mrwulf
2dae2ca0db
Two Fable-5 inventory agents cross-checked every empirical claim in the paper against code/deployed log, and every external pointer against the live internet. Fixes on both sides: CODE (system brought up to the paper's claims): - SECURITY: pin-store mutation (incl. permanent poisoning) was reachable via receipts whose head signature FAILED verification in two of three consumer paths (attestation.py, cli.py) - an unauthenticated forged head at the pinned size could poison a consumer's pin forever and pollute the equivocation-evidence pair with an unverifiable head, contradicting SS5.4's 'validly signed' precondition and Prop 1. Both paths now gate the store on a verified Ed25519 head signature (logclient.py already did). Regression test added. - Prop 2 made literally true: _normalize_certificate now derives the cleanliness verdict purely from (observed cone, local allowed set) in EVERY branch; the operator's axiom_status label is never copied (was passed through for non-proven certs), missing cone => unverifiable always. Labels can deny, never grant. Test added. - webdocs: '/v1/sth-history: every head ever signed' -> 'the published head history'. PAPER (claims brought down to reality): - 'every head ever signed' -> the signed head history since publication began (heads for sizes 1-7 predate the mirror and were not retained). - Run-3 bullet: 'independently checkable by diffing the two commit trees' was no longer reproducible (pre-rewrite objects discarded); now states the log-internal corroboration (identical cert lists and cones across leaves 4-7 vs 8-11) and that tree diffs are not public. - Appendix A leaf block now actually verbatim: scheme openssl-ed25519, verified_backend serial/u64, real Lean version (4.30.0-rc2) instead of 4.x.y placeholder, leaf's actual axiom order (finalize/new/update), machine_protection note quoted, elisions marked; preamble wording matches. - Appendix C upstream boundary reordered to check.sh's verbatim order. - '27 lines - all annotation' -> honest description (axiom-list entries + operation reordering from one fork's black_box barrier). - Prop 2 proof + App A: status label consulted only negatively. - SS7: provenance fields noted as outside the signed payload; consumer chain relies on none of them. - Bibliography: all 20 entries verified against DBLP/RFC-editor - zero errors; added missing page numbers to 6 entries; thebibliography width 19->20. All URLs verified public; no PlanetMacro leakage. 17 pages, 106 tests green, accumulator untouched (tree_size 12). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| pyproject.toml | ||
| README.md | ||
PACTA Proof Check Provider
This nested project is a prototype third-party proof-checking service. It reuses host Lean/Aeneas infrastructure, runs portable PACTA replay/audit checks, and emits signed attestation certificates.
It does not modify anything outside this repository. It may read configured toolchains such as /Users/oho/GitClone/ClaudeCodeProjects/your-lean-project/aeneas-toolchain/env.sh.
It can also maintain a local transparency log. The log is an RFC 9162-style Merkle accumulator over signed attestations. It emits Signed Tree Heads with Ed25519 today and records an ML-DSA/FIPS 204 signature slot as unavailable unless a real backend is present. Agents that require both signatures must reject such receipts.
Commands
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider discover
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider init-key --key-dir provider/state/demo-provider
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider check \
--config examples/repos.yaml \
--repo-name dalek-ed25519-verified \
--repo repos/dalek-ed25519-verified \
--provider local-pacta-provider \
--private-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.key \
--public-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.pub \
--out provider/out/dalek.attestation.yaml
Transparency log:
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider log-init \
--log-dir provider/state/transparency-log \
--provider local-pacta-provider \
--public-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.pub
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider log-append \
--log-dir provider/state/transparency-log \
--attestation provider/out/dalek.attestation.yaml \
--private-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.key \
--public-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.pub \
--out provider/out/dalek.receipt.yaml
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider log-sth \
--log-dir provider/state/transparency-log \
--private-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.key \
--public-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.pub
The resulting certificate can be consumed by pacta with --attestation, --trust-attestation-provider, and --attestation-public-key.
The receipt can be consumed with --transparency-receipt, --transparency-log-public-key, and --require-transparency-receipt.
The private key must remain provider-side. Downstream agents only need the public key, the inclusion receipt, and a policy decision that the provider name/log key is trusted.