash comparison removed it goes red on exactly that case while cheerfully reporting "10 harness files match their pins". TRUSTED-BASE.md states the limit at equal length to the claim: pinning a harness from inside that harness is circular, and an author who edits a script and refreshes its pin in the same commit passes every phase. What the pin changes is that the edit can no longer be SILENT — it must appear in the diff at the commit being reviewed. A green button says "this is the apparatus that was reviewed", never "this apparatus is trustworthy". Also fixed, found by this sweep: both self-tests compared the working tree against its starting state with `diff <(echo "$VAR") <(command)`, which is asymmetric — for a clean tree the variable is empty and `echo` emits a blank line the command does not. It reported a difference precisely when nothing was wrong, and only surfaced once P1-a was committed and Proofs/ became clean. Both now compare as strings. Verified green: 20 runs across the four ed25519 repositories (four buttons, four harness self-tests, four axiom-gate self-tests, four binding self-tests, four scalar buttons), zero red. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-29 18:13:00 +00:00
diff <(printf '%s\n' "$TREE_AT_START") <(printf '%s\n' "$TREE_NOW") | sed 's/^/ /'
verification: bind the statements, the specifications, and the model (P1-a) Phases 3/3b establish what each certificate RESTS ON. Neither says what it SAYS, nor what it is ABOUT. A certificate gutted to a tautology of the same axiom cone passes both; so does one whose reference definition has been redefined to BE the extracted code, at which point the theorem reads `loop = loop` and every cone is byte-identical. Phase 3c closes that. Proofs/Audit.lean emits a canonical block holding the policy constants, every certificate's fully-elaborated statement (pp.all, so implicit arguments, instances and universe levels are visible), and the body of every specification constant transitively reachable from those statements. Its SHA-256 is pinned in check.sh and the block itself is committed as AUDIT-MANIFEST.txt, so a mismatch is DIFFED, not merely reported. 31 certificates, 68 specification constants per repository. Two tiers, not one. These forks have an arithmetic tier that must stay oracle-free and an apex tier carrying this fork's hash and wire-format axioms, and the apex boundary genuinely differs per fork (dalek 8 extra names, anza 4, risc0 and betrusted 5). One shared constant would have widened the arithmetic tier to accept hash oracles, which is the most valuable property these repos have. Each auditor is generated from its own repository's policy. Phase 0b pins the extracted model. This was not a precaution: risc0 and betrusted were observed emitting BYTE-IDENTICAL audit-manifest digests (6c821b8e…) while shipping demonstrably different extracted models, their point-doubling routines differing in operation order. A statement names an extracted function; it does not contain that function's body. Binding statements is not binding the subject. Membership derives from the filesystem, so a new model file fails closed. selftest-statements.sh attacks both phases with ten cases, each asserting a specific diagnostic: an edited model body, an unlisted model file, a widened policy, a hand-edited committed block, a certificate dropped from the auditor WITH the digest refreshed to match, and a gutted statement whose cone is unchanged. It lifts the phases out of check.sh at run time, so it attacks the shipping gate rather than a copy. Two bugs found and fixed during that testing, both mine: Phase 3c read `$0` after `cd "$AENEAS_LEAN"`, and $0 is the caller's relative path; and the axgate self-test compared the tree against a pristine checkout rather than against how it found it. A third expectation was wrong rather than the code — widening the apex boundary is caught by the exact-cone requirement before the digest ever runs, which is a stronger rejection, and the test now says so. All sixteen runs green at these commits: four main buttons, four axgate self-tests, four binding self-tests, four scalar buttons. TRUSTED-BASE.md records what this binds and, at equal length, what it does not: a digest binds identity, not meaning; an author can rotate the pins in one commit and is caught by review, not by the script; and pinning the model says nothing about whether Charon and Aeneas translated the Rust faithfully. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 22:38:20 +00:00
FAILURES=$((FAILURES+1))
else
echo " ok working tree restored to its starting state"
fi
echo ""
if [ "$FAILURES" -eq 0 ]; then
echo "SELFTEST PASSED — Phase 3c rejects statement- and specification-level"
echo "tampering that moves no axiom cone, for the stated reason in each case."
exit 0
fi
echo "SELFTEST FAILED: $FAILURES check(s) did not behave as claimed."
exit 1