saymrwulf/proof-aware-crypto-tooling-agent

mirror of https://github.com/saymrwulf/proof-aware-crypto-tooling-agent.git synced 2026-09-03 19:53:43 +00:00

History

mrwulf bcbf929045 receipt-verify checks the post-quantum co-signature — the tool now does what rung 2 promises Operator-caught: rung 2 demanded both public keys while the shown command consumed only the Ed25519 one — and the gap was real: pacta had NO SLH-DSA head-signature check (only the mirror's verify.py had one; '--require-signatures both' refers to the empty ML-DSA slot). New: verify_receipt(slhdsa_public_key_path=...) verifies the additive co-signature fail-closed (absent on pre-14 heads reports absent, not failed; unavailable OpenSSL fails closed), CLI grows --slhdsa-public-key, rung 2's command carries the flag and its muted text explains both checks. Proven against the LIVE log: accepted:true, slh_dsa:verified, ed25519 on the dogfood backend. New tamper test flips a signature byte and must be rejected. Suite 156 green.		2026-08-17 10:29:42 +02:00
..
src/pacta_provider	receipt-verify checks the post-quantum co-signature — the tool now does what rung 2 promises	2026-08-17 10:29:42 +02:00
pyproject.toml	add nested proof check provider	2026-07-03 13:03:58 +02:00
README.md	docs: the pre-Green full-scan repairs — ESTATE/llms/evidence to the 19-leaf world, leaf-index numbering unified, instruction traps closed	2026-08-16 18:32:37 +02:00

README.md

PACTA Proof Check Provider

This nested project is a prototype third-party proof-checking service. It reuses host Lean/Aeneas infrastructure, runs portable PACTA replay/audit checks, and emits signed attestation certificates.

It does not modify anything outside this repository. It may read configured toolchains such as ~/aeneas-toolchain/env.sh.

It can also maintain a local transparency log. The log is an RFC 9162-style Merkle accumulator over signed attestations. It emits Signed Tree Heads with Ed25519 today; heads are dual-sign capable with an additive SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s slot (proven verify path), and the ML-DSA/FIPS 204 slot stays honestly not_configured/unavailable — never silently filled. Agents that require both signatures must reject such receipts.

Commands

PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider discover
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider init-key --key-dir provider/state/demo-provider
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider check \
  --config examples/repos.yaml \
  --repo-name dalek-ed25519-verified \
  --repo repos/dalek-ed25519-verified \
  --provider local-pacta-provider \
  --private-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.key \
  --public-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.pub \
  --out provider/out/dalek.attestation.yaml

Transparency log:

PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider log-init \
  --log-dir provider/state/transparency-log \
  --provider local-pacta-provider \
  --public-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.pub

PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider log-append \
  --log-dir provider/state/transparency-log \
  --attestation provider/out/dalek.attestation.yaml \
  --private-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.key \
  --public-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.pub \
  --out provider/out/dalek.receipt.yaml

PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider log-sth \
  --log-dir provider/state/transparency-log \
  --private-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.key \
  --public-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.pub

The resulting certificate can be consumed by pacta with --attestation, --trust-attestation-provider, and --attestation-public-key.

The receipt can be consumed with --transparency-receipt, --transparency-log-public-key, and --require-transparency-receipt.

The private key must remain provider-side. Downstream agents only need the public key, the inclusion receipt, and a policy decision that the provider name/log key is trusted.