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https://github.com/saymrwulf/proof-aware-crypto-tooling-agent.git
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mrwulf
caa864a749
The verified corpus completed its phase 2 on 2026-07-06: every ed25519 fork now carries FOUR button-enforced apex tiers up to the full lift (accept <=> decompress(R) = [k](-A)+[s]B as points), the complete scalar layer, and the constructive encoding/decoding chain. pacta was calibrated to the pre-apex corpus and - worse - had no vocabulary for boundary-audited certificates: its axiom audit knew only "clean = exactly the three standard axioms", so the apex tiers would have scored dirty. New vocabulary: - Profile.certificate_axioms: per-certificate ALLOWED axiom sets; expected_axioms_for(cert) resolves each certificate's own boundary. - RepoConfig.apex_boundary: a simple per-fork key (dalek-wrappers / hash3 / anza) expanded by the ed25519 profile into the exact per-tier allowed sets. AUTHORITY NOTE in profiles/ed25519.py: each repo's check.sh Phase 3b is the enforcement point; if the button and this table disagree, the button wins. - run_axiom_audit compares each certificate against ITS allowed set; deviation in EITHER direction (extra axiom or missing boundary axiom) is dirty. New risk reality: - R4 is now reachable: full four-tier apex + constructive chain + scalar arithmetic, all proven with cones pinned to their documented boundaries. R4 always carries explicit residual blockers (SHA-512 oracle, hypothesis-parametric wire parses, translation faithfulness, no side-channel/build assurance - those gate R5). - R3 unchanged (arithmetic pair) and now explains exactly which apex certificates are missing for R4. Attestation trust model hardened: - The provider is trusted for its OBSERVATION, never its VERDICT: axiom_status is re-derived locally from observed_axioms against the agent's own boundary policy. A provider that labels a dirty cone "clean" gains nothing; "proven" with no observed axioms is "unverifiable". - Partial attestations degrade instead of being rejected: uncovered certificates stay unproven and the score caps accordingly (an arithmetic-only attestation still authorizes an R3 library capsule, never a wallet). Also: scripts/mini_pytest.py - a dependency-free test runner (tmp_path, raises, monkeypatch, capsys) for hosts without pytest; examples regenerated FROM the tool (dalek/anza fixtures now R4, 16 certs; new full four-tier attestation example); tests updated + new tests/test_boundaries.py (lying-provider, missing-boundary-axiom, partial-coverage cases). 40/40 tests green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
54 lines
2.3 KiB
Python
54 lines
2.3 KiB
Python
from pacta.attestation import load_attestation, validate_attestation
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from pacta.claims import build_claim_card
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from pacta.config import RepoConfig
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from pacta.signing import generate_ed25519_keypair, sign_attestation
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def _repo():
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return RepoConfig(
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name="dalek-ed25519-verified",
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url="https://github.com/saymrwulf/dalek-ed25519-verified.git",
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kind="ed25519",
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verified_backend="serial/u64",
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certificates=["CurveFieldProofs.fieldImplementation", "CurveFieldProofs.edwardsImplementation"],
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)
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def test_trusted_attestation_can_drive_r3_claim(tmp_path):
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raw = load_attestation("examples/dalek-ed25519.attestation.yaml")
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result = validate_attestation(
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raw,
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_repo(),
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path="examples/dalek-ed25519.attestation.yaml",
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trusted_provider="example-proof-checker.invalid",
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allow_unsigned=True,
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)
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card = build_claim_card(_repo(), tmp_path, attestation=result)
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assert result.accepted
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assert card["risk"]["level"] == "R3"
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assert "trusted third-party provider" in card["risk"]["rationale"]
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assert card["evidence"]["evidence_mode"] == "third_party_attestation"
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assert any("Third-party proof-checking" in item for item in card["trusted_base"])
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def test_untrusted_attestation_scores_r0(tmp_path):
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raw = load_attestation("examples/dalek-ed25519.attestation.yaml")
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result = validate_attestation(raw, _repo(), path="examples/dalek-ed25519.attestation.yaml")
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card = build_claim_card(_repo(), tmp_path, attestation=result)
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assert not result.accepted
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assert card["risk"]["level"] == "R0"
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def test_signed_attestation_requires_public_key(tmp_path):
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private_key = tmp_path / "provider.key"
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public_key = tmp_path / "provider.pub"
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generate_ed25519_keypair(private_key, public_key)
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raw = load_attestation("examples/dalek-ed25519.attestation.yaml")
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raw["provider"] = "signed-test-provider"
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raw["signature"] = {}
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signed = sign_attestation(raw, private_key, public_key)
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result = validate_attestation(signed, _repo(), trusted_provider="signed-test-provider")
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card = build_claim_card(_repo(), tmp_path, attestation=result)
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assert not result.accepted
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assert card["risk"]["level"] == "R0"
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assert any("attestation-public-key" in item for item in result.diagnostics)
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