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Operator-ordered milestone, built under an explicit no-risk constraint while the paper application is in flight: strictly ADDITIVE (one new module + one CLI subcommand; zero changes to wallet semantics, the public site, or anything the paper describes), LOCAL-ONLY (never deployed; binds 127.0.0.1), and READ-ONLY in v1 (human approve/deny is deliberately deferred — that is a custody-semantics change belonging to a separately reviewed milestone). New: src/pacta/walletui.py — four views over an existing wallet: - Posture: latch state, ledger head with FULL hash-chain re-verification, pinned quorum members, spending policy verbatim. - Signature queue: airgap outbox/inbox, observed never operated. - Incidents & refusals: verbatim records, newest first. - Receipt inspector: paste attestation + receipt + log key; verdict, per-signature results, and diagnostics come verbatim from transparency.verify_receipt — the deployed verifier itself, reused not reimplemented. Design law, stated in the module and enforced by tests: THE COCKPIT RENDERS EVIDENCE, IT NEVER ASSERTS IT. Every panel recomputes at request time and carries a provenance line (function + timestamp); anything unverifiable renders a loud FAILED-TO-VERIFY panel — no cached green, no neutral gray. Panels state what they do NOT prove (e.g. binary pinning vs source-to-binary correspondence). CLI: pacta wallet cockpit --wallet DIR [--host --port]. Tests (10 new, suite 118 -> 128 green): recomputed-evidence rendering, CHAIN BROKEN on tampered ledger, loud failure on collector error, latched-state rendering, airgap queue states, verbatim incident/refusal rendering, fail-closed inspector on garbage, real-evidence roundtrip (skips if example evidence absent), full-sweep BYTE-LEVEL read-only guarantee (wallet dir hash-identical after all GETs + a POST), and fail-fast on non-wallet dirs. Rendering additionally verified visually against a live demo wallet (posture, quorum table, incidents). Docs: docs/cockpit.md; WALLET.md section; ESTATE.md + llms.txt updated. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
39 lines
2.7 KiB
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39 lines
2.7 KiB
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# pacta — proof-aware crypto tooling agent
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> Tooling for autonomous agents that must choose, and then run on, a
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> cryptographic library they can trust with money. Evidence of formal
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> verification is turned into machine-readable claim cards, scored R0–R5,
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> with every verdict re-derived locally from observed Lean axiom cones —
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> never taken on a provider's word. The `warden` product builds a custody
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> wallet whose Ed25519 boundary is a quorum of four independently proven
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> curve25519-dalek forks.
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## Start here
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- [ESTATE.md](ESTATE.md): the map of the whole endeavour — every repo, service, mirror, operator-held entity, and the two self-referential loops.
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- [README.md](README.md): what pacta is, the R0–R5 risk model, the dogfood loop.
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- [WALLET.md](WALLET.md): warden, the verified-custody wallet — the quorum boundary, the signing firewall, the R4 gate, the MCP surface, and the local read-only custody cockpit for the human operator (docs/cockpit.md).
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- [docs/agent-native.md](docs/agent-native.md): why the wallet is agent-native first (AX, MCP, A2A, AP2, x402, ERC-8004) and what each idea became.
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- [docs/products.md](docs/products.md): the four warden deployment profiles.
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## Live evidence
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- Transparency log (RFC 9162): https://ltl.zkdefi.org — signed replay attestations of the Lean proofs. Thirteen leaves: three replay generations over four Ed25519 forks, plus entry 13 attesting the Lean mechanization of the log's own accumulator model. The mirror ships a fail-closed offline verifier (verify.py --all covers every leaf, signed head, and receipt) with an adversarial self-test.
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- The paper: https://ltl.zkdefi.org/paper — "Accountable Distribution of Machine-Checked Correctness Evidence: A Transparency Model and the Lean Transparency Log" (23 pages: trust decomposition, scheme-level accountability games with explicit reductions, live deployment, and the measured model/deployment divergence reported as a result). Earlier versions archived at /paper/v0.2 (19 pages) and /paper/v0.1 (4 pages).
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## For agents
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warden speaks MCP over stdio: `pacta wallet mcp --wallet <dir>`. Tools:
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`wallet_status`, `verify_inbound`, `request_signature`, `custody_card`,
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`posture_challenge`, `list_incidents`, `explain_refusal`. Errors are
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structured objects (code / missing / remediation). The custody card at
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`.well-known/custody-card.json` is self-proving: it embeds transparency-log
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inclusion proofs a counterparty recomputes rather than trusts.
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## Honesty boundary
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Verification paths are certificate-covered; signing is trusted base (the
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attested artifact, fenced by the firewall). SHA-512 is an opaque oracle;
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wire parsers are hypotheses; reproducible builds and side channels are R5,
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not claimed; ML-DSA (PQC) fails closed — no proven implementation exists.
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