proof-aware-crypto-tooling-.../provider
mrwulf f8de7d9e6f paper v0.9: round-15 final patch — the frozen submission candidate
Round-15 reconciliation: both reviewers ran the mandated rendered-PDF
gate (all 22 pages each, acts stated). They CONFLICTED on one checkable
fact: GPT found the transport figure's s label on the wrong node (the
computed [4,8) parent instead of the consumed [6,8) proof value); the
Fable reviewer certified 'dashed consumed s over [6,8)'. Adjudicated
against the tikz source: GPT RIGHT — my drawing contradicted its own
caption; Fable's script verified the instance's mathematics but misread
the label placement. Fixed (s -> p67 dashed; q47 -> plain computed
node) and CONFIRMED BY RE-RENDER.

GPT's second blocker also real and fixed: Definition 2(i) claimed
'unique accepted opening' (witness uniqueness) where Game PB proves
leaf-value binding — clause (i) now 'an authentic signed view and a
uniquely determined leaf value at its claimed position'; Appendix A row
aligned ('authentic opening with a position-bound leaf value').

Layout (all confirmed by rendered inspection): figure relocated after
the transport introduction (no longer floats between Theorem 4's
statement and proof); Lemma 4's full statement held together
(samepage); Appendix C given its own page — heading + scope warning +
complete code + Appendix D on p23 (clearpage; 22 -> 23 pages).

GPT optionals adopted: abstract 'one project-specific uninterpreted
SHA-256 boundary axiom'; adaptive-oracle sentence defining Q; corollary
overhead phrasing; PB-vs-mirror bridge sentence in the mapping
paragraph; 'bespoke bar' lead-in dropped; Table 1 ragged-right columns.
Declined with reasons recorded: Lemma-4 sub-case itemization and
renaming the composition theorem (both reviewers' optional-only notes;
churn risk at the frozen gate outweighs gain).

Gate status by the reviewers' own words: Fable round 15 'nothing
blocks' x3 with full evidence discipline; GPT 'after the two
correctness fixes and the three layout fixes ... nothing blocks
submission on correctness or readability grounds' — all five applied
and render-verified. 0 overfull, suite 115 green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 22:20:42 +02:00
..
src/pacta_provider paper v0.9: round-15 final patch — the frozen submission candidate 2026-07-17 22:20:42 +02:00
pyproject.toml add nested proof check provider 2026-07-03 13:03:58 +02:00
README.md add transparency log trust provider 2026-07-03 14:09:34 +02:00

PACTA Proof Check Provider

This nested project is a prototype third-party proof-checking service. It reuses host Lean/Aeneas infrastructure, runs portable PACTA replay/audit checks, and emits signed attestation certificates.

It does not modify anything outside this repository. It may read configured toolchains such as /Users/oho/GitClone/ClaudeCodeProjects/your-lean-project/aeneas-toolchain/env.sh.

It can also maintain a local transparency log. The log is an RFC 9162-style Merkle accumulator over signed attestations. It emits Signed Tree Heads with Ed25519 today and records an ML-DSA/FIPS 204 signature slot as unavailable unless a real backend is present. Agents that require both signatures must reject such receipts.

Commands

PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider discover
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider init-key --key-dir provider/state/demo-provider
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider check \
  --config examples/repos.yaml \
  --repo-name dalek-ed25519-verified \
  --repo repos/dalek-ed25519-verified \
  --provider local-pacta-provider \
  --private-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.key \
  --public-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.pub \
  --out provider/out/dalek.attestation.yaml

Transparency log:

PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider log-init \
  --log-dir provider/state/transparency-log \
  --provider local-pacta-provider \
  --public-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.pub

PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider log-append \
  --log-dir provider/state/transparency-log \
  --attestation provider/out/dalek.attestation.yaml \
  --private-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.key \
  --public-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.pub \
  --out provider/out/dalek.receipt.yaml

PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider log-sth \
  --log-dir provider/state/transparency-log \
  --private-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.key \
  --public-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.pub

The resulting certificate can be consumed by pacta with --attestation, --trust-attestation-provider, and --attestation-public-key.

The receipt can be consumed with --transparency-receipt, --transparency-log-public-key, and --require-transparency-receipt.

The private key must remain provider-side. Downstream agents only need the public key, the inclusion receipt, and a policy decision that the provider name/log key is trusted.