2026-07-02 12:38:52 +00:00
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# check.sh — THE button. Compiles EVERY shipped .lean file and axiom-audits
# EVERY layer certificate. If a file is in this repo, this script checks it;
# if this script doesn't check it, it must not be in the repo.
#
# Phases:
# 0. resource + source-integrity guards
# 1. stub audit: no `by trivial` specs, no True-target theorems, and — the
# anti-axiom-smuggling gate — ZERO `axiom` declarations under Proofs/
# (external models in gen/ are the only sanctioned axiom site)
# 2. compile gen/ + Proofs/ in dependency order (explicit -o, capped cores,
# per-file timeout). Any "declaration uses 'sorry'" warning is a FAILURE
# (this catches sorry robustly — text greps can't, comments mention it).
verification: kernel-side axiom-declaration gate (Phase 2b) + self-test
Phase 1's anti-smuggling check reads source text. Measured today on Lean
v4.30.0-rc2, four distinct declarations compile cleanly and slip past its
anchored pattern:
` axiom cheat : ...` one leading space
`@[simp] axiom cheat : ...` line starts with the attribute
`unsafe axiom cheat : ...` `unsafe` absent from the modifier list
`axiom` <newline> ` cheat` no space follows the keyword
Any of them yields a repository that proves False while the button prints
ALL GREEN. Only the tab variant is blocked, and by Lean, not by us.
Hardening the pattern would fix the exhibited syntax rather than the class,
which is the mistake this estate has made before. Phase 2b stops parsing text
and asks the kernel instead: it reads every compiled Proofs/*.olean with
readModuleData and rejects any declaration that is an axiom.
Design notes:
- reads compiled artifacts rather than importing the modules, because
Proofs.Basic and Proofs.ConstSpecs deliberately reuse `zero_spec` and a
whole-corpus import is impossible by construction;
- membership is self-deriving from the filesystem, so Scalar* and
AxiomCheck are covered too — both are skipped by the CERTS audit and by
the dead-file gate;
- fails closed on absence: a missing .olean would make the scan vacuous, so
the count of compiled modules must equal the count of shipped sources;
- removes its temp source AND artifact on both paths, since a bare `rm`
after the call never runs under `set -e` when the gate goes red — exactly
how this repo accumulated 101 orphan .olean files;
- ~3 s for the whole corpus, against ~53 s for one module-importing run.
Phase 1's grep stays as a fast first line of defence. Phase 2b is the gate
that is load-bearing.
selftest-axgate.sh attacks the shipping gate, lifted out of check.sh at run
time rather than copied. It asserts the specific diagnostic, so a rejection
for an unrelated reason fails too, and it was itself negative-tested: with
the gate's throwError removed, the self-test goes red on exactly that case.
No proof, statement, specification or certificate is touched. No attested
commit is altered — the log binds specific commit hashes, all of which remain
ancestors of HEAD.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 16:24:18 +00:00
# 2b. kernel-side axiom-declaration gate: read every compiled Proofs/*.olean
# and reject ANY axiom declared there. Phase 1's grep reads source text
# and is evadable four ways (see the phase header); this one asks the
# kernel, derives its scope from the filesystem, and fails closed if the
# set of compiled modules does not match the set of shipped sources.
2026-07-02 12:38:52 +00:00
# 3. axiom audit: #print axioms for every certificate in CERTS; each must
# report exactly [propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound]
verification: bind the statements, the specifications, and the model (P1-a)
Phases 3/3b establish what each certificate RESTS ON. Neither says what it
SAYS, nor what it is ABOUT. A certificate gutted to a tautology of the same
axiom cone passes both; so does one whose reference definition has been
redefined to BE the extracted code, at which point the theorem reads
`loop = loop` and every cone is byte-identical.
Phase 3c closes that. Proofs/Audit.lean emits a canonical block holding the
policy constants, every certificate's fully-elaborated statement (pp.all, so
implicit arguments, instances and universe levels are visible), and the body
of every specification constant transitively reachable from those statements.
Its SHA-256 is pinned in check.sh and the block itself is committed as
AUDIT-MANIFEST.txt, so a mismatch is DIFFED, not merely reported. 31
certificates, 68 specification constants per repository.
Two tiers, not one. These forks have an arithmetic tier that must stay
oracle-free and an apex tier carrying this fork's hash and wire-format axioms,
and the apex boundary genuinely differs per fork (dalek 8 extra names, anza 4,
risc0 and betrusted 5). One shared constant would have widened the arithmetic
tier to accept hash oracles, which is the most valuable property these repos
have. Each auditor is generated from its own repository's policy.
Phase 0b pins the extracted model. This was not a precaution: risc0 and
betrusted were observed emitting BYTE-IDENTICAL audit-manifest digests
(6c821b8e…) while shipping demonstrably different extracted models, their
point-doubling routines differing in operation order. A statement names an
extracted function; it does not contain that function's body. Binding
statements is not binding the subject. Membership derives from the filesystem,
so a new model file fails closed.
selftest-statements.sh attacks both phases with ten cases, each asserting a
specific diagnostic: an edited model body, an unlisted model file, a widened
policy, a hand-edited committed block, a certificate dropped from the auditor
WITH the digest refreshed to match, and a gutted statement whose cone is
unchanged. It lifts the phases out of check.sh at run time, so it attacks the
shipping gate rather than a copy.
Two bugs found and fixed during that testing, both mine: Phase 3c read `$0`
after `cd "$AENEAS_LEAN"`, and $0 is the caller's relative path; and the
axgate self-test compared the tree against a pristine checkout rather than
against how it found it. A third expectation was wrong rather than the code —
widening the apex boundary is caught by the exact-cone requirement before the
digest ever runs, which is a stronger rejection, and the test now says so.
All sixteen runs green at these commits: four main buttons, four axgate
self-tests, four binding self-tests, four scalar buttons.
TRUSTED-BASE.md records what this binds and, at equal length, what it does
not: a digest binds identity, not meaning; an author can rotate the pins in
one commit and is caught by review, not by the script; and pinning the model
says nothing about whether Charon and Aeneas translated the Rust faithfully.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 22:38:20 +00:00
# 3b. signature-apex audit: the four apex certificates against this fork's
# documented SHA-512 + wire-format boundary, exactly.
# 3c. statement + specification binding: Proofs/Audit.lean emits a canonical
# block of the policy constants, every certificate's fully-elaborated
# statement, and the body of every specification constant reachable from
# those statements. Its SHA-256 is pinned here and the block itself is
# committed, so a mismatch is diffable. This is the phase that makes a
# gutted statement, or a reference definition redefined to BE the
# extracted code, fail — neither moves any axiom cone.
2026-07-02 12:38:52 +00:00
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
set -euo pipefail
source ~/aeneas-toolchain/env.sh
HERE = " $( cd " $( dirname " $0 " ) " && pwd ) "
AENEAS_LEAN = " $AENEAS_HOME /backends/lean "
TIMEOUT = " ${ LEAN_TIMEOUT :- 300 } "
2026-07-03 10:54:28 +00:00
export LEAN_MEM_MB = " ${ LEAN_MEM_MB :- 8192 } " # 8192: ReduceSpec exceeds 6144 (coherence pass 2)
2026-07-02 12:38:52 +00:00
CORES = " ${ LEAN_MAX_CORES :- 0 -3 } "
# Layer manifests (extended as the pyramid grows; ORDER = import order).
GEN_MODULES = (
CurveField/TypesExternal
CurveField/Types
CurveField/FunsExternal
CurveField/Funs
THE SIGNATURE APEX on the risc0 fork: verify_accepts_iff, button-enforced
Replicates dalek's apex with this fork's sha2-0.10 adaptation: the hash
oracle is the single monomorphic sha512_hash3(R, A, m) call (no foreign
types in its signature — the 0.10 Sha512 alias cannot be declared opaque),
and extraction runs --no-default-features so the error path avoids boxed
dyn-Error.
- gen/CurveSig: the extracted verify glue, definitionally welded to the
proven model (TypesExternal/FunsExternal import CurveField; every curve
and scalar call is a certified definition).
- Proofs/SigApexSpec.lean (unchanged from dalek): verify_loop_full (the
32-byte comparison = array equality; axiom cone exactly the standard
three) and verify_accepts_iff — accept IFF compress([s]B - [k]A) = R
byte-for-byte, SHA-512 opaque.
- check.sh Phase 3b: the apex axiom cone is enforced to be EXACTLY
[propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound, ed25519.Signature,
verifying.sha512_hash3, ed25519.Signature.to_bytes,
signature.error.Error, signature.error.Error.new]
- zero curve, scalar, or backend axioms.
Full check.sh green: 17 standard certificates + the apex audit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-04 20:35:20 +00:00
CurveSig/TypesExternal
CurveSig/Types
CurveSig/FunsExternal
CurveSig/Funs
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)
PROOFS = (
Denote
P25519
ReduceSpec
SubNegSpec
ConstSpecs
AddSpec
MulSpec
SquareSpec
Square2Spec
Field
InvertSpec
FieldMain
FeQ
2026-07-02 14:23:30 +00:00
EdCurve
EdDenote
EdDouble
EdAddProjNiels
EdAddAffNiels
EdConvert
EdMain
Double-scalar-mul proof campaign, bricks 1-3: table, digit step, loop
Three new proof files over the CurveField extraction, composing the proven
group-law layer (no new axioms, no associativity assumed — computational
layering over the abstract `edAdd`):
- `Proofs/DsmTableSpec.lean` — `NafLookupTable5::from(&A)`: the 8 entries
are valid `ProjectiveNielsPoint` caches of valid on-curve points denoting
the odd multiples A, 3A, ..., 15A as the `edOdd` double-and-add recursion.
7 explicit loop peels over edwards_as_projective_niels_spec /
add_projniels_law / compl_as_extended_law, seeded by edwards_double_law.
`select`: both masserts (x odd, x < 16) DISCHARGED — panic-freedom is
proven, not assumed; post enumerates all 8 digit cases.
- `Proofs/DsmStepSpec.lean` — `proj_double_law` (the projective doubling
denotes `edAdd P P`; same Z^2-scaled linear_combination discipline as the
extended-coordinate law), `compl_as_projective_law` ((X:Z),(Y:T) to
(XT:YZ:ZT) preserves the point), `naf_select_entry` (digit-indexed lookup
returns THE entry: NafEntryOf r A ((x-1)/2)), and `dsm_step_p_law` /
`dsm_step_b_law`: the three-way NAF digit step denotes `edDigit` — add
the d-th odd multiple, add its negation, or pass through.
- `Proofs/DsmLoopSpec.lean` — the 256-iteration Straus loop by GENUINE
induction on the counter (one symbolic body walk, no unrolling):
`dsm_loop_spec` — from the identity, the loop returns a valid on-curve
point denoting `dsmFold ... edId 256`, the abstract double-and-add fold
of both digit arrays over the table points. Digit and table hypotheses
are exactly what the NAF spec and naf_table_spec provide (layering).
check.sh wired: PROOFS + AUDIT_IMPORTS + 7 new CERTS (naf_table_spec,
naf_select_spec, proj_double_law, compl_as_projective_law, dsm_step_p_law,
dsm_step_b_law, dsm_loop_spec), each `#print axioms`-audited to exactly
[propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound]. Full check.sh green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-04 13:07:57 +00:00
DsmTableSpec
DsmStepSpec
DsmLoopSpec
NAF encoder proven end-to-end + the phase-1 double-scalar-mul apex
The complete non_adjacent_form(5) verification (four stages):
- `Proofs/DsmNafLoadSpec.lean` (generated) — the LE byte-to-word load.
- `Proofs/DsmNafMath.lean` — the digit loop's arithmetic core: window-read
lemmas (single/cross-word), the exact ZZ invariant steps (Nat.mod_mul
telescope), the carry-kill argument from V < 2^253, and the exit theorem.
- `Proofs/DsmNafLoopSpec.lean` — the w=5 digit loop by induction on the
remaining-bits measure: per-step 64-bit window read (4-way word split),
digit write via hcast/wrapping_sub (exact value window - 32*carry',
oddness, |d| < 16), invariant carried through even/odd steps.
- `Proofs/DsmNafSpec.lean` — the public spec: both entry masserts
DISCHARGED; the digits satisfy the NAF conditions and
sum naf[k]*2^k = V EXACTLY (integers, no modular slack)
for any scalar whose LE byte value V is below 2^253.
And the campaign's brick 4, `Proofs/DsmMulSpec.lean`:
- `run_basepoint` — the transpiled ED25519_BASEPOINT_POINT is the standard
base point: valid extended coordinates (X*Y = Z*T) and the curve equation,
kernel-checked via denominator-free 121666-scaled witnesses. Includes the
generic witness lemmas fp_mul_eq_of_witness / onCurve_of_witness.
- `vartime_double_base_mul_spec` — THE PHASE-1 COMPUTATIONAL SPEC of
vartime_double_base::mul: for canonical scalars and a valid on-curve A,
the result is valid, on-curve, and denotes
dsmFold (naf a) (naf b) (edPt A) edBasePt edId 256
with both digit arrays proven exact NAF encodings. Phase 2 (group
semantics [a]A + [b]B) requires Edwards associativity — deferred and
documented; nothing assumes it.
Also: removed a vestigial pre-re-extraction axiom stub
(backend.serial.scalar_mul.vartime_double_base.mul) from FunsExternal —
a root-level leftover that shadowed the real namespaced definition during
name resolution in proof files. Never referenced by any certificate (the
#print-axioms audit guards against that); deleted for hygiene.
CERTS += naf_load_spec, naf_exit, naf_digit_loop_spec,
non_adjacent_form_spec, run_basepoint, vartime_double_base_mul_spec —
each audited to exactly [propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound].
Full check.sh green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-04 14:52:08 +00:00
DsmNafLoadSpec
DsmNafMath
DsmNafLoopSpec
DsmNafSpec
DsmMulSpec
2026-07-05 14:38:21 +00:00
ToBytesMath
ToBytesSpec
ScalarPackSpec
CompressSpec
THE SIGNATURE APEX on the risc0 fork: verify_accepts_iff, button-enforced
Replicates dalek's apex with this fork's sha2-0.10 adaptation: the hash
oracle is the single monomorphic sha512_hash3(R, A, m) call (no foreign
types in its signature — the 0.10 Sha512 alias cannot be declared opaque),
and extraction runs --no-default-features so the error path avoids boxed
dyn-Error.
- gen/CurveSig: the extracted verify glue, definitionally welded to the
proven model (TypesExternal/FunsExternal import CurveField; every curve
and scalar call is a certified definition).
- Proofs/SigApexSpec.lean (unchanged from dalek): verify_loop_full (the
32-byte comparison = array equality; axiom cone exactly the standard
three) and verify_accepts_iff — accept IFF compress([s]B - [k]A) = R
byte-for-byte, SHA-512 opaque.
- check.sh Phase 3b: the apex axiom cone is enforced to be EXACTLY
[propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound, ed25519.Signature,
verifying.sha512_hash3, ed25519.Signature.to_bytes,
signature.error.Error, signature.error.Error.new]
- zero curve, scalar, or backend axioms.
Full check.sh green: 17 standard certificates + the apex audit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-04 20:35:20 +00:00
SigApexSpec
2026-07-05 14:38:21 +00:00
PointLiftSpec
2026-07-05 17:25:54 +00:00
PointEqSpec
2026-07-05 23:29:22 +00:00
DecompressSpec
FromBytesSpec
DecompressMain
verification: bind the statements, the specifications, and the model (P1-a)
Phases 3/3b establish what each certificate RESTS ON. Neither says what it
SAYS, nor what it is ABOUT. A certificate gutted to a tautology of the same
axiom cone passes both; so does one whose reference definition has been
redefined to BE the extracted code, at which point the theorem reads
`loop = loop` and every cone is byte-identical.
Phase 3c closes that. Proofs/Audit.lean emits a canonical block holding the
policy constants, every certificate's fully-elaborated statement (pp.all, so
implicit arguments, instances and universe levels are visible), and the body
of every specification constant transitively reachable from those statements.
Its SHA-256 is pinned in check.sh and the block itself is committed as
AUDIT-MANIFEST.txt, so a mismatch is DIFFED, not merely reported. 31
certificates, 68 specification constants per repository.
Two tiers, not one. These forks have an arithmetic tier that must stay
oracle-free and an apex tier carrying this fork's hash and wire-format axioms,
and the apex boundary genuinely differs per fork (dalek 8 extra names, anza 4,
risc0 and betrusted 5). One shared constant would have widened the arithmetic
tier to accept hash oracles, which is the most valuable property these repos
have. Each auditor is generated from its own repository's policy.
Phase 0b pins the extracted model. This was not a precaution: risc0 and
betrusted were observed emitting BYTE-IDENTICAL audit-manifest digests
(6c821b8e…) while shipping demonstrably different extracted models, their
point-doubling routines differing in operation order. A statement names an
extracted function; it does not contain that function's body. Binding
statements is not binding the subject. Membership derives from the filesystem,
so a new model file fails closed.
selftest-statements.sh attacks both phases with ten cases, each asserting a
specific diagnostic: an edited model body, an unlisted model file, a widened
policy, a hand-edited committed block, a certificate dropped from the auditor
WITH the digest refreshed to match, and a gutted statement whose cone is
unchanged. It lifts the phases out of check.sh at run time, so it attacks the
shipping gate rather than a copy.
Two bugs found and fixed during that testing, both mine: Phase 3c read `$0`
after `cd "$AENEAS_LEAN"`, and $0 is the caller's relative path; and the
axgate self-test compared the tree against a pristine checkout rather than
against how it found it. A third expectation was wrong rather than the code —
widening the apex boundary is caught by the exact-cone requirement before the
digest ever runs, which is a stronger rejection, and the test now says so.
All sixteen runs green at these commits: four main buttons, four axgate
self-tests, four binding self-tests, four scalar buttons.
TRUSTED-BASE.md records what this binds and, at equal length, what it does
not: a digest binds identity, not meaning; an author can rotate the pins in
one commit and is caught by review, not by the script; and pinning the model
says nothing about whether Charon and Aeneas translated the Rust faithfully.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 22:38:20 +00:00
Audit # LAST: imports the certificate corpus and runs the audit
2026-07-02 12:38:52 +00:00
)
# Fully-qualified certificate names; each must be axiom-clean.
CERTS = (
CurveFieldProofs.fieldImplementation
2026-07-02 14:23:30 +00:00
CurveFieldProofs.edwardsImplementation
Double-scalar-mul proof campaign, bricks 1-3: table, digit step, loop
Three new proof files over the CurveField extraction, composing the proven
group-law layer (no new axioms, no associativity assumed — computational
layering over the abstract `edAdd`):
- `Proofs/DsmTableSpec.lean` — `NafLookupTable5::from(&A)`: the 8 entries
are valid `ProjectiveNielsPoint` caches of valid on-curve points denoting
the odd multiples A, 3A, ..., 15A as the `edOdd` double-and-add recursion.
7 explicit loop peels over edwards_as_projective_niels_spec /
add_projniels_law / compl_as_extended_law, seeded by edwards_double_law.
`select`: both masserts (x odd, x < 16) DISCHARGED — panic-freedom is
proven, not assumed; post enumerates all 8 digit cases.
- `Proofs/DsmStepSpec.lean` — `proj_double_law` (the projective doubling
denotes `edAdd P P`; same Z^2-scaled linear_combination discipline as the
extended-coordinate law), `compl_as_projective_law` ((X:Z),(Y:T) to
(XT:YZ:ZT) preserves the point), `naf_select_entry` (digit-indexed lookup
returns THE entry: NafEntryOf r A ((x-1)/2)), and `dsm_step_p_law` /
`dsm_step_b_law`: the three-way NAF digit step denotes `edDigit` — add
the d-th odd multiple, add its negation, or pass through.
- `Proofs/DsmLoopSpec.lean` — the 256-iteration Straus loop by GENUINE
induction on the counter (one symbolic body walk, no unrolling):
`dsm_loop_spec` — from the identity, the loop returns a valid on-curve
point denoting `dsmFold ... edId 256`, the abstract double-and-add fold
of both digit arrays over the table points. Digit and table hypotheses
are exactly what the NAF spec and naf_table_spec provide (layering).
check.sh wired: PROOFS + AUDIT_IMPORTS + 7 new CERTS (naf_table_spec,
naf_select_spec, proj_double_law, compl_as_projective_law, dsm_step_p_law,
dsm_step_b_law, dsm_loop_spec), each `#print axioms`-audited to exactly
[propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound]. Full check.sh green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-04 13:07:57 +00:00
CurveFieldProofs.naf_table_spec
CurveFieldProofs.naf_select_spec
CurveFieldProofs.proj_double_law
CurveFieldProofs.compl_as_projective_law
CurveFieldProofs.dsm_step_p_law
CurveFieldProofs.dsm_step_b_law
CurveFieldProofs.dsm_loop_spec
NAF encoder proven end-to-end + the phase-1 double-scalar-mul apex
The complete non_adjacent_form(5) verification (four stages):
- `Proofs/DsmNafLoadSpec.lean` (generated) — the LE byte-to-word load.
- `Proofs/DsmNafMath.lean` — the digit loop's arithmetic core: window-read
lemmas (single/cross-word), the exact ZZ invariant steps (Nat.mod_mul
telescope), the carry-kill argument from V < 2^253, and the exit theorem.
- `Proofs/DsmNafLoopSpec.lean` — the w=5 digit loop by induction on the
remaining-bits measure: per-step 64-bit window read (4-way word split),
digit write via hcast/wrapping_sub (exact value window - 32*carry',
oddness, |d| < 16), invariant carried through even/odd steps.
- `Proofs/DsmNafSpec.lean` — the public spec: both entry masserts
DISCHARGED; the digits satisfy the NAF conditions and
sum naf[k]*2^k = V EXACTLY (integers, no modular slack)
for any scalar whose LE byte value V is below 2^253.
And the campaign's brick 4, `Proofs/DsmMulSpec.lean`:
- `run_basepoint` — the transpiled ED25519_BASEPOINT_POINT is the standard
base point: valid extended coordinates (X*Y = Z*T) and the curve equation,
kernel-checked via denominator-free 121666-scaled witnesses. Includes the
generic witness lemmas fp_mul_eq_of_witness / onCurve_of_witness.
- `vartime_double_base_mul_spec` — THE PHASE-1 COMPUTATIONAL SPEC of
vartime_double_base::mul: for canonical scalars and a valid on-curve A,
the result is valid, on-curve, and denotes
dsmFold (naf a) (naf b) (edPt A) edBasePt edId 256
with both digit arrays proven exact NAF encodings. Phase 2 (group
semantics [a]A + [b]B) requires Edwards associativity — deferred and
documented; nothing assumes it.
Also: removed a vestigial pre-re-extraction axiom stub
(backend.serial.scalar_mul.vartime_double_base.mul) from FunsExternal —
a root-level leftover that shadowed the real namespaced definition during
name resolution in proof files. Never referenced by any certificate (the
#print-axioms audit guards against that); deleted for hygiene.
CERTS += naf_load_spec, naf_exit, naf_digit_loop_spec,
non_adjacent_form_spec, run_basepoint, vartime_double_base_mul_spec —
each audited to exactly [propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound].
Full check.sh green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-04 14:52:08 +00:00
CurveFieldProofs.naf_load_spec
CurveFieldProofs.naf_exit
CurveFieldProofs.naf_digit_loop_spec
CurveFieldProofs.non_adjacent_form_spec
CurveFieldProofs.run_basepoint
CurveFieldProofs.vartime_double_base_mul_spec
THE SIGNATURE APEX on the risc0 fork: verify_accepts_iff, button-enforced
Replicates dalek's apex with this fork's sha2-0.10 adaptation: the hash
oracle is the single monomorphic sha512_hash3(R, A, m) call (no foreign
types in its signature — the 0.10 Sha512 alias cannot be declared opaque),
and extraction runs --no-default-features so the error path avoids boxed
dyn-Error.
- gen/CurveSig: the extracted verify glue, definitionally welded to the
proven model (TypesExternal/FunsExternal import CurveField; every curve
and scalar call is a certified definition).
- Proofs/SigApexSpec.lean (unchanged from dalek): verify_loop_full (the
32-byte comparison = array equality; axiom cone exactly the standard
three) and verify_accepts_iff — accept IFF compress([s]B - [k]A) = R
byte-for-byte, SHA-512 opaque.
- check.sh Phase 3b: the apex axiom cone is enforced to be EXACTLY
[propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound, ed25519.Signature,
verifying.sha512_hash3, ed25519.Signature.to_bytes,
signature.error.Error, signature.error.Error.new]
- zero curve, scalar, or backend axioms.
Full check.sh green: 17 standard certificates + the apex audit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-04 20:35:20 +00:00
CurveFieldProofs.verify_loop_full
2026-07-05 14:38:21 +00:00
CurveFieldProofs.to_bytes_spec
CurveFieldProofs.ed_compress_spec
ScalarProofs.from_bytes_mod_order_wide_spec
CurveFieldProofs.vartime_dsm_basepoint_spec
2026-07-05 17:25:54 +00:00
CurveFieldProofs.enc_point_inj
2026-07-05 23:29:22 +00:00
CurveFieldProofs.pow_p58_spec
CurveFieldProofs.fe_ct_eq_spec
CurveFieldProofs.sqrt_core
CurveFieldProofs.sqrt_ratio_i_sq_spec
CurveFieldProofs.from_bytes_spec
CurveFieldProofs.decompress_of_canonical
2026-07-02 12:38:52 +00:00
)
# Imports needed so every certificate in CERTS is in scope for the audit.
AUDIT_IMPORTS = (
Proofs.FieldMain
2026-07-02 14:23:30 +00:00
Proofs.EdMain
Double-scalar-mul proof campaign, bricks 1-3: table, digit step, loop
Three new proof files over the CurveField extraction, composing the proven
group-law layer (no new axioms, no associativity assumed — computational
layering over the abstract `edAdd`):
- `Proofs/DsmTableSpec.lean` — `NafLookupTable5::from(&A)`: the 8 entries
are valid `ProjectiveNielsPoint` caches of valid on-curve points denoting
the odd multiples A, 3A, ..., 15A as the `edOdd` double-and-add recursion.
7 explicit loop peels over edwards_as_projective_niels_spec /
add_projniels_law / compl_as_extended_law, seeded by edwards_double_law.
`select`: both masserts (x odd, x < 16) DISCHARGED — panic-freedom is
proven, not assumed; post enumerates all 8 digit cases.
- `Proofs/DsmStepSpec.lean` — `proj_double_law` (the projective doubling
denotes `edAdd P P`; same Z^2-scaled linear_combination discipline as the
extended-coordinate law), `compl_as_projective_law` ((X:Z),(Y:T) to
(XT:YZ:ZT) preserves the point), `naf_select_entry` (digit-indexed lookup
returns THE entry: NafEntryOf r A ((x-1)/2)), and `dsm_step_p_law` /
`dsm_step_b_law`: the three-way NAF digit step denotes `edDigit` — add
the d-th odd multiple, add its negation, or pass through.
- `Proofs/DsmLoopSpec.lean` — the 256-iteration Straus loop by GENUINE
induction on the counter (one symbolic body walk, no unrolling):
`dsm_loop_spec` — from the identity, the loop returns a valid on-curve
point denoting `dsmFold ... edId 256`, the abstract double-and-add fold
of both digit arrays over the table points. Digit and table hypotheses
are exactly what the NAF spec and naf_table_spec provide (layering).
check.sh wired: PROOFS + AUDIT_IMPORTS + 7 new CERTS (naf_table_spec,
naf_select_spec, proj_double_law, compl_as_projective_law, dsm_step_p_law,
dsm_step_b_law, dsm_loop_spec), each `#print axioms`-audited to exactly
[propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound]. Full check.sh green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-04 13:07:57 +00:00
Proofs.DsmTableSpec
Proofs.DsmStepSpec
Proofs.DsmLoopSpec
NAF encoder proven end-to-end + the phase-1 double-scalar-mul apex
The complete non_adjacent_form(5) verification (four stages):
- `Proofs/DsmNafLoadSpec.lean` (generated) — the LE byte-to-word load.
- `Proofs/DsmNafMath.lean` — the digit loop's arithmetic core: window-read
lemmas (single/cross-word), the exact ZZ invariant steps (Nat.mod_mul
telescope), the carry-kill argument from V < 2^253, and the exit theorem.
- `Proofs/DsmNafLoopSpec.lean` — the w=5 digit loop by induction on the
remaining-bits measure: per-step 64-bit window read (4-way word split),
digit write via hcast/wrapping_sub (exact value window - 32*carry',
oddness, |d| < 16), invariant carried through even/odd steps.
- `Proofs/DsmNafSpec.lean` — the public spec: both entry masserts
DISCHARGED; the digits satisfy the NAF conditions and
sum naf[k]*2^k = V EXACTLY (integers, no modular slack)
for any scalar whose LE byte value V is below 2^253.
And the campaign's brick 4, `Proofs/DsmMulSpec.lean`:
- `run_basepoint` — the transpiled ED25519_BASEPOINT_POINT is the standard
base point: valid extended coordinates (X*Y = Z*T) and the curve equation,
kernel-checked via denominator-free 121666-scaled witnesses. Includes the
generic witness lemmas fp_mul_eq_of_witness / onCurve_of_witness.
- `vartime_double_base_mul_spec` — THE PHASE-1 COMPUTATIONAL SPEC of
vartime_double_base::mul: for canonical scalars and a valid on-curve A,
the result is valid, on-curve, and denotes
dsmFold (naf a) (naf b) (edPt A) edBasePt edId 256
with both digit arrays proven exact NAF encodings. Phase 2 (group
semantics [a]A + [b]B) requires Edwards associativity — deferred and
documented; nothing assumes it.
Also: removed a vestigial pre-re-extraction axiom stub
(backend.serial.scalar_mul.vartime_double_base.mul) from FunsExternal —
a root-level leftover that shadowed the real namespaced definition during
name resolution in proof files. Never referenced by any certificate (the
#print-axioms audit guards against that); deleted for hygiene.
CERTS += naf_load_spec, naf_exit, naf_digit_loop_spec,
non_adjacent_form_spec, run_basepoint, vartime_double_base_mul_spec —
each audited to exactly [propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound].
Full check.sh green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-04 14:52:08 +00:00
Proofs.DsmNafSpec
Proofs.DsmMulSpec
THE SIGNATURE APEX on the risc0 fork: verify_accepts_iff, button-enforced
Replicates dalek's apex with this fork's sha2-0.10 adaptation: the hash
oracle is the single monomorphic sha512_hash3(R, A, m) call (no foreign
types in its signature — the 0.10 Sha512 alias cannot be declared opaque),
and extraction runs --no-default-features so the error path avoids boxed
dyn-Error.
- gen/CurveSig: the extracted verify glue, definitionally welded to the
proven model (TypesExternal/FunsExternal import CurveField; every curve
and scalar call is a certified definition).
- Proofs/SigApexSpec.lean (unchanged from dalek): verify_loop_full (the
32-byte comparison = array equality; axiom cone exactly the standard
three) and verify_accepts_iff — accept IFF compress([s]B - [k]A) = R
byte-for-byte, SHA-512 opaque.
- check.sh Phase 3b: the apex axiom cone is enforced to be EXACTLY
[propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound, ed25519.Signature,
verifying.sha512_hash3, ed25519.Signature.to_bytes,
signature.error.Error, signature.error.Error.new]
- zero curve, scalar, or backend axioms.
Full check.sh green: 17 standard certificates + the apex audit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-04 20:35:20 +00:00
Proofs.SigApexSpec
2026-07-05 14:38:21 +00:00
Proofs.ToBytesSpec
Proofs.CompressSpec
Proofs.ScalarPackSpec
Proofs.PointLiftSpec
2026-07-05 17:25:54 +00:00
Proofs.PointEqSpec
2026-07-05 23:29:22 +00:00
Proofs.DecompressSpec
Proofs.FromBytesSpec
Proofs.DecompressMain
2026-07-02 12:38:52 +00:00
)
# ── Phase 0: resource + integrity guards ────────────────────────────────────
free -m | awk '/Mem:/{if($7<2048){print "FATAL: <2GB RAM available — refusing to compile"; exit 1}}'
echo "=== Phase 0: source integrity ==="
for f in " $HERE " /gen/CurveField/*.lean " $HERE " /Proofs/*.lean; do
[ -f " $f " ] || continue
if ! grep -qE '^(/-|import |namespace |theorem |def |open |set_option |--)' " $f " ; then
echo " CORRUPTED: $f is not Lean source (olean clobber?). Restore: git checkout HEAD -- $f "
exit 1
fi
done
echo " all sources valid"
verification: bind the statements, the specifications, and the model (P1-a)
Phases 3/3b establish what each certificate RESTS ON. Neither says what it
SAYS, nor what it is ABOUT. A certificate gutted to a tautology of the same
axiom cone passes both; so does one whose reference definition has been
redefined to BE the extracted code, at which point the theorem reads
`loop = loop` and every cone is byte-identical.
Phase 3c closes that. Proofs/Audit.lean emits a canonical block holding the
policy constants, every certificate's fully-elaborated statement (pp.all, so
implicit arguments, instances and universe levels are visible), and the body
of every specification constant transitively reachable from those statements.
Its SHA-256 is pinned in check.sh and the block itself is committed as
AUDIT-MANIFEST.txt, so a mismatch is DIFFED, not merely reported. 31
certificates, 68 specification constants per repository.
Two tiers, not one. These forks have an arithmetic tier that must stay
oracle-free and an apex tier carrying this fork's hash and wire-format axioms,
and the apex boundary genuinely differs per fork (dalek 8 extra names, anza 4,
risc0 and betrusted 5). One shared constant would have widened the arithmetic
tier to accept hash oracles, which is the most valuable property these repos
have. Each auditor is generated from its own repository's policy.
Phase 0b pins the extracted model. This was not a precaution: risc0 and
betrusted were observed emitting BYTE-IDENTICAL audit-manifest digests
(6c821b8e…) while shipping demonstrably different extracted models, their
point-doubling routines differing in operation order. A statement names an
extracted function; it does not contain that function's body. Binding
statements is not binding the subject. Membership derives from the filesystem,
so a new model file fails closed.
selftest-statements.sh attacks both phases with ten cases, each asserting a
specific diagnostic: an edited model body, an unlisted model file, a widened
policy, a hand-edited committed block, a certificate dropped from the auditor
WITH the digest refreshed to match, and a gutted statement whose cone is
unchanged. It lifts the phases out of check.sh at run time, so it attacks the
shipping gate rather than a copy.
Two bugs found and fixed during that testing, both mine: Phase 3c read `$0`
after `cd "$AENEAS_LEAN"`, and $0 is the caller's relative path; and the
axgate self-test compared the tree against a pristine checkout rather than
against how it found it. A third expectation was wrong rather than the code —
widening the apex boundary is caught by the exact-cone requirement before the
digest ever runs, which is a stronger rejection, and the test now says so.
All sixteen runs green at these commits: four main buttons, four axgate
self-tests, four binding self-tests, four scalar buttons.
TRUSTED-BASE.md records what this binds and, at equal length, what it does
not: a digest binds identity, not meaning; an author can rotate the pins in
one commit and is caught by review, not by the script; and pinning the model
says nothing about whether Charon and Aeneas translated the Rust faithfully.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 22:38:20 +00:00
# ── Phase 0b: pin the extracted model ───────────────────────────────────────
# WHY. The certificates are stated ABOUT the extracted model in gen/. Phase 3c
# binds their statements and the specification definitions those statements are
# stated against — but a statement mentions an extracted function BY NAME, so
# editing that function's BODY changes what the theorem is about while leaving
# every statement, every cone and the audit digest byte-identical.
#
# This is not hypothetical. On 2026-07-28 the risc0 and betrusted repositories
# were observed to produce byte-identical AUDIT-MANIFEST digests despite
# shipping demonstrably different extracted models (a different operation order
# in the point-doubling routine). The statements could not tell them apart.
# Only a byte pin can.
#
# Membership is derived from the filesystem, not from a list: every .lean under
# gen/ must appear in GEN-MODEL.sha256 and vice versa, so adding a model file
# fails closed rather than passing unnoticed.
echo "=== Phase 0b: extracted-model byte pin ==="
if [ ! -s " $HERE /GEN-MODEL.sha256 " ] ; then
echo "FATAL: GEN-MODEL.sha256 is missing or empty — the extracted model is unpinned."
exit 1
fi
GEN_OBSERVED = $( cd " $HERE /gen " && find . -name '*.lean' -type f | sed 's|^\./||' | sort)
GEN_PINNED = $( awk '{print $2}' " $HERE /GEN-MODEL.sha256 " | sort)
if [ " $GEN_OBSERVED " != " $GEN_PINNED " ] ; then
echo "FATAL: the set of extracted-model files does not match GEN-MODEL.sha256."
echo " (< pinned, > present on disk)"
diff <( echo " $GEN_PINNED " ) <( echo " $GEN_OBSERVED " ) | sed 's/^/ /'
exit 1
fi
if ! ( cd " $HERE /gen " && sha256sum -c --quiet " $HERE /GEN-MODEL.sha256 " ) ; then
echo "FATAL: an extracted-model file does not match its pin. The proofs are"
echo "about a model that is no longer the one that was reviewed."
exit 1
fi
echo " $( wc -l < " $HERE /GEN-MODEL.sha256 " ) extracted-model files match their pins "
verification: pin the harness, the audit drivers and the policy files (P1-c)
Every gate this repository has was executed by scripts that nothing pinned.
Round-5 review of the companion SLH-DSA repository stubbed the compiler
wrapper alone and its button printed ALL GREEN in 3.6 seconds over
deliberately destroyed proofs; flipping two guards in the audit driver
disabled every check with the digest byte-identical. Depth of checking is
worth nothing if the thing doing the checking is unbound — and every gate
added this week made that gap more valuable to an attacker, not less.
Phase 0c requires every harness file to match HARNESS.sha256. Two design
points carry the weight:
- WHICH files must be pinned is POLICY and lives in check.sh, never in the
map being consulted. If the required set were read from the pin file,
deleting an entry would silently un-pin that file. It is instead derived
from the filesystem, so a deleted entry is a set mismatch and a build
failure. That is the exact defect SLH-DSA round-6 found, closed here by
construction.
- Membership self-derives from the executable bit: anything this script can
shell out to must be pinned, so a NEW script fails closed until someone
pins it deliberately. Load-bearing files that are not executable — the
audit driver, the committed manifests, the policy tables — cannot be
discovered that way and are listed explicitly.
lean-guard is inside the set, which finally makes the standing "lean-guard
stays hash-pinned" rule a property of the repository rather than a convention.
selftest-harness.sh replays five cases, each asserting a specific diagnostic:
an edited lean-guard, a new unpinned executable, a deleted pin entry, a
missing pin file, and a positive control. It was itself negative-tested — with
the hash comparison removed it goes red on exactly that case while cheerfully
reporting "10 harness files match their pins".
TRUSTED-BASE.md states the limit at equal length to the claim: pinning a
harness from inside that harness is circular, and an author who edits a script
and refreshes its pin in the same commit passes every phase. What the pin
changes is that the edit can no longer be SILENT — it must appear in the diff
at the commit being reviewed. A green button says "this is the apparatus that
was reviewed", never "this apparatus is trustworthy".
Also fixed, found by this sweep: both self-tests compared the working tree
against its starting state with `diff <(echo "$VAR") <(command)`, which is
asymmetric — for a clean tree the variable is empty and `echo` emits a blank
line the command does not. It reported a difference precisely when nothing was
wrong, and only surfaced once P1-a was committed and Proofs/ became clean.
Both now compare as strings.
Verified green: 20 runs across the four ed25519 repositories (four buttons,
four harness self-tests, four axiom-gate self-tests, four binding self-tests,
four scalar buttons), zero red.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-29 18:13:00 +00:00
# ── Phase 0c: harness integrity ─────────────────────────────────────────────
# WHY. Every gate in this script is executed by a script that, until now,
# nothing pinned. Round-5 review of the companion SLH-DSA repository stubbed
# the compiler wrapper alone and the button printed ALL GREEN in 3.6 seconds
# over deliberately destroyed proofs; flipping two guards in the audit driver
# disabled every check with the digest byte-identical. Depth of checking is
# worth nothing if the thing doing the checking is unbound.
#
# WHICH files must be pinned is POLICY, and policy lives here — in the root of
# trust — never inside the map being consulted. If the required set were read
# from HARNESS.sha256, deleting an entry would silently un-pin the file rather
# than failing the build.
#
# The set is SELF-DERIVING from the executable bit: anything this script can
# shell out to must be pinned, so a NEW script fails closed until someone pins
# it deliberately. Non-executable files that are nonetheless load-bearing —
# the audit driver, the committed manifests, the policy tables — cannot be
# discovered that way and are listed explicitly.
HARNESS_EXTRA = (
verification: pin the whole declaration surface (P1-b)
Phase 2b asks the kernel whether any AXIOM is declared under Proofs/. Phase 3
pins the cones of the named certificates. Between them sat every other
declaration in the corpus — around three thousand of them — and a helper lemma
quietly acquiring a hash oracle in its cone moved nothing either phase looked
at.
Phase 2c closes that. Ported from ltl-accumulator-verified, where a nine-attack
self-test proved a source-regex enumerator evadable by attributed, private,
indented and `instance` declarations and by a nested-namespace basename
collision. Reading the compiled environment sees what the kernel saw; no name
shape hides. Every constant contributes module, name, kind and full axiom cone,
and the observed set must equal inventory-allowlist.txt exactly in BOTH
directions, with a count trailer so a truncated run cannot pass as an empty
diff.
FOUR THINGS THIS BUILD GOT WRONG, each caught by a check rather than by review:
- The number of inventory drivers is a per-repo FACT, not an assumption.
dalek and anza cannot import their corpus as one environment (Proofs.Basic
and Proofs.ConstSpecs both declare CurveFieldProofs.zero_spec); risc0 and
betrusted have no Proofs.Basic at all. Determined by compiling a probe.
check.sh now DISCOVERS its drivers from the filesystem instead of naming
two, and the generator refuses to split out a module the repo lacks.
- The split let one real declaration hide behind another's entry. Keyed on
name alone, the two zero_specs produced byte-identical records, so 3022
declarations were covered by 3021 allowlist entries. Caught by the count
trailer. Every record now carries its originating module.
- The gate's success line said "single sanctioned axiom", inherited from the
accumulator's policy. This corpus permits NONE. A success message
describing a different rule is how an assertion stops meaning anything.
- selftest-axgate.sh lifted Phase 2b with a range ending at "Phase 3", so
inserting Phase 2c between them made it swallow the new phase and die on
variables only check.sh defines — surfacing as the BASELINE case failing,
a self-test blaming a gate for its own extraction bug. Both self-tests now
stop at the next phase marker whatever it is called, and refuse to run if
they capture more than one phase. The guard is the fix; the range was the
symptom.
WHAT THIS IS NOT, recorded in TRUSTED-BASE.md at the same length as the claim:
- No independent cone walker. The accumulator cross-checks collectAxioms
against a hand-written walker. Ported here it was wrong in BOTH directions
on mathlib's inductive shapes: EdPoint gave [] against the kernel's three
axioms, and once extended, ProjPoint gave three against the kernel's none.
Two implementations disagreeing both ways are a second wrong answer, not a
check. These cones rest on collectAxioms alone.
- Thirteen Proofs/Scalar* modules are inventoried by nothing — the
second-button seam, still open. Phase 2c names every uncovered module on
every run so the omission is visible rather than inferred.
selftest-inventory.sh exercises the shipping gate with six cases, each
asserting a specific diagnostic, including the one that matters: a cone
widened by one oracle while name, module and kind stay put. Negative-tested by
disabling the gate's diff, which turns two cases red including one for the
wrong reason, correctly reported as such.
Verified green: 20 runs across the four repositories (four buttons, four
harness, four inventory, four axgate, four binding self-tests), zero red. The
four check-scalar.sh greens from the preceding sweep stand: that script neither
reads the pin file nor changed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-29 23:20:19 +00:00
AUDIT-MANIFEST.txt # the statement block Phase 3c's digest is taken over
GEN-MODEL.sha256 # the extracted-model pins Phase 0b enforces
inventory-allowlist.txt # the audit surface Phase 2c diffs against
Proofs/Audit.lean # the audit driver: it computes the digest it is judged by
Proofs/InventoryCore.lean # inventory machinery
Proofs/Inventory.lean # inventory driver: main chain
verification: pin the harness, the audit drivers and the policy files (P1-c)
Every gate this repository has was executed by scripts that nothing pinned.
Round-5 review of the companion SLH-DSA repository stubbed the compiler
wrapper alone and its button printed ALL GREEN in 3.6 seconds over
deliberately destroyed proofs; flipping two guards in the audit driver
disabled every check with the digest byte-identical. Depth of checking is
worth nothing if the thing doing the checking is unbound — and every gate
added this week made that gap more valuable to an attacker, not less.
Phase 0c requires every harness file to match HARNESS.sha256. Two design
points carry the weight:
- WHICH files must be pinned is POLICY and lives in check.sh, never in the
map being consulted. If the required set were read from the pin file,
deleting an entry would silently un-pin that file. It is instead derived
from the filesystem, so a deleted entry is a set mismatch and a build
failure. That is the exact defect SLH-DSA round-6 found, closed here by
construction.
- Membership self-derives from the executable bit: anything this script can
shell out to must be pinned, so a NEW script fails closed until someone
pins it deliberately. Load-bearing files that are not executable — the
audit driver, the committed manifests, the policy tables — cannot be
discovered that way and are listed explicitly.
lean-guard is inside the set, which finally makes the standing "lean-guard
stays hash-pinned" rule a property of the repository rather than a convention.
selftest-harness.sh replays five cases, each asserting a specific diagnostic:
an edited lean-guard, a new unpinned executable, a deleted pin entry, a
missing pin file, and a positive control. It was itself negative-tested — with
the hash comparison removed it goes red on exactly that case while cheerfully
reporting "10 harness files match their pins".
TRUSTED-BASE.md states the limit at equal length to the claim: pinning a
harness from inside that harness is circular, and an author who edits a script
and refreshes its pin in the same commit passes every phase. What the pin
changes is that the edit can no longer be SILENT — it must appear in the diff
at the commit being reviewed. A green button says "this is the apparatus that
was reviewed", never "this apparatus is trustworthy".
Also fixed, found by this sweep: both self-tests compared the working tree
against its starting state with `diff <(echo "$VAR") <(command)`, which is
asymmetric — for a clean tree the variable is empty and `echo` emits a blank
line the command does not. It reported a difference precisely when nothing was
wrong, and only surfaced once P1-a was committed and Proofs/ became clean.
Both now compare as strings.
Verified green: 20 runs across the four ed25519 repositories (four buttons,
four harness self-tests, four axiom-gate self-tests, four binding self-tests,
four scalar buttons), zero red.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-29 18:13:00 +00:00
)
echo "=== Phase 0c: harness integrity ==="
if [ ! -s " $HERE /HARNESS.sha256 " ] ; then
echo "FATAL: HARNESS.sha256 is missing or empty — the harness is unpinned."
exit 1
fi
# NOTE ON check.sh ITSELF: it is pinned like everything else. That catches
# drift and accident. It does NOT stop an author who edits this script and
# refreshes its pin in the same commit — nothing executed by the harness can.
# The defence there is that both changes appear in the diff at the pinned
# commit, which is why TRUSTED-BASE.md says the consumer's check is review.
HARNESS_REQUIRED = $( { find " $HERE " -type f -executable -not -path '*/.git/*' -printf '%P\n'
printf '%s\n' " ${ HARNESS_EXTRA [@] } " ; } | sort -u )
HARNESS_PINNED = $( awk '{print $2}' " $HERE /HARNESS.sha256 " | sort -u)
if [ " $HARNESS_REQUIRED " != " $HARNESS_PINNED " ] ; then
echo "FATAL: the set of harness files does not match HARNESS.sha256."
echo " (< pinned, > present and requiring a pin)"
diff <( echo " $HARNESS_PINNED " ) <( echo " $HARNESS_REQUIRED " ) | sed 's/^/ /'
exit 1
fi
if ! ( cd " $HERE " && sha256sum -c --quiet HARNESS.sha256 ) ; then
echo "FATAL: a harness file does not match its pin. The button you are"
echo "running is not the button that was reviewed."
exit 1
fi
echo " $( wc -l < " $HERE /HARNESS.sha256 " ) harness files match their pins "
2026-07-02 12:38:52 +00:00
# ── Phase 1: stub + axiom-smuggling audit ───────────────────────────────────
echo "=== Phase 1: stub audit ==="
if grep -rn 'by trivial' " $HERE " /Proofs/*Spec*.lean 2>/dev/null; then
echo "STUB DETECTED: 'by trivial' in spec files" ; exit 1; fi
if grep -rn ' : True :=' " $HERE " /Proofs/*.lean 2>/dev/null; then
echo "STUB DETECTED: True-target theorem" ; exit 1; fi
if grep -rnE '^(private |protected |noncomputable )*axiom ' " $HERE " /Proofs/*.lean 2>/dev/null; then
echo "AXIOM SMUGGLING DETECTED: axiom declaration under Proofs/ — forbidden."
echo "External models belong in gen/*/FunsExternal.lean and must stay outside"
echo "every certificate's dependency cone (Phase 3 verifies that)."
exit 1
fi
echo " clean: no trivial stubs, no True targets, no axioms outside gen/"
# ── Phase 2: compile everything shipped ─────────────────────────────────────
echo "=== Phase 2: compile ==="
LOG = $( mktemp /tmp/check-compile-XXXX.log)
cd " $AENEAS_LEAN "
lake env bash -c "
set -euo pipefail
cd '$HERE/gen' && export LEAN_PATH = \" \$ LEAN_PATH:\$ PWD:$HERE \"
compile( ) {
echo \" · \$ 1\"
2026-07-02 14:23:30 +00:00
LEAN_TIMEOUT = $TIMEOUT LEAN_MAX_CORES = $CORES '$HERE/lean-guard' \" \$ { 1} .lean\" 2>& 1 | tee -a '$LOG' || { echo \" FAIL: \$ 1\" ; exit 1; }
2026-07-02 12:38:52 +00:00
}
for m in ${ GEN_MODULES [*] } ; do compile \" \$ m\" ; done
cd '$HERE'
for m in ${ PROOFS [*] } ; do
[ -f \" Proofs/\$ m.lean\" ] || { echo \" MISSING: Proofs/\$ m.lean listed in manifest\" ; exit 1; }
compile \" Proofs/\$ m\"
done
# every shipped proof file must be in the manifest (no dead files)
for f in Proofs/*.lean; do
b = \$ ( basename \" \$ f\" .lean)
[ \" \$ b\" = AxiomCheck ] && continue
verification: pin the whole declaration surface (P1-b)
Phase 2b asks the kernel whether any AXIOM is declared under Proofs/. Phase 3
pins the cones of the named certificates. Between them sat every other
declaration in the corpus — around three thousand of them — and a helper lemma
quietly acquiring a hash oracle in its cone moved nothing either phase looked
at.
Phase 2c closes that. Ported from ltl-accumulator-verified, where a nine-attack
self-test proved a source-regex enumerator evadable by attributed, private,
indented and `instance` declarations and by a nested-namespace basename
collision. Reading the compiled environment sees what the kernel saw; no name
shape hides. Every constant contributes module, name, kind and full axiom cone,
and the observed set must equal inventory-allowlist.txt exactly in BOTH
directions, with a count trailer so a truncated run cannot pass as an empty
diff.
FOUR THINGS THIS BUILD GOT WRONG, each caught by a check rather than by review:
- The number of inventory drivers is a per-repo FACT, not an assumption.
dalek and anza cannot import their corpus as one environment (Proofs.Basic
and Proofs.ConstSpecs both declare CurveFieldProofs.zero_spec); risc0 and
betrusted have no Proofs.Basic at all. Determined by compiling a probe.
check.sh now DISCOVERS its drivers from the filesystem instead of naming
two, and the generator refuses to split out a module the repo lacks.
- The split let one real declaration hide behind another's entry. Keyed on
name alone, the two zero_specs produced byte-identical records, so 3022
declarations were covered by 3021 allowlist entries. Caught by the count
trailer. Every record now carries its originating module.
- The gate's success line said "single sanctioned axiom", inherited from the
accumulator's policy. This corpus permits NONE. A success message
describing a different rule is how an assertion stops meaning anything.
- selftest-axgate.sh lifted Phase 2b with a range ending at "Phase 3", so
inserting Phase 2c between them made it swallow the new phase and die on
variables only check.sh defines — surfacing as the BASELINE case failing,
a self-test blaming a gate for its own extraction bug. Both self-tests now
stop at the next phase marker whatever it is called, and refuse to run if
they capture more than one phase. The guard is the fix; the range was the
symptom.
WHAT THIS IS NOT, recorded in TRUSTED-BASE.md at the same length as the claim:
- No independent cone walker. The accumulator cross-checks collectAxioms
against a hand-written walker. Ported here it was wrong in BOTH directions
on mathlib's inductive shapes: EdPoint gave [] against the kernel's three
axioms, and once extended, ProjPoint gave three against the kernel's none.
Two implementations disagreeing both ways are a second wrong answer, not a
check. These cones rest on collectAxioms alone.
- Thirteen Proofs/Scalar* modules are inventoried by nothing — the
second-button seam, still open. Phase 2c names every uncovered module on
every run so the omission is visible rather than inferred.
selftest-inventory.sh exercises the shipping gate with six cases, each
asserting a specific diagnostic, including the one that matters: a cone
widened by one oracle while name, module and kind stay put. Negative-tested by
disabling the gate's diff, which turns two cases red including one for the
wrong reason, correctly reported as such.
Verified green: 20 runs across the four repositories (four buttons, four
harness, four inventory, four axgate, four binding self-tests), zero red. The
four check-scalar.sh greens from the preceding sweep stand: that script neither
reads the pin file nor changed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-29 23:20:19 +00:00
# Inventory drivers are compiled by Phase 2c, not here: they must elaborate
# with the corpus already in the environment, and the two of them cannot be
# imported together. They are NOT unchecked — Phase 2b reads their compiled
# .olean like every other module, and Phase 0c pins their sources.
case \" \$ b\" in Inventory| InventoryBasic| InventoryCore) continue ; ; esac
2026-07-03 10:54:28 +00:00
case \" \$ b\" in Scalar*) continue ; ; esac # scalar layer: checked by check-scalar.sh (coherence pass 2)
2026-07-02 12:38:52 +00:00
case \" ${ PROOFS [*] } \" in ( *\" \$ b \" *) ; ; ( *) echo \" DEAD FILE: \$ f not in check manifest\" ; exit 1; ; esac
done
"
if grep -q "uses 'sorry'" " $LOG " ; then
echo "STUB DETECTED: a compiled declaration uses 'sorry'" ; exit 1; fi
rm -f " $LOG "
verification: kernel-side axiom-declaration gate (Phase 2b) + self-test
Phase 1's anti-smuggling check reads source text. Measured today on Lean
v4.30.0-rc2, four distinct declarations compile cleanly and slip past its
anchored pattern:
` axiom cheat : ...` one leading space
`@[simp] axiom cheat : ...` line starts with the attribute
`unsafe axiom cheat : ...` `unsafe` absent from the modifier list
`axiom` <newline> ` cheat` no space follows the keyword
Any of them yields a repository that proves False while the button prints
ALL GREEN. Only the tab variant is blocked, and by Lean, not by us.
Hardening the pattern would fix the exhibited syntax rather than the class,
which is the mistake this estate has made before. Phase 2b stops parsing text
and asks the kernel instead: it reads every compiled Proofs/*.olean with
readModuleData and rejects any declaration that is an axiom.
Design notes:
- reads compiled artifacts rather than importing the modules, because
Proofs.Basic and Proofs.ConstSpecs deliberately reuse `zero_spec` and a
whole-corpus import is impossible by construction;
- membership is self-deriving from the filesystem, so Scalar* and
AxiomCheck are covered too — both are skipped by the CERTS audit and by
the dead-file gate;
- fails closed on absence: a missing .olean would make the scan vacuous, so
the count of compiled modules must equal the count of shipped sources;
- removes its temp source AND artifact on both paths, since a bare `rm`
after the call never runs under `set -e` when the gate goes red — exactly
how this repo accumulated 101 orphan .olean files;
- ~3 s for the whole corpus, against ~53 s for one module-importing run.
Phase 1's grep stays as a fast first line of defence. Phase 2b is the gate
that is load-bearing.
selftest-axgate.sh attacks the shipping gate, lifted out of check.sh at run
time rather than copied. It asserts the specific diagnostic, so a rejection
for an unrelated reason fails too, and it was itself negative-tested: with
the gate's throwError removed, the self-test goes red on exactly that case.
No proof, statement, specification or certificate is touched. No attested
commit is altered — the log binds specific commit hashes, all of which remain
ancestors of HEAD.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 16:24:18 +00:00
# ── Phase 2b: kernel-side axiom-declaration gate ────────────────────────────
# WHY THIS EXISTS. Phase 1's anti-smuggling check reads SOURCE TEXT, and a
# source-text grep is the wrong instrument. Measured on Lean v4.30.0-rc2
# (2026-07-28), each of the following compiles cleanly and slips past it:
# ` axiom cheat : ...` (one leading space — the pattern is anchored)
# `@[simp] axiom cheat : ...` (line starts with the attribute)
# `unsafe axiom cheat : ...` (`unsafe` is not in the modifier alternation)
# `axiom` <newline> ` cheat` (no space follows the keyword)
# Only the tab variant is blocked, and by Lean itself, not by us. Hardening the
# pattern would fix the exhibited syntax rather than the class; the class fix is
# to stop parsing text and ask the kernel, which is what this phase does.
# Ported from fips205-slhdsa-verified/verification/Proofs/Audit.lean.
#
# Phase 1's grep is kept as a fast, readable first line of defence. THIS is the
# gate that is load-bearing.
echo "=== Phase 2b: kernel-side axiom-declaration gate ==="
# dot-prefixed and inside $HERE: `lean` refuses a file outside the root
# directory, and a leading dot keeps it out of every *.lean glob.
# The gate reads the COMPILED ARTIFACTS directly (readModuleData) rather than
# importing the modules. Two reasons, both load-bearing:
# · Proofs.Basic and Proofs.ConstSpecs deliberately reuse the name
# `zero_spec` (they are never imported together), so a whole-corpus import
# is impossible by construction — it fails with "environment already
# contains". Reading oleans merges nothing, so collisions cannot arise.
# · Membership is then SELF-DERIVING from the filesystem: every .olean under
# Proofs/ is scanned, including Scalar* and AxiomCheck, which the CERTS
# audit and the dead-file gate both skip. Nothing is on a hand-kept list.
# Cost is ~3 s for the whole corpus (no mathlib import), against ~53 s for a
# single module-importing invocation.
N_PROOF_SRC = $( ls -1 " $HERE " /Proofs/*.lean 2>/dev/null | wc -l)
GATE = $( mktemp " $HERE /.axgate-XXXX.lean " )
{
echo "import Lean"
echo "open Lean"
echo " def expectedModules : Nat := $N_PROOF_SRC "
cat <<'LEANGATE'
run_cmd do
let dir : System.FilePath := "Proofs"
let mut errs : Array String := #[]
let mut nMod := 0
let mut nConst := 0
for entry in ( ← dir.readDir) do
if entry.path.extension = = some "olean" then
nMod := nMod + 1
let ( mod, _) ← readModuleData entry.path
for ci in mod.constants do
nConst := nConst + 1
if ci matches .axiomInfo _ then
errs := errs.push s!" {entry.fileName}: {ci.name}"
unless errs.isEmpty do
throwError "AXIOM DECLARED under Proofs/ (kernel-side gate):\n{String.intercalate " \n " errs.toList}"
-- FAIL CLOSED ON ABSENCE: an empty result and a clean result must not share
-- a code path. A deleted .olean would make the scan above vacuous; an extra
-- one is orphan litter with no shipped source.
if nMod != expectedModules then
throwError "COVERAGE MISMATCH under Proofs/: scanned {nMod} compiled modules, but the directory ships {expectedModules} sources. A missing .olean makes this gate vacuous; an extra .olean is an orphan with no source."
logInfo s!" kernel confirms: {nConst} declarations across {nMod} compiled Proofs modules, none is an axiom"
LEANGATE
} > " $GATE "
cd " $AENEAS_LEAN "
# The temp source AND its compiled artifact are removed on BOTH paths. Under
# `set -e` a bare `rm` after the call never runs when the gate goes red, which
# is exactly how this repo accumulated 101 orphan .olean files (fixed today).
GATE_RC = 0
lake env bash -c "
set -euo pipefail
cd '$HERE/gen' && export LEAN_PATH = \" \$ LEAN_PATH:\$ PWD:$HERE \"
cd '$HERE'
LEAN_TIMEOUT = $TIMEOUT LEAN_MAX_CORES = $CORES '$HERE/lean-guard' '$GATE'
" || GATE_RC= $?
rm -f " $GATE " " ${ GATE %.lean } .olean "
if [ " $GATE_RC " -ne 0 ] ; then
echo "AXIOM SMUGGLING GATE FAILED (kernel-side) — see the error above."
exit 1
fi
verification: pin the whole declaration surface (P1-b)
Phase 2b asks the kernel whether any AXIOM is declared under Proofs/. Phase 3
pins the cones of the named certificates. Between them sat every other
declaration in the corpus — around three thousand of them — and a helper lemma
quietly acquiring a hash oracle in its cone moved nothing either phase looked
at.
Phase 2c closes that. Ported from ltl-accumulator-verified, where a nine-attack
self-test proved a source-regex enumerator evadable by attributed, private,
indented and `instance` declarations and by a nested-namespace basename
collision. Reading the compiled environment sees what the kernel saw; no name
shape hides. Every constant contributes module, name, kind and full axiom cone,
and the observed set must equal inventory-allowlist.txt exactly in BOTH
directions, with a count trailer so a truncated run cannot pass as an empty
diff.
FOUR THINGS THIS BUILD GOT WRONG, each caught by a check rather than by review:
- The number of inventory drivers is a per-repo FACT, not an assumption.
dalek and anza cannot import their corpus as one environment (Proofs.Basic
and Proofs.ConstSpecs both declare CurveFieldProofs.zero_spec); risc0 and
betrusted have no Proofs.Basic at all. Determined by compiling a probe.
check.sh now DISCOVERS its drivers from the filesystem instead of naming
two, and the generator refuses to split out a module the repo lacks.
- The split let one real declaration hide behind another's entry. Keyed on
name alone, the two zero_specs produced byte-identical records, so 3022
declarations were covered by 3021 allowlist entries. Caught by the count
trailer. Every record now carries its originating module.
- The gate's success line said "single sanctioned axiom", inherited from the
accumulator's policy. This corpus permits NONE. A success message
describing a different rule is how an assertion stops meaning anything.
- selftest-axgate.sh lifted Phase 2b with a range ending at "Phase 3", so
inserting Phase 2c between them made it swallow the new phase and die on
variables only check.sh defines — surfacing as the BASELINE case failing,
a self-test blaming a gate for its own extraction bug. Both self-tests now
stop at the next phase marker whatever it is called, and refuse to run if
they capture more than one phase. The guard is the fix; the range was the
symptom.
WHAT THIS IS NOT, recorded in TRUSTED-BASE.md at the same length as the claim:
- No independent cone walker. The accumulator cross-checks collectAxioms
against a hand-written walker. Ported here it was wrong in BOTH directions
on mathlib's inductive shapes: EdPoint gave [] against the kernel's three
axioms, and once extended, ProjPoint gave three against the kernel's none.
Two implementations disagreeing both ways are a second wrong answer, not a
check. These cones rest on collectAxioms alone.
- Thirteen Proofs/Scalar* modules are inventoried by nothing — the
second-button seam, still open. Phase 2c names every uncovered module on
every run so the omission is visible rather than inferred.
selftest-inventory.sh exercises the shipping gate with six cases, each
asserting a specific diagnostic, including the one that matters: a cone
widened by one oracle while name, module and kind stay put. Negative-tested by
disabling the gate's diff, which turns two cases red including one for the
wrong reason, correctly reported as such.
Verified green: 20 runs across the four repositories (four buttons, four
harness, four inventory, four axgate, four binding self-tests), zero red. The
four check-scalar.sh greens from the preceding sweep stand: that script neither
reads the pin file nor changed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-29 23:20:19 +00:00
# ── Phase 2c: environment-derived declaration inventory ─────────────────────
# WHAT THIS ADDS over Phase 2b. Phase 2b asks the kernel whether any AXIOM is
# declared under Proofs/. It says nothing about the ~3000 other declarations:
# a `def` or `theorem` whose cone quietly acquired an oracle, a declaration
# renamed, added or removed, or a compiler-generated auxiliary that changed
# shape, all pass 2b unremarked.
#
# This phase pins the whole surface. Every constant originating in an audited
# module contributes NAME, MODULE, KIND and full AXIOM CONE, and the observed
# set must equal inventory-allowlist.txt EXACTLY, both directions:
# UNCLASSIFIED (in the environment, not allowlisted) and STALE (allowlisted,
# not in the environment) are both build failures.
#
# PORTED from ltl-accumulator-verified, where a nine-attack self-test proved a
# source-regex enumerator evadable by attributed, private, indented and
# `instance` declarations and by a nested-namespace basename collision.
#
# TWO DRIVERS, because this corpus cannot be imported as one environment:
# Proofs.Basic and Proofs.ConstSpecs both declare CurveFieldProofs.zero_spec.
# The records carry their originating module precisely so those two remain
# distinct entries — keyed on name alone they were byte-identical, and the
# merged allowlist covered 3022 declarations with 3021 entries.
echo "=== Phase 2c: environment-derived declaration inventory ==="
INVFAIL = 0
INVLOG = $( mktemp /tmp/check-inv-XXXX.log)
cd " $AENEAS_LEAN "
# The DRIVERS are discovered, not listed: whether this corpus needs one or two
# is a per-repo fact (dalek and anza cannot import Proofs.Basic together with
# Proofs.ConstSpecs; risc0 and betrusted have no Proofs.Basic at all). A
# hardcoded pair would silently look for a file that does not exist here.
DRIVERS = $( ls " $HERE " /Proofs/Inventory*.lean 2>/dev/null | xargs -r -n1 basename \
| sed 's/\.lean$//' | grep -v '^InventoryCore$' | sort)
if [ -z " $DRIVERS " ] ; then
echo " NO INVENTORY DRIVER FOUND — the audit surface would go unchecked." ; exit 1
fi
N_DRIVERS = $( printf '%s\n' " $DRIVERS " | grep -c .)
for drv in $DRIVERS ; do
lake env bash -c "
set -uo pipefail
cd '$HERE/gen' && export LEAN_PATH = \" \$ LEAN_PATH:\$ PWD:$HERE \"
cd '$HERE'
LEAN_TIMEOUT = $TIMEOUT LEAN_MEM_MB = 8192 '$HERE/lean-guard' Proofs/$drv .lean
" >> " $INVLOG " 2>&1 || { cat " $INVLOG "; echo " INVENTORY COMPILE FAILED ( $drv ) "; rm -f " $INVLOG " ; exit 1; }
done
# Reconcile the two trailers into one. Summing them and comparing against the
# lines actually collected preserves the integrity property in the presence of
# the split: truncation in EITHER driver shows up as a mismatch.
N_TRAILERS = $( grep -c '^INV-COUNT|' " $INVLOG " )
if [ " $N_TRAILERS " -ne " $N_DRIVERS " ] ; then
echo " INVENTORY INCOMPLETE: expected a count trailer from each of the $N_DRIVERS driver(s), saw $N_TRAILERS "
INVFAIL = 1
fi
SUM = $( grep '^INV-COUNT|' " $INVLOG " | cut -d'|' -f2 | paste -sd+ - | bc)
OBS = $( mktemp /tmp/check-inv-obs-XXXX.log)
grep '^INV|' " $INVLOG " > " $OBS "
echo " INV-COUNT| ${ SUM :- 0 } " >> " $OBS "
" $HERE /inventory_gate.sh " " $OBS " " $HERE /inventory-allowlist.txt " || INVFAIL = 1
rm -f " $INVLOG " " $OBS "
# The drivers' corpus lists must together BE the compile manifest, minus the
# audit infrastructure and the scalar layer. Checked in both directions so a
# module cannot fall between the two drivers, and NO SILENT TRUNCATION: what
# this phase does not cover is named on stdout every run.
COVERED = $( for d in $DRIVERS ; do grep -ohE '`Proofs\.[A-Za-z0-9]+' " $HERE /Proofs/ $d .lean " ; done \
| sed 's/`Proofs\.//' | sort -u)
for m in " ${ PROOFS [@] } " ; do
case " $m " in Audit| Inventory| InventoryBasic| InventoryCore) continue ; ; esac
grep -qx " $m " <<< " $COVERED " || { echo " UNINVENTORIED: $m is compiled by this script but no driver covers it " ; INVFAIL = 1; }
done
while read -r m; do
[ -z " $m " ] && continue
case " ${ PROOFS [*] } " in ( *" $m " *) ; ; ( *) echo " PHANTOM: driver claims $m , which this script does not compile " ; INVFAIL = 1; ; esac
done <<< " $COVERED "
for f in " $HERE " /Proofs/*.lean; do
b = $( basename " $f " .lean)
case " $b " in Audit| Inventory| InventoryBasic| InventoryCore) continue ; ; esac
grep -qx " $b " <<< " $COVERED " || echo " NOT INVENTORIED HERE (separate button): Proofs/ $b .lean "
done
[ " $INVFAIL " = 0 ] || { echo "INVENTORY COVERAGE FAILED" ; exit 1; }
2026-07-02 12:38:52 +00:00
# ── Phase 3: axiom audit of every certificate ───────────────────────────────
echo "=== Phase 3: axiom audit ==="
EXPECTED = "[propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound]"
cd " $AENEAS_LEAN "
lake env bash -c "
set -euo pipefail
cd '$HERE/gen' && export LEAN_PATH = \" \$ LEAN_PATH:\$ PWD:$HERE \"
cd '$HERE'
2026-07-03 10:54:28 +00:00
AUD = \$ ( mktemp '$HERE/.audit-XXXX.lean' )
2026-07-02 12:38:52 +00:00
{
for i in ${ AUDIT_IMPORTS [*] } ; do echo \" import \$ i\" ; done
for c in ${ CERTS [*] } ; do echo \" #print axioms \$c\"; done
} > \" \$ AUD\"
2026-07-03 10:54:28 +00:00
OUT = \$ ( LEAN_TIMEOUT = $TIMEOUT LEAN_MEM_MB = 4096 '$HERE/lean-guard' \" \$ AUD\" 2>& 1)
2026-07-02 12:38:52 +00:00
echo \" \$ OUT\"
2026-07-28 15:31:54 +00:00
rm -f \" \$ AUD\" \" \$ { AUD%.lean} .olean\"
2026-07-02 12:38:52 +00:00
N_CLEAN = \$ ( echo \" \$ OUT\" | grep -cF \" depends on axioms: $EXPECTED \" || true )
if [ \" \$ N_CLEAN\" -ne ${# CERTS [@] } ] ; then
echo \" AXIOM AUDIT FAILED: \$ N_CLEAN/${# CERTS [@] } certificates clean\"
exit 1
fi
"
THE SIGNATURE APEX on the risc0 fork: verify_accepts_iff, button-enforced
Replicates dalek's apex with this fork's sha2-0.10 adaptation: the hash
oracle is the single monomorphic sha512_hash3(R, A, m) call (no foreign
types in its signature — the 0.10 Sha512 alias cannot be declared opaque),
and extraction runs --no-default-features so the error path avoids boxed
dyn-Error.
- gen/CurveSig: the extracted verify glue, definitionally welded to the
proven model (TypesExternal/FunsExternal import CurveField; every curve
and scalar call is a certified definition).
- Proofs/SigApexSpec.lean (unchanged from dalek): verify_loop_full (the
32-byte comparison = array equality; axiom cone exactly the standard
three) and verify_accepts_iff — accept IFF compress([s]B - [k]A) = R
byte-for-byte, SHA-512 opaque.
- check.sh Phase 3b: the apex axiom cone is enforced to be EXACTLY
[propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound, ed25519.Signature,
verifying.sha512_hash3, ed25519.Signature.to_bytes,
signature.error.Error, signature.error.Error.new]
- zero curve, scalar, or backend axioms.
Full check.sh green: 17 standard certificates + the apex audit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-04 20:35:20 +00:00
echo "=== Phase 3b: signature-apex audit (SHA-512 + wire-format boundary) ==="
# The verification-equation apex is grounded in the PROVEN curve model; its
# only axioms beyond the standard three are the deliberate, documented
# boundary: the SHA-512 hash oracle and the opaque wire-format types.
# NO curve axioms, NO scalar axioms, NO backend-dispatch axioms.
cd " $AENEAS_LEAN "
lake env bash -c "
set -euo pipefail
cd '$HERE/gen' && export LEAN_PATH = \" \$ LEAN_PATH:\$ PWD:$HERE \"
cd '$HERE'
ALLOWED = '[propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound, ed25519.Signature, verifying.sha512_hash3, ed25519.Signature.to_bytes, signature.error.Error, signature.error.Error.new]'
AUD = \$ ( mktemp '$HERE/.apex-XXXX.lean' )
2026-07-05 23:29:22 +00:00
{ echo 'import Proofs.SigApexSpec' ; echo 'import Proofs.PointLiftSpec' ; echo 'import Proofs.PointEqSpec' ; echo 'import Proofs.DecompressMain' ; echo '#print axioms CurveFieldProofs.verify_accepts_iff' ; echo '#print axioms CurveFieldProofs.verify_accepts_iff_point' ; echo '#print axioms CurveFieldProofs.verify_accepts_iff_point_eq' ; echo '#print axioms CurveFieldProofs.verify_accepts_iff_decompress' ; } > \" \$ AUD\"
THE SIGNATURE APEX on the risc0 fork: verify_accepts_iff, button-enforced
Replicates dalek's apex with this fork's sha2-0.10 adaptation: the hash
oracle is the single monomorphic sha512_hash3(R, A, m) call (no foreign
types in its signature — the 0.10 Sha512 alias cannot be declared opaque),
and extraction runs --no-default-features so the error path avoids boxed
dyn-Error.
- gen/CurveSig: the extracted verify glue, definitionally welded to the
proven model (TypesExternal/FunsExternal import CurveField; every curve
and scalar call is a certified definition).
- Proofs/SigApexSpec.lean (unchanged from dalek): verify_loop_full (the
32-byte comparison = array equality; axiom cone exactly the standard
three) and verify_accepts_iff — accept IFF compress([s]B - [k]A) = R
byte-for-byte, SHA-512 opaque.
- check.sh Phase 3b: the apex axiom cone is enforced to be EXACTLY
[propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound, ed25519.Signature,
verifying.sha512_hash3, ed25519.Signature.to_bytes,
signature.error.Error, signature.error.Error.new]
- zero curve, scalar, or backend axioms.
Full check.sh green: 17 standard certificates + the apex audit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-04 20:35:20 +00:00
OUT = \$ ( LEAN_TIMEOUT = $TIMEOUT LEAN_MEM_MB = 4096 '$HERE/lean-guard' \" \$ AUD\" 2>& 1)
echo \" \$ OUT\"
2026-07-28 15:31:54 +00:00
rm -f \" \$ AUD\" \" \$ { AUD%.lean} .olean\"
THE SIGNATURE APEX on the risc0 fork: verify_accepts_iff, button-enforced
Replicates dalek's apex with this fork's sha2-0.10 adaptation: the hash
oracle is the single monomorphic sha512_hash3(R, A, m) call (no foreign
types in its signature — the 0.10 Sha512 alias cannot be declared opaque),
and extraction runs --no-default-features so the error path avoids boxed
dyn-Error.
- gen/CurveSig: the extracted verify glue, definitionally welded to the
proven model (TypesExternal/FunsExternal import CurveField; every curve
and scalar call is a certified definition).
- Proofs/SigApexSpec.lean (unchanged from dalek): verify_loop_full (the
32-byte comparison = array equality; axiom cone exactly the standard
three) and verify_accepts_iff — accept IFF compress([s]B - [k]A) = R
byte-for-byte, SHA-512 opaque.
- check.sh Phase 3b: the apex axiom cone is enforced to be EXACTLY
[propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound, ed25519.Signature,
verifying.sha512_hash3, ed25519.Signature.to_bytes,
signature.error.Error, signature.error.Error.new]
- zero curve, scalar, or backend axioms.
Full check.sh green: 17 standard certificates + the apex audit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-04 20:35:20 +00:00
FLAT = \$ ( echo \" \$ OUT\" | tr '\\n' ' ' | tr -s ' ' )
2026-07-05 14:38:21 +00:00
if echo \" \$ FLAT\" | grep -qF \" 'CurveFieldProofs.verify_accepts_iff' depends on axioms: \$ ALLOWED\" \
2026-07-05 17:25:54 +00:00
&& echo \" \$ FLAT\" | grep -qF \" 'CurveFieldProofs.verify_accepts_iff_point' depends on axioms: \$ ALLOWED\" \
2026-07-05 23:29:22 +00:00
&& echo \" \$ FLAT\" | grep -qF \" 'CurveFieldProofs.verify_accepts_iff_point_eq' depends on axioms: \$ ALLOWED\" \
&& echo \" \$ FLAT\" | grep -qF \" 'CurveFieldProofs.verify_accepts_iff_decompress' depends on axioms: \$ ALLOWED\" ; then
echo ' apex + full-lift axiom cones = exactly the SHA-512 + wire-format boundary (no curve/scalar/backend axioms)'
THE SIGNATURE APEX on the risc0 fork: verify_accepts_iff, button-enforced
Replicates dalek's apex with this fork's sha2-0.10 adaptation: the hash
oracle is the single monomorphic sha512_hash3(R, A, m) call (no foreign
types in its signature — the 0.10 Sha512 alias cannot be declared opaque),
and extraction runs --no-default-features so the error path avoids boxed
dyn-Error.
- gen/CurveSig: the extracted verify glue, definitionally welded to the
proven model (TypesExternal/FunsExternal import CurveField; every curve
and scalar call is a certified definition).
- Proofs/SigApexSpec.lean (unchanged from dalek): verify_loop_full (the
32-byte comparison = array equality; axiom cone exactly the standard
three) and verify_accepts_iff — accept IFF compress([s]B - [k]A) = R
byte-for-byte, SHA-512 opaque.
- check.sh Phase 3b: the apex axiom cone is enforced to be EXACTLY
[propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound, ed25519.Signature,
verifying.sha512_hash3, ed25519.Signature.to_bytes,
signature.error.Error, signature.error.Error.new]
- zero curve, scalar, or backend axioms.
Full check.sh green: 17 standard certificates + the apex audit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-04 20:35:20 +00:00
else
echo 'APEX AUDIT FAILED: verify_accepts_iff cone is not the documented boundary' ; exit 1
fi
"
verification: bind the statements, the specifications, and the model (P1-a)
Phases 3/3b establish what each certificate RESTS ON. Neither says what it
SAYS, nor what it is ABOUT. A certificate gutted to a tautology of the same
axiom cone passes both; so does one whose reference definition has been
redefined to BE the extracted code, at which point the theorem reads
`loop = loop` and every cone is byte-identical.
Phase 3c closes that. Proofs/Audit.lean emits a canonical block holding the
policy constants, every certificate's fully-elaborated statement (pp.all, so
implicit arguments, instances and universe levels are visible), and the body
of every specification constant transitively reachable from those statements.
Its SHA-256 is pinned in check.sh and the block itself is committed as
AUDIT-MANIFEST.txt, so a mismatch is DIFFED, not merely reported. 31
certificates, 68 specification constants per repository.
Two tiers, not one. These forks have an arithmetic tier that must stay
oracle-free and an apex tier carrying this fork's hash and wire-format axioms,
and the apex boundary genuinely differs per fork (dalek 8 extra names, anza 4,
risc0 and betrusted 5). One shared constant would have widened the arithmetic
tier to accept hash oracles, which is the most valuable property these repos
have. Each auditor is generated from its own repository's policy.
Phase 0b pins the extracted model. This was not a precaution: risc0 and
betrusted were observed emitting BYTE-IDENTICAL audit-manifest digests
(6c821b8e…) while shipping demonstrably different extracted models, their
point-doubling routines differing in operation order. A statement names an
extracted function; it does not contain that function's body. Binding
statements is not binding the subject. Membership derives from the filesystem,
so a new model file fails closed.
selftest-statements.sh attacks both phases with ten cases, each asserting a
specific diagnostic: an edited model body, an unlisted model file, a widened
policy, a hand-edited committed block, a certificate dropped from the auditor
WITH the digest refreshed to match, and a gutted statement whose cone is
unchanged. It lifts the phases out of check.sh at run time, so it attacks the
shipping gate rather than a copy.
Two bugs found and fixed during that testing, both mine: Phase 3c read `$0`
after `cd "$AENEAS_LEAN"`, and $0 is the caller's relative path; and the
axgate self-test compared the tree against a pristine checkout rather than
against how it found it. A third expectation was wrong rather than the code —
widening the apex boundary is caught by the exact-cone requirement before the
digest ever runs, which is a stronger rejection, and the test now says so.
All sixteen runs green at these commits: four main buttons, four axgate
self-tests, four binding self-tests, four scalar buttons.
TRUSTED-BASE.md records what this binds and, at equal length, what it does
not: a digest binds identity, not meaning; an author can rotate the pins in
one commit and is caught by review, not by the script; and pinning the model
says nothing about whether Charon and Aeneas translated the Rust faithfully.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 22:38:20 +00:00
# ── Phase 3c: statement + specification binding ─────────────────────────────
# WHAT THE EARLIER PHASES DO NOT ESTABLISH. Phase 3 proves each certificate
# rests on exactly the declared axioms; 3b does the same for the apex tier.
# Neither says WHAT THE THEOREM SAYS. A certificate gutted to a tautology of
# the same cone passes both. So does one whose reference definition has been
# redefined to BE the extracted code, at which point the theorem reads
# `loop = loop` and every cone is byte-identical.
#
# Proofs/Audit.lean emits a canonical block holding the policy constants,
# every certificate's fully-elaborated statement, and the body of every
# specification constant transitively reachable from those statements. This
# phase binds the SHA-256 of that block, and the block's INPUT is committed
# too, so a mismatch can be DIFFED rather than merely reported.
#
# To rotate deliberately: run check.sh, take the printed OBSERVED digest, and
# update the constant below AND AUDIT-MANIFEST.txt in the same reviewable
# commit. That the rotation is visible in review is the whole point — an
# author who edits a statement and refreshes the digest in one commit is
# caught by reading the diff, not by this script.
EXPECTED_AUDIT_SHA256 = "6c821b8e465d3b394cb3cbb4bb3757791ace064b6d1b273ba9a41402dac74e24"
echo "=== Phase 3c: statement + specification binding ==="
cd " $AENEAS_LEAN "
# The compiler's own exit code is the primary signal; the transcript is only
# corroboration. A timeout or a memory clamp exits non-zero WITHOUT printing
# "error:", so grepping the text alone would let it through.
AUD_RC = 0
AUD_OUT = $( lake env bash -c "
set -uo pipefail
cd '$HERE/gen' && export LEAN_PATH = \" \$ LEAN_PATH:\$ PWD:$HERE \"
cd '$HERE'
LEAN_TIMEOUT = $TIMEOUT LEAN_MEM_MB = 8192 '$HERE/lean-guard' Proofs/Audit.lean 2>& 1
" ) || AUD_RC= $?
if [ " $AUD_RC " -ne 0 ] ; then
echo " AUDIT FAILED — Proofs/Audit.lean exited $AUD_RC : "
tail -20 <<< " $AUD_OUT " | sed 's/^/ /'
exit 1
fi
if grep -q 'error:' <<< " $AUD_OUT " ; then
echo "AUDIT FAILED — Proofs/Audit.lean did not elaborate cleanly:"
grep 'error:' <<< " $AUD_OUT " | head -20 | sed 's/^/ /'
exit 1
fi
BLOCK = $( awk '/AUDIT-MANIFEST-BEGIN/{f=1;next} /AUDIT-MANIFEST-END/{f=0} f' <<< " $AUD_OUT " )
# FAIL CLOSED ON ABSENCE: no block and a matching block must not share a path.
if [ -z " $BLOCK " ] ; then
echo "AUDIT FAILED — no AUDIT-MANIFEST block was emitted (fail-closed)." ; exit 1
fi
GOT_SHA = $( printf '%s\n' " $BLOCK " | sha256sum | cut -d' ' -f1)
if [ " $GOT_SHA " != " $EXPECTED_AUDIT_SHA256 " ] ; then
printf '%s\n' " $BLOCK " > " $HERE /.audit-manifest.observed "
echo "AUDIT FAILED — audit-manifest digest mismatch."
echo " expected: $EXPECTED_AUDIT_SHA256 "
echo " observed: $GOT_SHA "
echo " A statement, a specification body, or a policy constant changed."
echo " First differences against the committed block:"
diff -u " $HERE /AUDIT-MANIFEST.txt " " $HERE /.audit-manifest.observed " 2>/dev/null \
| head -30 | sed 's/^/ /' || echo " (AUDIT-MANIFEST.txt absent — cannot diff)"
rm -f " $HERE /.audit-manifest.observed "
exit 1
fi
# The digest's INPUT must be committed and current, or the diff above would
# compare against a stale reference and quietly mislead the next reader.
if ! printf '%s\n' " $BLOCK " | cmp -s - " $HERE /AUDIT-MANIFEST.txt " ; then
echo "AUDIT FAILED — the committed AUDIT-MANIFEST.txt does not match the emitted block."
echo " (the digest matched, so the committed copy is stale — refresh it)" ; exit 1
fi
# CROSS-CHECK the certificate list against its OTHER two sources in this file:
# the CERTS array (Phase 3) and the apex names Phase 3b actually asks about.
# The apex names are read back out of this script rather than retyped, so a
# fourth copy cannot drift. Without this, a certificate could be dropped from
# the auditor's manifest and nothing would notice.
# Match only the QUOTED commands Phase 3b actually emits. An unquoted match
# also hits this file's own prose ("#print axioms for every certificate...")
# and silently contributes the word "for" as a certificate name.
# NOT "$0": this phase runs after `cd "$AENEAS_LEAN"`, and $0 is the relative
# path the caller used ("./check.sh"), which no longer resolves from there.
# $HERE was resolved absolutely at the top of the script.
APEX_FROM_3B = $( grep -oE "'#print axioms [A-Za-z0-9_.]+'" " $HERE /check.sh " | tr -d "'" | awk '{print $3}' | sort -u)
if [ -z " $APEX_FROM_3B " ] ; then
echo "AUDIT FAILED — could not recover the apex certificate names from Phase 3b." ; exit 1
fi
# Every recovered name must be namespace-qualified; a bare word means the
# pattern drifted onto prose again rather than onto a command.
while read -r n; do
case " $n " in *.*) ; ; *) echo " AUDIT FAILED — recovered apex name ' $n ' is not qualified. " ; exit 1; ; esac
done <<< " $APEX_FROM_3B "
AUD_CERTS = $( grep -o 'AUDITED-CERTIFICATES:.*' <<< " $AUD_OUT " | sed 's/AUDITED-CERTIFICATES: //' | tr ' ' '\n' | sort -u)
BASH_CERTS = $( printf '%s\n' " ${ CERTS [@] } " $APEX_FROM_3B | sort -u)
if [ " $AUD_CERTS " != " $BASH_CERTS " ] ; then
echo "AUDIT FAILED — the auditor's certificate list and this script's have drifted:"
diff <( echo " $BASH_CERTS " ) <( echo " $AUD_CERTS " ) | sed 's/^/ /'
exit 1
fi
grep -o 'statement audit PASSED:.*' <<< " $AUD_OUT " | sed 's/^/ /'
echo " audit-manifest sha256 = $GOT_SHA (matches the committed block byte-for-byte) "
2026-07-02 12:38:52 +00:00
echo ""
echo "ALL PROOFS PASS. ALL CERTIFICATES AXIOM-CLEAN. NO DEAD FILES."
verification: bind the statements, the specifications, and the model (P1-a)
Phases 3/3b establish what each certificate RESTS ON. Neither says what it
SAYS, nor what it is ABOUT. A certificate gutted to a tautology of the same
axiom cone passes both; so does one whose reference definition has been
redefined to BE the extracted code, at which point the theorem reads
`loop = loop` and every cone is byte-identical.
Phase 3c closes that. Proofs/Audit.lean emits a canonical block holding the
policy constants, every certificate's fully-elaborated statement (pp.all, so
implicit arguments, instances and universe levels are visible), and the body
of every specification constant transitively reachable from those statements.
Its SHA-256 is pinned in check.sh and the block itself is committed as
AUDIT-MANIFEST.txt, so a mismatch is DIFFED, not merely reported. 31
certificates, 68 specification constants per repository.
Two tiers, not one. These forks have an arithmetic tier that must stay
oracle-free and an apex tier carrying this fork's hash and wire-format axioms,
and the apex boundary genuinely differs per fork (dalek 8 extra names, anza 4,
risc0 and betrusted 5). One shared constant would have widened the arithmetic
tier to accept hash oracles, which is the most valuable property these repos
have. Each auditor is generated from its own repository's policy.
Phase 0b pins the extracted model. This was not a precaution: risc0 and
betrusted were observed emitting BYTE-IDENTICAL audit-manifest digests
(6c821b8e…) while shipping demonstrably different extracted models, their
point-doubling routines differing in operation order. A statement names an
extracted function; it does not contain that function's body. Binding
statements is not binding the subject. Membership derives from the filesystem,
so a new model file fails closed.
selftest-statements.sh attacks both phases with ten cases, each asserting a
specific diagnostic: an edited model body, an unlisted model file, a widened
policy, a hand-edited committed block, a certificate dropped from the auditor
WITH the digest refreshed to match, and a gutted statement whose cone is
unchanged. It lifts the phases out of check.sh at run time, so it attacks the
shipping gate rather than a copy.
Two bugs found and fixed during that testing, both mine: Phase 3c read `$0`
after `cd "$AENEAS_LEAN"`, and $0 is the caller's relative path; and the
axgate self-test compared the tree against a pristine checkout rather than
against how it found it. A third expectation was wrong rather than the code —
widening the apex boundary is caught by the exact-cone requirement before the
digest ever runs, which is a stronger rejection, and the test now says so.
All sixteen runs green at these commits: four main buttons, four axgate
self-tests, four binding self-tests, four scalar buttons.
TRUSTED-BASE.md records what this binds and, at equal length, what it does
not: a digest binds identity, not meaning; an author can rotate the pins in
one commit and is caught by review, not by the script; and pinning the model
says nothing about whether Charon and Aeneas translated the Rust faithfully.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 22:38:20 +00:00
echo "STATEMENTS AND SPECIFICATIONS BOUND TO THE COMMITTED AUDIT MANIFEST."