Implement optional check for contributory behaviour.

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Isis Lovecruft 2021-09-13 21:31:54 +00:00
parent 3d87bd3c7d
commit c13e102f95
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@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
use curve25519_dalek::constants::ED25519_BASEPOINT_TABLE;
use curve25519_dalek::montgomery::MontgomeryPoint;
use curve25519_dalek::scalar::Scalar;
use curve25519_dalek::traits::IsIdentity;
use rand_core::CryptoRng;
use rand_core::RngCore;
@ -177,6 +178,43 @@ impl SharedSecret {
pub fn as_bytes(&self) -> &[u8; 32] {
self.0.as_bytes()
}
/// Ensure in constant-time that this shared secret did not result from a
/// key exchange with non-contributory behaviour.
///
/// In some more exotic protocols which need to guarantee "contributory"
/// behaviour for both parties, that is, that each party contibuted a public
/// value which increased the security of the resulting shared secret.
/// To take an example protocol attack where this could lead to undesireable
/// results [from Thái "thaidn" Dương](https://vnhacker.blogspot.com/2015/09/why-not-validating-curve25519-public.html):
///
/// > If Mallory replaces Alice's and Bob's public keys with zero, which is
/// > a valid Curve25519 public key, he would be able to force the ECDH
/// > shared value to be zero, which is the encoding of the point at infinity,
/// > and thus get to dictate some publicly known values as the shared
/// > keys. It still requires an active man-in-the-middle attack to pull the
/// > trick, after which, however, not only Mallory can decode Alice's data,
/// > but everyone too! It is also impossible for Alice and Bob to detect the
/// > intrusion, as they still share the same keys, and can communicate with
/// > each other as normal.
///
/// The original Curve25519 specification argues that checks for
/// non-contributory behaviour are "unnecessary for Diffie-Hellman".
/// Whether this check is necessary for any particular given protocol is
/// often a matter of debate, which we will not re-hash here, but simply
/// cite some of the [relevant] [public] [discussions].
///
/// # Returns
///
/// Returns `true` if the key exchange was contributory (good), and `false`
/// otherwise (can be bad for some protocols).
///
/// [relevant]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7748#page-15
/// [public]: https://vnhacker.blogspot.com/2015/09/why-not-validating-curve25519-public.html
/// [discussions]: https://vnhacker.blogspot.com/2016/08/the-internet-of-broken-protocols.html
pub fn was_contributory(&self) -> bool {
!self.0.is_identity()
}
}
/// "Decode" a scalar from a 32-byte array.